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ABSTRACT 
TRULY HUMAN, FULLY DIVINE:  
THE KENOTIC CHRIST OF THOMAS AQUINAS 
 
 
Gregorio Montejo, B.A., M.A. 
 
 
Marquette University, 2016 
 
 
 
Thomas Aquinas’ mature Christology, developed primarily during his second and final 
Parisian residency in the years 1269 to 1273 is notable for—among other things—its 
increasing focus on explicating and defending the full humanity of the incarnate Son. In 
several important works that Thomas undertook during this period, particularly the Tertia 
Pars of the Summa Theologiae, and Quaestio Disputata De unione Verbi Incarnati, an 
early Christian hymn preserved in Paul’s Epistle to the Philippians, 2:6-11, with its 
emphasis on the Son’s kenosis or ‘self-emptying,” the assumption of a human nature 
whereby the pre-existent Word comes to subsist in the “form of a slave,” often plays a 
key role in Aquinas’ arguments regarding the truth of Christ’s humanity. However, a 
complete appreciation of the importance of the notion of kenosis in Thomas’ mature 
Christological cannot be achieved without first establishing the prominence of the 
concept of kenosis in the Bible and its reception in the Patristic and Medieval eras. 
 
In the remainder of the dissertation I trace the development of Thomas’ understanding of 
certain aspects of this hymn from the beginning of his career, a development often seen in 
conjunction with his increasing familiarity with the Christological Councils. In the 
process, I explicate the crucial task played by this hymn in what has come to be 
recognized as one of the most controversial topics in Aquinas’ final Christology: the 
intrinsically human existence of the enfleshed Word, what in the De unione Thomas 
refers to as the secondary created human act of existence (esse) of the enfleshed Word, 
and the function of that esse secundarium in the saving work of Christ Jesus. After 
considering the reception history of this contested notion in modern Thomism, I conclude 
with a proposal that the incarnate Son’s unique mode of human subsistence mirrors the 
Son’s properly obediential relationship to the Father. This kenotic reciprocity is in turn 
manifested in the incarnate Word’s theandric existence, at once both truly human and 
fully divine, and in the divine-human instrumentality of the God-man’s operations as 
mediator and salvific exemplar pro nobis.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274) is one of the most important theological thinkers 
not only of the medieval era but in the entire Christian tradition.  In his relatively brief yet 
extraordinarily prodigious teaching and writing career he explored many if not all of the 
most profound religious doctrines of the Christian faith, including the existence of God, 
the Trinity, and the nature of grace. Among them perhaps there is no topic more 
important, not only in terms of historical research, but also for contemporary Christianity, 
than the Christological mystery of the Incarnation.   Aquinas’ most fully articulated 
analysis and explication of the mystery of the Word made flesh is to be found in the third 
section (tertia pars) of his monumental Summa Theologiae (ST III).  In questions 1 to 26 
of the tertia pars Aquinas explores the mystery of the Incarnation according to which 
God became man for our salvation by setting forth the categories and principles 
according to which that life and mission of Christ are to be understood.  The first twenty-
six questions not only explicate the nature and purpose of the Incarnational union and 
assumption of a human nature in the enfleshed Son, but also such attendant topics as 
Christ’s human and divine knowledge and will, and the crucial role these elements play 
in Christ’s salvific mediatorship.  In other words, Thomas considers what it means for 
God to become man for man’s salvation, and in doing this, he provides his readers with 
an understanding of who and what Christ is so as to grasp more profoundly the meaning 
of what Christ does.      
In question 17 of the tertia pars Aquinas offers a sustained discussion of Christ’s 
single act of existence (esse) and vigorously defends Christ’s status as a single subject in 
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whom two natures are united.  In article 2 of q. 17, he writes: “Everything is said to be a 
being, inasmuch as it is one, for one and being are convertible. Therefore if there were 
two acts of being [esse] in Christ, and not one only, Christ would be two and not one.”  
The contention that Christ can only have one esse—inasmuch as he exists as a single 
entity—can seem like a mere technical or metaphysical verification of a larger scriptural 
and religious truth: that Christ is a single person. Thomas’ affirmation in this question, 
however, performs remarkable conceptual work. As becomes evident in the remainder of 
ST III, the Christological and theological commitments at stake in Thomas’ teaching on 
the single esse is a reminder that q. 17 cannot be isolated from a host of larger theological 
claims held by the author.  Indeed Christ’s esse does not merely satisfy an ontological 
consideration of the mode of union in the Incarnation, it also provides a conceptual 
foundation on which to understand the import of Christ’s saving mission and its 
consequences for the life of grace.   
However, the fourth article of another of Thomas Aquinas’ works: the Quaestio 
disputata De Unione Verbi incarnati, has for centuries perplexed and frustrated the 
interpretive efforts of his most faithful commentators. The difficulty stems, in very large 
part, from Aquinas’ introduction of a second, human esse (in addition to the divine esse) 
into the metaphysical constitution of Christ.  He thus departs from and even seems to 
contradict his standard account of Christ’s esse in which, as we have already seen, he 
repeatedly insists that Christ has only one act of existence, the divine and eternal esse of 
the Word.  This difficulty is compounded by the fact that De Unione itself offers little to 
no explanation as to what metaphysical status Thomas is willing to grant Christ’s human 
esse. He does state that the human esse is not accidental, but neither is it, he adds, the 
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primary or substantial esse whereby Christ subsists as a person.  This raises some obvious 
questions:  What is the human esse, what role does it serve, and how is this account 
compatible with what Aquinas says elsewhere?  
While some have sought to diminish the importance—or even question the 
authenticity—of the De Unione, it is important to note that both the Christological 
portion of the Summa and the De Unione, despite differences of scope, size, and levels of 
elaboration, are actually structured  along very similar conceptual lines.  Most significant 
in this regard is the fact that in both texts Aquinas feels it is of vital importance to clarify 
the crucial matter of Christ’s human and divine natures, as it relates to the issue of 
Christ’s act of existence before he goes on to explore the question of Christ’s specifically 
theandric or divine-human operations as they are instrumentally utilized in order to bring 
about the salvation of fallen humanity. In both the tertia pars of the Summa Theologiae, 
and the Disputed Question on the Incarnate Word, the early Christian kenotic hymn 
preserved in Paul’s Epistle to the Philippians, 2:5-11, with its emphasis on the Son’s 
kenosis or ‘self-emptying,’ that is, the assumption of humanity by the pre-existent Word, 
plays a key role in Aquinas’ arguments for the truth of Christ’s humanity. In this 
dissertation I argue that Thomas’ changing conception of kenosis discloses a 
correspondingly developmental set of complexly interlocking and mutually reinforcing 
Christological concepts: instrumentality, theandry, and esse. As Aquinas will 
continuously remind us in these works, the Word does not utilize this humanity and its 
operations as an external and inanimate tool; rather he acts instrumentally through his 
created humanity in a manner that is in accordance with his mode of existence as this 
particular human being. This developed understanding of the two-fold esse of Christ also 
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helps Aquinas to explicate the soteriological significance of the Son’s theandric 
operation, an explication that is not at odds with his earlier emphasis on the divine  esse 
in Q. 17 of the Summa, but which is actually closely mirrored in the  succeeding 
eighteenth and nineteenth questions, which similarly explicate how the incarnate Word 
continuously evinces a synergistic inter-penetration of volitional salvific actions arising 
from two distinct natures operating in harmony.  Thus, as I argue in the remainder of the 
dissertation, Thomas’ articulation of theandry in the Disputed Question, affirming the 
integral reality of two operations, two wills, two natures, and two acts of existence in the 
God-man, should be seen as the final fruition of Aquinas’ long engagement with the 
kenotic hymn.  
In Chapter 1, I commence by exploring the importance of kenosis in Philippians 
2:5-11, not only for Aquinas’ formulation of the Incarnation, but in selected early 
Christian, patristic, and medieval theologians who shaped that Christian tradition on the 
mystery of the Word made flesh, which was to be of such profound importance for 
Thomas.  The hymn to Christ is found in the Apostle Paul’s Philippians Epistle.  In my 
analysis of Philippians 2:5-11, I pay particular attention to the  allied themes of pre-
existence, self-emptying,  the paired notions of forma Dei and forma servi, humility, and 
exaltation of the crucified Son. I follow this with a look at a select list of early Christian 
witnesses and patristic writers on kenosis: Origen and Athanasius on the development of 
a partitive exegesis and the communication of divine and human idioms in the incarnate 
Son, and the seeming conceptual dichotomy of Christus in se/Christus pro nobis. Shifting 
my focus to the Latin west, I then look at Hilary of Poitiers’ and Ambrose of Milan’s 
introduction and development of kenotic themes into western theological thought.  
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However, without doubt, the most influential expositor of kenoticism in in the first 
millennium of Christianity is Augustine.  In his elaboration of Philippians 2:5-11, I trace 
several key themes that will be of considerable importance for later thinkers: the kenotic 
Christ as the humble mediator between God the Father, the enfleshed Word as the 
revelation of the Father, who through his human forma servi manifests the glorious 
invisible forma Dei of the Father to sinful humanity.  In addition, I explain how for 
Augustine  faith in the Son’s divinity consequently enables access to the beatific vision of 
God, a path to salvation which proceeds through participation in Christ in the forma 
servi; that is, through a process of self-emptying humility, obedience, and sacrificial love. 
Finally, I examine the Bishop of Hippo’s elaboration of kenosis as an explicitly 
ontological claim in Augustine’s habitus theory of the Incarnation, and its accompanying 
soteriology, wherein death on the cross, and ultimate exaltation, is the paradigm of the 
Christian life. Arriving thence at the twelfth century, I turn to Peter Lombard’s seminal 
compendium of medieval Christian theology, the Sentences, particularly Distinction 6, 
which raises the question of ‘How God Was Made Man,’ and reports three opinions 
current to the Lombard’s time speculating on the manner the Incarnation came about.  As 
I go on go show, in his explication of the third or habitus model, Lombard evokes 
Augustine, utilizing the very same verses from Philippians to elucidate the both the 
means and the purpose of the Word’s assumption of a human nature. I also briefly 
examine Lombard’s other notable use of the kenotic hymn, in Distinction 18, where he 
invokes Philippians 2 in order to explicate a profound soteriological account of how and 
what Christ merited through the suffering and death he endured in his servant-form. 
Finally, I turn to Thomas’s engagement with the concepts of kenoticism, theandry, 
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instrumentality and esse in his Scriptum super Sententiis, and I offer two substantive 
critiques of Aquinas’ work in the Commentary: First, I argue that by positing a model of 
the hypostatic union which denies an independent act of existence to the human nature of 
Christ, Thomas wisely precludes any potential misunderstanding of the Son’s kenosis as 
the assumption of a separate human being by the Word, however he also dramatically 
weakens claims that the incarnate Christ possesses a true and full humanity.  Secondly,  I 
demonstrate how Aquinas’ insufficiently robust concept of instrumentality reduces the 
efficacy of the Son’s humanity to a kind of meritorious exemplarity that, at best, only 
disposes us to the reception of divine grace, but does not actually transmit that saving 
grace to fallen humanity.  
Chapter 2 traces Thomas’ developing Christological thought after his 
commentary on the Lombard, a development which will see him beginning to redress 
some of the problematical aspects of his explication of instrumentality, a development 
first recorded in the somewhat contemporaneous Disputed Question of Truth (De 
Veritate), in relation to Christ’s humanity within the context of the Son’s kenosis, but 
only fully explored in Thomas’ first mature work of theological synthesis, the Summa 
Contra Gentiles, completed during his sojourn in Orvieto in1264-65.  In my analysis, I 
explain how a great deal of Thomas’ growth as a theological thinker during these crucial 
years can be attributed to his encounter with the Collectio Casinensis, a collection of 
texts translated from the Greek into Latin which provided Aquinas with unprecedented 
access to the texts of the first four Ecumenical Councils, most notably Ephesus and 
Chalcedon.  As I also demonstrate, the massive amounts of patristic citations which begin 
to appear in Thomas’s work during this particular period are also partly the result of 
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Thomas’ extensive research in various Byzantine biblical commentaries, particularly 
those of Theophylact of Ohrid (1055–1107), whose texts Thomas had translated in order 
to assist him on his work on the Catena Aurea, undertaken at the request of Pope Urban 
IV—again, while Aquinas was a resident of Orvieto—in the mid-1260s. In this chapter I 
explicate how Book IV of the Contra Gentiles demonstrates Thomas’ new-found 
awareness of the intricate connections between instrumentality, theandry and kenoticism 
and does so as part of an increasingly sophisticated dialogue with both the newly 
discovered acta of the Christological Councils and the patristic heritage.
1
    
Chapter 3 explores in some detail some of the most theologically rich of all of 
Thomas’ Biblical commentaries, the Commentary on Paul’s Epistle to the Philippians and 
the Lectura super Ioannem, composed at the University of Paris during the period 1270-
72.  In my analysis of the Commentary on Philippians, which marks Thomas’ most 
prolonged and detailed interpretation of kenoticism within its distinctively biblical 
context, I examine Thomas’ explicit focus on the humility of the enfleshed Word in 
Philippians 2, which as we have already noted is also one of Augustine’s key themes in 
his examination of kenosis, indeed one of the principal reasons for the Word’s 
incarnation, as well as the primary means for fallen humanity to be redeemed through 
becoming more Christ-like in their humility  Indeed, in this particular  explication of the 
kenotic hymn, Thomas will connects the personal or hypostatic unity of divinity and 
                                                          
1
 E.g., Thomas Aquinas, Liber de veritate Catholicae Fidei contra errores infidelium, (Summa 
contra Gentiles), ed. P. Marc, C. Pera, and P. Caramello (Turin: Marietti, 1961-1967): IV, 4 [union by 
grace; Phil 2:6, 8]; IV, 6-8 [Arianism, instrumentality; Phil 2:6-9]; IV, 9 [Photinus, Sabellius]; IV, 27 
[Incarnation; Phil 2:6-7];  IV, 28 [Photinus; Phil 2:6-9];  IV, 29 [Manicheans, Phil 2:6-8]; IV, 34 [Theodore 
of Mopsuestia, Nestorius; Phil 2:5-7]; IV, 35 [Eutyches; Phil 2:6-7]; IV, 36 [Macarius of Antioch, 
Dyotheletism, instrumental causality, theandry, Dionysius, Ep. 4 ad Caium; Phil 2:8-9], IV, 37 [soul, body 
unity of Christ; Phil 2:7]; IV, 38 [Cyril, Nestorius, Ephesus, two hypostases in the one person of Christ, 
communicatio idiomatum, esse]; IV, 41 [incarnation, instrumentality; Phil 2:13]; IV, 55 [instrumentality, 
satisfaction; Phil 2:8].   
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humanity, that is, the theandric interrelation of the natures in the divine person of the 
incarnated Christ, to our sanctifying conformity to that union of natures, or our imitation 
and participation in the theandry of the Word through the instrumental causality of that 
humanity which Christ has united to himself. I also note the emphasis that Aquinas gives 
to the volitional dimensions of the God-man’s theandric existence, for it is Christ’s will 
in obedience to the Father that is the means of our salvation.  While as yet Thomas is not 
yet fully conversant with the post-Chalcedonian Monothelite controversy, nevertheless he 
is already stressing the importance of the conformity of Christ’s will with the divine will.  
As we shall see in the fourth and fifth chapters, this will become an especially important 
topic once Thomas has discovered and absorbed the meaning of the dyothelite Council of 
Constantinople III, which occurs soon after his completion of his Philippians 
commentary, and only a short while before he commenced work on ST III. One of the 
most significant aspects the Commentary on the Fourth Gospel is Thomas’ 
comprehensive utilization of the newly discovered documents of Constantinople II to 
begin to construct an argument for the importance of the two wills for the incarnate 
Word’s salvific mission. It is the Son’s freely given assent to undergo the passion willed 
for him by the Father, which finally allow Thomas to fully explicate the significance of 
the kenotic form of obedience that he firmly locates in Philippians 2:8; a key passage as 
well in John of Damascus’ discussion of Dyotheletism in De Fide III, a text which will 
hold particular importance for Aquinas in his subsequent Christological works. 
According to Paul Gondreau, in the Lectura Aquinas is specifically defending Christ 
from Docetic attacks that would deny the real humanity of the incarnate Word, attacks 
possessing a two-fold danger: a soteriological hazard—since a non-human Christ cannot 
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in fact save humanity, and an ontological danger which denigrates the material in order to 
exalt the spiritual, thus denigrating the embodied truth of the Son’s Incarnation.2  
Gondreau points to Thomas’ recurring dictum that the “humanity of Christ is the way that 
leads us to God” (cap. 7, lect. 4, no. 1074) to defend his thesis that Aquinas’ main task is 
to uphold the truth of the human nature” assumed by Christ.  This locution echoes the 
celebrated Christological axiom penned by Leo the Great, which states that “Each form 
accomplishes in concert what is appropriate to it, the Word performing what belongs to 
the Word, and the flesh carrying out what belongs to the flesh.”3 This axiom, which was 
formulated to counter the Monophysite denial of the full integrity of Christ’s humanity, 
was read into the Acts of the second session of the Council of Chalcedon, and 
subsequently appropriated and employed in an anti-Monothelite manner  by 
Constantinople II, and later yet by the Damascene.  So while Gondreau and others posits 
that Thomas uses it in an largely anti-Docetic manner, I argue at some length that from a 
close reading of several key passages of the Lectura, it is overwhelmingly evident that 
Aquinas employs his defense of Christ’s integral humanity, his existence precisely as this 
man Jesus Christ, as both a dyophysite and dyothelite counter-arguments against heretical 
teachings he has been made aware of in the material from Chalcedon and Constantinople 
II, both of which are explicitly cited in the Commentary.
4
  
Chapter 4 is a sustained retrieval and reevaluation of the contested theme of 
Thomas’ esse secundarium as adapted and defended in contrasting ways among a small, 
                                                          
2
 Paul Gondreau, “Anti-Docetism in Aquinas’s Super Ioannem: St. Thomas as Defender of the 
Full Humanity of Jesus,” in Reading John with St Thomas Aquinas, ed. M. Dauphinais (Washington, D.C.: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2005), pp. 254-276. 
3
 Cf. Tome of Leo in DS 294. 
4
 See Super evangelium Sancti Ioannis lectura, ed. R. Cai (Turin: Marietti, 1952): cap. 1, lect. 7, 
nos. 166, 171.  See also cap. 5, lect. 4, nos. 759, 762, 791, 795-796; cap. 6, lect. 4, nos. 922-923, 927-928; 
cap. 9, lect. 2, no. 1318; cap. 10, lect. 4, no. 1422  
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disparate group of twentieth-century Thomists. While earlier Thomistic scholars 
attempted to overcome the vexing difficulties regarding the importance and meaning of 
the De Unione, and its controversial position regarding the esse of Christ, by dismissing 
the problematic text as either spurious or at best a juvenile theological lark.
5
  Indeed, 
Cardinal Cajetan’s antagonistic  position gradually became codified as the majority-
opinion among most Thomists, who subsequently developed aa theory  according to 
which Christ’s human nature has no separate created existence, for in this case God not 
only creates it, but also communicates his divine existence.
6
  Nonetheless, a small 
congeries of unorthodox Thomists, such as Maurice de la Taille, with his provocative 
theory of created actuation through uncreated act, left room for a created existential 
reality with the incarnate Word, which they were willing to call a secondary human esse. 
For the most part, however, traditional Thomists insisted that the one personal being of 
Christ entailed a unitary act of existence, and defended the basic concept of the ‘ecstasy 
of existence’ as the authentic view of Thomas.7  This opinion was weakened in its 
historical foundations by the pioneering scholarship of Franz Pelster and others, who 
established that the Disputed Question was not only authentic but probably a late work of 
Aquinas.
8
  More significantly, some prominent students of Thomas in the 1950s, among 
them Bernard Lonergan, argued for the important role that this concept played in 
                                                          
5
  See, for example, Louis Billot, De Verbo Incarnato: commentarius in tertiam partem S. Thomae 
(Rome: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1949).  
6
. 
7
  Maurice de la Taille’s major Christological pieces, including “Actuation créée par Acte incréé, 
lumière de gloire, grâce sanctifiante, union hypostatique,”  originally published in Revue des Sciences 
Religieuses 18 (1928), pp. 253-268,  are all conveniently collected in The Hypostatic Union and Created 
Actuation by Uncreated Act, trans. C. Vollert (West Baden Springs, I.N.: West Baden College, 1952). 
8
  See Pelster’s seminal essay, “La Quaestio disputata de saint Thomas De unione Verbi 
incarnati,” Archives de Philosophie 3 (1925), pp. 198-245.  
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Aquinas’ mature Christology, and incorporated it into their own work.9  Perhaps the most 
significant figure in this regard was Herman Diepen, who wrote an extensive series of 
provocative articles defending just such a thesis in the pages of the Revue Thomiste.
10
  
Indeed, no less a luminary of twentieth-century Thomism than Jacques Maritain, late in 
his career admitted that Diepen’s critique of the prevailing ecstasy of existence theory 
had caused him to abandon his own previous position, and acknowledge the presence in 
Christ of a secondary, created esse.
11
  I conclude this survey with an examination of the 
works of Jean Galot and Thomas Weinandy, the most articulate and insightful proponent 
of Christ’s human esse among contemporary theologians. In this chapter I not only 
retrieve this largely forgotten strain of Thomism, but I also adjudicate the various 
elucidations of the esse secundarium extolled by these writers, and conclude by offering 
my own formulation of Christ’s human act of existence as Thomas’ ultimate 
understanding of the kenosis of Philippians 2:5-11.  That is, that finite mode of existing 
which created at the moment the Incarnation, bringing at once into being both the 
participated act of human existence and the potency proportioned to receive the unlimited 
act divine being in the one person of the Word.  As Aquinas himself explains in another 
context, “in giving existence, God at the same time produces that which receives 
                                                          
9
  Lonergan’s most significant contribution during this period is contained in De Verbo Incarnato, 
third edition (Rome: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1964), and The Ontological and Psychological 
Constitution of Christ, trans. M.G. Shields, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 7 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2002). 
10
  Among many others, we should especially note: “La psychologie humaine du Christ selon saint 
Thomas d’Aquin,” Revue Thomiste 50 (1950), pp. 515-562; “L’unique Seigneur Jésus-Christ, bilan d’une 
étude christologique,” Revue Thomiste 53 (1953), pp. 28-80; “Les implications métaphysiques du mystère 
de l’Incarnation,” Revue Thomiste 54 (1954), pp. 257-266; and “L’existence humaine du Christ en 
métaphysique thomiste,” Revue Thomiste 58 (1958), pp. 197-213.  
11
  See Maritain, “Sur la notion de subsistence,” Revue Thomiste 54 (1954), pp. 242-256, and 
idem, The Degrees of Knowledge, translated from the fourth French edition under the supervision of G.B. 
Phelan (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1959).  
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existence.”12  In other words, to be in composition with a nature or essence, existence 
itself must be modified, and thereby determined to a certain kind of being. Hence, the 
secondary yet non-accidental esse that Thomas introduces in the Disputed Question, thus 
understood, amounts to kind of incarnational limiting in the received act of existence in 
Christ of the unlimited being of the Word. To say that the human nature of Christ 
substantiates the Word is thus to say as well that it renders the Word finite, that it 
actualizes the Word in a truly human mode of existence by bringing the Incarnate Son to 
be within the boundaries of the temporal and historical world. 
Chapter 5 brings the dissertation to a close by marshaling its themes into a 
focused evaluation of Thomas’ final theological synthesis of kenosis, instrumentality, 
theandry, and esse in his mature Christology.  As already elaborated, this synthesis is 
made possible by Thomas’ articulation of a grammar of the saving mystery of the God-
man as elaborated by the Christological Councils, particularly Ephesus, Chalcedon, 
Constantinople II and III, and results in his definitive understanding of  two united yet 
distinct natures, operations, wills, and acts of existence in the unique hypostasis of 
Christ
13
  This culminating chapter elaborates that contention through a detailed reading of 
De Unione a.5 in parallel with ST III qq.17-19, both of which treat  Dyoenergism and 
Dyotheletism in the light of instrumentality of the natures as actualized in the two-fold 
being of the enfleshed Word.  I further contend that it is the very kenoticism proper to the 
Son of the Father that in turn establishes the kenotic mode of subsistence of the enfleshed 
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 “Deus simul dans esse, producit id quod esse recipit: et sic non oportet quod agat ex aliquo 
praeexistenti,” Quaestiones de potentia, q. 3, a. 1, ad 17. 
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 E.g., Dyoenergism and Dyotheletism and Constantinople II in SCG: IV, 24; ST III: q.2, a.1, 
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utilization of Constantinople III in ST III: q.9, a.1; q.13, a.4, ad.1; q.18, a.1; q.18, a.6, arg.1 q.19, a.1; and 
De Unione: a.5 s. c. 
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Word in creation.  This theme is then explored in an examination of Thomas’ exposition 
on theandric activity, meritoriously redemptive death, and resurrection of the God-man as 
efficient, instrumental, and exemplary cause of salvation in us, and the final judgment of 
Christ as man,
14
 we see that Aquinas’ articulation of Christ’s human act of existence, as 
briefly formulated in a. 4  of the Disputed Question, and made elaborately manifest here 
at the conclusion of his most profound and extensive rumination upon the person and 
mission of Christ, should be considered not as an aberration but as the final fruition of 
Aquinas’ long engagement with the kenotic hymn of Philippians 2:5-11 and the topics of 
instrumentality and theandry.    
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 See ST III, q. 43, a. 2; q. 44, a. 3; qq. 46-47; q. 48, a.6 co.; qq. 56-59.  
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II. Chapter 1: The Kenosis of the Christ: 
Philippian 2:5-11 
  
 
 
1. Introduction:  
 
 
Thomas Aquinas’ earliest Christology was developed during his time as student at 
the University of Paris in the years 1252 to 1256, when he was writing his commentary 
on the Sentences of Peter Lombard.  Thomas’ first foray into the mystery of the person 
and mission of Jesus Christ is notable, even at this early stage, for its focus on explicating 
and defending the full humanity of the incarnate Son.  Much of this is inspired Aquinas 
reading of the so-called kenotic hymn preserved in Paul’s Epistle to the Philippians, 2:5-
11.  With its emphasis on the Son’s kenosis, or ‘self-emptying,” whereby the Word 
assumed the “form of a slave,” these verses often plays a key role in Aquinas’ arguments 
for the truth of Christ’s humanity.  As Thomas explicates in the Christological section of 
his Lombard commentary, the self-emptying exinanio or kenosis of Philippians does not 
refer to an abandonment of the divine prerogatives or attributes, nor to a change of God’s 
eternal being into what God formerly was not. Rather, it refers to the condescension and 
love with which God, without ceasing to be the transcendent deity, assumes a human 
nature and suffers humanly in order to redeem us.
15
  Through that humanity, the God-
man performs his atoning works, not only in his acts of human righteousness before God 
on our behalf, but also in the way that the Incarnate Word as man through his human 
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 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super Sententiis , ed. M.F. Moos and P. Mandonnet (Paris: Sumptibus 
P. Lethielleux, 1929–1947), III, d. 5, q. 1, a. 2, c.;  d. 5, q. 3, a. 1, s. c. 3;  d. 6, q. 3, a. 2; d. 7, q. 1, a. 2, arg. 5; d. 
18, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 3, arg. 2; d. 21, q.1, a.1; d. 22, q. 3, a. 1, ad 2; et al. 
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actions effectuates our salvation. How precisely does the saving power of God operate in 
the enfleshed Son? In the Commentary, in the context of the Philippians hymn, Thomas 
will undertake an initial explication of the soteriological significance of these actions in 
terms of the instrumentality of the human nature of Christ, which are salvific precisely 
because they are the human acts of the Word made flesh, and are undertaken 
theandrically (or in a conjointly divine-human manner) in unison with the divine acts of 
the one person of the Son. In his later Christology, Thomas will highlight how the God-
human operations evident in the birth, life, suffering, and death of the Incarnate Word all 
indicate that the Son’s kenotic assumption of humanity entails the exercise of a fully 
authentic human mode of existence (esse) undertaken for the redemption of fallen 
humanity. Thus, as this dissertation will illustrate at some length, a diachronic analysis of 
Thomas’ changing conception of kenosis discloses a correspondingly developmental set 
of complexly interlocking and mutually reinforcing Christological concepts: theandry, 
instrumentality, and esse.
16
    
However, it is quite difficult to fully understand how and why Thomas employs 
the hymn in this regard, not only in an early text such as the Sentences Commentary, but 
even more so as it evolves over the course of his later theological career, without first 
grasping the importance of the kenotic hymn for the Christian theological tradition. 
Philippians chapter two, verses five to eleven, that portion of the Philippians Epistle that 
has come to be known as the kenotic hymn to Christ, is one of the most theologically 
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 Thomas Joseph White, “Kenoticism and the Divinity of Christ Crucified,” The Thomist 75 (2011), 
pp. 1-41, gives a good introductory account of Thomas’ reading of Philippian 2: 5-11, and it is exemplary in its 
investigation of the important differences between more modern notions of kenosis and the classical Thomistic 
account of the kenotic hymn; however, in this admittedly narrowly-focused essay, White does not even begin to 
explore how precisely the concept of kenosis functions in Aquinas’ theology in relation to such crucial concepts 
as  instrumentality, theandry, and esse. The balance of this dissertation attempts to redress this oversight. 
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significant and therefore debated passages in the New Testament.
17
  A significant aspect 
of the scholarly debate focuses on the literary form of the Hymn and on the attendant 
question of whether this pericope pre-dates the composition of the Philippians Epistle as 
a whole.  Although a significant body of scholarship indicates that the hymn provides us 
with a glimpse into the beliefs and liturgical practices of earliest Christianity, and was in 
all likelihood only subsequently incorporated into the body of letter by the Apostle Paul 
with minimal redactional adaptations, However, the question of the hymn’s origin and 
authorship is beyond our purview, since patristic and medieval readers, including Thomas 
Aquinas, assumed that the Paul was the original source of Philippians 2:5-11. Regardless 
of the hymn’s true beginnings, its importance as the fixed point from which much 
subsequent Christological thought develops has been and continues to be widely 
recognized, particularly in regard to the inextricably related and contested issues of 
Christ’s preexistent equality with God and subsequent Incarnation in human form.  
Finally, as subsequent chapters will explicate, it is impossible to fully grasp the 
development of Thomas’s Christological thought, particularly in relation to the 
interconnecting themes of instrumentality, theandry, and esse, without recognizing the 
rich heritage of early Christian and patristic engagement with the kenotic hymn alongside 
an appreciation of Aquinas’ later retrieval and creative appropriation of the Philippians 
text. 
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 For a survey of scholarly interpretations of the kenotic hymn and an extensive bibliography, see 
Ralph P. Martin, Carmen Christi: Philippians 2.5-11 in Recent Interpretation and in the Setting of Early 
Christian Worship, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1983). For a discussion of the possible ontological 
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God: Kenosis, Justification, and Theosis in Paul’s Narrative Soteriology (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans 
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2. The Hymn to Christ in the Philippians Epistle 
Any interpretation of the kenotic hymn must proceed from its immediate context 
within the opening verses of the Epistle, an exhortation to the fractious Christian 
community at Philippi to put aside internal dissention, to conduct their lives in a manner 
worthy of the gospel of Christ (1:27), and to remember the fellowship into which they 
were united with and in Christ (2:1).  Paul encourages the Philippians to be like-minded 
in their love for each other (2:2), admonishes them to do nothing out of selfish ambition 
or vain conceit, but rather place greater value on others than on themselves (2:3). They 
should not be looking out for their own self-centered interests; on the contrary, everyone 
should be concerned for the interests of the other members of the community (2:4). 
Finally, the hymn proper is prefaced by as simple declaration that counsels the 
Philippians that in their relationships with one another, they are to have the same mindset 
as Christ Jesus (2:5), before the following verses (6-11) go on to illustrate those 
paradigmatic characteristics that as followers of Christ they should imitate.
18
  Paul’s 
exact phrase here is τοῦτο φρονεῖτε ἐν ὑμῖν ὃ καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, “let this be your 
disposition, which was also in Christ Jesus.” The demonstrative pronoun “this” (τοῦτο) 
points the reader backwards to the characteristics enumerated by the Apostle in verses 
1:27-2:4, followed by the imperative form of the verb φρονεῖν (phronein), designating the 
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1
Εἴ τις οὖν παράκλησις ἐν Χριστῷ, εἴ τι παραμύθιον ἀγάπης, εἴ τις κοινωνία πνεύματος, εἴ τις 
σπλάγχνα καὶ οἰκτιρμοί, 
2
πληρώσατέ μου τὴν χαρὰν ἵνα τὸ αὐτὸ φρονῆτε, τὴν αὐτὴν ἀγάπην ἔχοντες, σύμψυχοι, 
τὸ ἓν φρονοῦντες, 
3
μηδὲν κατ' ἐριθείαν μηδὲ κατὰ κενοδοξίαν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ταπεινοφροσύνῃ ἀλλήλους ἡγούμενοι 
ὑπερέχοντας ἑαυτῶν, 
4
μὴ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἕκαστος σκοποῦντες, ἀλλὰ [καὶ] τὰ ἑτέρων ἕκαστοι. 
18 
 
 
sort of practical reasoning that comprehends God’s will; a pattern of thinking, acting, and 
willing that is fully in accord with the exemplary pattern evinced by Christ Jesus.
19
  
 
6 
Who, being in the form of God, 
     did not consider equality with God  
as something to be used for his own advantage; 
7 
instead, he emptied himself,  
    taking the form of a slave, 
    being born in human likeness. 
8 
And being found in appearance as a man, 
    he humbled himself 
    and became obedient to death— 
        even death on a cross. 
 
The hymn is evenly divided into two stanzas of roughly equal length, the first 
describing Christ’s humble entrance into creation (vv.6-8). It is evident that the opening 
words of verse six are of paramount importance in understanding the entire narrative and 
conceptual arc which the rest of the hymn unfolds.  The most important initial question 
regards the meaning of the opening phrase which tells us that Christ was in the morphe 
(form) of Theou/God (μορφῇ θεοῦ). Obviously, the answer to this question will have 
great bearing on our understanding of the subsequent pronouncement that Christ did not 
deem the equality to God which this morphe entails something to be used to his own 
advantage, certainly not something to be rapaciously grasped (ἁρπαγμὸν).  Moreover, our 
construal of morphe will inform our reading of the startling claim in v.7 that the Christ 
who was in the form of God emptied himself (ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν), took the morphe of a 
slave (μορφὴν δούλου), and was thereafter found in human likeness (ὁμοιώματι 
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τοῦτο φρονεῖτε ἐν ὑμῖν ὃ καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. C.f.,  F.E. Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms: A 
Historical Lexicon (New York: New York University Press, 1967), p. 157; G. Bertram, “phrēn, aphrōn, 
aphrosynē, phroneō, phronēma, phronēsis, phronimos,” in  eds. G. Kittel and G. Freidrich, G.W. Bromiley, 
trans., Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, Vol. IX (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1968.), pp. 220-235; Stephen E. Fowl, Philippians, The Two Horizons New Testament Commentary 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2005), pp. 88-90.   
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ἀνθρώπων).20  The most common utilization of μορφή in in this time period points to the 
outward visible aspects of a material object,
21
 yet Paul repeatedly reaffirms the Old 
Testament’s emphatic declarations of God’s immateriality and invisibility (e.g., Genesis 
32:22-30, Exodus 24:9-11, 33:20, Deuteronomy 4:19), most notably in Romans 1:20, 
Colossians 1:15 and 1 Timothy 1:17.  However, the use of μορφή to designate a unique 
perceptible manifestation of an otherwise immaterial and invisible God to humanity is not 
wholly without precedent in Second Temple Judaism.  For example, in his Life of Moses, 
Philo explains that when Moses approached the burning bush (Exodus 3), he beheld a 
“most beautiful form (μορφή), not like any merely visible object, but an image supremely 
divine in in appearance (θεοειδέστατον ἅγαλμα), shining with a light more brilliant than 
that of fire.” As Philo concludes, one “might suppose this to be the image of Him Who Is 
(εἰκόνα τοῦ ὂντος).”22 
The principal characteristic of the Godly form as described by Philo is its 
superlatively divine and resplendent beauty, qualities very often used in the Septuagint 
(e.g., Exodus 16:10, 24:16-17, 33:17-23, 40:34-38; 1 Kings 8:11; Isaiah 6:3; Ezekiel 
1:28, 43:3, 44:4) to describe God’s glory or δόξα (doxa) as a manifestly effulgent 
splendor.
23
  Indeed, the term δόξα was frequently employed by the Hellenistic-Jewish 
scholars who produced the LXX as a translation for the דובכ (kavod) of the Hebrew 
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6
ὃς ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ, 
7
ἀλλὰ ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν 
μορφὴν δούλου λαβών, ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος: καὶ σχήματι εὑρεθεὶς ὡς ἄνθρωπος.  
21
 Cf. “ΜΟΡΦΗ΄,” in Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, 
7
th
 edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 519.  
22
 Philo, De Vita Mosis, 1.66. This is a clear reference to the “I am that I am” of Exodus 3:14.  
23
 See Gerhard Kittel, “Dokeo, doxa, ktl” in G. Kittel and G. Freidrich eds., G.W. Bromiley, trans., 
Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, Vol. II (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1968.), pp. 232-245;  H. Hegermann, “Doxa, doxazo” in H. Balz and G. Schneider eds., Exegetical 
Dictionary of the New Testament, Vol. I (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1990), pp. 344-349; Ceslas 
Spicq, “Doxa,” in C. Spicq ed., Theological Lexicon of the New Testament, Vol. I (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 
1994), pp. 362-379. 
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Scripture.
24
  In the OT דובכ was associated with God’s awe-inducing power and 
transcendent mystery as glimpsed in providential demonstrations of divine majesty in 
history and creation, and is often referred to as a devouring and dazzling fire (e.g., 
Exodus 24:15ff).  In Ezekiel 1 the prophet describes a vision of the divine kavod which 
rides on a chariot-throne surrounded by angelic beings and is described as having a 
refulgent human form (תומד הארמכ םדא), and in Isaiah 66:18-19 the Lord’s works of 
salvation in the world is said to allow humanity to see God’s glory (וארו תא-ידובכ). This 
constellation of meanings, denoting the transcendent and supra-perceptible divine glory 
which is expressed and thus made visible in God’s powerful operations within the 
unfolding of history, is echoed in various passages in the New Testament, associated 
particularly with Christ (Luke 2:14; John 1:14, 2:11, 11:40; Hebrews 13:21), most 
especially by Paul, who explicitly designates glory as the visible manifestation of God’s 
majesty ( Romans 1:23; 1 Corinthians 11:7; 2 Corinthians 3:18, 4:6)).  More specifically, 
it is Jesus who is raised by the doxa of the Father (Romans 6:4) and taken up into glory (1 
Timothy 3:16), he is called κύριον τῆς δόξης, the Lord of glory (1 Corinthians 2:8), for 
our very eschatological hope of salvation is the glorious appearance of our great God and 
Savior Jesus Christ (Titus 2:13).  The Apostle follows the Hellenistic-Jewish practice of 
showing a relationship between God’s transcendent and invisible form with its visibly 
glorious expression in the world, and by describing Christ as being in the form of God 
(Philippians 2:6), the hymn which Paul has either composed or incorporated into this 
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letter seems to implicitly correlate Christ with the Lord’s glorious deity made manifest in 
salvation history.  
The language of V.6 gives us another valuable insight into the Christological 
beliefs evident in earliest Christianity and in Paul’s theology.  This line begins with the 
participial phrase ὃς ἐν (“who in”) rather than a finite verb, in all probability used in 
order to indicate that Christ’s God-like form had always been found in the form of God. 
Indeed, the participial ultimately modifies, and therefore stands in temporal and modal 
contrast to, the main verb in verse 7: ἀλλὰ ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν (“but emptied himself”), 
rather than the aorist “he did not consider” of verse 6.25  In other words, the grammar 
indicates that it was while already being in the pre-existent form of God that Christ 
emptied himself and took on a new form, the temporal and material mode of being a 
slave.  But what precisely did Paul understand the main verb of the Hymn’s seventh verse 
(ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν/“emptied himself”) to mean?  The most common way of interpreting 
the Greek verb κενόω is that of the physical voiding of an object, such as water being 
poured out of a bucket until it is empty.  In a less literal sense, the verb can also mean to 
nullify or come to nothing or deprive of power.  Thus, when conjoined to the final clauses 
of verse 7, μορφὴν δούλου (morphe doulou) λαβών, ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος: 
καὶ σχήματι εὑρεθεὶς ὡς ἄνθρωπος, it should be seen as a profound indication of the 
purpose of the Incarnation:  Christ comes to be, (literally, he is generated) in a form that 
embodies humility and servitude when he refuses to exploit his inherent deity, and takes 
on the form of a slave.  As Paul seems to strongly indicate in 2 Corinthians 8:9, this does 
not entail a negation of divinity on the part of Christ, but rather denotes Christ’s 
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 See Gordon D. Fee, Pauline Christology: An Exegetical-Theological Study (Peabody, MA: 
Hendrickson, 2007), pp. 376-377.   
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willingness to become subject to all the things that fallen humanity is subject to, 
including death, in loving obedience to the Father: ἐταπείνωσεν ἑαυτὸν γενόμενος 
ὑπήκοος μέχρι θανάτου, θανάτου δὲ σταυροῦ (“he humbled himself, and became 
obedient to death—even death on a cross”).  
The term σχήματι or “appearance” in v.7 may at first glance indicate a merely 
superficial appearance, so that Christ would seem to have taken on only the outward 
semblance of a man, and not truly become man, and although the word is rarely used in 
the LXX, it was widely employed in classical Greek to denote everything in an individual 
which strikes the senses, not only the outward figure and bearing, but all actions and 
manner of living which discloses that which is most essential in a person.
26
  In other 
words, this phrase reinforces the fact of Christ’s full humanity, and lays the linguistic and 
conceptual groundwork for the following description (in v. 8) of the manner in which 
Christ’s authentic humanity is lived out—i.e., in humility and suffering.  Moreover, 
Christ’s kenotic assumption of humanity or, more literally, of a despised slave-form, 
reveals something crucial about God as well.  In declining to use his share in the divine 
glory for his own advantage, and “adopting, instead, the disposition of self-emptying, 
which includes Incarnation, obedience, crucifixion, and ultimately exaltation, Christ is 
actually displaying the form of God, making the glory of God manifest to humans.”27  
For, as Paul states so emphatically in 1 Corinthians 1:18-25, God’s sacrificial love is 
revealed most perfectly in the cruciform character of Christ’s death; in fact, it is the utter 
                                                          
26
 Peter T. O’Brien, The Epistle to the Philippians: A Commentary on the Greek Text, The New 
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humiliation of  Jesus’ execution on the cross which comprehensively manifests the depths 
of God’s glorious wisdom and power to humanity.  
 
9 
Therefore God exalted him to the highest place 
    and gave him the name that is above every name, 
10 
that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, 
    in heaven and on earth and under the earth, 
11 
and every tongue acknowledge that Jesus Christ is Lord, 
    to the glory of God the Father. 
 
With the opening phrase of verse 9 the hymn takes a decisive turn: whereas in 
vv.6-8 Christ was the subject of all the finite verbs and participles which described the 
Son’s humble assumption of a slave form and obedient sacrifice on the cross, now the 
Father becomes the subject as he exalts Christ. Having reached the depths of self-
abasement in his shameful death, the Son’s self-emptying is vindicated, and he is raised 
by the Father to the highest degree and graciously given the name which is above all 
other names. As the language itself indicates, διὸ καὶ ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸν ὑπερύψωσεν, God 
exalts Christ on account of the Son’s humility and obedient self-sacrifice. The term 
ὑπερύψωσεν (highly exalted) is hapax legomenon in the NT, and signifies that God is 
placing Christ over all of creation, a phrase evoking a similar use of language in the LXX 
version of Psalm 96[97]:9, where Yahweh is described as the “most high” above all the 
earth and is “exalted” (ὑπερυψώθης) far above all other deities.  This linguistic similarity 
is carried over to the parallel assertion that in exalting the Son, God the Father bestows 
the “name that is above every name” (ὄνομα τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὄνομα) on Christ. While some 
would contend that the highly honorific name given to the Son is that of Jesus, the links 
with the Septuagintal Psalm would indicate that this onomastic exaltation points to the 
bestowal of God’s own personal name on Christ. Indeed, the ἵνα clause of verses 10 and 
24 
 
 
11, which is subordinate to the main clause of verse 9, strongly indicates that Christ is to 
be identified with κύριος (“Lord”), the designation used in the LXX to translate the 
Hebrew Adonai (ינודא), the title that stands in for Yahweh (הוהי), the ineffable name of 
God. This also clarifies verse 10, which states that at the bestowal of this name every 
knee “in heaven and on earth and under the earth” (ἐπουρανίων καὶ ἐπιγείων καὶ 
καταχθονίων) should bow, along with the assertion in verse 11 that every tongue confess. 
The phrases “every knee shall bow” (πᾶν γόνυ κάμψῃ) and “every tongue confess” (πᾶσα 
γλῶσσα ἐξομολογήσηται) are dependent on the LXX version of Isaiah 45:22-25, where 
the same phrases are invoked to indicate a future time when Yahweh’s supreme lordship 
over all creation will at last be universally acknowledge.
28
 In the hymn, the exalted name 
has already been given to the Son, and his lordship over all creation already inaugurated, 
and it looks forward to the eschatological fulfillment of his universal acclimation as Lord, 
to the glory(doxa/kavod) of God (εἰς δόξαν θεοῦ πατρός). An Eschaton wherein those 
who had the faith to see the glorious divine form of the Son in the enfleshed slave-form 
of Jesus, and participated in his humble self-abasement and exemplary servant-hood, will 
put on resurrected bodies as anticipated by the exalted Christ’s gloriously risen flesh 
(σώματι τῆς δόξης: Philippians 3:21).29   
 
3. Early Christian Witnesses 
 
The followers of Christ in the years immediately following the time of Paul up 
until the final redaction of the Gospels (c. 90-150) did not overly concern themselves 
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with abstract Christological theory; rather the mysterious unity of God and man in Jesus 
was primarily proclaimed in terms of the kerygmatic teaching recounting the saving deed 
which the Father had accomplished through Christ, a soteriological action effectuated 
through the mediating life, passion, death, and resurrection of the Son.
30
  The late 
apostolic First Epistle of Clement, dated to either the last two decades of first century or 
the very beginning of the second, and thus one of the earliest extant documents outside 
the New Testament,
31
 explicitly references the Philippians hymn in describing the 
mediating Son as the “scepter of the majesty of God, the Lord Jesus Christ,” who 
“appeared not with pomp of pride or arrogance, though well he might, but in humility.”32  
Moreover, the author of First Clement continues, just as God is the proper title for the 
Father, so Lord (κύριος) is properly ascribed to the Son, for the pre-existent Christ is the 
splendor of the Father, who sent him into the world as a man— a high priest—to 
reconcile humanity with the Father, and for that reason he is exalted above all other 
creatures and united with God in glory. This proclamation is presented largely within the 
schema established by the New Testament of mission and return, with the Son being sent 
“for us” (pro nobis) into the world in order to draw fallen creatures back into communion 
                                                          
30
 See, for example, Ignatius of Antioch, Epistle to the Ephesians, 7.2, which lists the contrasting 
characteristics of both the μορφῇ θεοῦ and the μορφὴν δούλου of Christ, the healer “who is possessed both of 
flesh and spirit; both made and not made; God existing in flesh; true life in death; both of Mary and of God; first 
passible and then impassible—even Jesus Christ, our Lord.” Εἷς ἰατρός ἐστιν, σαρκικός τε καὶ πνευματικός, 
γεννητὸς καὶ ἀγέννητος, ἐν σαρκὶ γενόμενος θεός, ἐν θανάτῳ ζωὴ ἀληθινή, καὶ ἐκ Μαρίας καὶ ἐκ θεοῦ, πρῶτον 
παθητὸς καὶ τότε ἀπαθής, Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν. C.f., Aloys Grillmeier, Christ in the Christian 
Tradition, Vol. 1: From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon, Revised edition, trans. J. Bowden (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox, 1975); Basil Studer, Trinity and Incarnation: The Faith of the Early Church, ed. A. 
Louth (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1994). 
31
 See A.E. Wilhelm-Hooijbergh, “A Different View of Clement Romanus,” Heythrop Journal 16 
(1975), pp. 266-288; L.L. Welborn, “On the Date of First Clement,” Biblical Research 29 (1984), pp. 35-54; and 
Thomas J. Herron, “The Most Probable Date of the First Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians,” in ed. E.A. 
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with the Father. As yet, there is no attempt to go beyond a descriptive functional 
Christology and undertake an analysis of the ontological status of the Word, Christ as he 
is in his being (Christus in se), considered apart from the economy of salvation. 
The first attempt to formulate a fully systematic understanding of the person of 
the Son can be attributed to Origen of Alexandria (184/85-254), who posited that there 
are two natures in Christ, divine and human.
33
  For Origen, the Son is essentially divine 
since he is eternally generated by the Father, a distinct hypostasis or being, yet the Father 
shares everything with the Son, and that is why in the name of Jesus all shall bow and 
confess that he is Lord. In addition, since the incarnate Son is the image of the Father, he 
makes the invisible God known to humanity; he makes the transcendent Father’s glory 
visible.  Indeed, because the Son’s eternal nature is to be the revealer and communicator 
of the Father’s divinity, he is uniquely suited to undertake the mission of the 
Incarnation.
34
  However, the enfleshment of the Word continues to trouble Origen, 
precisely because he conceives of the enfleshed Christ as a possessing two integrally 
distinctive natures. The Gospel accounts of Christ are particularly worrisome in this 
regard, for along with their dscriptions of Christ’s divine majesty, they also relate 
episodes of Christ’s all-too-human weakness which do not appear to reveal anything 
regarding the Father’s glory.  In response, Origen advocates a kind of partitive exegesis 
whereby each of these contrasting episodes, and their corresponding characteristics, are 
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carefully distinguished and assigned to the respective natures, thus nothing unworthy can 
be attributed to the divinity of Christ, while human frailty is predicated of the incarnate 
Christ only because the two natures are so closely related with the person of the Son.   
Here, Origen has begun to formulate not only a hermeneutical principle regarding 
how one should read the scriptural witness of the Son’s mission, but also the first 
Christian attempt to establish an ontological explication for Christ’s simultaneous 
existence as both morphe Theou and morphe doulou. Origen explains that this intimate 
conjunction of natures is due to the fact that Christ’s soul, among all the pre-existent 
rational souls created by God before the foundation of the world, was the only one that 
clung to God with a kind of inseparable and indissoluble love.  As a result, all other souls 
fell from their primordial state of blessedness into the material world, while the soul of 
Christ was assumed by the divine Son—the very Word of God generated from all eternity 
by the ungenerate Father—into itself, which is to say that Christ’s human soul in turn 
entered fully into the divine being of the Son.
35
  Because of this intimate union, Christ is 
the perfect mediator between the Creator and the creation, particularly when it takes 
creaturely material form in the Incarnation in its mission to reconcile fallen souls with 
God.  Moreover, on account of this interpenetration of the Word and Christ everything 
that belongs to the flesh of Christ, to his servant-form, can be attributed of Word, and 
every characteristic of the Word can be predicated of human Christ.  In effect, Origen 
establishes what will later be known as the communicatio idiomatum (communication of 
idioms), whereby divine attributes are ascribed to the humanity of the incarnate Christ, 
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and human attributes are ascribed to the divine Word.
36
  Yet, despite this strong 
affirmation of mutual idiomatic inter-predication, Origen is always careful to distinguish 
those statements that belong naturally to the divine Word from those statements that refer 
principally to the humanity of Jesus, particularly those concerning his passion and death. 
So, even though Origen asserts that it was precisely when Christ humbled himself and 
was obedient unto death, even death on a cross (Philippians 2:8), that he revealed the 
Father’s true divinity, nevertheless he goes on to clarify that it is not the divine Son who 
is sacrificially crucified, rather he is the great high priest who does the sacrificing.
37
  
In other words, it was only the humanity of Christ who suffered and died on the 
cross.
38
 The human Christ is offered as a propitiatory sacrifice to the Father, and it is 
soteriologically efficacious because the human soul of Christ is perfectly obedient and 
sinless in its sacrifice. In those who truly believe, the eyes of faith reveal the divine 
nature of the Word in perfect union with the humanity of Christ, particularly on the cross, 
and this vision of deity within the material brings about a transformation, so that the soul 
of the believer becomes progressively divinized. This moral progress come about 
primarily through the imitation of the humble self-emptying obedience displayed by 
Christ as the supreme moral exemplar, above all in his sacrificial suffering and death; an 
imitation which in turn further clarifies our perception of (and union with) Christ’s 
divinity.  For Origen, then, the Christological pro nobis falls squarely on the side of 
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humanity, both for Christ, who must use a human being who dwells in the Word to reveal 
God, and on fallen humans, who must strive to purify their senses in order to be made 
worthy of perceiving the divinity of the Word and thereby gain salvation. This 
soteriological imbalance can ultimately be traced back to Origen’s inability to work out a 
satisfactory incarnational understanding, one that would account for both the 
distinctiveness of the two natures in Christ, while also establishing a true union of 
divinity and humanity in the one incarnate Word.  In the end, Origen’s fundamentally 
dualistic reading of the kenotic hymn cannot successfully reconcile the μορφῇ θεοῦ of 
Philippians 2:6 with the μορφὴν δούλου of verses 7-8.    
Origen’s contention that only the Father is ungenerate, and that the Son is 
generated by the Father, was one of the probable sources for the contentious theological 
debates that erupted at the start of the fourth century.  For example, in Alexandria the 
presbyter Arius started to argue that, in words that bear a close similarity to some of 
Origen’s teachings, the Son’s generation from the Father renders the Word the highest 
example of creatureliness, thus “there was a time when the Son was not.”  Nevertheless, 
the created shared in the natural divinity of the Father to an unparalleled degree because 
of his foreseen meritorious obedience.  Hence, Arius apparently  had in mind Philippians 
2:9, διὸ καὶ ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸν ὑπερύψωσεν καὶ ἐχαρίσατο αὐτῷ τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὄνομα, 
with its claim that it was on account of the obedience highlighted in v. 8 that God 
therefore exalted Christ.  For Arius and his followers, this meritorious exaltation 
indicated that Christ was a creature raised by grace above the natural status of other 
creatures as a reward for his immutable love for the Father.
39
  It is evident that even 
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though these debates about the ontological status of the Son largely revolved around the 
Trinitarian question of whether the Son can be construed to be divine by nature, there was 
also a strong Christological component to the ongoing controversy.  In 325 the Council of 
Nicaea responded to Arius’ doctrinal challenge by adopting the non-Biblical term 
homoousios, meaning “of the same substance,” not so much to define the divine being, 
but rather to establish a correct understanding of the relationship between the Father and 
the Son by ruling out that the Word was created.
40
 But this was only the beginning of 
these debates, for in the following decades three groups emerged, each positing rival 
understandings of the Son’s relations to the Father.  The homoian group insisted that the 
Son was only like (homoios) the Father, and therefore ontologically subordinate to the 
one divine God. Another faction, variously labeled as heterousian or anomian, claimed 
that the principle appellation of the divine nature is agennētos, meaning unbegotten, 
ingenerate, or unoriginate. Therefore, since the Son is begotten of the Father, there must 
be an unbridgeable ontological disparity between the Father and the Word. Finally, a 
group of homoiousians, who continued to balk at the claim that the Son was ὁμοούσιον 
with the Father, yet wanted to preclude the reduction of the Son to mere creaturehood, 
adopted the compromise term homoiousios which posited that the Son is “alike in 
essence” to the Father.41  
At the center of many of these debates was the towering figure of Athanasius 
(c.296-373), who in the course of a long and contentious life as Bishop of Alexandria 
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became the leading proponent of Nicene Creed, defending the homoousios as the most 
suitable term—despite its non-Scriptural pedigree—to preclude a subordinationist 
misreading of the Bible that would mistakenly adduce the incarnate Son’s essential 
createdness.  Supporters of Arius tended to argue their position based on the biblical 
account of Christ’s human limitations, sufferings, and crucifixion to buttress their 
contention that the Son was ontologically inferior to the Father. As a result, Athanasius 
came to believe that the coherence of the Christian faith rested on a correct understanding 
of the Word’s kenosis, his incarnational self-emptying, as presented in Philippians 2:5-11 
and narrated in the Gospels.
42
 For Athanasius, the Son must be consubstantiality divine 
with the God the Father, his generation is not a temporal coming-to-be, but rather an 
eternal procession of the Word from the Father, so as a consequence the Son can reveal 
the Father directly.  In other words, within the economy of salvation there is 
“epistemological correlativity” of mutual self-disclosure between the Father and the 
Son—with the Son revealing the glory of the Father, and the Father disclosing himself 
through his perfect image in the Son—which is only possible if both share the same 
divine ousia. 
43
 Athanasius is perhaps most critical of the homoian assertion that the Son 
was created primarily for the purpose of mediating between the transcendent Father and 
creation, so that his existence is for all intent and purposes reduced to a wholly functional 
role. Athanasius retorts by shifting the Christological pro nobis to the Son’s very being, 
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that is, to the divine ousia he shares with the Father as it is revealed in the economy of 
salvation.  In other words, the Son’s kenosis (Philippians 2:7), his assumption of a frail 
human nature “for us,” as well as his obedient endurance of a painful and humiliating 
demise (Philippians 2:7-8) “for us,” is ultimately grounded in the divine nature itself, in 
God’s self-emptying love “for us” which in integral to the glorious divine essence.  
Athanasius’ reading of the Kenotic hymn thus allows him to properly construe the 
dynamics of the Christological pro nobis in the hymnic text, and thereby establish a 
criterion for the identification and predication of idioms. On the one hand, the narrative 
of abasement and subsequent exaltation are enacted through the Word’s humanity and is 
thus properly predicated of that humanity.  On the other, it establishes that the kenosis is 
a constitutive feature of the divine nature as well.  Hence, the essential unity of the Father 
and Son are established, while at the same time the concordance of divine and human 
attributes in the one incarnate Word is recognized. Athanasius’ full-fledged adumbration 
of this partitive exegesis, which we first saw in a nascent state in Origen, allows him to 
establish that the scriptural accounts of Christ’s weaknesses are not an indicator of his 
subordinate ontological status, but rather a manifestation of divinity in Christ’s human 
servant-form.
44
 Thus Christ is presented in the scriptural Christological accounts as the 
single ontological subject of two distinct yet inter-communicative sets of properties that 
that are united in the enfleshed Son of Father. Athanasius has succeeded in laying down 
the foundations for future ontological speculations about the two natures present in the 
one person of Christ, and done so in terms of the biblical witness as read through the 
hermeneutical key of the Philippians hymn.
45
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In certain instances, however, Athanasius seems considerably more reluctant to 
affirm the full humanity of the Word’s morphe doulou, especially when he insists that the 
body which was seen nailed on the cross was not the body of a human being, but rather 
the body of God in which he existed even when he was crucified.
46
 The implication is 
that the Christ who died could not be a complete human being, so even though Christ’s 
body exhibited all manner of human behavior, including suffering and death, that body’s 
intellect and animating principle was given by the Word, for if this were not the case 
Christian’s would have to worship a human being as their savior alongside the divine 
Word.
47
 At times Athanasius describes the human body as an instrument (organon) used 
by the divine Son in order to accomplish his work, so that upon the cross only that 
instrument of flesh suffers and not the deity; nevertheless, it would be a distortion to see 
this as an attempt by Athanasius to distance the enfleshed humanness of Christ from his 
divine nature. Some modern critics have even contended that Athanasius’ Logos-sarx 
model of the Incarnation denying a full-fledged human soul, once capable of feeling and 
reflecting upon his sufferings, to the enfleshed Son, but as the Tomus ad Antiochenos, 
chapter 7 indicates, Christ had to undergo his passion, death and resurrection in both 
body and soul.
48
 Clearly then, Athanasius emphasizes the unity of both the human and the 
divine elements, so that everything the Christ does is what the Word does, and the Word 
accomplishes all he does in, though, and by the organon of his ensouled flesh. The 
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distinction is not so much between the divine Word and the human nature through which 
he undertakes his creaturely activities, but rather a distinction between the one personal 
subject of all the Gospel narratives, the Word, and the various actions he accomplishes in 
the economy of salvation.
49
   
Theological reflection on the person and mission of Christ flourished in the West 
in the second half of the Fourth century, inspired in large part as a reaction against the 
pro-homoian Council of Sirmium (357), which rejected both homoousios and 
homoiousios as unbiblical terminology, and affirmed that the Father was ontologically 
greater than the Son, as well as the equally anti-Nicene Council of Rimini (359), both 
held under the patronage of the Arian-sympathizing Emperor Constantius II. Hilary, the 
Bishop of Poitiers (c. 300 – c. 368) and a firm of opponent of both homoian and 
heterousian theology, developed his mature Christology during a period of exile in the 
East in the years 356 to 361, where he seems to have been  impressed by homoiousian 
thinkers.
50
  Hilary’s De Trinitate, composed sometime after the year 358, is largely 
grounded upon the notion of the Son’s eternal generation from the Father, as interpreted 
through Origen’s contention that this generation entails that the Son receives everything 
from the Father, including his divine essence or form, and is thereby the unique revealer 
of the Father’s glory.51 Hilary’s Christology is also informed by his reading of 
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Philippians 2:5-11, particularly his reading of the phrases “form of God” (forma Dei) and 
“form of a servant” (forma servi), which the Bishop of Poitiers takes to mean that in 
emptying himself, the pre-existent Son assumed the servant-form of a “living human 
being.”  For Hilary, this self-emptying implies that in taking on the forma servi, Christ 
may be putting aside some properties of the forma Dei, which are only restored by the 
Son’s exaltation.52  Surprisingly, Hilary seems to tacitly accept the homoian claim that if 
Christ were to suffer in a truly human manner then that would prove the ontological 
subordination of the Son to the Father, so in his account of the Agony in the Garden of 
Gethsemane, Jesus expresses his anguish only to demonstrate his solidarity with his 
human disciples, not because he truly suffers.
53
 Above all though, Hilary is determined to 
defend the idea that at the heart of the Christian mystery is the “double birth” of the one 
Son of God, that is, the unity of the one subject of the kenotic hymn, for “in him is the 
whole God of the Word,” as well as “the whole man Christ.54  
Ambrose of Milan (c. 340 – 397), who was fluent in Greek and studied the works 
of Origen and Athanasius,  also championed pro-Nicene teachings in the West, and wrote 
a number of works that directly addressed homoian doctrine. Like Hilary, Ambrose uses 
the Philippians hymn throughout his De fide, an important work defending his 
understanding of orthodox Trinitarian and Christological doctrines written early during 
his episcopate in Milan.
55
  Ambrose also parallels Hilary in treating the text of 
Philippians 2: 5-11as a summary of Christ’s mission and indeed of the Christian life as a 
whole, however, unlike Hilary, he does not interpret the pre-existent Christ’s kenosis as a 
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 This explicitly anti-homoian treatise was probably written in the late fall of 378. See Daniel H. 
Williams, Ambrose of Milan and the End of the Arian-Nicene Conflicts, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 128-153 for details. 
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putting-aside of  any aspect of  the divine essence.  In reading the Scripture accounts, 
Ambrose contends, one must carefully distinguish those things that are predicated of 
Christ as God and of Christ as man: As he writes, “It is one thing to be named Son 
according to the divine substance, but it is another thing to be so called according to the 
adoption of human flesh. For, according to the divine generation, the Son is equal to God 
the Father; and, according to the adoption of a body, He is a servant to God the Father, 
for, it says, ‘He took upon Him the form of a servant’” (Philippians 2:7).  However, the 
Son remains one and the same, for “according to His glory” he remains Lord, even 
though he “emptied himself.”56  To those homoian opponents who would misread the 
Bible in a subordinationist manner, Ambrose unambiguously states, “the Son thought it 
not robbery to be equal with God; (Philippians 2:6), but no creature is equal with God, 
the Son, however, is equal; therefore the Son is not a creature.”57 Ambrose interprets the 
kenotic self-emptying, the exinanio of the Word, as the assumption of “all the perfections 
of humanity in their completeness, and obedience in its completeness,” for it is by his 
perfect obedience as a man that the salvation will be affected.
58
  Here it is apparent that 
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 Ambrose, De Fide ad Gratianum Imperatorem, 5.106-107. 
57
 Ibid, 5.138: “Filius non rapinam arbitratus est esse se aequalem deo.” 
58
 Ibid, 5.108-109: “Et ipse Filius ait: Sic dicit Dominus, qui finxit me ex utero servum sibi, et dixit 
mihi: Magnum tibi est vocari puerum meum. Ecce posui te in testamentum generis mei, in lucem gentium; ut sis 
in salutem usque ad extremum terrae. Cui hoc dicitur, nisi Christo? qui cum in forma Dei esset, exinanivit se, et 
formam servi accepit [Philippians 2:6-7]. Quid est in Dei forma, nisi in divinitatis plenitudine? Disce igitur quid 
sit: Formam servi accepit, id est, plenitudinem perfectionis humanae, plenitudinem obedientiae. Ideoque dicit in 
psalmo trigesimo: Statuisti in loco spatioso pedes meos. Super omnes inimicos meos factus sum opprobrium. 
Illustra faciem tuam super servum tuum. Servus dictus est homo, in quo sanctificatus est: servus homo, in quo 
unctus est: servus homo, in quo factus sub Lege, factus ex Virgine est; et ut compendio dicam, servus dictus est, 
in quo matrem habet, sicut scriptum est: O Domine, ego servus tuus, ego servus tuus, et filius ancillae tuae; et 
alibi: Afflictus sum et humiliatus sum nimis. “And the Son Himself says: "Thus says the Lord, that formed Me 
from the womb to be His servant, and said unto Me: It is a great thing for You to be called My Servant. Behold I 
have set You up for a witness to My people, and a light to the Gentiles, that You may be for salvation unto the 
ends of the earth." Isaiah 49:5-6 To whom is this said, if not to Christ? Who being in the form of God, emptied 
Himself and took upon Him the form of a servant [Philippians 2:6-7]. But what can be in the form of God, except 
that which exists in the fullness of the Godhead? Learn, then, what this means: “He took upon Him the form of a 
servant.” It means that He took upon Him all the perfections of humanity in their completeness, and obedience in 
its completeness. And so it says in the thirtieth Psalm: “You have set my feet in a large room. I am made a 
reproach above all mine enemies. Make Your face to shine upon Your servant.” “Servant” means the Man in 
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Ambrose understands Christ’s salvific mission in a way which includes the divine nature 
in a much more integral manner than we see in Hilary, for Christ’s did not humble 
himself by taking on a servant-form only in order to defeat sin through his obediential 
sacrifice of the cross.  According to Ambrose, the Son also assumed human nature so that 
we too may be glorified—divinized—as Christ was exalted, and in that manner the 
Incarnate Word effects the entire mystery of salvation in both his divinity and humanity: 
“He received from us what he offered as his own for us, that he might redeem us from 
our own, and that he might confer upon us what was not our own from his divine 
liberality. According to our nature, then, he offered himself, that he might do a work 
beyond our nature. From that which is ours he took the sacrifice, from his the reward.”59  
 
 
4. Augustine: Gemina Substantia, Una Persona 
 
It is a truism to state that Augustine (354-430) is the most influential Latin 
patristic theologian, that his immense influence, particularly during the medieval period 
which shall be the main focus of this study, was nearly ubiquitous, and that it is 
impossible to understand the course of western Christianity without taking his work into 
account.  What is much less obvious is the tremendous impact that his Christological 
thought played in the West, and the centrality of the kenotic hymn of Philippians to a 
significant portion of that thought.  This critical lacuna can at least be partly attributed to 
the fact that Augustine did not devote any one treatise to a systematic adumbration of his 
                                                                                                                                                                             
whom He was sanctified; it means the Man in whom He was anointed; it means the Man in whom He was made 
under the law, made of the Virgin; and, to put it briefly, it means the Man in whose person He has a mother, as it 
is written: “O Lord, I am Your Servant, I am Your Servant, and the Son of Your hand-maid;” and again: “I am 
cast down and sore humbled.”  
59
 Ambrose, De incarnationis Dominicae sacramento, 6.54.  See J. Warren Smith, Christian Grace and 
Pagan Virtue: The Theological Foundation of Ambrose's Ethics, Oxford Studies in Historical Theology (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 85-86 and Beeley, Unity of Christ, p. 234.  
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Christology, but rather scattered his thoughts on the person and mission of Christ 
throughout many works over many years.  Yet, as we shall see, Augustine’s ruminations 
on the Son of God, and the value he placed on Philippians 2:5-11 as one of the key 
hermeneutical principles for understanding the identity and saving work of the incarnate 
Word, proved to be decisive in the development of Medieval Latin Christology up to the 
time of Aquinas. 
Ambrose played a pivotal role in Augustine’s conversion to Christianity, and 
while the Bishop of Milan’s works were an important theological resource for the future 
Bishop of Hippo, and there are even some notable points of correspondence between 
Augustine and Ambrose on the particular significance of the Son’s exinanio, especially in 
the way that both men will use the kenotic hymn in formulating anti-homoian 
Christologies, they nevertheless have a number of significantly divergent points of view. 
Perhaps the most conspicuous influence can be seen in Augustine’s adoption of  
Ambrose’s phrase “twin-substanced giant” from De fide and De incarnationis Dominicae 
sacramento (a reference to Psalm 19:5 [Vulgate 18:6]: Exsultavit ut gigas ad currendam 
viam), in an attempt refute the homoian arguments contained in a contemporary Arian 
Sermon, by pointing out that Christ “was not only a human being, but also God; indeed, 
he revealed that there was only one person [personam] in both natures [natura]—namely, 
of God and a human being—lest, if he should form two persons, a quaternity should 
come to exist rather than a trinity! So there are twin substances, but one person (gemina 
quidem substantia, sed una persona est)!”60 Here, with his incisive use of person and 
                                                          
60
 “Hoc est, non tantum homo, verum etiam Deus erat. Unam quippe ostendit esse personam in utraque 
natura, hoc est, Dei et hominis, ne si duas faciat, quaternitas incipiat esse, non trinitas. Quoniam itaque gemina 
quidem substantia, sed una persona est.” Augustine, Contra sermonen Arianorum liber unus, 7.6, J.P. Minge, 
Patrologiae cursus completus: Series Latina, Vol. 42 (Paris: 1844). Hereafter referred to as PL. 
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natures terminology, Augustine almost seems to anticipate the Chalcedonian doctrinal 
formulations of the fifth century.
61
  Even more striking, according to Augustine, is the 
fact that within the personal unity of Christ the distinctive integrity of both natures are 
nevertheless sustained.  This insight will in turn serve Augustine as the theological basis 
for a robust defense of the communicatio idiomatum, as when the Bishop of Hippo goes 
on to boldly asserts that Christ on the cross is none other than the “crucified God.”62 The 
humanity of Christ was and remains complete, undiminished both in body and soul by its 
union with the Son, and very much like Origen before him, for Augustine the human soul 
is the connecting link between the forma Dei of the divine Word, and the forma servi of 
Christ the man.
63
  Indeed, the relationship of the soul to the body will become a dominant 
Christological analogy for Augustine, exemplifying the intimate yet unconfused union of 
divinity and humanity in the enfleshed person.  
In time, Augustine comes to describe this assumption of humanity as the 
“bearing’’ (gerere, agere) of a human being; or, inspired no doubt by the Latin of 
Philippians 2:7 (sed semet ipsum exinanivit formam servi accipiens in similitudinem 
hominum factus et habitu inventus ut homo), as the putting on of a human body by the 
Word in a manner analogous to our putting on a garment (habitus).
64
  We can see this sort 
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 See Brian E. Daley, “The Giant’s Twin Substances: Ambrose and the Christology of Augustine’s 
Contra sermonem Arianorum,” in Collectanea Augustiniana: Augustine: Presbyter Factus Sum, eds. J.T. 
Lienhard, E.C. Muller, R.J. Teske (New York, Bern, Berlin: Peter Lang, 1993), pp. 477-496.   
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 Sermo, 213.4.  
63
 Origen, On First Pronciples, 2.6.3-6; for Augustine, c.f. De diversis quaestionibus octaginta tribus 
83, q.80.1. 
64
 See, for example, Sermo 263.3A, Patrologiae cursus completus: Series Latina, vol. 38, col. 1211: 
Nam et illud nonnullos calumniantibus haereticis movet, quemadmodum Dominus sine corpora descendent, cum 
corpore ascenderit; velut contrarium sit illis verbis quibus ait: Nemo ascendit in caelum, nisi qui de caelo 
descendit. Corpus ergo, inquiunt, quod non descendit de caelo, quomodo potuit ascendere in caelum? Quasi ille 
dixerit: Nihil ascendit in caelum, nisi quod de caelo descendit; sed ait: Nemo ascendit, nisi qui descendit. Hoc 
enim ad personam, non ad personae habitum retulit. Descendit sine corporis indumento, ascendit cum corporis 
indumento; nemo tamen, nisi qui descendit, ascendit. Nam si nos sibimet tamquam sua membra ita coaptavit, ut 
etiam nobis coniunctis idem ipse sit; quanto magis illud corpus, quod de virgine assumpsit, aliam non potest in 
illo habere personam?; and Sermo 264.7, PL vol. 38, col. 1214: “sed quid fecit? semetipsum, ait, exinaniuit, 
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of exegesis in Augustine’s reading of Philippians 2: 6-7 in question 73 of De diversis 
quaestionibus, wherein he endeavors to explicate how the eternal, immutable, and 
invisible Word could assume a mutable, visible human nature in time. As Augustine 
indicates, it is “clear that habit (habitus) refers to that thing which is added (accidit) to 
someone in such a way that he could just as well not have it.”65 Augustine then proceeds 
to enumerate four ways in which a habitus may be added to someone or something. In the 
first way, the habitus is in itself unchanged, but changes the recipient, as the wisdom 
acquired by a fool changes him into a wise man. According to Augustine’s second 
example, there is a way in which both the habitus and the recipient are changed, as food 
is changed when we take it into our body, and the food also effects a change in our body 
when it is consumed.  In Augustine’s third way, the recipient remains unchanged, but the 
habitus is changed, as a garment changes its shape when it is put on by its wearer. In the 
fourth example, neither the habitus nor the recipient are changed, as—for example—
neither the ring nor the finger are changed when a ring is put on a finger. Augustine then 
adds that with respect to what pertains to his divinity, the Son is equal to the Father and 
remains so, retaining his form Dei even while emptying himself and taking on the “form 
of a servant” (forma servi).66 The habitus referenced in v.7 of the hymn must therefore be 
an example of the third type, in which a garment is altered by the shape of the wearer, for 
Christ 
  
   took up humanity in such a way that it was transformed for the better, 
   and it was so formed (formaretur) by him in a manner more ineffably  
                                                                                                                                                                             
formam serui accipiens; in similitudinem hominum factus, et habitu inuentus ut homo: humiliauit se, factus 
obediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis. 
65
 Manifestum est in ea re dici habitum, quae accidit alicui, ita ut eam possit etiam non habere.   
66
 Q.v.: “Our Lord Jesus Christ is to be understood to be God’s Son, both equal to the Father by the 
form of God in which he is, and less than the Father by the form of a servant which he took.” De Trinitatte. II, 2 
[98]. 
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   excellent and intimate than in a garment when put on by a man. Thus, 
   by this name habit (habitus), the Apostle has clearly indicated what he 
   meant by saying “having been made in human likeness” (Philippian 2:7:  
   in similitudinem hominum factus), because he became a man not by way 
   of transformation, but by way of a habit (habitus) when he was clothed by  
   a humanity which he, in some way uniting and adapting to himself, joined  
   to his immortality and eternity.
67
 
 
This articulation of the pre-existent Son’s dual-natured Incarnation, whereby he 
retains essential equality with the Father’s divinity, while assuming a fully human 
manner of being in the world, allows Augustine to rebut the anti-Nicene exegesis of those 
contested scriptural passages often employed by homoian polemicists to prove that the 
Son’s human limitations disclose his ontological subordination.  According to Augustine, 
these misguided readings miss out on the central soteriological and exegetical point of the 
biblical accounts, which is that the Incarnation and its kerygmatic proclamation in the 
words of Scripture are both given for our salvation; they are both equally constitutive 
features of the Christological pro nobis through which we are saved. Thus, for Augustine, 
the kenotic narrative in Philippians 2:6-7—which proclaims how Christ, being found in 
the form of God, emptied himself (ipsum exinanivit), assumed a servant-form, and was 
made in the likeness of men—summarizes a hermeneutical principle, a regula, whereby 
one can understand Christ as one subject who may be spoken of as he is eternally and as 
he is having assumed human flesh.
68
 Moreover, Augustine’s interpretation shows us that 
the kenotic hymn also serves as a summary of the entire incarnational mission within the 
economy of salvation.  Thus, to accept a partitive exegesis in which Scripture speaks of 
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 Sic enim assumptus est, ut commutaretur in melius, et ab eo formaretur ineffabiliter excellentius 
atque coniunctius quam vestis ab homine cum induitur. Hoc ergo nomine habitus satis significavit Apostolus, 
quemadmodum dixerit in similitudinem hominum factus, quia non transfiguratione in hominem, sed habitu factus 
est, cum indutus est hominem quem sibi uniens quodammodo atque conformans immortalitati aeternitatique 
sociaret.  
68
 Cf. Jaroslav Pelikan, “Canonica regula: The Trinitarian Hermeneutics of Augustine,” in eds. J.C. 
Schnaubel and F. van Fleteren, Collectanea Augustiniana, I, Augustine: ‘Second Founder of the Faith’ (New 
York: Peter Lang, 1990), pp. 329-343.  
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the Son in both  forma servi and in forma Dei is also to accept a “narrative of salvation in 
which Christ comes to purify and reshape the attention of human beings towards eternal 
contemplation of and in the incorporeal and invisible divine” persons of the triune God.69   
The Word’s enfleshment, then, was brought about because “it was impossible for 
him to be found as God by those who had unclean hearts,” and therefore it was 
“impossible for them to see the Word with the Father except by his assuming something 
which they could see, and something by which they might be led to that inner light.”70 If 
those obsessed with the material world and its visual objects—those with “unclean 
hearts”—were incapable of seeing the forma Dei of Christ, then it was equally impossible 
for them to see how the Son was equal to the Father unless God’s Word took on a 
material form in the world—a forma servi—through which they might be led to see with 
the inner illumination of faith.  Hence, for Augustine, the very movement from 
materialist illusion to contemplation of the divine is an innate aspect of the purification 
that is salvation, a movement mediated through and occurring in the two-natured Christ.  
By “his very nativity,” God made an “eye-salve to cleanse the eyes of our heart, and to 
enable us to see his majesty by means of his humility;” through Christ’s humble 
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 Lewis Ayers, Augustine and the Trinity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 154.  See 
also Mark D. Jordan, “Words and Word: Incarnation and Signification in Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana,” 
Augustinian Studies 11 (1980), pp. 177-196;  Goulven Madec, La Patrie et la voie: Le Christ dans la vie et la 
pensée de saint Augustin (Paris: Desclée, 1989); Basil Studer, The Grace of Christ and the Grace of God in 
Augustine of Hippo: Christocentrism or Theocentrism?, trans. M.J. O’Connell (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical 
Press, 1997); Joseph S. O’Leary, “The Invisible Mission of the Son in Origen and Augustine,” in eds. W. Beinert 
and U. Kühneweg, Origeniana Septima (Leuven: Peeters, 1999), pp. 605-622; Michel René Barnes, “Visible 
Christ and Invisible Trinity: Mt. 5:8 in Augustine’s Trinitarian Theology of 400,” Modern Theology 19:3 (2003), 
pp. 329-355; Kari Kloos, “Seeing the Invisible God: Augustine’s Reconfiguration of Theophany Narrative 
Exegesis,” Augustinian Studies 26 (2005), pp. 397-420; Luigi Gioia, The Theological Epistemology of 
Augustine’s De Trinitate, Oxford Theological Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008);  Jean-Luc 
Marion, Au lieu de soi: L’approche de saint Augustin (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2008); Ronnie 
Rombs, “Augustine on Christ,” in eds. C.C. Pecknold and T. Toom, T&T Clark Companion to Augustine and 
Modern Theology (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2013), pp. 36-53.  
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 De diversis quaestionibus, q.73.2: Non enim poterat inveniri ab his, qui cor immundum habebant et 
Verbum apud Patrem videre non poterant, nisi hoc suscipiendo quod possent videre, et per quod ad illud lumen 
interius ducerentur.  
43 
 
 
assumption of humanity God’s glory is revealed and grace is mediated to humanity; 
indeed, no one can see the Word’s glory “unless they are healed by the humility of his 
flesh.”71  Christ is both exemplum, a model we are called to imitate, and via, the way 
through which we participate in the grace of God, for it is through the servant-like 
humility of Christ’s humanity, humble and obedient even unto death on a cross, the very 
humility that Paul advocated to his Philippian interlocutors, that we are healed of our 
blind pridefulness, and it is by Christ as the source of participatory grace that we are 
integrated into God’s  divine plan of mercy realized by the enfleshed Son, and find our 
way, through the via humilitatis, to the final unmediated vision of the form Dei, the 
Father’s divine glory.72 
 
5. Peter Lombard: On the Incarnation of the Word 
 
 
The era of scholastic theology in the Latin West opened with a very limited 
knowledge of patristic theology and the acts of the various Christological councils. 
Unaware of the details of these earlier debates, medieval theologians often approached 
the same topics from different perspectives, so that the content and import of certain 
questions shifted. The authoritative source for many thirteenth-century Christological 
                                                          
71
 In Evangelium Ioannis tractatus CXXIV, 2.16: Ipsa nativitate collyrium fecit, unde tergerentur oculi 
cordis nostri, et possemus videre maiestatem eius per eius humilitatem . . . Gloriam eius nemo posset videre, nisi 
carnis humilitate sanaretur.  
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 Among the most important explorations of the kenotic hymn in Augustine, in addition to the works 
treated here, we should also note De Trinitate I. 7.14 [Phil 2:6-7],  IV.21.31, XIII.17.22 [Phil 2:8]; Sermo 38 
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Christology,” Word and Spirit 9 (1987), pp. 100-117; Stephen Pardue, “Kenosis and its Discontents: Towards an 
Augustinian Account of Divine Humility,” Scottish Journal of Theology 65:3 (2012), pp. 271-288.     
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debates were not the acts of Ephesus (431) or Chalcedon (451) but rather Peter 
Lombard’s book of Sentences. The Lombard’s treatment of the person and mission of 
Christ in book III of his treatise served as the ground upon which later medieval 
theologians, including Thomas Aquinas, would build their Christology.  In Sentences III, 
Peter Lombard’s list of auctoritas or theological authorities is unsurprisingly led by 
Augustine, followed by Hillary of Poitiers, Ambrose of Milan, Jerome, and various other 
Latin authorities. Significantly, there is no mention of Athanasius’ authentic works, such 
as his On the Incarnation, anywhere in the Sentences, nor are there citations from Cyril 
of Alexandria or any other of the Greek Fathers engaged in the Christological disputes of 
the fifth and sixth centuries in book III.
73
  And even though the Lombard is the first 
Western theologian to quote from John Damascene’s important seventh-century summary 
of doctrine, De fide orthodoxa, he employed this source relative scarcely and then only 
quoted from a small portion of the work.  Nonetheless, the influence of the Damascene 
can be detected in several parts of book III, especially in the way that Peter will frame the 
doctrinal disputes regarding the Incarnation in soteriological terms.
74
  Despite the overall 
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 The only Eastern authority quoted with any regularity is John Chrysostom, who did not participate 
directly in the immediate post-Nicene development of Christological thought, although he was a valuable witness 
the growth of pro-Nicene orthodoxy in the latter half of the fourth century. Origen is cited sporadically, usually 
as a cautionary example of the deleterious effects of theological confusion and heresy.    
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 See Marcia L. Colish, Peter Lombard, Vol. 1, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 41 (Leiden/New 
York/Cologne: Brill, 1994), p. 419. According to Philipp W. Rosemann, Peter Lombard, Great Medieval 
Thinkers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 55:“A first version of the Sentences was completed after 
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though he only ever quotes portions also translated by Cerbanus. According to Jacques-Guy Bougerol, “The 
Church Fathers and the Sentences of Peter Lombard,” in ed. I. Backus, The Reception of the Church Fathers in 
the West: From the Carolingians to the Maurists (Leiden/New York/Cologne: Brill, 1997), p. 133:“Peter 
Lombard is aware that in introducing John Damascene, he is introducing a completely new ‘auctoritas’ in the 
West. He feels the need to support it with pontifical patronage.”  See E.M. Buytaert, “St. John of Damascus, 
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lack of knowledge of the Conciliar process whereby Christological doctrine was 
established, there was nevertheless a certain overlap between early medieval Latin 
Christology and the general tenets comprising the Chalcedonian definition, which as we 
will later see, is in part attributable to the transmission of Augustine’s understanding of 
the communicatio idiomatum, through the Tome of Leo, to the final formulation of the 
Confession of Chalcedon.
75
  
Lombard commences his discussion of the Incarnation in book III with the 
position that in taking on human flesh the Word took on the fullness of humanity, which 
due to the deleterious effects of the fall, needs divine redemption.  The mediatory agent 
between the human body of the incarnate Word and his divine essence is Christ’s human 
soul, which as we have seen was advocated by Augustine.  However, unlike the Bishop 
of Hippo—who speculated that the pre-existent Son first assumed the soul of a man, and 
then the body through that soul—for Peter, the flesh and the soul were not assumed 
separately, but rather from the very first instance of the Incarnation the Word took on the 
form of a slave, encompassing both a body and a soul.
76
  The Son having simultaneously 
taken a soul and a body in union with his divine person, it remains to be determined 
whether “a person took on a nature, or a nature a nature, or a person a nature or a nature a 
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Augustine, the most important influence on Pope Leo’s use of the communicatio idiomatum in the Tome is the 
text from Philippians 2:5-11, often used in conjunction with the Prologue of John’s Gospel (1:1-18) and the 
passages describing Christ as mediator in 1Timothy (2:3-6).  
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 D. 2.4: “Totam igitur hominis naturam, id est animam et carnem. et horum proprietates sive 
accidentia assumsit Deus: non carnem sine anima nec animam sine rationes.” 
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person; and whether it is suitable to say that the divine nature became flesh.”77  For 
Lombard, Christ’s divine nature is consubstantial with the divinity shared by the three 
persons of the Trinity, and it is in this sense that the Son took his divine nature into the 
Incarnation.  At the same time he took up a human nature, consisting of a body and soul, 
and consubstantial with all other humans, so Peter concludes that the best way to 
understand the Incarnation is to see that two distinct natures were assumed and united in 
the person of the Word. As to the claim that the Word became flesh, that denotes that 
Christ truly assumed a human nature, which is constituted by an ensouled body, but not a 
human person (persona). But how can Christ be fully human if he lacks a human 
persona? The Lombard responds by pointing out that Christ did not assume a pre-existent 
human person, since the human soul and body where not united to each prior to the 
Incarnation; rather, the Son took on the distinct human components of a soul and a body, 
out of which a human nature was formed only when they were united to each other in the 
divine person of the Word.  Moreover, a divine person, by its very nature, cannot be 
composed of more than one person nor can it change from being one person to another 
person, therefore, after the union of the human components in the Word, there could only 
be one divine person in Christ. Yet this absence of a human persona does not 
compromise the incarnate Christ’s full humanity, because Christ still possesses 
everything that is essentially human, since he is a unique individual possessing a human 
soul and a human body, along with all their attendant human faculties and characteristics. 
Hence, in response to the question of “whether Christ, insofar as He was a man, was a 
                                                          
77
 D. 5.1: “Praeterea inquiri oportet, cum ex praemissis constet Verbum Dei carnem et animam simul 
assumpsisse in unitatem personae, quid horum potius concedendum sit, scilicet quod persona personam, vel 
natura naturam, vel persona naturam, vel natura personam assumpserit.” All English translations are taken from 
Peter Lombard, The Sentences, Book 3: On the Incarnation of the Word, trans. G. Silano (Toronto: Pontifical 
institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2008).  
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person (persona) , or, likewise, if He was anything (aliquid),” Lombard’s balanced 
approach is that in denying that the enfleshed Son possessed a human persona we are not 
thereby forced to fall into the error of denying that Christ’s humanity was therefore not 
anything at all (non aliquid), for insofar as he possessed a unique human nature, he was 
an aliquid composed of a human soul and a human body. 
Peter further explores the mystery of the Incarnation, the union of the forma Dei 
and the forma servi in Christ, by explicating and analyzing the three most prevalent 
“opinions” or theories of the hypostatic union in the West during the twelfth century. The 
first opinion, later named the assumptus homo theory by scholars,
78
 posited that the Word 
assumed a composite of body and soul and, therefore, a ‘man’ was assumed.  As the 
Lombard presents it, the proponents of this position held that in the Incarnation of the 
Word a certain man, made up of a rational soul and a human body, which thus constituted 
a true and full human being, began to be God, not through the nature of God but through 
the person of the Word.
79
 This man was assumed by the Word, is united to the Word, and 
(for all intent and purposes) is the Word. Given the prevalence of Augustine’s influence 
in the medieval Latin west, it is probably not surprising that proponents found a number 
of Augustinian texts that seem to authorize such a reading of the Incarnation, perhaps 
most appositely the statement that “Both are one, but one on account of the Word, the 
other on account of the man; not two sons, God and man, but one Son of God: God 
without beginning, man from a certain beginning.”80 As we shall see, Augustinian texts 
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  The three terms were coined by Bernhard Barth in “Ein neues Dokument zur Geschichte der 
frühscholastichen Christologie,” Theologische Quartalschrift [Tübingen] 100 (1919) 409-426; 101 (1920) 235-
262. 
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 C.f., D 6. 
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 Augustine, Enchiridion, 35: Unus Dei Filius, idemque hominis filius, unus hominis filius, idemque 
Dei Filius, non duo filii Dei, Deus et homo, sed unus Dei Filius; Deus sine initio, homo a certo initio. 
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can be found that seem to bolster the other two opinions as well.
81
 Lombard’s fear is that 
in establishing such a close analogy between the way the two natures are united in Christ 
and in the way which a soul and body are united in human beings, the assumptus-homo 
model produces a human individual who also possesses the power and knowledge of the 
divine nature. In fact, assumptus-homo-theorists effectively divinize the humanity of the 
Word, while theoretically keeping the two natures distinct, by actually creating a tertium 
quid that draws upon and mixes the two natures in order to arrive at the one Son of God.  
The second opinion summarized by Lombard came to be called the subsistence 
theory. Proponents of this opinion held that Christ was made up out of three substances: 
divinity, a human body, and a human soul. Before the incarnation, Christ was a unitary 
and simple person, but in the enfleshment he became a composite person made up of both 
divinity and humanity. There are not two persons, but one and the same person of the 
Word and of a man, a person who previously existed only in one nature but now subsists 
in and through two natures, not only through the human soul united to a human body but 
also through the divinity. Lombard harbors several reservations about this second 
theory’s resulting composite person, which in his estimation cannot be fully equated with 
the pre-existent person of the Word, since the incarnate Son must now subsist through his 
human elements in addition to his divinity. This indicates to Peter that the divinity of the 
pre-existent person has been somehow diluted in the process of being made man, which 
is impossible on two counts: the eternal and immutable person of the second person of 
the Trinity cannot undergo such change, and the notion of a composite person of the 
incarnate Son would seem to introduce a fourth person into the Trinity.  In addition, the 
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 C.f. Walter H. Principe, “Some Examples of Augustine’s Influence on Medieval Christology,” in eds. 
B. Bruning, M. Lamberigts, J. Van Houtem, Collectanea Augustiniana: Mélanges T.J. van Bavel, Bibliotheca 
Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 92-B (Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1990), pp. 955-974.  
49 
 
 
theory designates each of the components which constitute the incarnate Word—the 
body, soul, and divinity— as a separate substance, but a divine person is not a composite 
made up of parts, but rather is whole and complete for all eternity and lacks nothing—not 
even the Incarnation—to complete it.   
The third opinion is an adaptation of Augustine’s habitus theory, which held that 
in the Incarnation a human body and a human soul were assumed, but not as a composite; 
that is, the body and soul were not united so as to form a substance but were rather joined 
to the person of the Word in the mode of a habitus, thereby preserving the Word from 
any change, and also precluding the existence of two persons in Christ. This theory 
seemed to have the explicit endorsement of the Bishop of Hippo, not to mention a 
scriptural warrant from the Latin text of Philippians 2:7 (habitu inventus ut homo). The 
Lombard himself had seemingly endorsed a version of the theory in his earlier 
commentary on Philippians, pointing to Augustine’s definition of habitus, in which the 
Word assumes a servant-form without compromising or changing his divinity, much in 
the way that one puts on a garment.
82
 Moreover, Peter explains that the humanity that 
Christ assumed was comprised of both a body and a soul united in the person of Word.
83
  
In Sentences III, Lombard reiterates the Augustinian conception of the habitus according 
to the understanding that the Son emptied himself, not by changing his forma Dei, but by 
taking on the habit of a forma servi. However, this does not imply that he was changed or 
transformed into a man, hereby losing his unchangeable ontological status, rather the 
taker himself was made in the likeness of a man, that is, by having human form; and not 
for himself, but rather for those to whom he appeared in his human form. This last point 
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 In Epistolam ad Philippenses, 2:1-8, PL 192: 235A-D.  For Augustine, see the discussion of De 
diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q.73 above.  
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 Ibid, 2:1-8, PL 192: 231D-234C. 
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builds upon those epistemological dimensions of Augustine’s incarnational theories 
which construed that one of the principal functions of the Son’s humbly obedient 
enfleshment was to render humanly visible the invisible glory of God, and thereby 
elevate the human spirit from its sinful obsession with the merely material aspects of the 
world, upwards to a beatific contemplation of the transcendent Father. Notwithstanding 
this positive exposition of the habitus theory, Lombard’s evaluation of the third opinion 
in the Sentences is not unqualifiedly positive. Indeed, in his critical appraisal of 
contemporary appropriations of the habitus, Peter raises one especially troubling feature 
of the predominant twelfth-century version of the theory: it denies that Christ’s soul and 
body were joined to each other, but says that they were rather put on individually by the 
Word.  And even though this denial precludes the homo-assumptus error of 
understanding this to be the assumption of a man, it comes at the expense of Christ’s true 
humanity, because it posits that the Son’s assumed manhood is purely accidental and 
therefore partible. Thus, while the assumptus-homo theory threatens to absorb Christ’s 
humanity into his divinity by absorbing the humanity of Christ and changing it into 
something else, the habitus theory poses a similar threat, not only by making it difficult 
to conceive how the divine Word took on a human nature in such a way that the two 
natures became and continued to be united, but also by making it difficult to conceive 
how each nature retained its own distinctive characteristics after the union. With this final 
observation, Lombard comes to the end of his analysis of the various incarnational 
theories, without fully resolving their various conceptual liabilities, and therefore without 
openly endorsing any of the three opinions.  
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Peter Lombard’s discussion of Christ’s salvific role is also framed in the context 
of earlier twelfth-century debates regarding the correct understanding of the atonement in 
light of the incarnation. Whereas the traditional “ransom” model of salvation, instigated 
by Origen and elaborated by Gregory Nyssa, before being further developed by Gregory 
the Great in the West, centered on the idea that the fall had rendered humanity captives to 
the power of Satan, and that a price beyond the ability of any human ability to provide 
just recompose would have to be paid to the Devil in order to redeem fallen mankind—a 
debt which could only be satisfactorily paid by God in the person of the incarnate Son.
84
  
Beginning with Anselm of Canterbury, and then continuing with Peter Abelard and 
Bernard of Clairvaux, Latin theologians began to develop rival soteriological models. 
Anselm marks a decisive shift away for the Ransom model when he postulates that the 
price that must be paid is not due to Satan’s power but rather as recompense for God’s 
lost honor. This price is beyond any mere human capacity to remunerate, so of necessity 
it must be paid by the God-man, the enfleshed Son, who in voluntarily offering himself as 
an unspotted and blameless victim makes satisfaction to the Father on the cross, and 
thereby earns a reward from God that he then transfers to fallen humanity.
85
  This 
                                                          
84
 C.f. Gustav Aulén, Christus Victor: An Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea of the 
Atonement, trans. A.G. Hebert (New York: Macmillan, 1969); however, Aulén tends to simplify his portrayal of 
Anselm’s soteriology by invidiously contrasting it to an idealized Eastern model of salvation, one should 
supplement his account with more recent works, such as Gillian R. Evans, Anselm and Talking about God 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978); Brian Leftow, “Anselm on the Necessity of the Incarnation,” Religious Studies 
31 (1995), pp. 167-185; Richard Campbell, “The Conceptual Roots of Anselm’s Soteriology,” in eds. D. E. 
Luscombe and G. R. Evans, Anselm: Aosta, Bec and Canterbury (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), 
pp. 256-263; Giles E.M. Gasper, Anselm of Canterbury and His Theological Inheritance (Hampshire: Ashgate, 
2004); Sandra Visser and Thomas Williams, Anselm, Great Medieval Thinkers (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), pp. 213-240.  
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 Cur Deus Homo II.16. S 2.118.20-3. Thus, in Anselm’s Christology, one can say that the general 
ontological Christological tradition derived from Chalcedon (Christus in se) is pressed into the service of a 
functional Christology of the Son’s saving work (Christus pro nobis). See Eugene R. Fairweather, “Incarnation 
and Atonement: An Anselmian Response to Aulén’s Christus Victor,” Canadian Journal of Theology 7 (1961), 
pp. 167-175; Kevin McMahon, “The Cross and the Pearl: Anselm’s Patristic Doctrine of Atonement,” in ed. J.R. 
Fortin, Saint Anselm—His Origins and Influence (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001), pp. 57-69; Michael 
J. Deem, “A Christological Renaissance: The Chalcedonian Turn of St. Anselm of Canterbury,” The Saint 
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supererogatory gift recompenses the honor of God, and thus changes the Father’s 
relationship with humanity.  Abelard and Bernard differ from Anselm’s Satisfaction 
theory by stressing the point that the Incarnation was not necessary in order to change 
God’s unfailingly loving attitude towards humanity, but rather to change humanity vis–à–
vis God, which, according to Abelard, Christ accomplishes by demonstrating his 
infinitely merciful condescension in humbly becoming man, and through his teaching by 
word and example.
86
  In Bernard’s estimation, Christ triumphs over Satan by emptying 
himself, taking on a servant-form, and obediently enduring the sufferings of rejection and 
the crucifixion (Philippians 2: 6-8), thereby inspiring humans to empathetically repay the 
incarnate Son’s example with love towards God. Thus, Bernard agrees with Abelard that 
in addition to the objective debt paid by Christ through his sacrificial death on the cross, 
there is also an important subjective element, one which brings about an intrinsic change 
by eliciting an affective response within the heart of the redeemed.
87
 The Lombard will 
work out his own unique understanding of Christ’s saving work in dialogue with these 
older theories of atonement.    
                                                                                                                                                                             
Anselm Journal 2:1 (2004), pp. 42-51; David Brown, “Anselm on Atonement,” in eds. B. Davies and B. Leftow, 
The Cambridge Companion to Anselm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 279–302.  
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 C.f. Peter Abelard, Commentarii super S. Pauli epistolam ad Romanos, in PL 178, cols. 783-978.  
For secondary literature on Abelard’s theory of the atonement, see Richard E. Weingart, The Logic of Divine 
Love: A Critical Analysis of the Soteriology of Peter Abailard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970); John 
Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Thomas Williams, 
“Sin, Grace, and Redemption,” in ed. J. Marenbon, The Cambridge Companion to Abelard (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 258-277.    
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 C.f., Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermones super Cantica canticorum, in ed. J. Leclercq and H.M. Rochais, 
Sancti Bernardi Opera, vols. 1-2 (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1957-1958) 1: 11-14; 2: 2.6, 6.3-4, 11.7, 
22.3.3-4.9.  For secondary literature on Bernard’s soteriology, see Robert S. Franks, A History of the Doctrine of 
the Work of Christ, 2 vols. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1918), an older work that is still has many valuable 
insights;  John R. Sommerfeldt, The Spiritual Teachings of Bernard of Clairvaux, Cistercian Studies 125, 
(Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1991); G. R. Evans, Bernard of Clairvaux, Great Medieval Thinkers (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Mette B. Bruun, “Bernard of Clairvaux and the Landscape of Salvation,” 
in ed. B.P. McGuire, A Companion to Bernard of Clairvaux, Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition 
(Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 249-278.   
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Peter begins to explicate how exactly Christ merited salvation for fallen humanity 
through his passion in Distinction XVIII, where the kenotic hymn, and previous 
discussions about the Son’s incarnational self-emptying, will play a crucial role in that 
explication because Lombard grounds his soteriology in his doctrine of Christ’s full 
humanity.  It is precisely because Christ has a fully functional human will capable of 
being tempted, and yet freely chooses to align his will perfectly with the Father’s will 
which earns him merit for himself, which—being God—he does not need, so his this 
merit allows to earn redemption for humanity from the power of Satan, from sin, and the 
punishment due to sin.
88
  On account of his perfect obedience, Christ earns the glory of 
impassibility and immortality through his humbling exinanio or self-emptying, and by 
becoming obedient even to death on the cross, for which God the Father exalts him and 
gives him a name above all other names (Philippians 2:8-9).  Hence, the passion earned 
for Christ immortality and immunity from suffering in the hereafter, and Christ as human 
(forma servi), by being named Lord, is exalted or divinized, and thus we—as Christ’s 
members—are also redeemed from sin and death.89  So, while Christ’s passion, humility, 
and death could not increase his own portion of grace, since he possessed them from the 
instant of his Incarnation, nevertheless Christ’s sacrifice are the form and cause of our 
salvation.  It does so in a twofold way. As an exemplary form, because Christ’s perfect 
virtue and humility, his obedient assumption of a slave-form (Philippians 2:7), effects a 
change of heart in us, a turning away from sin and that enables us to receive the grace of 
salvation.  This line of argumentation is taken directly from Augustine, who Lombard 
quotes at this point: “In order that Christ might be made glorious by his resurrection, he 
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 Lombard follows the older soteriological model which believes that because of the fall the devil has 
acquired certain rights over fallen humanity, in this he mirrors Bernard of Clairvaux’s atonement theory. 
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 See Lombard, Sentences, III, d. 18, c. 5. 
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was first humbled by the passion; humility merits glory, and glory is the reward of 
humility. But all this was done in the form of a servant; glory, on the other hand, was and 
shall ever be in the form of God [Philippians 2:6-8].”90 This affective transformation 
brought about by the example of Christ’s sacrifice has clear parallels with Abelard’s and 
Bernard’s respective soteriologies.  In regard to the incarnate Son’s humanity, Lombard 
points out that if Christ were not truly human, then his suffering and death would not 
truly inspire a change of heart in us. Secondly, in terms of objective causality, it was the 
God-man’s consummate humility in obediently accepting death on our behalf which is 
the efficacious sacrifice that reconciles humanity, with its disobedient lack of humility, to 
the Father. Lombard thus combines the objective aspects of Christ’s atoning death on the 
cross, with the internal transformation which that sacrifice effectuates in, and he attempts 
to do so by linking the existence of the incarnate Son as both forma Dei and forma servi 
in the person of Christ(Christus in se), with the atoning mission of the Christological pro 
nobis. 
 
6. Aquinas: Kenoticism, Esse, Instrumentality, and Theandry in the Scriptum super 
Sententiis 
 
 
By the middle of the thirteenth century, Peter Lombard’s Sentences was firmly 
established as the dominant theological textbook of the schools, and producing a 
commentary on the Sentences had become one of the prerequisites for achieving the 
status of magister in theology. Thomas wrote his commentary, the Scriptum super libros 
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 In Evangelium Ioannis tractatus CXXIV, 104.3: Ut ergo mediator Dei et hominum homo Christus 
Iesus resurrectione clarificaretur vel glorificaretur, prius humiliatus est passione: non enim a mortuis 
resurrexisset, si mortuus non fuisset. Humilitas, claritatis est meritum; claritas, humilitatis est praemium. Sed hoc 
factum est in forma servi; in forma vero Dei semper fuit, semper erit claritas: imo non fuit quasi iam non sit, nec 
erit quasi nondum sit; sed sine initio, sine fine semper est claritas.  
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Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi episcopi Parisiensis (or Scriptum super 
Sententiis), from 1252 to 1256.  Like other commentaries from this time period, Thomas’ 
Scriptum follows the general order of topics found in the Sentences’ four books fairly 
closely, along with the distinctions and articles into which Alexander of Hales, who 
introduced Peter’s tome into the university curriculum in the early 1220s, had divided 
Lombard’s treatise.91 Nonetheless, commentators on the Sentences were not slow to 
introduce new topics into their annotations, some of them quite foreign to Lombard’s 
original text, but few were as innovative in their additions as the young Aquinas.  One of 
the topics that Thomas takes over from Peter, but which he expands in many unexpected 
ways, is the way that the kenotic hymn informs questions about the person and mission of 
Jesus Christ.
92
  For example, in D.5, q.1, a.2, which queries whether the hypostatic union 
was brought about in the nature, Thomas adduces several reasons why the incarnate 
Word would seem to have only one nature.  For example, since there is but one person of 
the Son from out of the divinity and humanity, as some of Augustine’s pronouncements 
on Philippians 2:6 may be construed, then it would appear that he possesses just one 
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 C.f. Ignatius Brady, “The Distinctions of Lombard’s Book of Sentences and Alexander of Hales,” 
Franciscan Studies 25 (1965), pp. 90-116; Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, vol. 1: The Person and 
His Work, revised edition, trans. R. Royal (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 
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 The only article exclusively examining Thomas’ use of the kenotic hymn is Wanda Cizewski, 
“Forma Dei – Forma Servi: A Study of Thomas Aquinas’ Use of Philippians 2: 6-7,” Divus Thomas 92:1-2 
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Philippians text, as evinced in his employment of the hymn in “unexpected contexts, using it as a clear, concise 
statement about the full humanity joined to true divinity in Christ,” p. 30. Among other topics, this dissertation 
will demonstrate that Thomas’ use of not just Philippians 2: 6-7, but of the entire kenotic hymn, displays a slow 
but profound development between the time of Aquinas’ earliest works, the Sentences commentary, and later 
treatises, perhaps most markedly in the Disputed Question on the incarnate Word, and may also help to explain 
the hymn’s deployment in a number of “unexpected contexts” in Thomas’ final Christological ruminations.  
56 
 
 
composite nature blending aspects of both.
93
 Furthermore, the practice of the 
communicatio idiomatum, which predicates human attributes to the divinity and divine 
characteristics to the humanity, would imply that there would be one mixed nature in the 
person possessing those attributes. Or, since the divine nature so far exceeds the human 
nature, when the two are united in the Son, perhaps the human nature is fully absorbed by 
the divine, or maybe even completely divinized, resulting in only one nature.
94
   
But Thomas firmly renounces such notions, observing that the term “nature,” 
which Aquinas takes to mean originally meant “to be born” (nascendo) was transferred to 
signifying the active principle of that generation, and from this it came to be used to 
signify the active principle of any natural motion.  In time, it further came to signifying 
the material and formal principles of any substance, that is, of any individually subsisting 
thing, so we can identify a particular human being—i.e., “this man”—insofar as a 
substance is signified by the term person or hypostasis; but it can also designate the 
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 E.g., Encheridion, 35, Wherefore Christ Jesus, the Son of God, is both God and man; God before all 
worlds; man in our world: God, because the Word of God and man, because in His one person the Word was 
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essence or conceptual definition of a being, which also serves to distinguish things from 
each other. So, if Christ had only one nature—a unitary principle of activity, it would 
mean that either there was a divine active principle in the Son, which would imply that no 
assumption of a human nature had occurred at the incarnation; or there was only a human 
nature or active principle present in Christ, which would make him an ordinary human 
being, and thus “the Incarnation comes to nothing.”  Or, alternatively, the divine nature 
changed into something essentially different when it joined to itself a human principle of 
activity, which is impossible, since the divine nature is immutable; or the human nature 
was transformed completely into the divine nature of God, which would signify that “the 
truth of the passion and of everything which Christ did corporeally would be 
destroyed.”95  Conversely, if one nature were composed from two, then some third mixed 
principle of activity would remain, resulting in an utterly material divine nature, but if 
this were the case, then the faith concerning Christ to be true God and true man would 
also be diminished. 
In this manner Thomas systematically eliminates a host of misapprehensions 
regarding the existence of the incarnate Christ (Christus in se) not only on ontological, 
but on soteriological grounds as well.  In both instances, Aquinas is always at pains to 
preserve the integrity of both natures. Indeed, Thomas will affirm that in Christ the divine 
nature and the human nature are each a being in act (divina autem natura et humana, 
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 3 d. 5 q. 1 a. 2 co.: Relictis ergo omnibus aliis significationibus naturae, secundum hanc tantum 
significationem quaeritur, utrum in Christo sit una natura vel plures. Si autem sit una tantum, vel altera earum 
tantum, vel composita ex utrisque. Si altera earum tantum, hoc erit dupliciter. Uno modo nulla adiunctione 
interveniente unius ad alteram; et sic si sit divina tantum, nihil novum accidit in hoc quod Verbum caro factum 
est, et incarnatio nihil est. Si vero sit humana tantum, non differt Christus ab aliis hominibus, et perit incarnatio. 
Alio modo altera naturarum transeunte in alteram; quod non potest esse: quia quae non communicant in materia, 
non possunt in invicem transire; divina autem natura penitus est immaterialis, nedum ut communicet humanae in 
materia. Praeterea si divina natura transiret in humanam, tolleretur simplicitas et immutabilitas divinae naturae; si 
vero humana verteretur in divinam, tolleretur veritas passionis, et omnium quae corporaliter operatus est 
Christus.  
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utraque est ens actu); in other words, even after the incarnation, each principle of motion, 
each nature, is actualized or brought into existence in its own essential integrity. As we 
shall see, this topic of the esse, or the respective acts of existence of the divinity and 
humanity of Christ, will come to play a pivotal role in Thomas’ later understanding of 
incarnation, but even in this early work, Aquinas is adamant in his affirmation of the 
complete reality of Christ’s human nature.  
The flesh is called deified not because it was made the Godhead, but 
because it was made the flesh of God, and also because it shares more 
abundantly the gifts of the Godhead from the fact that it was united to the 
Godhead, and because it is like an instrument through which the divine 
power accomplishes our salvation: for by touching the leper in the flesh he 
healed by the power of the Godhead, and by dying in the flesh he 
conquered death through the power of the Godhead. Now, the power of an 
agent is in some way in the instrument, by which means the agent does 
something.
96
 
 
The humanity of Christ has to be fully authentic since it will be the instrument through 
which God’s crucial work of salvation will be accomplished. Therefore, Aquinas retorts, 
the communication of idioms evinced in the miraculous healing of the leper (c.f., 
Matthew 8:1-4; Mark 1:40-45; Luke 5:12-16, 17:11-19) is not an indication of a 
composite nature into which the human principle of activity has been absorbed , but 
rather of Christ’s humanity and divinity working seamlessly together towards a common 
soteriological end. Thomas introduces here the vital concept of the instrumental character 
of the Word’s forma servi, a notion which he will explicate further in Distinction 18, 
when he takes up the subject of Christ’s meritoriously salvific passion and death.   
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 3 d. 5 q. 1 a. 2 ad 6: Quod caro dicitur deificata, non quia sit facta ipsa Divinitas, sed quia facta est 
Dei caro, et etiam quia abundantius dona Divinitatis participat ex hoc quod est unita Divinitati, et quia est quasi 
instrumentum per quod divina virtus salutem nostram operatur: tangendo enim leprosum carne sanavit per 
Divinitatis virtutem, et moriendo carne mortem vicit per virtutem Divinitatis. Virtus autem agentis aliquo modo 
est in instrumento, quo mediante aliquid agit.    
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Both Lombard and Aquinas agree that the three incarnational theories presented 
in Distinction VI are attempts to give a metaphysical account of Christ’s human nature. 
Medieval disputes concerning the reality of Christ’s human nature focused, as we have 
partly seen, on the question of whether the Son—insofar as he was human—was 
“something” (aliquid), and the challenge posed by the claim, erroneously attributed to 
twelfth-century exponents of the habitus theory and in time even to Peter Lombard, that 
“Christus secundum quod est homo, non est aliquid.”  In other words, that Christ’s 
humanity cannot be an independently subsistent entity, and therefore it is properly 
considered “nothing.”  After Lombard’s death, this kind of Christological nihilianism and 
the concern raised by this erroneous point of view, became so pronounced that it was 
eventually condemned by Pope Alexander III in 1170 and again 1177.
97
 Yet, the vexing 
question posed by the Philippians’ account of the Word’s kenosis remained: If natures do 
not have independent existence, then it seems we are committed to the disturbing view 
that Christ’s human nature is non aliquid. What is at stake here is the metaphysical status 
of Christ as man. In saying that Christ’s being a man does not entail that he is an aliquid, 
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 There is still considerable debate over whether Peter Lombard accurately related Augustine’s habitus 
theory as it was interpreted in the twelfth century, as well as its precise relation to the interpretation of the 
habitus that came to be known as Christological Nihilianism, or even if Peter was in fact a proponent of this 
problematic understanding of the third opinion presented in the Sentences. In my estimation, Lombard did not 
ascribe to Nihilianism, and actually offered a fairly balanced account of Christ’s human nature as aliquid. For 
further details regarding the vexed question of Lombard and the habitus theory see, among other works, P. 
Glorieux, “L’orthodoxie de III Sentences (d.6, 7 et 10),” in Miscellanea Lombardiana, pubblicata a chiusura 
delle celebrazioni centenarie organizzate in Novara per onorare Pietro Lombardo a cura del Pontificio Ateneo 
Salesiano di Torino (Novara: Istituto geografico De Agostini, 1957), pp.137-147; Horacio Santiago-Otero, “El 
‘nihilianismo’ cristológico y las tres opiniones,” Burgense: Collectanea Scientifica,10 (1969), pp.431-443; Lauge 
Olaf Nielsen, Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century: A Study of Gilbert Porreta's Thinking and the 
Theological Expositions of the Doctrine of the Incarnation during the Period 1130-1180, Acta Theologica 
Danica 15 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1982); Colish, Peter Lombard, vol. 1, pp. 427-438; idem., “Christological 
Nihilianism in the Second Half of the Twelfth Century,” Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 63 
(1996), pp.146-155. For Pope Alexander’s condemnations, see Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et 
declarationum de rebus fidei et morum, eds. H. Denzinger and A. Schönmetzer, S.J., 34
th
 ed. (Barcelona: Herder, 
1967), nos.749 and 750. 
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one seems to deny a sufficient degree of reality to the forma servi, the servant form or 
human nature, that Christ assumed.  
As we have explored at some length in this chapter, the term habitus had strong 
scriptural warrant in the kenotic hymn, and as an interpretive key for the incarnation its 
influence could be traced back through a highly influential theological tradition that 
originated in earliest Christianity.  And as we have also seen, one of the primary concerns 
for many twelfth-century proponents of the habitus theory was to effectively preclude the 
possibility of two persons in Christ after the Incarnation, which on their account the 
assumption of a human body with a soul would seem to entail, and also to foreclose the 
possibility of the Son’s exinanio necessitating a change in the forma Dei. So habitus-
theorists posited that the forma servi was united to the pre-existent Word in an accidental 
manner, hence the incarnate Christ could only be referred to as a man in an equivocal 
sense, because his humanity was non aliquid.
98
  In his critique of the habitus theory, 
Aquinas will focus on these claims of a purely accidental union, and the consequent use 
of equivocation to describe Christ’s humanity, in order to refute the third opinion.  
According to Thomas, in the habitus account the mere union of body and soul establishes 
the ratio, or character, of a man, indicating that the conjunction of a body and a rational 
soul is both necessary and sufficient for the formation of a human person.
99
  Aquinas will 
argue against this assertion by accepting the habitus-theorist’s line of reasoning regarding 
equivocation, but then turning that reasoning round against the habitus theory itself.  
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 See Walter H. Principe, “St. Thomas on the Habitus-Theory of the Incarnation,” in St Thomas 
Aquinas 1274-1974: Commemorative Studies, vol. 1 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), 
pp. 381-418.  
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 3 d. 6 q. 3 a. 1 co.: Tamen ista opinio videtur ex eodem fonte processisse cum prima, scilicet ex hoc 
quod credebant omne compositum ex anima et corpore habere rationem hominis; et ideo, quia prima opinio 
posuit animam et corpus unita ad invicem, esse assumpta, coacta fuit ponere hominem esse assumptum, et 
Christum esse duo. Haec autem opinio, ut hoc negaret, posuit animam et corpus esse assumpta non unita.  
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Thomas’ argument is that if it is indeed the case that the body is not a human body when 
separated from the soul, and the soul is not a human soul if it is never conjoined to a 
body, then it follows that if Christ’s assumed nature is not a true union of body and soul 
in Christ, then Christ is not a man truly and properly speaking, but only so equivocally, 
an implication that is obviously unacceptable from both a doctrinal and soteriological 
point of view.
100
  
In this respect, the error of the habitus theory mirrors the error of the assumptus-
homo theory, for both believe that the mere conjunction of a body and soul instantiates a 
human person.  Thus, according to the assumptus-homo-theorists, at the Incarnation the 
Word assumed as second person, with its own act of existence (esse), when it took for 
itself an ensouled human body, while the habitus-theorists deny that Christ assumed a 
body with a soul in order to prevent just such an erroneous misinterpretation of the 
incarnation, but in the process must deny any actual humanity to the enfleshed Son. 
Aquinas therefore embraces the alternative subsistence theory which holds that a 
composite of soul and body was assumed by Christ, but that this composite in and of 
itself does not constitute an independently subsistent person, as long as it is considered 
apart from its relation to the divine person of the Word. Aquinas thus contends that the 
conjunction of a soul and a body is necessary, but not sufficient; for it is also necessary 
that there be a subsistent person, with its own esse or act of existence, in order for there to 
be an authentic human being.  Hence the assumptum—that which is assumed—
considered in itself,  prescinding from the fact of its being united to the divine person of 
the Son, does not have the ratio of a man. Before the incarnation, the pre-existent Word 
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 3 d. 6 q. 3 a. 1 co.; the logic of Aquinas’ argument is explored at length in Jason L.A. West, 
“Aquinas on Peter Lombard and the Metaphysical Status of Christ’s Human Nature,” Gregorianum 88:3 (2007), 
pp. 557-586. 
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is only one person, utterly simple, with a divine essence (forma Dei), afterwards it is a 
composite person wherein divinity and humanity are united. There are not two persons, 
but one and the same person of the Word and of a man who now subsists in and through 
two natures. The person who was only divine has become a truly human being who 
subsists not only through the soul and the body but also through the divinity of the 
Word.
101
   
Hence, the notion of person cannot apply to the human nature standing by itself, 
for it only exists as a result of the union’s completion in the divine esse of the Son.  A 
habitus theory which ascribes an accidental union of natures would thus seem to posit a 
two-fold esse in Christ, with a divine act of existence extrinsically conjoined to an 
accidental human esse; the assumptus-homo model also posits a duplex esse wherein the 
person of the Word unites to himself an independently subsistent human person, so as a 
result there is an irreducible duality of being in Christ. In his exposition of the subsistence 
theory, Thomas attempts to circumvent these errors by positing a union of divinity and 
humanity in the Word according to a two-fold relation. This allows him to conceptualize 
the hypostatic union in such a way that all change is undergone on the part the assumed 
human nature (forma servi) when it is established in a new relation to the assuming Word 
(forma Dei), which as the terminus of that relation remains immutable.
102
  Moreover, this 
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 C.f., Michael B. Raschko, “Aquinas’ Theology of the Incarnation in Light of Lombard’s Subsistence 
Theory,” The Thomist 65 (2001), pp. 409-439; for a more critical view, see Michael Gorman, “Christ as 
Composite According to Aquinas, Traditio 55 (2000), pp. 143-157; idem., “Questions Concerning the Existences 
of Christ,” in eds. K. Emery, R. Friedman, A. Speer, Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages: A 
Tribute to Stephen F. Brown, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 105 (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 
pp. 709-735.  
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 3 d. 6 q. 2 a. 2 co.: Prima ergo opinio, quae ponit duo subsistentia, ponit duo esse substantialia; 
similiter tertia opinio, quia ponit quod partes humanae naturae adveniunt divinae personae accidentaliter, ponit 
duo esse, unum substantiale, et aliud accidentale; secunda vero opinio, quia ponit unum subsistens, et ponit 
humanitatem non accidentaliter advenire divinae personae, oportet quod ponat unum esse. Impossibile est enim 
quod unum aliquid habeat duo esse substantialia; quia unum fundatur super ens: unde si sint plura esse, 
secundum quae aliquid dicitur ens simpliciter, impossibile est quod dicatur unum. Sed non est inconveniens quod 
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preserves the unicity of personhood in the Incarnation, for insofar as the Son is one divine 
subsistent being, he has one uncreated act of existence (unius non est nisi unum esse. Sed 
Christus est unum, ut dictum est. Ergo habet unum esse tantum).
103
  In summary, the  
concrete human nature  of Christ  does not  subsist  as an  independent  human  
hypostasis  or  person,  nor is it simply abandoned bereft of a hypostasis, a non aliquid 
lacking reality; rather it subsists in the hypostasis of the divine Word. The human nature 
does not simply exist in the person of the Word—for that would be a merely accidental 
existence—rather, it subsists; that is, it exists in its own right, but only by, and so in that 
sense within the subsistence, the very being of the divine Word.
104
  On this this account, 
then, the humanity of Christ has no distinctive, separate, integral act of human existence 
(esse) of its own. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
esse unius subsistentis sit per respectum ad plura, sicut esse petri est unum, habens tamen respectum ad diversa 
principia constituentia ipsum: et similiter suo modo unum esse Christi habet duos respectus, unum ad naturam 
humanam, alterum ad divinam. As we will see, Aquinas will elaborate this theme of two-fold or mixed relatio at 
much greater length later in his career ST III, q.2, a.7.  C.f. A. Krempel, La doctrine de la relation chez Saint 
Thomas: Exposé historique et systématique (Paris: J. Vrin, 1952). Thomas G. Weinandy first addressed this topic 
in “Aquinas and the Incarnational Act: ‘Become’ as a Mixed Relation’” Doctor Communis 32 (1979), pp. 15-31, 
and has returned to in various subsequent works, including Does God Change? The Word’s Becoming in the 
Incarnation (Still River, M.A.: St. Bede’s Publications, 1985); and Does God Suffer? (Notre Dame, I.N.: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2000). His most recent essay touching upon subject of mixed relations in the 
incarnate Chris can be found in “Aquinas: God IS Man: The Marvel of the Incarnation,” in Aquinas on Doctrine: 
A Critical Introduction, ed. T. Weinandy, D. Keating, and J. Yocum (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), 
pp. 67-89.    
103
 3 d. 6 q. 2 a. 2 s. c. 3.  Aquinas will continue to reiterate the presence of only one act of existence 
(esse) in Christ in many subsequent works, among them Quodlibetal Questions, 9.2.2 (3), Compendium 
Theologiae, I, 212, and most notably ST III, q.17, a.1. However, in De unione Verbi Incarnati, 4, Aquinas 
seemingly reverses himself and posits a secondary non-accidental human esse in the incarnate Word. As I 
discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, this is not a repudiation of his prior position, but rather—as 
subsequent chapters will demonstrate—the end-point or the final fruition of Thomas’ on-going engagement and 
reassessment of the meaning of the incarnation. 
104
 Ibid: Aliquando tamen sumitur esse pro essentia, secundum quam res est: quia per actus 
consueverunt significari eorum principia, ut potentiae vel habitus. Loquendo igitur de esse secundum quod est 
actus entis, sic dico, quod secundum secundam opinionem oportet ponere tantum unum esse; secundum alias 
autem duas oportet ponere duo esse. Ens enim subsistens, est quod habet esse tamquam eius quod est, quamvis 
sit naturae vel formae tamquam eius quo est: unde nec natura rei nec partes eius proprie dicuntur esse, si esse 
praedicto modo accipiatur; similiter autem nec accidentia, sed suppositum completum, quod est secundum omnia 
illa. Unde etiam Philosophus dicit in 2 Metaph., quod accidens magis proprie est entis quam ens. As I will later 
explore, the non-accidental secondary human act of existence in Christ, the esse secundarium of De unione Verbi 
Incarnati, 4, may perhaps finds its earliest precursor in these observations. 
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Distinctions 17, 18, and 19 of book III of the Sentences Comentary all deal with a 
series of closely allied soteriological concerns: the presence and salvific efficacy of a 
human will in the incarnate Word, the merit that Christ earned in regard to himself and 
for others through the saving work of his passion, death, and resurrection, and finally the 
redemption from sin that Christ accomplished in his mediatorial and atoning death.  At 
this juncture Aquinas’ commentary departs considerably from Lombard’s earlier 
treatment, adding several new subjects that were not covered by Peter in the original. 
Perhaps Thomas’ most significant departure is the attention which he devotes to the 
question of whether there is a human operation in Christ that is distinct from the divine 
operation of God, a question that was undoubtedly suggested to him by his reading of 
John Damascene on this subject. As it turns out, this is an absolutely crucial question for 
Aquinas, since the very possibility of Christ meriting at all for us will depend on a 
meaningfully affirmative answer. Throughout his analysis, Aquinas will repeatedly recall 
the ontological doctrine of the two natures, in order to safeguard the reality of human 
activity, alongside that of the actions of the divinity. In the course of this exposition in 
Distinction 18, Thomas will draw attention to a couple of key interrelated concepts: The 
incarnate Son must have two distinct operations proceeding from his two distinct natures, 
and these two natures must also be so united that the human nature will be utilized as an 
instrumental cause by the divine Word.  In other words, each of the operations must be 
integrally distinct yet theandric (divine-human); that is, produced by God through the 
assumed humanity in the one person of Christ Jesus, in order for that salvific activity to 
be truly efficacious.   
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Theandry is the older of these two concepts, introduced by Pseudo-Dionysius the 
Areopagite, the purported pagan converted by the Apostle Paul at the Areopagus in 
Athens (Acts 17: 16-34), but in reality probably an anonymous late fifth-century monk.  
In his Fourth Epistle Dionysius attempts to answer the questions of a monk named Gaius, 
who was puzzled by references to Jesus as a man, since he was also said to be utterly 
transcendent. In his reply, Dionysius states that Christ is called man because he was 
“quite truly a man in all essential respects.” 105 However, Dionysius is quick to affirm 
that Christ is not an ordinary man, but in another sense completely beyond humanity. 
Christ became man out of love for humanity: “But we do not confine our definition of 
Jesus to the human domain, for he is not simply a man, nor would he be transcendent if 
he were only a man. Out of his great love for humanity, he became quite truly a human, 
both supra-human and yet like humans;” and—in a phrase reminiscent of Philippians 2:6-
7—( ἀμέλει τῇ ταύτης περιουσίᾳ) “without concern for the fullness of his being, even 
though himself beyond being, he took upon himself the being of humans.” Yet, He is 
transcendent and remained so even after His taking on of the human flesh: “he is not less 
overflowing with transcendence.”106 The proof that Christ was a true man, while still 
remaining transcendent, is his actions pertaining to humans; for example, his birth from a 
virgin mother and his walking on water: “[Jesus] does the work of a man. A proof for this 
is that a virgin supernaturally bore him and that flowing water, bearing the weight of his 
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 Epistle 4 PG 3.1072 B: “κατ᾽ οὐσίαν ὅλην ἀληθῶς ἄνθρωπος ὤν”. Unless otherwise indicated, the 
English text quoted in this work is that of C. Luibheid and P. Rorem’s translation of the Corpus Dionysiacum: 
Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works (New York, Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1987), pp. 264-265. 
106
 Ibid., “Ἰησοῦν οὐκ ἀνθρωπικῶς ἀφορίζομεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος μόνον οὐδὲ ὑπερούσιος, εἰ 
ἄνθρωπος μὀνον, ἀλλ᾽ἄνθρωπος ἀληθῶς ὁ διεφερόντως φιλάνθρωπος, ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπους καὶ κατὰ ἀνθρώπους ἐκ 
τῆς ἀνθρώπων οὐσίας ὁ ὑπερούσιος οὐσιωμένος  Ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲν ἧττον ὑπερουσιότητος ὑπερπλήρης ὁ ἀεὶ 
ὑπερούσιος, ἀμέλει τῇ ταύτης περιουσίᾳ.”  
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corporeal, earthly feet, did not yield, but, rather, held him up with supernatural power.”107 
Dionysius concluded that in the final analysis the incarnate Word was neither human nor 
nonhuman, since “[Christ] did not do what is divine as God, nor what is human as man, 
but instead [as] God having become man, He has administered to [or, arranged for] us a 
certain, new divine-human activity” (οὐ κατὰ θεὸν τὰ θεῖα δράσας, οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια 
κατὰ ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνδρωθέντος θεοῦ, καινήν τινα τὴν θεανδρικὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡμῖν 
πεπολιτευμένος).  The earliest students of Pseudo-Dionysius read this final line as 
advocating one of two possible views, one which insisted on a unitary, divine nature 
(Monophysitism) in Jesus after the Incarnation, which therefore possessed only one 
divine operation; or a second view which claimed that the enfleshed Son had one, 
composite (synthetos) divine-human nature, and therefore one composite activity which 
was neither strictly divine nor purely human.
108
   
At this point in his scholarly career, the young Thomas was unaware of the 
checkered tradition of this Dionysian term, and accepts it in the thoroughly Chalcedonian 
manner espoused by John of Damascus in the wake of the sixth and seventh century 
Christological debates, as when the Damascene writes that “when God became man, that 
is to say, was incarnate, his human operation was divine, that is to say, deified. And it 
was not excluded from his divine operation, nor was his divine operation excluded from 
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 Ibid., “[Ἰησοῦς] ἐνήργει τὰ ἀνθρὠπου. Καὶ δηλοῖ παρθένος ὑπερφυῶς κύουσα καὶ ὕδωρ ἄστατον 
ὑλικῶν καὶ γεηρῶν ποδῶν ἀνέχον βάρος καὶ μὴ ὑπεῖκον, ἀλλ᾽ὑπερφεῖ δυνάμει πρὸς τὸ ἀδιάχυτον 
συνιστάμενον.” 
108
  Debate has long surrounded this expression, questioning both the correct reading of the text – some 
manuscripts have ‘one theandric energy,’ others have ‘new theandric energy’ – and even the true meaning of the 
expression θεανδρικὴν ἐνέργειαν. C.f., K. P. Wesche, “Christological Doctrine and Liturgical Interpretation in 
Pseudo-Dionysius” St. Vladimir’s Quarterly 33:1 (1989), pp. 53-74; István Perczel, “The Christology of Pseudo-
Dionysius the Areopagite: The Fourth Letter in its Indirect and Direct Text Traditions,” Le Muséon 117 (2004), 
pp. 409-446.  
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his human operation. On the contrary, each is found in the other.” 109 This reading of the 
concept was promulgated by Thomas’ mentor, Albert the Great, perhaps the first Latin 
schoolman to incorporate the notion of theandry into his Christology, and who invariably 
interprets Dionysius as advocating the position that Christ activities are always to be 
construed as the operations of the ontologically united God-man employing the capacities 
inherent in both his divine and human natures. 
110
  So, when Aquinas raises the first 
objection on the topic of whether there is a distinct operation in Christ apart from the 
divine activity, he promptly advances the conjecture that “it seems that in Christ there is 
only one action. Indeed, Dionysius called the operation of Christ theandricam; that is to 
say, divine-human. However, this does not mean different actions, but one action in 
Christ, so there is only one action of divinity and humanity.”111  Aquinas subsequently 
gives the answer that he reads in both Damascene and Albert, that Dionysius calls the 
action of Christ theandric not because there is only one action of divinity and humanity in 
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 De Fide orthodoxa, III, 19. John goes on to explain: “Thus, the theandric operation shows this: Now, 
when one expresses two things with one word, this figure of speech is called circumlocution. Thus, while we 
speak of the cut burn and the burnt cut of the red-hot knife, we nevertheless hold the cutting to be one operation 
and the burning another, the one belonging to one nature and the other to the other—the burning to the fire and 
the cutting to the steel. In the very same way, when we speak of one theandric operation of Christ, we understand 
the two operations of his two natures: the divine operation of the divinity and the human operation of the 
humanity.” C.f. Saint John of Damascus: Writings, trans. F.H. Chase, Jr., Fathers of the Church 37 (New York: 
Fathers of the Church, 1958), p. 323.  
110
  In Albert’s own commentary on the Sentences (Commentarii in III, d.17, a.5, ad 4), Pseudo-
Dionysius’ expression theandric is introduced, with the explanation that “there are distinct actions in Christ, not 
in comparison to the one acting, namely that Christ is many actors, but with respect to the principle of the acting, 
namely because he sometimes acted as man, sometimes as God” (Ad aliud dicendum, quod in Christo sunt 
actiones distinctae: non in comparatione ad agentem, scilicet quod Christus sit plures agentes: sed quoad 
rationem agendi, scilicet quia aliquando egit ut homo, aliquando ut Deus). It is clear to Albert that in both cases 
the incarnate Christ acted as the God-man, for Damascene, he explains, understood Christ’s operations in terms 
of the natural powers involved in an act. Hence, the one actor Christ acted always as the God-man, exercising 
both the divine and human natural powers. Moreover, Albert takes this to imply that Christ’s every action was as 
the God-man and therefore was salvific: “Et nota, quod hoc ipsum quod agens fuit unus Deus et homo, et 
inclinantia ad actum duo, scilicet creatum et increatum, facit omnem Christi actionem nobis salutarem: quia 
etiamsi comedit et dormivit, verum erat quod Deus hoc fecit: et ita pro nobis fecit, qui pro se non habuit quid 
faceret talium. Et idem est de tristitia, timore, et omnibus aliis.” 
111
 3 d. 18 q. 1 a. 1 arg. 1: Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Christo sit tantum una actio. 
Dionysius enim actionem Christi nominat theandricam, idest deivirilem. Hoc autem non diversas actiones, sed 
unam significat. Ergo in Christo est tantum una actio divinitatis et humanitatis.  
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Christ, but rather because the actions of the two natures are united since they are 
performed by the one ontological subject, the person of the Word, seen—for example—in 
the unitary effect of the Word’s salvific actions, such as the cleansing of the leper.112 
John of Damascus was the first theologian to describe Christ’s human nature as an 
instrument of his divinity (instrumentum Divinitatis, οργανον της θεοτητος).113 
Damascene’s insight grew out of his understanding that a nature is never found except 
within a hypostasis, a person, and that person’s never act except in and through a nature. 
Hence, Damascene argues, if a nature is the principle of activity, then Christ’s two 
natural operations should not be seen as a form of dualism, but rather as the two natural 
operations through which the unitary ontological subject of the incarnate Word acts; and 
it is in relation to this distinction between the person of Christ, and the duality of natural 
principles through which he operates, that John will interpret the communicatio 
idiomatum.
114
 Thus, even though the divine and human operations of Christ are distinct, 
they are nevertheless not separated, for the divine nature indwells the human nature in 
such a way that the human operations of Christ are instruments for the operations and 
                                                          
112
 3 d. 18 q. 1 a. 1 ad 1: “Primo quantum ad ipsum suppositum agens actionem divinam et humanam, 
quod est unum. Secundo quantum ad unum effectum, qui dicitur opus operatum, vel apotelesma secundum 
Damascenum, sicut mundatio leprosi.” In chapter four I explain how Aquinas’ later theology, particularly in the 
tertia pars of the ST and De Unione, reinterprets the Fourth Epistle’s pronouncements on Christ’s theandric 
operations in the light of his growing familiarity with post-Chalcedonian Dyothelite Christology.   
113
 “Instrumentum enim caro deitatis extitit. Et si igitur ex summa conceptione nihil divisum fuit 
alterutrius formae, sed unius personae omnis temporis actus alterutrius formae facti sunt, tamen ipsa quae 
indivisibiliter facta sunt, secundum nullum modum confundimus, sed quid cuius fuerit formae ex operum 
qualitate sentimus” (De Fide orthodoxa, III.15). This is the Latin version Aquinas would have used; c.f., John of 
Damascus, De fide orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus, ed. E.M. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, NY: 
Franciscan Institute/Louvain-Paderborn: E. Nauwelaerts-Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 1955).  For a general 
overview of Damascene and his Christological work, see Keetje Rozemond, La christologie de saint Jean 
Damascène, Studia Patristica et Byzantina, vol. 8 (Buch Kunstverlag Ettal, 1959); Andrew Louth, St. John 
Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).  
114
  De Fide orthodoxa, III, 19: “For we hold that the two operations are not divided and that the natures 
do not act separately, but that each conjointly in complete community with the other acts with its own proper 
activity.... We speak sometimes of His two natures and sometimes of His one person: and the one or the two is 
referred to one conception. For the two natures are one Christ and the one Christ is two natures. Wherefore it is 
all the same whether we say “Christ acts according to either of His natures," or “either nature acts in Christ in 
communion with the other.” 
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effects of his divine life.  Thus, when Christ heals a leper, he wills humanly to touch the 
man with the fleshly hand of his forma servi, yet the power of healing that proceeds forth 
from his human hand originates in the divinity (forma Dei) present in his person. This is 
nowhere more the case than with respect to the human mind and will of Christ, “since the 
latter are the human mind and will of God incarnate, they must operate according to their 
intrinsically natural principles, yet they are also altered as to their mode so as to function 
in concord with the divine life and will that dwell within the Word.”115 
Given the overwhelming import of John of Damascus’ De fide in scholastic 
theology, especially in regards to Christology, it is remarkable that Thomas Aquinas was 
the first scholastic theologian to use the notion of instrumental causality in his 
examination of the Incarnation.
116
  Aquinas’ earliest treatment of the instrumental relation 
between the two natures and their operations is found in his commentary on question 1, 
article 1 of Distinction 18. As we shall see in the next chapter, Aquinas’ understanding of 
Christ’s instrumental causality was to develop notably between the time he wrote the 
                                                          
115
  Thomas Joseph White, “Dyotheletism and the Instrumental Human Consciousness of Jesus,” Pro 
Ecclesia 17:4 (2008), pp. 396-422, here at p. 405. As White superbly demonstrates, Damascene reads the 
communication of idioms through the theandric instrumentality of Christ’s humanity, and in light of the 
Dyothelite consensus, forged in the wake of the Sixth Ecumenical Council (Constantinople III) in 681, regarding 
Christ’s two natures, two wills, and two operations. The next several chapters of this dissertation recount Thomas 
retrieval of that consensus and his subsequent elaboration of two theandrically inter-communicative acts of 
existence in the incarnate Word. C.f., De fide orthodoxa, III, 15: “For through both, that is through the energy of 
the body and the energy of the soul, He displayed one and the same, cognate and equal divine energy. For just as 
we say that His natures were united and permeate one another, and yet do not deny that they are different but 
even enumerate them, although we know they are inseparable, so also in connection with the wills and the 
energies we know their union and we recognize their difference... without introducing separation. For just as the 
flesh was deified without undergoing change in its own nature, in the same way also will and operation are 
deified without transgressing their own proper limits. For whether He is the one or the other, that is as God or as 
man, He is one and the same.” 
116
 See Edouard Hugon, “La causalité instrumentale de l’humanité sainte de Jésus,” Revue thomiste 13 
(1905), pp. 44-68; Humbert Bouëssé, “La causalité efficiente instrumentale et la causalité méritoire de la sainte 
humanité du Christ,” Revue thomiste 44 (1938), pp. 256-298; Joseph Lecuyer, “La causalité efficiente des 
mystères du Christ selon saint Thomas,” Doctor Communis 6 (1953), pp. 91-120; Nicholas Crotty, “The 
Redemptive Role of Christ’s Resurrection,” Thomist 25 (1962), pp. 54-106; Jean-Pierre Torrell, “La causalité 
salvifique de la résurrection du Christ selon saint Thomas,” Revue thomiste 96 (1996), pp. 179-208; Philip L. 
Reynolds, “Philosophy as the Handmaid of Theology: Aquinas on Christ’s Causality,” in ed. F. Kerr, 
Contemplating Aquinas: On the Varieties of Interpretation (London: SCM, 2003), pp. 217-245. 
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Sentences commentary and the Summa Theologiae.
117
  Here, Thomas will only go so far 
as to describe the instrumental causality of Christ’s human nature as a means of disposing 
us for the reception of grace by meriting salvation on our behalf.
118
  The question posed 
by Thomas is whether there is only one source of activity in Christ. Aquinas frames the 
argument by pointing out that a singular action belongs to both the instrument that carries 
out an action and to the principle or cause of that activity. Quoting Damascene, Thomas 
notes that in the incarnate Word the flesh was the instrument of the divinity; therefore it 
would seem that there was but one action of Christ according to both his divinity and his 
humanity.
119
 A diversity of causes will be followed by a diversity of effects. The cause of 
an action is the species of that which acts, and whatever acts does so by reason of 
whatever form it has. Where there are diverse forms, there are therefore diverse actions, 
                                                          
117
  Thomas’ presentation of Christ’ human nature as the instrument of the divinity changed throughout 
his works, as can be seen by contrasting his commentary on d.18 with various other parallel texts: Summa Contra 
Gentiles IV, 36; De Veritate q.20, a.1, ad 2; Comp. c. 212; De Unione q.1, a.1, ad 16 and a.5; ST III, q.19, a.1.  
For secondary literature on the instrumentality of Christ’s human nature, cf.  Theophil Tschipke, L’humanité du 
Christ comme instrument de salut de la divinité, Studia Friburgensia 94, trans. P. Secrétan (Fribourg: Academic 
Press, 2003); Joseph Wawrykow, “Instrumental Causality,” The Westminster Handbook to Thomas Aquinas, 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), pp. 75-76; Corey L. Barnes, Christ’s Two Wills in 
Scholastic Thought: The Christology of Aquinas and Its Historical Contexts, Studies and Texts 178 (Toronto: 
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2012). T. Tschipke, L’humanité du Christ, p.112, notes that, despite the 
heavy use of the Damascene by Albert the Great, Bonaventure, and various other thirteenth-century theologians, 
only Thomas offers an account of Christ’s human nature as instrument of the divinity. 
118
 E.g., 3 d. 18 q. 1 a. 6 qc. 1 co: dicit Damascenus, caro Christi et anima erat quasi instrumentum 
deitatis, unde quamvis esset alia operatio Dei et hominis, tamen operatio humana habebat in se vim divinitatis 
sicut instrumentum agit vi principalis agentis: et propter hoc dicit Damascenus quod ea quae hominis sunt, supra 
hominem agebat; unde et actio Christi meritoria, quamvis esset actio humana, tamen agebat in virtute divina: et 
ideo erat potestas ei supra totam naturam, quod non poterat esse de aliqua operatione puri hominis, quia homo 
singularis est minus dignus quam natura communis: quia divinius est bonum gentis quam bonum unius hominis. 
Et quia omnes homines sunt unus homo in natura communi, ut dicit Porphyrius, inde est quod meritum Christi, 
quod ad naturam se extendebat, etiam ad singulos se extendere poterat; et ita aliis mereri potuit. This passage and 
other relevant texts in the Sentences commentary, posit that the instrumental causality of Christ’s human nature 
only functions in meritorious and dispositive manner, but we shall see how by the time he writes the tertia pars 
of the ST, Thomas depicts Christ’s humanity as an instrument participating in the power of the principal cause. 
God remains that principal divine causal agent, but Christ’s humanity participates in it as an efficient 
instrumental cause. Christ, in his humanity, makes satisfaction for human sin and acts as cause of salvation, even 
though the divine person of the Word is the subject of all of Christ’s actions. C.f., James S. Albertson, 
“Instrumental Causality in St. Thomas,” The New Scholasticism 28:4 (1954), pp. 409-435; Paul G. Crowley, 
“Instrumentum Divinitatis in Thomas Aquinas: Recovering the Divinity of Christ,” Theological Studies 52 
(1991), pp. 451-475.  
119
 3 d. 18 q. 1 a. 1 arg. 4: “…instrumenti et principalis agentis est tantum una actio. Sed, sicut dicit 
Damascenus, caro est instrumentum divinitatis. Ergo est una actio Christi secundum divinitatem et 
humanitatem.”  
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just as fire both dries things out and warms things up, and just as a person hears through 
the sense of hearing and sees through the sense of sight. Similarly, by virtue of his 
distinct natures, Christ had diverse actions.
120
  Embracing Damascene’s understanding of 
instrumentality, Thomas responds to the objection by pointing out that in Christ each of 
the natures will have their own causal principles, that operations proper to the human 
nature itself will bring about its own proper actions, but that these two causal orders 
cooperate with each other through a relationship of instrumental causality by which the 
two natures work together, one moved by the other: “the instrument does not act except 
as moved by the principal agent, and acts in virtue of the principal agent. And by this 
means of action there is some kind of power in the humanity of Christ, inasmuch as the 
humanity itself is the instrument of divinity.” 121 More often than not, however, Thomas 
identifies Christ’s humanity as primarily a disposing cause, implying an efficient causal 
role to the actions of the assumed human nature of the Word, but as we shall see, this is 
almost inevitably reduced to a kind of meritorious satisfaction. 
In addition, in these instances Aquinas always highlights the divine initiative in 
the meritorious activity of Christ’s humanity, limiting the causal efficacy of the created 
humanity to the secondary role of preparing the believer for the exclusively divine 
infusion of sanctifying grace.
122
 
                                                          
120
  3, d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, resp. 
121
 3, d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4: Inquantum scilicet instrumentum non agit nisi motum a principali agente, et 
agit in virtute principalis agentis. Et hoc modo in ipsa actione humanitatis Christi est aliqua virtus, inquantum 
ipsa humanitas est instrumentum Divinitatis.  
122
 3, d. 19, a. 1, qla. 1, c.: Delere peccatum dicitur dupliciter. . . . Alio modo dicitur effective. Et hoc 
contingit tripliciter, secundum tria genera causae efficientis. Dicitur enim causa efficiens, uno modo perficiens 
effectum, et hoc est principale agens inducens formam; et sic Deus solus peccatum delet, quia ipse solus gratiam 
infundit. Alio modo dicitur efficiens, disponens materiam ad recipiendum formam: et sic dicitur peccatum delere 
ille qui meretur peccati deletionem, quia ex merito efficitur aliquis dignus quasi materia disposita ad recipiendum 
gratiam, per quam peccata deleantur. Hoc autem contingit dupliciter: vel sufficienter, vel insufficienter. 
Sufficienter quidem disposita est materia, quando fit necessitas ad formam: et similiter sufficienter aliquis per 
meritum disponitur ad aliquid, quando illud sibi efficitur debitum; et hoc est meritum condigni. . . . Solus autem 
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Aquinas then utilizes this nascent, still somewhat underdeveloped notion of 
instrumentality to further explicate the question of the purpose, role, and function of 
Christ’s merit in the economy of salvation. Aquinas initially adopts a basic version of the 
Anselmian satisfaction theory as presented by the Lombard, but goes on to strengthen the 
links between Christ’s redemptive activity and our participation in it to a much greater 
degree, primarily by taking up and elaborating Peter’s dual concepts of form and cause in 
the atonement. As we have already seen, Lombard’s Distinction 18 argues that Christ did 
not need the merit that the passion provided in order to gain the rewards that he receive 
from the Father, foremost among them the bestowal of the name that is above every name 
(Philippians 2:9-11)  So, Lombard goes on to ask, why precisely did Christ undertake his 
passion?  He underwent the passion for us (pro nobis), not for himself, Lombard answers, 
so that his suffering, death, and resurrection would be both the form (forma) and the 
cause (causa) of salvation in us.  In many ways, these two terms, forma and causa, 
summarize the theological soteriology of both the mature Peter Lombard and the young 
Thomas Aquinas. As we have already briefly ascertained, for the Lombard, forma 
indicates the moral meaning of Christ’s passion, inasmuch as the Son’s sacrifice offers 
striking examples of human virtue, perhaps—above all—the example of his humility, 
which as we saw Paul advocates to the Philippians, and which Lombard would have 
understood Augustine strongly highlights in his interpretation of the Philippians hymn.
123
 
Causa embodies the objective efficaciousness of Christ’s passion, a salvific efficacy 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Christus aliis potest sufficienter mereri: quia in naturam potest, inquantum Deus est, et caritas sua quodammodo 
est infinita, sicut et gratia, ut supra dictum est, dist. 13, q. 1, a. 2, quaestiunc. 2. In hoc autem pro tota natura 
meruit, in quo debitum naturae, scilicet mortis quae pro peccato ei debebatur, exsolvit ipse peccatum non habens; 
ut sic non pro se mortem solvere teneretur, sed pro natura solveret; unde satisfaciendo pro natura tota, 
sufficienter meruit deletionem peccatorum aliis qui peccata habebant.Tertio modo dicitur agens instrumentale; et 
hoc modo sacramenta peccata delent, quia sunt instrumenta divinae misericordiae salvantis.  Also see, 3, d. 18, a. 
6, qla. 1, s.c. 1; and IV, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, qla. 3, ad 1.   
123
 See Lombard, Sentences, III, d. 18, c. 1; d. 19, c. 1-5.  
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made possible because of the activity undertaken by Christ in his forma servi.  On the 
moral, exemplary side, Lombard also mentions virtue of humility, along with obedience 
(Philippians 2:8), as the causes of glory, liberty, and redemption from sin, punishment, 
and the devil. In Lombard’s understanding these two, form and cause, cannot be 
separated, since for him the means by which salvation is brought about centers around 
humility. The greatness of the Christ’s humility, as exemplified in his kenotic self-
emptying and assumption of the forma servi, is located opposite of the pride of Adam, 
and the obedient death on the cross of the Son as the means of conquering the death 
which has befallen the descendants of Adam; a humility which in its exemplarity, in turn 
elicits an inward transformation within the believer.
124
 
Aquinas fundamentally agrees with this aspect of Lombard’s soteriology, and in 
his Sentences commentary he presents an argument concerning the correspondence 
between Christ’s satisfaction and the satisfactions of the faithful, where he stresses that 
this relationship is primarily one of exemplarity, for the incarnate Son is the “model of all 
salvation.”125  In Thomas’ estimation, it is incorrect to assume that satisfaction is solely 
on the side of cause, for it must be efficacious on the moral, exemplary side as well.
126
  In 
other words, while Aquinas adopts Damascene’s language of Christ’s humanity as an 
                                                          
124
 Cf. Franks, Work of Christ, vol. 1, pp. 167-176; Colish, Lombard, vol.1, pp. 459-470; Rosemann, 
Lombard, pp. 135-139.  
125
 3 d. 20, q. 1 a. 3 co.: “Respondeo dicendum, quod Christi satisfactio fuit non pro uno homine 
tantum, sed pro tota humana natura; unde duas conditiones concernere debuit: ut esset universalis respectu 
omnium satisfactionum quodammodo, et ut esset exemplaris omnium satisfactionum particularium. Universalis 
autem erat non per praedicationem de multis, quasi per multas particulares satisfactiones multiplicata, sed habens 
virtutem respectu omnium; unde non oportebat quod ipse omnes poenas quae ex peccato quocumque modo 
consequi possent, assumeret in seipso; sed illam ad quam omnes ordinantur, et quae continet in se virtute omnes 
poenas, quamvis non actu. Finis autem omnium terribilium est mors, ut dicit philosophus, 3 Ethic.; et ideo per 
passionem mortis debuit satisfacere. Inquantum vero fuit exemplaris respectu nostrarum satisfactionum, debuit 
habere magnitudinem excedentem omnes alias satisfactiones, quia exemplar debet esse praestantius exemplato; 
et ideo secundum maximam poenarum debuit satisfacere, scilicet mortem.” 
126
 See Henk J.M. Schoot, “Divine Transcendence and the Mystery of Salvation According to Thomas 
Aquinas,” in eds. H. Goris, H. Rikhof, H. Schoot, Divine Transcendence and Immanence in the Work of Thomas 
Aquinas, Publications of the Thomas Instituut te Utrecht 13 (Leuven/Walpole, MA: Peeters 2009), pp. 255-281. 
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instrument of the divinity in regard to satisfaction, he nevertheless emphasizes the role of 
that humanity chiefly as a disposing cause of satisfaction in humans.  Hence, even though 
Thomas hints at an efficient causal efficacy in Christ’s sacrifice that will actualize the 
power of saving grace in the believer, this language is ultimately reduced in the Sentences 
commentary to a case of Christ’s meritorious satisfaction, a form at best of moral 
causality.  To be more precise, Christ merits salvation for us in his humanity, but has no 
direct relation to its efficient soteriological influence upon the soul, since Thomas has 
largely restricted the efficacy of the created cause to the task of preparing the human 
person for the exclusively divine infusion of sanctifying grace.
127
  Thus, while Aquinas 
gives repeated expression in his ontological model of the incarnate Son’s being (Christus 
in se) to the absolute necessity for a truly human mode of being and acting in Christ, this 
is significantly undermined, or at least largely unsupported, by a soteriological model 
which fails to adequately explain the importance of Christ’s human sacrifice for us 
(Christus pro nobis) apart from its functional exemplarity.
128
  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In the Christ hymn preserved as chapter two, verses five through eleven, of Paul’s 
Epistle to the Philippian, we encounter a text which posits the existence of a pre-existent 
Christ who is found in the form of God (forma Dei), yet willingly undergoes a kenosis or 
                                                          
127
 3, d. 13, q. 2, a. 1, ad. 3. 
128
 In the course of the next few chapters I will demonstrate that one can detect a clear development of 
the notion of instrumental causality in Aquinas, and that this evolution allows Thomas to establish the 
philosophical groundwork that will allow him to grasp the theoretical importance and soteriological 
consequences for post-Chalcedonian Christology of Christ’s human esse. C.f. Bernhard Blankenhorn, “The 
Instrumental Causality of the Sacraments: Thomas Aquinas and Louis-Marie Chauvet,” Nova et Vetera 4:2 
(2006), pp. 255–294; idem., “The Place of Romans 6 in Aquinas’s Doctrine of Sacramental Causality: A Balance 
of History and Metaphysics,” in eds. R. Hütter and M. Levering, Ressourcement Thomism: Sacred Doctrine, the 
Sacraments, and the Moral Life (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), pp. 136-
149.  
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self-emptying whereby the Word assumes humanity in the form of a servant (forma 
servi), and in which he will obediently suffer death on the cross, a sacrifice for which the 
Father exalts him as Lord. This brief passage exerted a profound influence on Christian 
theology, particularly on the development of Christology, and the resulting 
conceptualization of the Incarnation. The witness of early Christianity and of the patristic 
fathers, both East and West, attests to the hymn’s ongoing importance, particularly in the 
way that it aided the formulation doctrines describing the ontological status of the God-
man who unites two distinct natures, divine and human, in his unique person. Building 
upon the text of Philippians, as elaborated by Augustine’s understanding of the habitude 
of humanity assumed by the enfleshed Son, Latin medieval theologians proposed three 
contrasting opinions to account for the hypostatic union, and various rival theories to 
explicate the salvific efficacy of the God-man’s sacrificial death. The young Thomas 
Aquinas attempted an initial comprehensive explication of the Incarnation in his 
Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, one in which the divine Son subsists in 
and through two intrinsic principles of activity  or natures given their being by Word’s 
unique act of  divine existence (esse). Finally, employing two crucial concepts retrieved 
from the patristic era—instrumental causality and theandry, Aquinas posits that the divine 
nature utilizes the operations of Christ’s human nature instrumentally in order to merit 
salvation for sinful humanity.  
Aquinas’ account of the Incarnation and of the saving work of the Son is 
problematic in two principal ways. By positing a model which denies an independent act 
of existence to the human nature of Christ, Thomas excludes any misunderstanding of the 
Son’s kenosis as the assumption of a separate human being by the Word, but in the 
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process he also seems to weaken claims that the incarnate Christ possesses a true and full 
humanity.  In addition, Aquinas’ insufficiently robust concept of instrumentality reduces 
the efficacy of the Son’s humanity to a kind of meritorious exemplarity that, at best, only 
disposes us to the reception of divine grace. As we will see in the following chapter, in 
two major works from the middle period of his teaching and writing career, a 
commentary on the Epistle to the Philippians, and his first mature theological synthesis, 
the Summa Contra Gentiles, Thomas begins to work out the complex and inseparable 
relation of instrumental causality, theandry, and the human act of existence (esse) to the 
saving work of the incarnate Word, a development due in large part to Aquinas’ creative 
retrieval of the rich theological heritage of patristic Christological texts and Conciliar 
documents, many of them influenced by the Christ hymn of Philippians 2:5-11. 
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III. Chapter 2: Caro Est Instrumentum Divinitatis:  
An Incarnational Instrumentality 
 
 
1. Introduction: 
 
 
Quoting from the De fide of John of Damascus in his Scriptum commentary, the 
young Thomas Aquinas wrote that the flesh of Christ, the very physical embodiment of 
the Word, was a salvific instrument of the divine Son of God. 
129
 However, as we 
concluded at the end of the previous chapter, Aquinas’ conception of instrumentality, 
while seemingly espousing the actualizing power of saving grace as exercised by the 
Word through his assumed humanity, in point of fact problematically reduced the 
incarnate Son’s instrumentalized humanity to little more than a disposing moral 
exemplar.  Moreover, we also saw that in Thomas’ earliest Christological reflections the 
assumed humanity of the Son was denied any independent ontological status apart from 
the divine act of existence of the assuming Word, relegating that humanity to the status of 
a nature devoid of any distinctive esse of its own.  This denial of an autonomous 
ontological integrity for Christ’s human nature, as we further saw, was predicated by the 
legitimate fear that upholding a distinct humanity in the Son, with its own act of 
existence, would inevitably lead to a Nestorian position of two separate hypostases after 
the incarnation of the Word, one divine and the other human.     
The rationale for imposing such a strict hypostatic unicity of being in the 
incarnate Word, and the resulting understanding of the disparate instrumentalized 
relationship between the human and divine operations arising from these two natures (or 
                                                          
129
  “Sed, sicut dicit Damascenus, 'caro est instrumentum divinitatis.’ Ergo una est actio Christi 
secundum divinitatem et humanitatem” (3 d. 18, a. 1, obj. 4). 
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principles of action) united in the one person of the Son, are ably summarized by Thomas 
in Quodlibetum IX, q.2, a.2 [3], a written record of a public academic dispute on 
theological subjects undertaken at the University of Paris shortly after the completion of 
his Sentences commentary (that is, circa 1256-58).
130
  Thomas’s primary concern in this 
portion of the Quodlibetal Question is to safeguard the unity and uniqueness of the Word 
by defending the oneness of being in the incarnate Son.  In Thomas’ mind, one of the 
strongest objections against any such unity would appear to come from the presence of 
two radically different sets of principles of activities in Christ, as evinced by distinctively 
divine or human operations, for just as a unity of kinds of operation does not follow from 
the unity of the person of Christ, so it appears that the uniqueness of the one incarnate 
Word would not necessarily entail the unicity of the act of being (esse) in the enfleshed 
Son.
131
  Aquinas counters by arguing that there are two ways of speaking about being: 
one kind of existence which confers substantiality—that is, which something to be a 
separate substance, and the being predicated of those accidental qualities or properties 
which inhere in a substantial form.  Hence, “since we only posit one subsisting thing in 
Christ, to whose completeness his humanity accompanies, since there is one suppositum 
of both natures, thus we must say that the substantial being which is properly attributed to 
the suppositum, is only one in Christ, but it has unity from its suppositum, not from the 
natures.”132 However, if it were posited that Christ’s human nature were to be separated 
                                                          
130
 See Kevin White, “The Quodlibeta of Thomas Aquinas in the Context of His Work,” in 
Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Thirteenth Century, ed.C. Schabel (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 
pp. 49–133. 
131
  Sicut esse est suppositi, ita et operatio. Sed unitas suppositi non facit quin in Christo sint plures 
operationes. Ergo nec faciet quod in Christo sit tantum unum esse.  
132
 Quia ergo in Christo ponimus unam rem subsistentem tantum, ad cuius integritatem concurrit 
etiam humanitas, quia unum suppositum est utriusque naturae; ideo oportet dicere quod esse substantiale, 
quod proprie attribuitur supposito, in Christo est unum tantum; habet autem unitatem ex ipso supposito, et 
non ex naturis.  
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from the divinity, then the humanity of the Word would possess its own separate 
substantial being apart from the divine esse: in other words, it would be a hypostasis, “for 
Christ's humanity was not impeded from having its own being except by the fact that it 
was not subsisting per se.”133 And so, Thomas reiterates that we should adopt the 
conceptual model the second Christological opinion described by Peter Lombard in the 
Sentences, and affirm that there is only one substantial being in Christ, insofar as being is 
properly of a separate substance, a hypostasis, although there is a multiplicity of 
accidental being associated with the person.
134
  Hence, Aquinas concludes, operatio is not 
the cause of unity or multiplicity in a substantial being, but rather its proper activities 
follow upon the unity of its substantial existence, so that a multiplicity of operations can 
be predicated according to the principles of action present in the one being.
135
 Note that 
in defending the unity of Christ, and endorsing the Lombard’s second formulization of 
the hypostatic union as the most effective defender of that unity, Thomas acknowledges 
only two possible instantiations of existence in the Word: substantial and accidental 
being.  
According to Aquinas, neither of these are viable options for Christ’s humanity, 
for as we already saw in the first chapter, a substantial existence would result in a 
separate human person, a hypostasis existing per se, while an accidental esse would result 
                                                          
133
  Si tamen ponatur humanitas a divinitate separari, tunc humanitas suum esse habebit aliud ab 
esse divino. Non enim impediebat quin proprium esse haberet nisi hoc quod non erat per se subsistens.  
134
  Et sic patet quod secundum opinionem secundam oportet dicere quod in Christo est unum esse 
substantiale, secundum quod esse est suppositi proprie, quamvis sit in eo multiplex esse accidentale.  
135
 quod operatio suppositi non est de integritate unitatis eius, sed consequitur eius unitatem; unde 
unius suppositi invenimus multas operationes secundum diversa operationum principia, quae supposito 
insunt: sicut homo aliud operatur lingua et manu; sed esse est id in quo fundatur unitas suppositi: unde esse 
multiplex praeiudicat unitati essendi. “The operation of a suppositum is not to do with the integrity of its 
unity, but follows upon its unity, hence we find many operations of one suppositum according to the 
diverse principles of the operations which are present in the suppositum, just as a man uses his mouth and 
his hand differently; but being is that in which the unity of the suppositum is founded, hence multiple being 
is injurious to unity.”   
80 
 
 
in a mere agglomeration of divinity and humanity, but not a true union of God and man in 
the incarnate Word.
136
  Moreover, Christ’s human operation, arising from a humanity 
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 Aquinas explicates the dangers of such an accidental conjunction of disparate parts in 
Quodlibetum IX, q.2, a.2 [3]: Illud autem quod est subsistens in natura, est aliquod individuum et singulare: 
unde unitas Christi, in qua duae naturae uniuntur, attribuenda est alicui nomini per quod singularitas 
designetur. Nominum autem quae singularitatem designant, quaedam significant singulare in quolibet 
genere entis, sicut hoc nomen singulare et particulare et individuum, quia haec albedo est quoddam 
singulare et particulare et individuum; nam universale et particulare circumeunt omne genus. Quaedam 
vero significant singulare solum in genere substantiae; sicut hoc nomen hypostasis, quod significat 
individuam substantiam; et hoc nomen persona, quod significat substantiam individuam rationalis naturae: 
et similiter hoc nomen suppositum vel res naturae; quorum nullum de hac albedine potest praedicari, 
quamvis haec albedo sit singularis; eo quod unumquodque eorum significat aliquid ut subsistens, accidentia 
vero non subsistunt. Partes vero substantiarum quamvis sint de natura subsistentium, non tamen per se 
subsistunt, sed in alio sunt; unde etiam praedicta nomina de partibus substantiarum non dicuntur: non enim 
dicimus quod haec manus sit hypostasis vel persona, vel suppositum, vel res naturae, quamvis possit dici 
quod sit quoddam individuum, vel particulare, vel singulare, quae nomina de accidentibus dicebantur. 
“Now that which is subsisting in a nature is something individual or singular. Hence, the unity of Christ, in 
which the two natures are united, must be attributed to some name through which singularity is designated. 
However, of those names which designate singularity, certain ones signify a singular thing in any genus of 
beings, such as the name 'singular', so also both 'particular' and 'individual', because this whiteness is a 
certain singular both individual and particular. For the universal and the particular extend to every genus. 
But certain names signify singularity only in the genus of substance, as the name 'hypostasis', which 
signifies an individual substance, and the name 'person', which signifies an individual substance of a 
rational nature; and similarly the name 'suppositum' or 'a thing of nature', none of which can be predicated 
of this whiteness, although this whiteness is singular, to the extent that each of these names signify 
something subsisting per se, but accidents do not subsist [in this way]. In fact, the parts of substances, 
although they are of the nature of subsisting things, nevertheless do not subsist per se, but they are in 
another; thus, even the aforesaid names are not said of the parts of substances; for we do not say that this 
hand is a hypostasis, a person, a suppositum, or a thing of nature, although it may be said that it is a certain 
individual or particular or singular, which names are also said of accidents.” As Thomas concludes: Non 
autem potest dici quod humana natura in Christo, vel aliqua pars eius, sit per se subsistens: hoc enim unioni 
repugnaret; nisi poneremus unionem secundum quid et non simpliciter: sicut uniuntur lapides in acervo, vel 
duo homines per effectum amoris, vel per aliquam imitationis similitudinem: quae omnia dicimus esse 
unum secundum quid, et non simpliciter. Quod enim est simpliciter unum et per se subsistens, nihil continet 
actu per subsistens, sed forte in potentia. Unde servata veritate unionis naturarum in Christo, oportet ponere 
sicut unam personam, ita unam hypostasim, et unum suppositum, et unam rem duarum naturarum. Sed 
ipsam humanam naturam in Christo nihil prohibet dicere esse quoddam individuum, aut singulare, aut 
particulare; et similiter quaslibet partes humanae naturae, ut manus et pedes et ossa, quorum quodlibet est 
quoddam individuum: non tamen quod de toto praedicetur, quia nullum eorum est individuum per se 
subsistens. Sed individuum per se subsistens, vel singulare, vel particulare, quod praedicatur de Christo, est 
unum tantum. “Now it cannot be said that the human nature in Christ or some part of it is subsisting per se: 
for this is contrary to the union, unless we posited a union in a certain respect and not absolutely [secundum 
quid et non simpliciter], as stones are united in a pile or [as] two men [are united] through the desire of love 
or through some likeness of imitation, all of which we call one in a certain respect and not simply. For that 
which is one thing, subsisting per se simply, contains nothing subsisting per se actually, but perhaps it does 
potentially. Hence, having preserved the truth of the union of natures in Christ, just as it is necessary to 
posit one person, so also one hypostasis, one suppositum and one thing of two natures [must be posited]. 
But nothing prevents saying that the human nature in Christ is a certain individual or singular or particular; 
and similarly any part of the human nature, as hands and feet and bones, each of which is a certain 
individual, yet it is not what is predicated of the whole, since none of them is an individual subsisting per 
se; but the individual subsisting per se, whether the singular or the particular which is predicated of Christ 
is only one.” 
81 
 
 
precluded from possessing any possible mode of human existence, has no more of an 
integral being than does a hand or a mouth in relation to the substantial form of the body 
to which it belongs; that is, while each of these parts has a distinctive proper function, in 
and of themselves they have no substantive esse independent of the unitary being of the 
divine hypostasis in which they reside.
137
 It is not difficult to see how Thomas would 
have difficulty elaborating a truly salvific efficacy to a humanity occupying at best only a 
subsidiary ontological role in the life of the enfleshed Son.  As we shall see, by the time 
Thomas composes the Disputed Question on the Incarnate Word he will locate a second 
non-substantial yet nevertheless non-accidental esse in Christ.  However, to reach this 
crucial breakthrough in his Christological thought, Aquinas will first have to re-
conceptualize the precise manner in which the incarnate human nature relates to the 
divinity in the enfleshed—a process whereby the flesh of Christ will truly become the 
saving instrument of the divine Word. 
  
2. A Disputed Question on Truth: Grace as Instrumental 
 
The initial, somewhat tentative steps of this process towards a fuller 
understanding of Christ’s instrumentality can be seen in the Quaestiones disputata de 
Veritate, a series of disputed questions that Thomas engaged in after the completion of 
the Sententiis, a period in which he was granted a licentiate in theology, made a magister 
of the sacred page, and began to teach at the University of Paris, and which also overlaps 
with the composition of the Quodlibetal Questions (c. 1256-1259). The Scholastic 
disputed question was one of the principle pedagogical tools of the medieval master 
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 See n. 7 above.   
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alongside the traditional classroom lectio on set texts. Unlike the lectures, however, the 
disputatio did not have a textual starting-point but rather an agreed-upon theme which set 
the parameters for the following extemporaneous debate between the master, his students, 
and on occasion even disputants from outside the school.
138
   
Thomas’ Disputed Question consists of 23 questions grouped into 29 articles, the 
first of which—“Quid est veritas”—has given the title to the entire series.  The series can 
be loosely characterized as a large grouping of questions concerning knowledge and 
veracity (qq.1-20), followed by a second, smaller grouping of questions concerning the 
theme of the good (qq.21-29).
139
  Question 27 comprises seven articles on various themes 
relating to the topic of grace, such as the crucial question of whether grace is something 
created in humanity by God.  In the first Article, Aquinas is anxious to affirm that grace 
is not merely an acceptance by God of a human being, since that would indicate that 
grace is nothing other than God willing the final supernatural good of someone, which is 
eternal life.  But, as Thomas points out, God does not will this supernatural good for 
anyone unworthy; yet fallen humanity itself is not naturally worthy of this supreme good, 
since it is supernatural.  Consequently, Thomas points out, by the “very fact that someone 
is affirmed to be pleasing to God with reference to this good,” it is must be correlatively 
affirmed that “there is in him something by which he is worthy of such a good above his 
natural endowments.”  The presence of this worthiness in a person does not, however, 
move the divine will to destine the man for that good, in fact—as Thomas explains—it is 
precisely the other way around: by the very fact that by His will God destines someone 
                                                          
138
 See Bernardo C. Bazán, “Les questions disputées, principalement dans les facultés de 
théologie” in Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de théologie de droit 
et de médecine, Typologie des sources du Moyen Âge occidental 44-45, ed. B.C. Bazán, G. Fransen, J.F. 
Wippel, and D. Jacquart (Turnhout: Brepols, 1985), pp. 12-149. 
139
 Cf., Torrell, Saint Thomas, pp. 62-66.  
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for eternal life, God supplies the person with something by which he is found worthy of 
eternal life. And the reason for this is that, “just as God’s knowledge is the cause of 
things and is not, like ours, caused by them, in the same way the act of His will is 
productive of good and not, like that of ours, caused by good.”140  Human beings, then, 
can be said to have the grace of God, and  not only on account of their being loved by 
God with a view to eternal life, but also from his being given the gift of grace, a grace 
created in them by the presence of God’s love, and by which they are made worthy of 
eternal life.
141
 
This conclusion leads Aquinas to query in the third Article whether “any creature 
can be the cause of grace?” This question is of paramount importance for Thomas 
because it touches upon the issue of Christ’s created humanity, which in turn raises the 
further difficulty of whether the incarnate Son in his human nature can be the 
instrumental cause of grace.  Among the signal examples of the Word’s seemingly grace-
causing humanity, Aquinas calls attention to Christ’s death and resurrection.  According 
to Thomas, these salvific actions belong to the incarnate Son according to His human 
nature, and quotes Psalm (29:6): “In the evening weeping shall have place,” pointing to 
the Glossa ordinaria’s claims that “Christ’s resurrection is the cause of the resurrection 
                                                          
140
 Quaestiones disputatae de Veritate, ed. A. Dondaine, Leonine edition, Vol. 22, 3 parts (Rome: 
Editore di San Tomasso, 1975-1976), q.27, a.1, resp.: Sed hoc bonum Deus non vult alicui indigno. Ex 
natura autem sua homo non est dignus tanto bono, cum sit supernaturale. Et ideo, ex hoc ipso quod ponitur 
aliquis Deo gratus respectu huius boni, ponitur quod sit dignus tali bono supra sua naturalia; quod quidem 
non movet divinam voluntatem ut hominem ad bonum illud ordinet, sed potius e converso: quia ex hoc ipso 
quod Deus sua voluntate aliquem ordinat ad vitam aeternam, praestat ei aliquid per quod sit dignus vita 
aeterna . . . Et huius ratio est, quia, sicut scientia Dei est causa rerum, non causata a rebus, ut nostra, ita 
voluntas eius est effectrix boni, et non causata a bono, sicut nostra. 
141
 Ibid, ad. 3: Ad tertium dicendum, quod esse naturale per creationem Deus facit in nobis nulla 
causa agente mediante, sed tamen mediante aliqua causa formali: forma enim naturalis principium est esse 
naturalis. Et similiter esse spirituale gratuitum Deus facit in nobis nullo agente mediante, sed tamen 
mediante aliqua forma creata, quae est gratia. “God causes natural existence in us by creation without the 
intervention of any agent cause, but nevertheless with the intervention of a formal cause; for a natural form 
is the principle of natural existence. Similarly God brings about gratuitous spiritual existence in us without 
the intervention of any agent, yet with the intervention of a created form, grace.” 
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of the soul in the present time and of the body in the future.”142  Since the resurrection of 
the soul in the present is through grace, this would certainly indicate that Christ is the 
cause of grace in us precisely through the causal agency of his created humanity.
143
  
Indeed, Thomas concludes (quoting once gain from John of Damascus) to the effect that 
Christ’s assumed human nature was like an “instrument of His divinity,” and it is for this 
reason that the works of His humanity, such as passion, death, and resurrection, are 
instrumental with regard to the effect of His divinity.  More specifically, “Christ’s 
resurrection does not cause spiritual resurrection in us as the principal agent but as the 
instrumental cause.—Or it can be said that it is the cause of our spiritual resurrection in 
so far as we are justified by faith in Him.—Or again the answer could be that it is the 
exemplary cause of spiritual resurrection inasmuch as there is in Christ’s resurrection a 
pattern of our spiritual resurrection.”144  We must note that in this passage, very much 
like in the Sentences Commentary, Thomas retains only a disposing or ministerial 
causation of salvific grace for the Word’s assumed humanity, since “Christ as God 
imparts grace effectively, but as man by His ministry.”145  Nevertheless, despite this 
caveat, it is also notable that in other passages Aquinas is willing to concede that Christ’s 
instrumentalized humanness “shared somewhat in the working of the divine power. By 
touching a leper, for instance, Christ made him clean. The very touch of Christ thus 
                                                          
142
 Cf. Biblia latina cum glossa ordinaria: Facsimile reprint of the Editio Princeps (Adolph Rusch 
of Strassburg 1480/81), 4 volumes, with an introduction by K. Froehlich and M. T. Gibson (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 1998).  For a study of the importance of the Glossa for Thomas and other medieval thinkers, see 
M.T. Gibson, “The Place of the Glossa ordinaria in Medieval Exegesis,” in Ad Litteram: Authoritative 
Texts and Their Medieval Readers, ed. M.D. Jordan and K. Emery (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1992), pp. 5-27; Lesley Smith, The Glossa Ordinaria: The Making of a Medieval Bible 
Commentary (Leiden: Brill, 2009).  
143
 De veritate, q.27 a.3 arg.7: Praeterea, mors et resurrectio Christi convenit ei secundum 
humanam naturam. Sed sicut dicit Glossa super illud Psalm. XXIX, 6, ad vesperum demorabitur fletus, 
resurrectio Christi est causa resurrectionis animae in praesenti, et corporis in futuro: resurrectio autem 
animae in praesenti est per gratiam. Ergo Christus secundum humanam naturam est causa gratiae.  
144
 De veritate, q.27, a.3, ad. 7.  
145
 Ibid, q.27, a.3, ad. 5; q.v. III Sent., d.13, q.2, a.1, ad.3.  
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caused the health of the leper instrumentally.”146 It was not merely in corporeal effects 
that Christ’s human nature shared instrumentally in the effect of the divine power but also 
in spiritual effects. Thus Christ’s blood poured out for us had the ability to wash away 
sins, and so we can truly say that the humanity of Christ is the instrumental cause of our 
justification.  Moreover, this causal efficacy is applied to us not only spiritually through 
faith and also bodily through the sacraments, because Christ’s humanity is comprised 
both of spirit, for Christ had a human soul which was the form of his corporeality and a 
human body.
147
  And this is done, in Thomas’ estimation, so that we may receive within 
ourselves the effect of sanctification, which is had through the enfleshed Christ. As a 
consequence, “the most perfect sacrament is that in which the body of Christ is really 
contained, the Eucharist; and it is the consummation of all the others,” nevertheless, the 
other “sacraments also share some of the efficacy by which Christ’s humanity works 
instrumentally for our justification.”148  
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 De veritate, a.4, c.: Damascenus in libro III dicit quod humana natura in Christo erat velut 
quoddam organum divinitatis; et ideo humana natura aliquid communicabat in operatione virtutis divinae, 
sicut quod Christus tangendo leprosum mundavit; sic enim ipse tactus Christi causabat instrumentaliter 
salutem leprosi. 
147
 Ibid, Sicut autem humana natura in Christo communicabat ad effectus divinae virtutis 
instrumentaliter in corporalibus effectibus, ita in spiritualibus; unde sanguis Christi pro nobis effusus habuit 
vim ablutivam peccatorum; Apoc. I, 5: lavit nos a peccatis nostris in sanguine suo; et Rom. III, 24: 
iustificati (...) in sanguine ipsius. “It was not merely in corporeal effects that Christ’s human nature shared 
instrumentally in the effect of the divine power but also in spiritual effects. Thus Christ’s blood poured out 
for us had the ability to wash away sins, as is said in the Apocalypse (1: 5): ‘[Jesus Christ] washed us from 
our sins in his own blood,’ and in the Epistle to the Romans (3:24): ‘Being justified... in his blood.’” 
148
 Ibid, Et sic humanitas Christi est instrumentalis causa iustificationis; quae quidem causa nobis 
applicatur spiritualiter per fidem, et corporaliter per sacramenta: quia humanitas Christi et spiritus et corpus 
est; ad hoc scilicet ut effectum sanctificationis, quae est Christi, in nobis percipiamus. Unde illud est 
perfectissimum sacramentum in quo corpus Christi realiter continetur, scilicet Eucharistia, et est omnium 
aliorum consummativum, ut Dionysius dicit in Eccl. Hierarch., cap. III. Alia vero sacramenta participant 
aliquid de virtute illa qua humanitas Christi instrumentaliter ad iustificationem operatur, ratione cuius 
sanctificatus Baptismo, sanctificatus sanguine Christi dicitur ab apostolo Hebr. X, 10. Unde passio Christi 
in sacramentis novae legis dicitur operari. Et sic sacramenta novae legis sunt causa gratiae quasi 
instrumentaliter operantia ad gratiam. “Thus the humanity of Christ is the instrumental cause of 
justification. This cause is applied to us spiritually through faith and bodily through the sacraments, 
because Christ’s humanity is both spirit and body. This is done to the end that we may receive within 
ourselves the effect of sanctification, which is had through Christ. As a consequence the most perfect 
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It would seem that it is through his engagement with the topic of the causative 
meditating capacity of the sacraments, particularly the sacrament of the Eucharist, that 
Thomas is inspired to inaugurate a tentative reformulation of the status and function of 
Christ’s humanity in the economy of salvation, and to begin to rethink his position on the 
ability of the incarnated Word, precisely as enfleshed in human form, to mediate grace 
instrumentally. Aquinas had already wrestled with this topic in the Lombard 
commentary, where he concludes that the sacraments, as created agents, cannot share 
directly in the causality of grace. Thomas’ argument is based on the notion that the grace 
of God is not the actualized form of any natural potential in human nature, since 
sanctifying grace is a supernatural, unmediated gift which joins us immediately with the 
divine, and must therefore be attributed to its principle source or agent, which is God.
149
  
With similar logic, Aquinas limits the function of Christ’s assumed human nature in the 
Scriptum; so that while Christ merits grace for us due to do his sacrifice, he does not 
                                                                                                                                                                             
sacrament is that in which the body of Christ is really contained, the Eucharist; and it is the consummation 
of all the others, as Dionysius says. But the other sacraments also share some of the efficacy by which 
Christ’s humanity works instrumentally for our justification. By reason of it a person sanctified by baptism 
is said by the Apostle in the Epistle to the Hebrews (10: 10-2 2) to be sanctified by the blood of Christ. 
Christ’s passion is accordingly said to work in the sacraments of the New Law. Thus the sacraments of the 
New Law are causes of grace working in some sense instrumentally to produce it.”    
149
 Cf. IV Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 2, c: Respondeo dicendum, quod cooperari alicui agenti dicitur 
quatuor modis. Uno modo sicut adjuvans ei cui auxilium praebet, cooperatur. Alio modo sicut consilium 
praebens. Tertio modo sicut quo mediante agens primum suum effectum inducit, sicut cooperantur 
instrumenta principali agenti. Quarto modo sicut disponens materiam ad effectum agentis principalis 
suscipiendum. Primis ergo duobus modis in nulla actione aliquid Deo cooperatur propter perfectam ejus 
potentiam, quae auxilio non indiget, et propter perfectam sapientiam, quae non indiget consilio, Isai. 40, 13: 
quis adjuvit spiritum domini, aut quis consiliarius ejus fuit ? Sed tertio modo cooperatur aliqua creatura 
Deo in aliqua actione, non tamen in omnibus. Cum enim Deus sit primum agens omnium naturalium 
actionum, quidquid natura agit, hoc efficit quasi instrumentale agens cooperans primo agenti, quod est 
Deus. Sed quaedam sunt quae sibi Deus retinuit, immediate ea operans; et in his creatura Deo non 
cooperatur hoc tertio modo, sed quarto modo potest ei cooperari; sicut patet in creatione animae rationalis, 
quam immediate Deus producit, sed tamen natura disponit materiam ad animae rationalis receptionem. Et 
quia recreatio animae rationalis creationi ipsius respondet, ideo in emundatione ipsius immediate operatur; 
nec aliquis ei quantum ad hoc cooperatur tertio modo, sed quarto; et hoc dupliciter: vel ex opere operante, 
sive docendo, sive merendo; et sic homines ei cooperantur in peccatorum remissione, de quibus dicitur 1 
Corinth. 3, 9: Dei adjutores sumus, vel ex opere operato, sicut qui conferunt sacramenta, quae ad gratiam 
disponunt, per quam fit remissio peccatorum; et haec est cooperatio ministerii, quae ministris Ecclesiae 
competit, de quibus dicitur 1 Corinth. 4, 1: sic nos existimet homo ut ministros Christi.  
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effectuate that grace in us, but only disposes us to its reception.
150
  It is interesting 
nevertheless to see that at this point the young Thomas is more willing to grant some 
measure of causal efficacy to the sacraments than to the incarnate Word’s humanity.  For 
example, while the Eucharist is fully subservient and wholly dependent upon the divine 
power of God as its principle cause, and finds its sacramental efficacy in Christ’s 
sacrificial death, yet it acts efficiently in transmitting the merit of that atoning sacrifice to 
the recipient of the sacrament.
151
 However, Thomas is also careful to clarify that this 
transmission is limited to effectively disposing the soul to receive the infusion of actual 
sanctifying grace which finds its ultimate cause in the divine; thus any claim to a direct 
causal efficacy of grace by the sacrament itself is judiciously avoided.
152
  
There is, as we have already discussed, a certain amount of overlap in Aquinas’ 
treatment of the humanity of Christ between the Scriptum and De veritate, so that at times 
Thomas appears, very much like his Sentences commentary, to restrict Christ’s causality 
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 III Sent., d. 13, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3:“Ad tertium dicendum, quod in actione aliqua potest aliquid esse 
medium dupliciter; scilicet quantum ad perfectionem, et quantum ad dispositionem tantum: sicut natura est 
medium in operatione qua Deus producit animam sensibilem, quia ipsa perfectio ultima fit mediante natura; 
sed in operatione qua producit animam rationalem, natura non est medium, nisi quantum ad dispositionem. 
Similiter dico, quod Deus immediate format mentem nostram quantum ad ipsam perfectionem gratiae, 
tamen potest ibi cadere medium disponens; et sic gratia fluit a Deo mediante homine Christo: ipse enim 
disposuit totum humanum genus ad gratiae susceptionem; et hoc tripliciter. Uno modo secundum 
operationem nostram in ipsum: quia secundum quod credimus ipsum Deum et hominem, justificamur; Rom 
3:25:‘quem posuit Deus propitiatorem per fidem in sanguine ipsius.’Alio modo per operationem ipsius (in 
nos), inquantum scilicet obstaculum removet, pro peccatis totius humani generis satisfaciendo; et etiam 
inquantum nobis gratiam et gloriam sui operibus meruit; et inquantum pro nobis interpellat ad Deum.Tertio 
modo ex ipsa affinitate ejus ad nos; quia ex hoc ipso quod naturam humanam assumpsit, humana natura est 
magis Deo accepta” 
151
 Cf. Ibid, d. 19, a. 1, qla. 2, ad 4; 
152
 For example, Ibid, IV, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, c.: As Bernhard Blankenhorn writes, in this passage 
Thomas teaches that the sacraments “directly and efficiently cause the sacramental character as well as a 
certain ‘decoration’ of the soul, while acting as efficient disposing causes of sanctifying grace. Such 
disposing activity is really indistinct from the direct infusion of the sacramental character and soul’s 
decoration, for these two modifications of the soul are precisely what prepare us for the exclusively divine 
infusion of grace. Any direct or perfecting efficient causality of grace by the sacraments is clearly 
excluded.”  See “The Instrumental Causality of the Sacraments: Thomas Aquinas and Louis-Marie 
Chauvet,” Nova et Vetera 4:2 (2006), pp. 255–294, here at p. 264.   
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to the realm of merit.
153
  In other passages, however, Aquinas ostensibly claims an 
efficient instrumental causality for the humanity of the Word as the medium of 
sanctifying grace.  For example, discussing the Pauline doctrine of the supremacy or 
headship of Christ in Colossians 1 (quia complacuit in ipso omnem plenitudinem 
inhabitare),
154
 Thomas argues that because of the proximity of Christ’s assumed human 
nature to the divine nature, that humanity acted as an instrument of the divinity, because 
it participated in that divine goodness through the grace of union. 
As a result there was a fitness in this humanity not only to have grace but 
also to communicate it to other beings, as the most shining bodies transmit 
the light of the sun to others. And because in some sense Christ 
communicates the effects of grace to all rational creatures, this is why He 
is in some sense the source of all grace in His humanity, just as God is the 
source of all being. Then, as all the perfection of being is united in God, in 
Christ the fullness of all grace and virtue is found, and because of it He not 
only is capable of the work of grace Himself but can bring others to grace. 
For this reason He has the headship.
155
 
 
This is precisely the sort of causal efficacy which in the Commentary on the Sentences 
Thomas—at least at first glance—seemed to reserve for actions that brought about 
change through the agency of efficient causation, but which he subsequently amended to 
indicate that Christ’s humanity can only be ascribed a dispositive power. 156  By 
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 E.g., De veritate, q. 29, a. 4, ad 9 and 17. 
154
 Colossians 1:15-20: “He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn over all creation. For 
by him all things were created: things in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or 
powers or rulers or authorities; all things were created by him and for him. He is before all things, and in 
him all things hold together. And he is the head of the body, the church; he is the beginning and the 
firstborn from among the dead, so that in everything he might have the supremacy. For God was pleased to 
have all his fullness dwell in him, and through him to reconcile to himself all things, whether things on 
earth or things in heaven, by making peace through his blood, shed on the cross.” 
155
 De veritate, q. 29, a. 5, c.: Ex quo idoneitas in ea fuit ut non solum gratiam haberet, sed etiam 
per eam gratia in alios transfunderetur, sicut per corpora magis lucentia lumen solis ad alia transit. Et quia 
Christus in omnes creaturas rationales quodammodo effectus gratiarum influit, inde est quod ipse est 
principium quodammodo omnis gratiae secundum humanitatem, sicut Deus est principium omnis esse: 
unde, sicut in Deo omnis essendi perfectio adunatur, ita in Christo omnis gratiae plenitudo et virtutis 
invenitur, per quam non solum ipse possit in gratiae opus, sed etiam alios in gratiam adducere. Et per hoc 
habet capitis rationem.  
156
 E.g., III, d. 13, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2; d. 19, a. 1, c.   
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comparison, in these Disputed Questions on Truth there is an ambiguity in 
pronouncements regarding the soteriological powers of Christ’s humanity that seems to 
mirror a more deep-seated ambiguity in Thomas’ mind about the precise status and 
function of the Word’s assumed nature.  For example, Aquinas’ claim here in the body of 
q. 29, a. 5 appear to be already forestalled by his previous pronouncements in q. 29, a. 4, 
ad 9, which gives an exhaustive listing of the causal powers of Christ’s  humanity in the 
process of  human justification, stressing the disposing efficacy which the Word’s human 
life elicits in the believer, but which is conspicuously bereft of any mention of efficient 
causality:  “Christ as man is said to justify us in two ways: first by His own action, 
inasmuch as He merited and atoned for us, and secondly by our operation in His regard, 
in the sense that we are said to be justified by faith in Him.”157 
Perhaps this ambiguity is most evident in Aquinas’ treatment of the question of 
the soteriological efficacy of the incarnate Christ’s atoning merit.  In the Scriptum, the 
Son’s merit is primarily a disposing preparatory cause for the reception of grace. In De 
verirtate, Thomas’ discussion centers largely on the questions of whether and how the 
Son could merit for us (pro nobis). Thomas mounts a series of objections against the 
possibility of the enfleshed Word meriting for us, perhaps the most convincing such 
objection being the charge that “Christ merited only inasmuch as He was a man, but other 
men cannot merit for others condignly, so then neither could Christ.”158  Aquinas begins 
to counter this and other such objections by making two general arguments about 
soteriological meritorious actions:  A human action informed by grace has value for 
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 “Ita etiam Christus, secundum quod homo, dupliciter nos iustificare dicitur. Uno modo 
secundum suam actionem, in quantum nobis meruit et pro nobis satisfecit . . . Alio modo per operationem 
nostram in ipsum secundum quod dicimur per fidem eius iustificari.”  
158
 De veritate, q. 29, a. 7, obj.1: Christus enim non meruit nisi secundum quod homo. Sed alii 
homines non possunt aliis mereri ex condigno. Ergo nec Christus.   
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obtaining salvation in two ways which correspond to the two manners in which humanity 
falls short of attaining beatitude.  First, humans fall short in regard to dignity, so as 
sinners we do are neither suited nor worthy of eternal life, whereas meritorious actions 
would be one that is worthy of glory because of its inherent dignity and aptness for 
beatitude.  Thus, just as “an act of sin leads to a certain deformity of the soul, a 
meritorious act leads to the soul’s adornment and dignity. From this there arises merit 
that is called condign.”159 Secondly, humans fall short of beatitude because the penalty of 
original sin impedes their attainment of glory.  So a human action is “related to glory 
much like the price paid to free a man from a penalty due. Under this aspect the human 
action has the character of satisfaction.”160  According to Thomas, in both of these 
respects Christ’s actions were more efficacious than those of other men. Because by  
the actions of other men only the one acting is made suited for the 
reception of glory, because one man cannot exercise a spiritual influence 
upon another. As a consequence one cannot merit grace or eternal life for 
another condignly. But Christ in His humanity could exercise spiritual 
influence upon other men. His actions could accordingly cause in others 
suitableness [or fittingness: idonietatem] for the winning of glory. He 
could therefore merit condignly for others, just as He could exercise 
influence upon others, inasmuch as His humanity was “the instrument of 
His divinity,” as Damascene teaches.161 
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 Ibid, a. 7, co: Quorum primum est indignitas personae; sicut patet in eo qui non habet 
caritatem, qui non est idoneus nec dignus quod habeat vitam aeternam: et secundum hoc, opus humanum 
valet ad vitam aeternam consequendam, in quantum per ipsum quaedam dignitas et idoneitas in homine 
consequitur ad consecutionem gloriae. Sicut enim actus peccati redit in quamdam animae deformitatem, ita 
et actus meritorius in quemdam animae decorem et dignitatem; et ex hoc dicitur meritum condignum.  
160
 Ibid: Aliud per quod deficit homo a consecutione gloriae, est aliquod impedimentum 
superveniens, ut homo qui alias est dignus, gloriam non consequatur; et hoc est reatus alicuius poenae 
temporalis. Et sic opus humanum ordinatur ad gloriam quasi per modum cuiusdam pretii, quo a reatu poena 
absolvitur; et ex hoc habet opus humanum rationem satisfactionis.  
161
 Ibid: Quantum ergo ad utrumque horum, opus Christi efficacius fuit operibus aliorum 
hominum. Nam per opus alterius hominis non redditur idoneus ad gloriae perceptionem nisi ille qui 
operatur, eo quod unus homo in alium spiritualiter influere non potest: et ideo unus alii ex condigno mereri 
non potuit gratiam vel vitam aeternam. Sed Christus secundum suam humanitatem spiritualiter influere 
potuit in alios homines: unde et eius opus in aliis causare potuit idoneitatem ad consecutionem gloriae. Et 
ideo potuit aliis ex condigno mereri, secundum quod influere in alios poterat, in quantum erat humanitas 
eius divinitatis instrumentum, secundum Damascenum.  
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So Thomas appears to frame his response in terms of instrumental causality, but a 
question nevertheless remains as to what exactly Christ’s humanity is effectuating 
instrumentally.  A long tradition of Thomist commentators and scholars has answered 
that vital question by positing that here we encounter the first articulation of Aquinas’ 
mature understanding of efficient instrumental causality in his Christological writings.
162
  
According to this interpretation, in this passage Thomas is positing that the enfleshed Son 
was indeed able to merit for others, since as an instrument of the divinity, his incarnate 
humanity could exert efficient causality upon others by configuring them for the 
reception of saving grace.
163
 But this is a fundamental misreading of the text, particularly 
of the crucial term idoneitas, which Aquinas consistently employs—from his earliest 
work up through the Disputed Questions on Truth— to denote a certain suitability or 
fittingness or aptness in the soul for the reception of grace, rather than the salvific grace 
itself.
164
  In other words, Christ’s meritorious incarnational activity does not directly 
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 See, among others, Palémon Glorieux, “Le mérite du Christ selon St. Thomas,” Revue des 
Sciences Religieuses 10 (1930), pp. 622-649. 
163
  For example, Jean-Pierre Torrell claims that in Aquinas’ work, the “transition to a true 
instrumental causality only occurs between questions 27 and 29 of the De veritate: from this point on, not 
only does the humanity of Christ truly work toward the production of grace, thus leaving its mark on this 
grace, but grace is also no longer simply divine but properly ‘Christian’ as well.” In other words, it is only 
at this juncture in Thomas’ Christology that he proposes a mediatorial role for Christ that takes full account 
of the mediatorial role of the assumed humanity in the transmission of a truly Christo-conforming form of 
grace. See Torrell, “Christ in the ‘Spirituality’ of St. Thomas,” in idem, Christ and Spirituality in St. 
Thomas Aquinas, trans. B. Blankenhorn (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of American Press, 
2011), pp. 74-109, here at p. 92, note 43; originally published as “Le Christ dans la ‘spiritualite´’ de saint 
Thomas,” in Christ among the Medieval Dominicans, ed. K. Emery, Jr. and J. Wawrykow (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame, 1998), pp. 197–219. 
164
  E.g., III d. 19, a. 1, qla. 1, c.: Alio modo dicitur efficiens, disponens materiam ad recipiendum 
formam: et sic dicitur peccatum delere ille qui meretur peccati deletionem, quia ex merito efficitur aliquis 
dignus quasi materia disposita ad recipiendum gratiam, per quam peccata deleantur. Hoc autem contingit 
dupliciter: vel sufficienter, vel insufficienter. Sufficienter quidem disposita est materia, quando fit 
necessitas ad formam: et similiter sufficienter aliquis per meritum disponitur ad aliquid, quando illud sibi 
efficitur debitum; et hoc est meritum condigni. In another way, is said to be efficient, disposing the matter 
for receiving form; consequently, the deletion of sin is called a sin to destroy he who merits, because it is 
made from the merit of the matter disposed to receive the grace to be worthy of, as it were, by which sins 
may be blotted out. Now this happens in two ways: either adequately or inadequately. To sufficiency, was 
disposed in the matter, when it is made to the form of necessity: and in like manner sufficiently through the 
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produce grace in the soul of the believer, but instead causally disposes the soul to receive 
this saving gift from God.  As Aquinas explained earlier in the question, meritorious 
actions are those activities that are worthy of glory because of their inherent dignity and 
aptness for beatitude.  As incarnate, Christ’s life and actions were of greater dignity, 
more worthy of glory, than those of other human beings,
165
 because they were not merely 
the earthly activities of a man, but because they were also the actions of a divine Person, 
and “for that reason were invested with an infinite dignity that rendered them more than 
condignly worthy of all the graces to be given to men.”166  This is the sense in which 
Aquinas understands how the atoning work of Christ’s assumed humanity merits for us 
(pro nobis).  As yet, Thomas has not developed a more fully articulated concept of the 
being of the God man (Chistus in se) which will allow him to elaborate a fuller role for 
the humanity of Christ, as an instrument of the divinity, in the economy of salvation. 
 
 
 
3. The Book on the Truth of the Catholic Faith against the Errors of the Infidels 
 
 
After completing his three-year regency as a master of theology at the University 
of Paris, in either late 1260 or early 1261, Aquinas was assigned as a Lector to the 
Dominican priory of San Domenico in Orvieto, north of Rome, and charged with the task 
of preparing his fellow bothers in the Order of Friars Preachers for their principal pastoral 
tasks of preaching and hearing confessions.
167
  Thomas’ tenure here coincided with the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
merit of a person is disposed to something, when that is accomplished to himself his due; This is called 
condign. 
165
 De veritate, q. 29, a. 7, ad.1: Christus, secundum quod homo, est aliis hominibus dignior. 
166
 William D. Lynn, Christ’s Redemptive Merit: The Nature of Its Causality According to St. 
Thomas, Analecta Gregoriana, Vol. 115 (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1962), p. 143. 
167
 There is continuing uncertainty about the precise chronology of Thomas’ academic 
appointments in this period of his teaching career. See Torrell, Saint Thomas, pp. 117-120.  
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time period when Orvieto became one of the main centers of the papal court, and Pope 
Urban IV resided there along with the administrative Roman curia, a large contingent of 
the Holy See’s diplomatic corps, and a studium generale or papal school with faculties of 
theology, law, and grammar, from October 1262 until shortly before his death in late 
1264.
168
  While there is no documentation that Aquinas was officially attached to the 
papal palace in Orvieto in any capacity as either a teacher or preacher (i.e., a “Master of 
the Sacred Palace”) during these years, nevertheless a close working relationship 
apparently arose between the Dominican friar and the Supreme Pontiff.
169
  Reportedly at 
the pope’s personal urging, Thomas composed the liturgy for the newly instituted feast of 
Corpus Christi, wrote the oposculum known as Contra errores Graecorum, ad Urbanum 
IV Pontificem Maximum in 1263-64 as a contribution to Urban IV’s efforts at reunion 
with the Eastern Church, and undertook the massive task of assembling the Glossa 
continua super Evangelia or Catenae aurea (Golden Chain), a running commentary on 
the four Gospels composed of extensive excerpts from the Church Fathers.   
The library attached to the papal studium gave Thomas unprecedented access to 
patristic material long lost to Western theology. At this time, Aquinas came into contact 
with the acta and gesta (proceedings) of the first five Ecumenical Councils contained in 
the Synodicon, a lengthy compendium of originally Greek documents, including conciliar 
acta and episcopal correspondence, which were arranged and translated into Latin by 
Rusticus, a Roman deacon and nephew of Pope Vigilius, during his sojourn in 
Constantinople in the later 560s.  The sole Latin manuscript copy of this work is found in 
the twelfth-century codex Casinensis, in which the Synodicon forms the second half of 
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 Cf. Weisheipl, pp. 147-162.  
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 Torrell, Saint Thomas, pp. 136-138.  
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the so-called Collectio Casinensis.  On of Rusticus’ primary objectives was to provide the 
Latin west with a record of the aftermath of the First Council of Ephesus in 431, 
particularly the then recent Christological debates that had precipitated the so-called 
Three Chapters controversy (543-553), an ultimately unsuccessfully attempt to reconcile 
non-Chalcedonian Christians and advocates of the emerging Christological consensus.
170
  
In putting together his own account, entitled the Synodicon, Rusticus drew extensively on 
an already existing documentary compilations which are now lost, some of which had 
been compiled and annotated more than a century earlier (ca. 435-436).
171
  It seems that 
from this and other rare manuscripts in the papal library, Aquinas gained first-hand 
knowledge of important citations and paraphrases of Christological works of by 
Athanasius, Cyril of Alexandria, John Chrysostom, in addition to the seminal 
Christological texts contained in the conciliar documents of Ephesus and Chalcedon.  
Indeed, it is fair to say that Thomas had the most extensive familiarity with the two great 
Christological councils and the Greek Fathers of any Medieval Latin scholastic.
172
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 See Richard M. Price, “The Three Chapters Controversy and the Council of Chalcedon,” in The 
Crisis of the Oikoumene: The Three Chapters and the Failed Quest for Unity in the Sixth-century 
Mediterranean, Studies in the Early Middle Ages 14,  ed. C.M. Chazelle and C. Cubitt (Turnhout: Brepols, 
2007), pp. 17-38.  
171
 Cf. U.M. Lang, “Christological Themes in Rusticus Diaconus’ Contra Acephalos disputatio,” 
in Studia Patristica 38, pp., 429-434. 
172
 Thomas gained access to the Collectio Casinensis probably no later than the year 1264, when 
the papal court departed Orvieto. See Collectionis Casinensis sive Synodici a Rustico Diacono compositi, 
Acta conciliorum oecumenicorum vols.3 and 4, ed., Eduard Schwartz (Berlin and Leipzig: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1922-1929). Aquinas’ familiarity with later Ecumenical Councils, such as Constantinople II (553) 
can also be dated to the period circa 1264/65, while his encounter with the acta of Constantinople III 
cannot be dated earlier than 1271, the first approximate date when he quotes from the documents of the 
Sixth Ecumenical Council (in ST III q.18, a.5 and q.20, aa.1-2). Aquinas’ debt to the rediscovered 
Chalcedonian material was initially explored by Gottfried Geenen, “En marge du concile de Chalcédoine. 
Les texts du quatrième Concile dans les œuvres de saint Thomas,” Angelicum 29 (1952): 43-59; and “The 
Council of Chalcedon in the Theology of St. Thomas,” in From an Abundant Spring: The Walter Farrell 
Memorial Volume of the Thomist (New York: P. J. Kennedy, 1952), pp. 172-217. More recently, Louis-
Jacques Bataillon, “Saint Thomas et les Pères: de la Catena à la Tertia Pars,” in Ordo sapientiae et amoris: 
image et message de saint Thomas d'Aquin à travers les récentes études historiques, herméneutiques et 
doctrinales: hommage au professeur Jean-Pierre Torrell, Studia Friburgensia78, ed. C.-J. Pinto de Oliveira 
(Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 1993), pp. 15-36; Leo J. Elders, “Thomas Aquinas and 
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In addition to the material that he fortuitously encountered with the arrival of the 
papal collection to Orvieto, Thomas was also assiduous in commissioning new Latin 
translations of Greek works heretofore unavailable in the West, such as the biblical 
commentaries of Theophylact of Ohrid, an important Byzantine scholar who lived about 
a century before Thomas’ birth, who was completely unknown to Latin Scholasticism 
before his extensive use by Aquinas in the later part of the Catena aurea.
173
 The profound 
effect of these newly found and translated patristic texts on Thomas’ Christology is 
already evident in the first volume of the Glossa continua on the Gospel of Matthew, 
finished in 1264 and dedicated to his patron Pope Urban IV. In the opening passage of 
the Matthean catena, commenting on the first sentence of Matthew’s Messianic 
genealogy (“The book of the generation of Jesus Christ, the Son of David, the Son of 
Abraham” MT 1:1), Thomas employs heretofore inaccessible material from several key 
works by Cyril of Alexandria and other Greek patristic fathers to counter the sort of 
misreading of the incarnation of the Word associated with Nestorianism: “The error of 
Nestorius was that he taught that a man only was born of the Blessed Virgin Mary, whom 
the Word of God received not into Unity of person and inseparable fellowship,”174  With 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the Fathers of the Church,” in The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West: From the Carolingians to 
the Maurists, ed. I. Backus  (New York: E.J. Brill, 1997), pp. 337-366; and Martin Morard, “Thomas 
d’Aquin lecteur des conciles,” Archivum Franciscanum Historicum 98 (2005), pp. 211-365, have greatly 
expanded our understanding of Thomas’ indebtedness to the Councils. 
173
 See Joseph  Reuss, “Der Mt-, Mk- und Jo-Kommentar des Theophylakt” in Matthäus-, Markus 
und 
Johannes-Katenen nach handschriftlichen Quellen untersucht (Münster: Aschendorff, 1941 [= 
Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen, vol. 18/4-5]), pp. 221-237; Ernest W. Saunders, “Theophylact of 
Bulgaria as Writer and Biblical Interpreter,” Biblical Research 2 (1957), pp. 31-44; Andrew J.  Brown, 
“The Gospel Commentary of Theophylact, and a Neglected Manuscript in Oxford,” Novum Testamentum 
49 (2007), pp. 185-196; Roberto Andrés Soto Ayala “Teofilacto de Ocrida y la educaciόn real: lόgoj ὲij 
tÕn porfurogέnnhton kῦρ Kwnstantῖnon (Paideίa Basilikή) c. 1081-1094 d.C.,” Byzantion Nea Hellás 
31 (2012), pp. 71-89. 
174
 Thomas Aquinas, Catena aurea in quatuor Evangelia, Vol. 1, ed. A. Guarienti (Taurini: 
Marietti, 1953), Expositio in Matthaeum, cap. 1, lec. 1: “Nestorii autem perversitas fuit ut hominem 
tantummodo ex beata Maria virgine genitum praedicaret, quem verbum Dei non in unitatem personae, et in 
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the very nest quote, Thomas offers a powerful rebuttal by offering extended extracts from 
two sections of Cyril’s Epistle to the Monks of Egypt, an encyclical written in Easter 429, 
at the commencement of the Nestorian Christological controversy.
175
  In this letter, Cyril 
is at pains to inform his monks on the grave dangers inherent in  Nestorius’ rejection of 
the title of Theotokos (Mother of God) for Mary, tracing this serious misinterpretation of 
the Virgin’s true role in salvation to a profound confusion as to who Mary gave birth to in 
Bethlehem.  For Nestorius, such a title seemed to threaten the full reality of Christ’s 
humanity—in his mind, the term ‘Christotokos,’ the bearer/mother of Christ—seemed 
more fitting, a term denoting the distinctively human nature of the one the Virgin had 
borne.
176
   
                                                                                                                                                                             
societatem inseparabilem recepisset.” This quotation is taken from the appended portion of Augustine’s 
very late work (c. 429) De haeresibus ad Quodvultdeum liber unus. 
175
 PG 77, 9-40; the critical text can be found in Acta conciliorum oecumenicorum, Concilium 
universale Ephesenum, Tome 1, Vol. 1, ed. E. Schwartz  (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1927), pp.10-23, and 
an English translation in John A. McGuckin, St. Cyril of Alexandria: The Christological Controversy : Its 
History, Theology, and Texts (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2004), pp. 245-261.  
176
 Nestorius, III Epistula ad Celestinem: “I have learned that Cyril, the most distinguished bishop 
of the city of Alexandria, has become worried about reports against him that we received, and is now 
hunting for subterfuges to avoid a Holy Synod taking place due to these reports. In the meantime he is 
devising some other disturbances over terms and has chosen [as a point of controversy] the term Theotokos 
and Christotokos: the first he allows, but as for Christotokos, sometimes he removes it from the gospels, 
and sometimes he allows it, on the basis of what I believe is a kind of excessive prudence. In the case of the 
term Theotokos, I am not opposed to those who want to say it, unless it should advance to the confusion of 
natures in the manner of the madness of Apollinaris or Arius. Nonetheless, I have no doubt that the term 
Theotokos is inferior to the term Christotokos, as the latter is mentioned by the angels and the gospels. And 
if I were not speaking to Your Worship who is already so knowledgeable, I would need to give a very long 
discourse on this topic. But even without a discourse, it is known in every way to Your Beatitude, that if we 
should think that there are two groups opposed to each other, the one using only the term Theotokos, the 
other only Anthropotokos, and each group draws [others] to what it confesses or, if they have not 
accomplished this, puts [others] in danger of falling from the church, it would be necessary to assign 
someone to such an affair if it arises who exercises concern for both groups and heals the danger of both 
parties by means of the term taken from the gospels that signifies both natures. For as I said, the term 
Christotokos keeps the assertion of both parties to the proper limits, because it both removes the blasphemy 
of Paul of Samosata, who claimed that Christ the Lord of all was simply a human being, and also flees the 
wickedness of Arius and Apollinaris. Now I have written these very things to the most distinguished bishop 
of Alexandria, as Your Beatitude can tell from the copies I have attached to this letter of mine, as well as 
from the copies of what he wrote to us. Moreover, with God’s help it has also been agreed to announce a 
world-wide synod in order to inquire into the other ecclesiastical matters. For I do not think it will be 
difficult to investigate a uncertainty over words, and it is not a hindrance for a discussion of the divinity of 
Christ the Lord.”  The original Greek text has been lost, the letter only survives in a fifth-century Latin 
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However, for Cyril, the rejection of the term Theotokos can only be the result of a 
dangerous misapprehension of how the preexistent Word came to be enfleshed: “The 
Apostle says of the Only-begotten, ‘Who being in the form of God, thought it no robbery 
to be equal with God’ [Phil 2:6]. Who then is this who is in the form of God? Moreover, 
how did He empty Himself, and humbled Himself to the likeness of man?”177  As Cyril 
argues, if Nestorians wish to divide Christ into two parts, that is, a man alongside the 
Word, and claim that it was the one born of the Virgin who was emptied of this divine 
glory at the incarnation, then they must first demonstrate “what form and equality with 
the Father are understood to be, and did exist, which might suffer any manner of 
emptying;” however, since there is “no creature, in its own proper nature, equal with the 
Father;” how then can it be said that this creature was emptied if he was a man by nature 
and born of a woman?
178
  Conversely, if they claim that the term kenosis only denotes the 
dwelling of the divine Word within the man the Virgin brought into the world, Cyril 
questions whether this in fact connotes a true self-emptying? If this is the case, then a 
biblical passage like John 14:23, where Christ says that “If any man loves Me, he will 
keep My saying, and My Father will love him, and We will come unto him, and make 
Our abode with him,” means that the Father comes to dwell in those that love Him. But 
does that also indicate that in such instances the Father undergoes a kenotic self-empting 
of His glory as well, and also takes on the form of a servant when He makes His abode in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
version by Marius Mercator published in Nestoriana: die Fragmente des Nestorius gesammelt, ed. F. Loofs 
and S.A. Cook (Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1905), pp. 181-182.  
177
 Cyril of Alexandria, Letter to the Monks of Egypt, c. 13. 
178
 Ibid.  
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the hearts of them that love Him? Or, Cyril concludes, what about the Holy Spirit, “does 
He fulfil an assumption of human flesh when He dwells in our hearts?” 179  
It is important to note that in these extracts Cyril presents his critique of 
Nestorianism specifically as a critique of Nestorius’ reading of the Kenotic hymn, and he 
will go on to offer in its place a rectified interpretation of Philippians 2:6.  Indeed, the 
first eleven verses of Philippians 2 feature so prominently in many of Cyril’s anti-
Nestorian polemics that one scholar has characterized the Alexandrian’s Christological 
writings as an extended exegesis of the Kenotic hymn, a reading of that hymn which 
focusses to an unprecedented degree on the profound soteriological significance of the 
Word taking on the form of a slave—that is, on assuming a human nature—in order to 
perform the saving work of the Cross.
180
  Christ’s center of personal unity remains the 
pre-existent Word, but attention is shifted to the servant-form assumed by the Son, which 
does not entail a diminution of the divine essence, but rather the assumption of a new 
human mode of being undertaken for the sake of his salvific mission. As we saw in the 
first chapter, this focus on the Christ Hymn is not unique to Cyril, but is rather a thematic 
concern he shares with many other writers of the patristic era.  In fact, Philippians 2:5-11 
                                                          
179
 Ibid, c. 14.   
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 Sarah Coakley, “Does Kenosis Rest on a Mistake? Three Kenotic Models in Patristic 
Exegesis,” in Exploring Kenotic Christology: The Self-Emptying of God, ed. C. Stephen Evans (Vancouver, 
BC: Regent College Publishing, 2010), pp. 246-264.  Cf. Frances M. Young, From Nicaea to Chalcedon: A 
Guide to the Literature and its Background,(London: SCM Press,1983), pp. 255-68. The Acts of 
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unchanging and unchangeable according to nature; considered already as one with his own Flesh, he is said 
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difference of his natures is not unknown, from which we say the ineffable union was made.” See also Paul 
L. Gavrilyuk, “Nestorianism Countered: Cyril's Theology of the Divine Kenosis,” Chapter 6 of The 
Suffering of the Impassible God: The Dialectics of Patristic Thought (Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 
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was a scriptural passage of particular importance in his Christological formulations. For 
Nestorius, on the other hand, the Kenotic hymn is a paradigmatic scriptural proof that the 
pre-existent Word did not assume a human nature, but rather conjoined to himself another 
prosopon, or human person, in a union of love—a union so strong that even though the 
two natures, divine and human, remained completely separate, nonetheless they were 
worshipped as one because of their shared dignity and the singular agreement of their will 
and purpose in carrying out the Father’s salvific plan.  According to Nestorius, 
prosopon/person designates only that observable form that the Son took on in order to 
make himself known to the world.  Hence, when Scripture relates that when the “Word 
took on the form of a slave (Philippians 2:7) for his person, but not for his nature.”181 But 
for Cyril, this duality of persons cannot be overcome merely by stipulating that Christ, as 
our object of worship, is worshipped as a single entity due only to the unbroken unity of 
purpose of the divine person and human person.  Only a divine nature and a human 
nature united indissolubly—hypostatically—in the one person of the incarnate Christ, and 
carrying out the distinctive yet joint work of the Cross, can be worshiped as the one true 
salvific God-man.  
Thus, in a text like Cyril’s Commentary on the Gospel of Luke posits a vigorous 
notion of causal efficacy to Christ’s human nature working in unison with the divine 
nature in the economy of salvation, a notion of that unambiguously indicates the efficient 
causal efficacy of such distinctively human activities as the incarnate Word’s human 
touch in the miraculous work of healing.  And it is precisely this text that Aquinas goes 
on to quote in his subsequent Catena of the Gospel of Luke:  
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But although as God He was able to drive away diseases by His word, He 
nevertheless touches them, showing that His flesh was powerful to apply 
remedies, since it was the flesh of God; for as fire, when applied to a 
brazen vessel, imprints on it the effect of its own heat, so the omnipotent 
Word of God, when He united to Himself in real assumption a living 
virgin temple, endued with understanding, implanted in it a participation 
of His own power.
182
 
 
This quotation from Cyril is significant for a number or reasons, most importantly in the 
way that it underscores the fact that it is Christ’s human flesh—due to its hypostatic 
union with the divinity of the Word—which is the instrument through which God carries 
out his salvific God-human activity in the world, and this clarified understanding of the 
efficient causal efficacy of Christ’s human instrumentality is a new feature of Thomas’ 
Christology that becomes fully apparent in his next major work, the Liber de veritate 
catholicae fidei contra errores infidelium. 
 The precise purpose and even the exact overall structuring principle of the Summa 
Contra Gentiles, as Thomas’ book on the “Truth of the Catholic Faith against the Errors 
of the Infidels” came to be known, remain in dispute. However, a general pattern of 
creation as a procession from God and a return to its source through the agency of the 
Word can be perceived as a general architectonic form in the Contra Gentiles.
183
 This 
exitus/reditus pattern, in which the divine, while remaining immanent in itself, emanates 
outward or downward due to a superfluity of its goodness and being, and then reverts or 
returns to itself, is found in such neo-Platonic sources as Proclus, which Aquinas would 
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 Thomas Aquinas, Catena aurea in quatuor Evangelia, Vol. 2, ed. A. Guarienti (Taurini: 
Marietti, 1953), Expositio in Lucam, cap.4, lec. 9:  Quamvis autem ut Deus potuisset omnes verbo pellere 
morbos, tamen tangit eos, ostendens propriam carnem efficacem ad praestanda remedia, nam caro Dei erat. 
Sicut enim ignis appositus vasi aeneo imprimit ei propriae caliditatis effectum; sic omnipotens Dei verbum, 
cum univit sibi veraciter assumptum templum ex virgine animatum et intellectivum, particeps suae 
potestatis, eius effectum inseruit.  
183
 Questions regarding the compositional purpose and scope, as well as the theological structuring 
of the SCG, are explored most fully in Thomas S. Hibbs, Dialectic and Narrative in Aquinas: An 
Interpretation of the Summa Contra Gentiles (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995). Cf. 
Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, pp. 101-116. 
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have become familiar with during his sojourn in Orvieto.
184
  Unlike his Neo-Platonic 
sources, Thomas’ conception of creaturely procession does not entail a necessary divine 
emanation, but is rather based on God’s divine freedom and reflects his goodness and 
wisdom.  As created, human beings can achieve goods proportionate to their creaturely 
natures, but their longing for happiness or beatitude can never be satisfied by created and 
finite goods, but by a non-contingent final goodness, a supernatural telos that is 
complicated by the mankind’s fall into sinfulness.  This sets the stage for Thomas’ 
account in the fourth and final section of the Contra Gentiles of humanity’s redemption 
and ultimate teleological fulfilment through the mediation of Christ the God-man.  
The composition of Book IV of the Contra Gentiles, indeed of the work as whole, 
is also a point of contention, although it is now accepted that Thomas commenced work 
on the first section in 1259 while he was still in Paris, and that the fourth and final section 
was completed by shortly before his departure from Orvieto in 1265.
185
  The late dating 
for Book IV places this Christological portion of the Contra Gentiles well after Aquinas’ 
retrieval of the conciliar materials located in the Papal court at Orvieto, and the beginning 
of his extensive employment of that patristic material in the early volumes of the Golden 
Chain. Thomas’ increasing utilization of these historical documents is quite evident in 
topics covered in SGC which follows to an unprecedented degree a historical 
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 See, for example, Paul Rorem, “‘Procession and Return’ in Thomas Aquinas and His 
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 Cf. R.A. Gauthier,“Introduction historiques à S. Thomas d’Aquin,” in Saint Thomas d’Aquin, 
Contra Gentiles, texte de l’édition léonine, trans. R. Bernier and M. Corvez, vol. 1 (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 
1961), pp. 31-59.  
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adumbration of the unfolding Christological debates during the patristic era. After an 
opening section on the Trinity comprised of fourteen chapters and a further twelve 
chapters focusing on questions regarding the Holy Spirit, Aquinas devotes an extensive 
portion of Book IV, comprising chapters 27 to 39, tracing various heretical 
misapprehensions of the Hypostatic Union, by such figures as Photinus and Sabellius (IV, 
27), the Manicheans (29), Apollinaris (31), Arius (32), Nestorius and Theodore of 
Mopsuestia (34), Eutyches (35), and Macarius of Antioch (36).   
This deeper engagement with the historical development of Christological thought 
has important consequences for two aspects of Thomas’ own developing Christology that 
we have already touched upon.  First, Aquinas, in delving deeper into the patristic 
sources becomes even more aware of the contested scriptural sources used in the 
Christological debates of the first six centuries of the Church, which in turn stimulates 
Aquinas to meditate even more deeply on the Biblical witness of Christ’s person and 
mission.  As a Master of the Sacred Page, one of Thomas’ primary duties since his days 
as a student in Paris was to study, explicate, and preach on the word of God, and Thomas’ 
reliance on the authority of the Bible is plainly seen in his Commentary on the Sentences 
and in all the other works we have looked at up to this point.  Nevertheless, Thomas’ 
readings in patristic scriptural commentaries, already manifest in his extensive use of 
them in the Catena Aurea, is even more evident in the attention he pays certain Biblical 
passages in Suma Contra Gentiles IV. Without doubt, the Kenotic hymn is the most cited 
scriptural pericope in the fourth book of the SCG, with over twenty-five quotations or 
allusions to Philippians 2:5-11. Indeed, Thomas begins his extensive exposition of the 
enfleshment of the Word in c. 27 (“The Incarnation of the Word According to the 
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Tradition of Scripture”) by citing two biblical texts—John 1:14 (“The Word was made 
flesh, and dwelt among us”) from the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel (1:1-18)—along 
with Philippians 2:6-7 (“Who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal 
with God: But emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant being made in the likeness 
of men, and in habit found as a man”) which best establish that the incarnate Christ was 
truly both God and man.  As we shall see, the Johannine Prologue will prove to be of 
even greater importance in the development of Thomas’ Christological when he came to 
compose his Commentary on John shortly after his completion of Contra Gentiles. The 
kenotic hymn, on the other hand, can be traced as a theological leitmotif throughout the 
rest of SCG IV. In the very next chapter, discussing Photinus’ assertion that Christ had 
only a human nature, and whatever divinity he did possess was due only to his 
participation in the Father’s divine glory which merited by His deeds, Aquinas counters 
that if this were the case then the Philippian hymn’s claim that the pre-existent Word, 
“Who being in the form of God emptied Himself . . . taking the form of a servant” (2:6-7) 
would be meaningless, since Photinus only spoke of a glorification of the man through 
participation, and not a kenosis of God. 
In SCG c. 29, Thomas is principally concerned with claims made by groups such 
as the Manicheans that in the Incarnation the Son assumed an illusory human nature, 
nothing more than a fictitious body, so that his various human actions, such as “being 
born, eating, drinking, walking, suffering, and being buried—were done not in truth but 
in a kind of false appearance,”186 thereby rendering the whole mystery of the Incarnation 
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 SCG IV, 29, 1: Unde nec verus homo esse potuit, sed apparens: neque ea quae secundum 
hominem gessit, sicut quod natus est, quod comedit, bibit, ambulavit, passus est et sepultus, in veritate 
fuisse, sed in quadam simulatione, consequitur. Et sic patet quod totum incarnationis mysterium ad 
quandam fictionem deducunt.   
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to little more than an elaborate ruse.  As Aquinas points out, among other things this 
position wipes out the authority of Scripture, since the mere appearance of flesh is not a 
true embodiment, and the likeness of walking is not walking at all; hence, the biblical 
texts must be lying when the make claims such as: “The Word was made flesh” (John 
1:14)—if Jesus’ body was only a phantasm. It also lies when it says that Jesus Christ 
walked, ate, died, and was buried—if these things took place only in an apparent 
phantasy. Most importantly, if Christ’s redemptive life, suffering, death, and resurrection 
in the body were nothing more than a hoax, then there was nothing truly redemptive 
about his seemingly human existence: “if Christ did not have true blood, He did not truly 
shed it for us. Therefore, we are neither truly justified nor truly redeemed. Therefore, 
there is no usefulness to being in Christ.”187 But the Kenotic hymn (2:7) expressly denies 
this misinterpretation of the Word’s enfleshment, for it expressly claims that the Word 
emptied himself and took on a true human nature, the form of a servant—that is, a 
humanity prone to all the mortal weaknesses of post-lapsarian humanity, including the 
ability to truly suffer and die, and it precisely Christ’s veritable human suffering and 
death which allows him to redeem us.
188
  Thomas also uses the Philippian hymn to 
defend the communication of idioms, which predicates both divine and human attributes 
to the one person of the incarnate Word, but as  Aquinas points,  for Nestorius and 
Theodore of Mopsuestia, it was unbecoming to attribute qualities such as been born of a 
woman or that he suffered, died, was buried; although they would accede that there are 
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certain names which, although they are chiefly befitting to God, are nonetheless 
communicated to men in a fashion—“Christ,” “lord,” “holy,” and even “son of God”—
nothing prevents us from predicating such names of the human Christ, especially since 
the man Jesus was united to God in special way because of the greater fullness of grace 
which dwelt within him.
189
 However, this attribution of holiness or sonship to Christ used 
because the Word of God was united to that man only through an indwelling by grace, 
and the union of wills that follows, is not for God’s Word to be made flesh. Again, 
however, this does not correlate with the statement that the Word, “being in the form of 
God, emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men” 
(Phil. 2:6-7). Rather, in Nestorius, Christ is divided into two—into that man who is the 
adoptive son, exalted by the Father for the fullness of his grace, and into God’s natural 
Son who is the Word of God; hence, the Kenotic hymn cannot be understood of that man.  
For Christ, “if he is human in this manner, was not first in the form of God, so as to be 
made later in the likeness of man; on the contrary, the existing man was made to share in 
divinity;” hence he was not emptied, he did not undergo a kenosis, but rather was 
glorified by the Father. So, the “text must then be understood of the Word of God who 
first was eternally in the form of God, that is, in the nature of God, and later emptied 
Himself, made in the likeness of man.”190 
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 Ibid, 32, 2: Sed quia sunt quaedam nomina quae, etsi Deo principaliter conveniant, 
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This defense of the full reality of Christ’s assumed humanity as stated in the 
Philippian’s hymn plays a central role in Thomas’ subsequent analysis of the hypostatic 
union; an analysis wherein Aquinas will comprehensively expound the concept of 
Christological instrumentality which he had been developing on and off since the 
Commentary on the Sentences and the Disputed Question on Truth. However, even 
though the inseparable unity of the Word with humanity is of uppermost in Thomas’ 
mind, he is all too aware that presuming the opposite error,  that this union of divinity and 
humanity occurred in one nature, is equally problematic. According to Thomas, this is 
precisely the problem with Eutyches, who in order to preserve the unity of the enfleshed 
Word, posited that the union of God and man was in one nature and not in one person or 
hypostasis. In response, Aquinas once again calls upon the Kenotic hymn to point out the 
absurdity of such a claim, and recognize that there must be two nature—or principles of 
activity—in Christ even after the union. The hymn describes the Word as “in the form of 
God,” and only then taking on the “form of a servant” (Phil. 2:6-7), and of course, the 
divine form/nature of God is not the same as the human nature or the forma servi. For 
Thomas, this premise anchors several postulations about the incarnate Christ: nothing 
receives what it already has, and so, if the form or nature of God and of the servant were 
the same, the Word would not—since He already had the form of God—have received 
the form of servant. “Neither, again, can one say that the form of God in Christ is 
corrupted by the union, because thus after the union Christ would not be God. Nor, again, 
can one say that the form of the servant was corrupted in the union, because thus the 
Word would not have received the form of the servant.” But neither can one say that the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
converso homo existens divinitatis particeps factus est, in quo non fuit exinanitus, sed exaltatus. Oportet 
igitur quod intelligatur de verbo Dei, quod prius fuerit ab aeterno in forma Dei, idest in natura Dei, et 
postmodum exinanivit semetipsum, in similitudinem hominum factus.  
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form of the servant is mixed thoroughly with the form of God, for things mixed 
thoroughly do not retain their integrity; rather, each is in part corrupted, and so the 
Philippians hymn would not say that the Word received the form of the servant, but only 
some partial aspect of the servant nature. Thus, one can only conclude that in Christ even 
after the hypostatic union there were two forms, and therefore, two natures.
191
 
As Thomas further elucidates, every nature has a proper operation of its own, for 
a nature or form is the principle of operation for all beings, and in accord with its form 
every nature has an identifiable species, i.e., those structuring principle that organize 
things to be what they are and specify what is proper for them to do.  Thus, if the 
presence of diverse natures in beings indicates diverse forms, where we discern a 
diversity of natures, so there must also be a diverse array of actions which follow from 
those natures.  Clearly then, if in Christ there were only one form of natural activity, it 
would follow that in him there would be only one nature from which this action 
originated; this is precisely the Monophysite heresy that Eutyches fell into: that there is 
only one nature in the incarnate Word from which Christ’s singular divine operation 
proceeds.  But this completely discounts the enfleshed Word’s human operations attested 
by Scripture; therefore, we must conclude that it is false to say there is but one natural 
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 Ibid, 36, 4: Natura est secundum quam res aliqua dicitur res naturalis. Dicitur autem res 
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Et sic oportet dicere, secundum verba apostoli, quod in Christo, etiam post unionem, fuerunt duae formae. 
Ergo duae naturae.  
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operation proceeding from one nature in Christ.
192
  Similarly, we must disavow the claim 
that there is only one will in Christ, for if there was in Christ but one will, surely it could 
only be a the divine will, since the divine will which the Word had from eternity He 
could not lose.  However, this raises a soteriological problem in Thomas’ mind: the 
divine will is unrelated to merit because only those who are striving towards perfection 
can merit, but the eternally divine Word has always possessed Godly perfection. Thus, 
Christ by His life, death, and resurrection would have merited nothing—whether for 
Himself, or for us. The exact contrary of this, nevertheless, seems to be taught by the 
Kenotic hymn, which states: “He was made obedient to the Father even unto death, for 
which cause God also has exalted Him” (Phil. 2:8-9). What is more, if there was no 
human will in Christ then it would follow that by His assumed nature the incarnate Word 
did not have free choice. And if this is the case—Thomas contends—then Christ did not 
act in a human manner, but after the manner of those animals who lack free choice; 
hence, nothing in Christ’s acts were “virtuous or laudable, nothing a model for imitation 
by us.”193 Yet a diversity of wills is well attested by the Biblical witness, for example, 
when it relates that Christ said “I came down from heaven, not to do My own will, but the 
will of Him that sent Me (John 6:38); and again: “Not My will, but Yours be done” (Luke 
22:42). From these words it is clear that there was in Christ another will apart from the 
will of the Father. But clearly, there was also in Christ a will common to Him and the 
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 Ibid, 36, 2: Cuiuslibet enim naturae est aliqua operatio propria: nam forma est operationis 
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 Ibid, 36, 6: Si in Christo voluntas humana non fuit, sequitur quod neque secundum naturam 
assumptam liberi arbitrii fuerit: nam secundum voluntatem est homo liberi arbitrii. Sic igitur non agebat 
Christus homo ad modum hominis, sed ad modum aliorum animalium, quae libero arbitrio carent. Nihil 
igitur in eius actibus virtuosum et laudabile, aut nobis imitandum, fuit.   
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Father.  For, just as the Father’s and the Son’s nature is one, so also is their will; hence, 
there are two wills in Christ.
194
 
It is worthwhile to identify Thomas’ debt to the Conciliar tradition in these 
passages and how they inform his argument. Above all, Aquinas writes this portion of the 
SCG with an attentive eye on the proceedings of the Second Council of Constantinople 
(convened in 553).  The fifth Ecumenical Council, or Constantinople II, was above all an 
attempt to come to terms with the fractious aftermath of Chalcedon, where various 
attempts at reconciliation between the Monophysite and orthodox parties had only sown 
even more confusion and conflict, and the emergence of the notions that in the incarnate 
Christ the propositions, respectively, that Christ had only one function, operation, or 
energeia (Monoenergism) and a sole divine thelema or will (Monotheletism), by restating 
the Chalcedonian formula with greater clarity. The Council clearly saw that such 
doctrines were a kind of repristination of the Nestorian view that there was one dominant 
divine nature or phusis (Monophysitism) in the Word made flesh.  Constantinople II 
reaffirmed that the one and the same subject of Jesus Christ, as posited in the 
Chalcedonian creed, is identical with the hypostasis of the eternal Word: 
If anyone understands the one hypostasis of our Lord Jesus Christ as 
admitting the meaning of several hypostases, and so tries to introduce into 
the mystery of Christ two hypostases or two persons, and after having 
introduced two persons, speaks of one person as regards dignity, honor 
and adoration, as Theodore and Nestorius have written senselessly; and if 
he makes the slanderous assertion that the holy Council of Chalcedon has 
used the term “one hypostasis” in this impious way and does not confess 
that the Word of God has been united to the flesh by way of hypostasis 
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Christo duae voluntates.  
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and that, therefore, there is but one hypostasis or person, and that this is 
the sense in which the holy Council of Chalcedon confessed one 
hypostasis of our Lord Jesus Christ, let him be anathema.
195
 
  
Perhaps even more importantly, the texts of Constantinople II emphasize the fact 
that while Christ has a human nature apart from his divine nature, nonetheless the Son’s 
distinctive human nature is decidedly non-hypostatic; in other words, it does not subsist 
in and of itself, and therefore does not constitute a separate human person or hypostasis. 
The two natures retain their distinctiveness, while remaining inextricably intertwined in 
their respective yet intimately conjoined activities or energies.
196
  In affirming this crucial 
teaching at this point in the SCG, Thomas reintroduces the Dionysian concept of theandry 
to begin to explicate not only how Christ’s human will can be autonomous yet ordered to 
the Father’s will, but also how the singularly activities proceeding from two distinct 
principles of operation, one human and the other divine, are nevertheless united in the 
one person of enfleshed Word.  According to Aquinas, the key to understanding this 
unification is to be found in the concept of ordering: the human will or Christ was 
ordered towards the Father’s will in the way that human volitional activities in the moral 
order are ordained towards an ultimate good, a goal or telos that is found only in God; 
similarly, Christ did nothing in His human nature, whether by acting or by suffering, 
except as the divine will disposed.
197
 The human operation of Christ, also “achieved a 
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  Second Council of Constantinople, capitula v, in Norman P. Tanner, Decrees of the 
Ecumenical Councils, Vol. I (London: Sheed & Ward, 1990), p. 116. 
196
 Thomas does not cite specific texts from Constantinople II in his discussing this subject, but we 
can be sure that Thomas is familiar with the decrees of the Fifth Ecumenical Council, since he quotes them 
in other portions of the SCG, for example in IV, 24, 6—the first Latin medieval writer to do so—and his 
explication of the heresies of Nestorius and Theodore in these chapters indicates familiarity with the 
Constantinopolitan conciliar texts.  
197
 IV, 36, 10: Videtur autem haec positio ortum ha  buisse ex hoc quod eius auctores nescierunt 
distinguere inter id quod est simpliciter unum, et ordine unum. Viderunt enim voluntatem humanam in 
Christo omnino sub voluntate divina ordinatam fuisse, ita quod nihil voluntate humana Christus voluit nisi 
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kind of divine efficacy by union with the divinity, just as the action of a secondary agent 
achieves a kind of efficacy from the principal agent;” and as a result, all of the incarnate 
Word’s action or suffering “were salutary.”198  It is precisely for this reason, Aquinas 
claims, that the Areopagite called Christ’s human operation as “theandric,” that is, “God-
human”; because it is of both God and a man.  Moreover, according to Thomas, this 
seamless interaction of humanity and divinity in the unitary subject of Christ led to the 
Monophysite’s confusion, since they conflated personal unity with an identity of wills 
and a conflation of energies, because they could not conceive how the two natures, 
volitions, and actions are ordered to each other.
199
 
As we have already seen in some detail in the first chapter, Thomas had 
appropriated John Damascene’s Chalcedonian reading of theandry, as mediated be Albert 
the Great, as a means of explicating how integrally human and divine actions could 
proceed from the two distinctive natures of the one hypostasis of the incarnate Word.  We 
also saw that as early as his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Aquinas—
in manner unique to Medieval Latin writers—raised this issue of theandric activity in 
conjunction with the topic of instrumentality.  Nevertheless, while affirming the 
humanity of Christ’s assumed human nature and the human actions proceeding from that 
nature, Thomas failed to ascribe any efficiently salutary power to those human activities 
in his adumbration of instrumental causality, let alone integrate his notion of theandry to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
quod eum velle voluntas divina disposuit. Similiter etiam nihil Christus secundum humanam naturam 
operatus est, vel agendo vel patiendo, nisi quod voluntas divina disposuit: secundum illud Ioan. 8-29: quae 
placita sunt ei, facio semper.  
198
 Ibid: Humana etiam operatio Christi quandam efficaciam divinam ex unione divinitatis 
consequebatur, sicut actio secundarii agentis consequitur efficaciam quandam ex principali agente: et ex 
hoc contigit quod quaelibet eius actio vel passio fuit salubris.  
199
 Ibid: Propter quod Dionysius humanam Christi operationem vocat theandricam, idest dei-
virilem; et etiam quia est Dei et hominis. Videntes igitur humanam voluntatem et operationem Christi sub 
divina ordinari infallibili ordine, iudicaverunt in Christo esse tantum voluntatem et operationem unam; 
quamvis non sit idem, ut dictum est, ordinis unum et simpliciter unum.  
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a truly causally efficacious instrumental activity of the Word’s assumed humanity. Here 
we see the beginnings of precisely this sort of integration.  Thomas had already thought 
deeply about the way both principle and instrumental agents achieved a desired end each 
according to their capacities.  What distinguished instrumental causality qua 
instrumentality, that is, as a moved mover, was the fact that the instrument needed to be 
moved under the influence of a higher agent in order to achieve an effect surpassing its 
own natural ability.
200
  In the time since period elapsed since his Scriptum commentary. 
Aquinas had begun to think seriously about the fact that any activity proceeding from the 
instrument must also proceed from a principle which somehow really belongs to the 
instrument as well, albeit not as a proper or full portion of that instrument’s principle of 
activity—its very nature—for even though the activity of a being belongs to it only 
insofar as that agent is an instrument, must proceed from the natural potentiality inherent 
within that being.
201
  
As Thomas had already noted earlier in the Contra Gentiles, the potential for 
acting resides within the principal and the instrumental agent in two distinct modalities, 
since “every agent acts so far as it is in act, the mode of action must follow the mode of a 
thing’s actual being” (Cum omne agens agat secundum quod actu est, oportet modum 
actionis esse secundum modum actus ipsius rei).
202
  So, the principle agent  acts 
according to the exigencies or driving forces of its nature, or, to put it another way, the 
active power in it is a certain form or quality existentially rooted in the nature of that 
being; while the instrumental agent, since it is a moved mover, has a potentiality in 
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 See, for example, In IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1 ad 4.  
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 Cf. among other instances, Thomas’ exploration of this topic in Quaestiones disputatae de 
potentia Dei, III, 4.   
202
 SCG II, 21, 9. 
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proportion to its being moved, a motion  towards a final end the instrumental agent 
cannot carry out unless it exercises its own natural potential to act inherent within its own 
way of being. This could be taken to mean that in any instance of instrumental causation 
there are always two irreducibly separate activities, but as Aquinas points out, whenever 
the mover and the moved have diverse—that is, their action proceeds from diverse 
operative principles or natures—it is necessary that one operation be proper to the 
moving agent and another to the moved.  Nevertheless, the moved participates in the 
operation of the mover, and the mover utilizes the operation of the moved, so that each 
acts in a commonality with the other. So, even though one can identify a diversity of 
operational principles at work in the resulting effect, the actual activity is unitary and that 
which it brings about or causes is the one effect of both the principle and instrumental 
causes, though the effect is brought about in diverse ways: “It is clear that one and the 
same effect is not attributed to the natural and to the divine power as though it came 
about partly from God and partly from the natural agent;” rather the entire “effect 
proceeds from both but in a different way from each, just as the whole effect is attributed 
to the instrument and the whole effect is attributed to the principal agent.”203 The 
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 SCG III, 70, 8: Patet etiam quod non sic idem effectus causae naturali et divinae virtuti 
attribuitur quasi partim a Deo, et partim a naturali agente fiat, sed totus ab utroque secundum alium 
modum: sicut idem effectus totus attribuitur instrumento, et principali agenti etiam totus.  Aquinas also 
writes in III, 70, 5: In quolibet enim agente est duo considerare, scilicet rem ipsam quae agit, et virtutem 
qua agit: sicut ignis calefacit per calorem. Virtus autem inferioris agentis dependet a virtute superioris 
agentis, inquantum superius agens dat virtutem ipsam inferiori agenti per quam agit; vel conservat eam; aut 
etiam applicat eam ad agendum, sicut artifex applicat instrumentum ad proprium effectum; cui tamen non 
dat formam per quam agit instrumentum, nec conservat, sed dat ei solum motum. Oportet ergo quod actio 
inferioris agentis non solum sit ab eo per virtutem propriam, sed per virtutem omnium superiorum 
agentium: agit enim in virtute omnium. Et sicut agens infimum invenitur immediatum activum, ita virtus 
primi agentis invenitur immediata ad producendum effectum: nam virtus infimi agentis non habet quod 
producat hunc effectum ex se, sed ex virtute proximi superioris; et virtus illius hoc habet ex virtute 
superioris; et sic virtus supremi agentis invenitur ex se productiva effectus, quasi causa immediata; sicut 
patet in principiis demonstrationum, quorum primum est immediatum. Sicut igitur non est inconveniens 
quod una actio producatur ex aliquo agente et eius virtute, ita non est inconveniens quod producatur idem 
effectus ab inferiori agente et Deo: ab utroque immediate, licet alio et alio modo. “In every agent, in fact, 
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Christological ramifications can be clearly drawn out from these basic metaphysical 
principles. The person of the incarnate Word produces single effects, even though the 
cause proceeds from diverse operational principles, one acting through the other, so that 
that the divine principle acts through the humanity and the human instruments effectuates 
the divine, so that they form one complete causal principle resulting in a single effect—in 
other words, the distinctive divine and human natures operate theandrically.  
Thomas’ clarification and extension of the metaphysical understanding of 
instrumental causality resolves once and for all the ambiguity present in his earlier 
treatments of the role and soteriological efficacy of the assumed human nature in the 
Incarnation.  Aquinas no longer restricts the actions of the Word’s instrumentality to a 
disposing, moral, or merely exemplar form of causality, in fact, quite the opposite.  The 
enfleshed Son’s human activities are now unambiguously presented as having a salvific 
power, precisely because of the hypostatic union, which safeguards the operative power 
proper to the instrumental human nature, which is used by a principle agent of a higher 
causality in order to effectuate a result that is superior to the operating principle of the 
human instrument, that is nevertheless proportioned to the nature of the principal agent. 
The instrument, Christ’s assumed nature, is fully recognized as a cause—according to its 
                                                                                                                                                                             
there are two things to consider: namely, the thing itself that acts, and the power by which it acts. Fire, for 
instance, heats by means of beat. gut the power of a lower agent depends on the power of the superior 
agent, according as the superior agent gives this power to the lower agent whereby it may act; or preserves 
it; or even applies it to the action, as the artisan applies an instrument to its proper effect, though he neither 
gives the form whereby the instrument works, nor preserves it, but simply gives it motion. So, it is 
necessary for the action of a lower agent to result not only from the agent by its own power, but also from 
the power of all higher agents; it acts, theft, through the power of all. And just as the lowest agent is found 
immediately active, so also is the power of the primary agent found immediate in the production of the 
effect. For the power of the lower agent is not adequate to produce this effect of itself, but from the power 
of the next higher agent; and the power of the next one gets this ability from the power of the next higher 
one; and thus the power of the highest agent is discovered to be of itself productive of the effect, as an 
immediate cause. This is evident in the case of the principles of demonstration, the first of which is 
immediate. So, just as it is not unfitting for one action to be produced by an agent and its power, so it is not 
inappropriate for the same effect to be produced by a lower agent and God: by both immediately, though in 
different ways.” 
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natural human modality—of the singular saving effect of the Word’s activity, and so is 
wholly and truly an agent or mover, even though Thomas simultaneously acknowledges 
that the assumed nature is a causative with respect to this activity and effect “only 
because it is acting along with and under the direction of a higher cause which is 
adequate to account for the full formality of the effect.”204   
This new understanding of the importance of the conjoined hypostatic activity 
allows Thomas to grasp the role of radical creaturely participation in the enfleshed Son’s 
divine operations, and thus distinctly proclaim that everything which Christ suffered and 
did in his humanity was indeed salutary.
205
  Thomas fullest articulation of this newly won 
insight is found in Contra Gentiles Iv, 41, “Quomodo oporteat intelligere incarnationem 
filii Dei,” where the Angelic Doctor explicates that the hypostatic union of natures in the 
person of Christ, and the resulting theandric operations of the incarnate Word, far 
exceeds all other created unions in intensity.  Aquinas briefly recapitulates the various 
ways in which the Incarnation was misunderstood, especially regarding how a human 
nature was assumed but the pre-existent word. As Thomas explains, since the Word 
already possessed a divine nature, the assumption of humanity could only be construed 
by many in an accidental and extrinsic conjunction—that is, as accidental quality such as 
a particular shade of skin pigmentation, or an acquired skill like playing a musical 
instrument, both of which can change over time—or as the relation of two natures to each 
other like the relation of a body to a garment which may be easily donned or just as 
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 Albertson, “Instrumental Causality,” p. 426  
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  SCG IV, 36, 10: Humana etiam operatio Christi quandam efficaciam divinam ex unione 
divinitatis consequebatur, sicut actio secundarii agentis consequitur efficaciam quandam ex principali 
agente: et ex hoc contigit quod quaelibet eius actio vel passio fuit salubris.  
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quickly removed.
206
  The clear allusion to a Habitus theory, and its origins in the Kenotic 
hymn, are unmistakable.
207
 As always, for Thomas the danger in minsconstruing the 
relationship of the assumed humanity to the Word in such a way that it almost inevitably 
leads to the error of Nestorius, who similarly imagined that the human nature of Christ 
stood to the Son as a kind of temple, so that the union of the Word to the human nature to 
be understood only as a kind of indwelling.  However, since a temple possesses its 
substantial individuation apart from anyone who may dwell within it, and the substantial 
individuation proper to human nature is personality or hypostasis, there can only be one 
logical conclusion: that the hypostasis of the human nature was one, and that of the Word 
another; hence, the Word and that man were two persons.
208
   According to Thomas, 
perhaps the best way to understand the coming together or divinity and humanity in the 
hypostasis of Christ is to compare to the exceedingly intimate union of the body and the 
soul. Here Aquinas draws upon a deep vein of Patristic thinking, as he pointedly quotes 
from the Quicunque Vult (“sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est homo, ita Deus et homo 
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 Ibid, 36, 5:  Ea enim quae habenti aliquam naturam adveniunt nec tamen pertinent ad 
integritatem naturae illius, vel accidentia esse videntur, ut albedo et musica; vel accidentaliter se habere ad 
ipsum, sicut anulus, vestimentum, domus, et similia. Consideraverunt autem, quod, cum humana natura 
verbo Dei adveniat nec ad eius naturae integritatem pertineat, necesse est, ut putaverunt, quod humana 
natura accidentalem unionem haberet ad verbum. Et quidem manifestum est quod non potest inesse verbo 
ut accidens: tum quia Deus non est susceptivum accidentis, ut supra probatum est; tum quia humana natura, 
cum sit de genere substantiae, nullius accidens esse potest. Unde reliquum videbatur quod humana natura 
adveniret verbo, non sicut accidens, sed sicut accidentaliter se habens ad ipsum. 
207
 Ibid, 36, 7: His igitur remotis per supra dicta, necessarium est ponere talem fuisse unionem 
verbi et hominis ut neque ex duabus una natura conflata sit; neque verbi ad humanam naturam talis fuerit 
unio sicut est alicuius substantiae, puta hominis, ad exteriora, quae accidentaliter se habent ad ipsum, ut 
domus et vestimentum 
208
 Ibid, 36, 5: Posuit igitur Nestorius quod humana natura Christi se habebat ad verbum sicut 
templum quoddam: ita quod secundum solam inhabitationem erat intelligenda unio verbi ad humanam 
naturam. Et quia templum seorsum habet suam individuationem ab eo qui inhabitat templum; individuatio 
autem conveniens humanae naturae est personalitas: reliquum erat quod alia esset personalitas humanae 
naturae, et alia verbi. Et sic verbum et ille homo erant duae personae. 
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unus est Christus”), the so-called Athanasian Creed, to the effect that just as the rational 
soul and the flesh are one human, so God and man are one Christ.
209
   
Moreover, Thomas adds, the rational soul is united to the body as an instrument—
a claim that, as we have seen, Thomas had been elaborating earlier in the Contra Gentiles 
on largely metaphysical ground, but which he now additionally defends as in full 
concordance with “the ancient Doctors, who held that the human nature in Christ was ‘a 
kind of organ of the divinity,’ just as the body is held to be an organ of the soul.”210 This 
phrase, of course, is found in John of Damascus’ De fide, but as we saw in the first 
chapter, the notion that the humanity of the Word was an organ or instrument of the 
divinity has Patristic provenance traceable all the way back to Athanasius’ anti-Arian 
polemics.
211
 As Thomas explains, the body and its parts are in a certain sense an organ of 
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 Ibid, 41, 9: The Athanasian Creed is not in fact the work of Athanasius, but it certainly includes 
much of the Chalcedonian Christological consensus, which can at least partly be traced back to Athanasius’ 
Logos-sarx: Sed necessarium est ad aeternam salutem, ut incarnationem quoque Domini nostri Iesu Christi 
fideliter credat. Est ergo fides recta ut credamus et confiteamur, quia Dominus noster Iesus Christus, Dei 
Filius, Deus [pariter] et homo est. Deus [est] ex substantia Patris ante saecula genitus: et homo est ex 
substantia matris in saeculo natus. Perfectus Deus, perfectus homo: ex anima rationali et humana carne 
subsistens. Aequalis Patri secundum divinitatem: minor Patre secundum humanitatem. Qui licet Deus sit et 
homo, non duo tamen, sed unus est Christus. Unus autem non conversione divinitatis in carnem, sed 
assumptione humanitatis in Deum. Unus omnino, non confusione substantiae, sed unitate personae. Nam 
sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est homo: ita Deus et homo unus est Christus. 
210
 Ibid, 41, 10: Ad quod etiam dicta antiquorum doctorum concordant, qui humanam naturam in 
Christo organum quoddam divinitatis posuerunt, sicut et ponitur corpus organum animae.  
211
 John of Damascus, De fide Orthodoxa, III, 15: “And thus His divinity communicates its own 
glories to the body while it remains itself without part in the sufferings of the flesh. For His flesh did not 
suffer through His divinity in the same way that His divinity energized through the flesh. For the flesh 
acted as the instrument of His divinity. Although, therefore, from the first conception there was no division 
at all between the two forms, but the actions of either form through all the time became those of one 
person, nevertheless we do not in any way confuse those things that took place without separation, but 
recognize from the quality of its works what sort of form anything has.”  Athanasius, Orationes contra 
Arianos, III, 31: “As the Apostle says, the Godhead dwelt in the flesh; as much as to say, ‘Being God, He 
had His own body, and using this as an instrument, He became man for our sakes.’ And on account of this, 
the properties of the flesh are said to be His, since He was in it, such as to hunger, to thirst, to suffer, to 
weary, and the like, of which the flesh is capable; while on the other hand the works proper to the Word 
Himself, such as to raise the dead, to restore sight to the blind, and to cure the woman with an issue of 
blood, He did through His own body. And the Word bore the infirmities of the flesh, as His own, for His 
was the flesh; and the flesh ministered to the works of the Godhead, because the Godhead was in it, for the 
body was God’s. And well has the Prophet said 'carried Isaiah 53:4;’ and has not said, ‘He remedied our 
infirmities,’ lest, as being external to the body, and only healing it, as He has always done, He should leave 
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the conjoined soul, unlike external instruments or tools such as an axe: an axe is not the 
soul’s very own instrument, as a hand is, for anyone can pick up the axe and operate it, 
but this hand is an intrinsic assistant to the soul by its very own operation.
212
  From this 
point of view, even the union of God and man can be considered in instrumental terms, 
since as creatures all humans are related to God as instruments of a sort, as the Apostle 
explained in his Letter to the Philippians, “for it is God who works in you both to will 
and to accomplish according to His good will” (2:3).  Nevertheless, humans are related to 
God as extrinsic and separated instruments, analogously to the external relations of a 
hand and an axe; for “God does not move them only to operations which are His very 
own, but to the operations common to every rational nature, such as understand truth, 
loving the good, or doing what is just.”213  Yet the human nature in Christ is assumed 
with the result that the incarnate Word instrumentally performs things which are the 
proper operation of God alone: washing away sins, enlightening minds darkened through 
sin by means of grace, and leading souls to the beatific perfection of eternal life.
214
  
It is important to note that in all earlier works, such as the Scriptum commentary 
and De veritate, the phrase sola Deo had been used to definitively excluded any 
                                                                                                                                                                             
men subject still to death; but He carries our infirmities, and He Himself bears our sins, that it might be 
shown that He has become man for us, and that the body which in Him bore them, was His own body; and, 
while He received no hurt Himself by ‘bearing our sins in His body on the tree,’ as Peter speaks, we men 
were redeemed from our own affections, and were filled with the righteousness of the Word.” 
212
  Summa contra gentiles IV, 41, 11: Aliter enim est animae organum corpus et eius partes, et 
aliter exteriora instrumenta. Haec enim dolabra non est proprium instrumentum, sicut haec manus: per 
dolabram enim multi possunt operari, sed haec manus ad propriam operationem huius animae deputatur. 
213
  Ibid: Propter quod manus est organum unitum et proprium: dolabra autem instrumentum 
exterius et commune. Sic igitur et in unione Dei et hominis considerari potest. Omnes enim homines 
comparantur ad Deum ut quaedam instrumenta quibus operatur: ipse enim est qui operatur in nobis velle et 
perficere pro bona voluntate, secundum apostolum, Philipp. 2:3. Sed alii homines comparantur ad Deum 
quasi instrumenta extrinseca et separata: moventur enim a Deo non ad operationes proprias sibi tantum, sed 
ad operationes communes omni rationali naturae, ut est intelligere veritatem, diligere bona, et operari iusta. 
214
  Ibid: Sed humana natura in Christo assumpta est ut instrumentaliter operetur ea quae sunt 
operationes propriae solius Dei, sicut est mundare peccata, illuminare mentes per gratiam, et introducere in 
perfectionem vitae aeternae. Comparatur igitur humana natura Christi ad Deum sicut instrumentum 
proprium et coniunctum, ut manus ad animam. 
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creaturely share in the causality of grace, but now Thomas pointedly employs the very 
same phrase (Sed humana natura in Christo assumpta est ut instrumentaliter operetur ea 
quae sunt operationes propriae solius Dei)  in order to emphasize the radical elevation of 
Christ’s instrumental operation—precisely as human—through participation in the divine 
power by means of the hypostatic union. The human nature of Christ is joined to God as a 
proper and conjoined instrument, very much as a hand is conjoined to its animating soul, 
so that Christ’s human actions are able to bring about both physical and spiritual healing.  
Indeed, there is a “flow of salvation from Christ to men” instrumentally mediated by the 
Word’s soteriologically efficacious humanity.215  This causal efficacy ensues from all the 
theandric and thus salutary activities of the Son, a causality which extends even to our 
present-day efficacious encounters with Christ in the Sacraments. Whereas in earlier texts 
sacramental activity was reduced by Thomas to a “sensible manifestation of a spiritual 
effect and a spiritual disposition for the divine infusion of sanctifying grace,” in the 
Contra Gentiles the sacraments are identified as instruments of the incarnate Word, their 
saving power effectuated through the Son’s human life, meritorious passion, satisfactory 
death, and glorious resurrection, and thus particular causes of Christ’ universal causality 
of salvation,  and powered in their operation by the “principal cause so that they may 
apply the effect of the universal cause of grace” to specific believers.216  Aquinas’ 
Christological evolution has clearly reached a milestone. As with his teaching on the 
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 Ibid, IV, 55, 30: Effluxus salutis a Christo in homines.   
216
 Blankenhorn, “Instrumental Causality of the Sacraments,” p. 282. Cf. Summa contra gentiles 
IV, 56, 1: Quia vero, sicut iam dictum est, mors Christi est quasi universalis causa humanae salutis; 
universalem autem causam oportet applicari ad unumquemque effectum: necessarium fuit exhiberi 
hominibus quaedam remedia per quae eis beneficium mortis Christi quodammodo coniungeretur. 
Huiusmodi autem esse dicuntur Ecclesiae sacramenta. Since, however, as has already been said, the death 
of Christ is, so to say, the universal cause of human salvation, and since a universal cause must he applied 
singly to each of its effects, it was necessary to show men some remedies through which the benefit of 
Christ’s death could somehow be conjoined to them. It is of this sort, of course, that the sacraments of the 
Church are said to be.  
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efficacy of Christ’s humanity, from this point on Aquinas will decline to describe 
sacramental causality as a type of disposing efficacy. The doctrinal change from the 
Sentences Commentary and De veritate is complete: the divine nature utilizes the 
operations of Christ’s human nature instrumentally in order to merit salvation for sinful 
humanity.  
 
 
 
4. Theandric Operations and the Esse of Christ: A Theological Compendium  
 
 
It is notable that in the Summa Contra Gentiles Aquinas does not begin to explain 
how Christ’s human nature is worked as an instrument of the divinity.  Moreover, while 
the role of the incarnate Word’s full humanity in the work of salvation is firmly 
established, Thomas does speculate on how the God-man’s actions and their saving effect 
is related to the Son’s human mode of existing in the world—in the other words, to the 
question of the Word’s human esse. However, a composition in all probability begun in 
the immediate aftermath of the completion of the Contra Gentiles and Thomas’s 
departure for Rome in 1265, the Compendium theologiae, seu, Brevis compilatio 
theologiae ad fratrem Raynaldum or Compendium of Theology, a brief compilation of 
theological doctrine put together at the behest of Reginald of Piperno, a fellow 
Dominican friar, as well as a father-confessor, faithful amanuensis, and constant 
travelling companion to the Angelic Doctor, begins to address some of these complex 
issues.
217
 Unsurprisingly, the immediate general context of Thomas’s brief doctrinal 
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 The exact dating of the Compendium is, as to be expected, not known with absolute precision, 
but the resemblance of many sections of this work with various passages in the Contra Gentiles suggests 
that the latter portion of the SCG and the much of the Compendium theologiae overlap or follow closely 
upon each other. The dates of composition are generally given as 1265-1267, but the work is incomplete, 
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meditations on the hypostatic union comes amidst a general discussion of the reasons for 
the Incarnation, a succinct review of sundry misapprehensions of the enfleshment of the 
Word, including the heretical teachings of Photinus, Nestorius, Arius, Apollinaris, and 
Eutyches, with the Kenotic hymn as a recurring thematic focus of the discussions.  For 
Thomas, the gravamen of Philippians 2 remains the question of the means of the union of 
divinity and humanity in Christ, and the need to refute the dangerous notion that two 
natures came together in an extrinsic or accidental manner, thereby resulting in two 
hypostases or persons.
218
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
terminating abruptly near the beginning of the second part.  The editor of the Leonine edition, Hyacinthe-
François Dondaine, speculated that Thomas was prevented from any further writing on the Compendium 
shortly after the completion of part one, taking up work on the second section only after his return to 
Naples in1272, which was then shortly thereafter permanently disrupted by the Saint’s death in 1274. 
However, there is little evidence for such a protracted and episodic compositional history; on the contrary, 
the consistency of the writing throughout both sections would indicate that Thomas wrote the entire 
truncated work as it exists now by around 1267-1268, when he was precluded from continuing by his return 
to the University of Paris in 1268. Certainly, the Christological portions that we will be looking at, even 
though they come from the second part of the Compendium, are nevertheless quite compatible with 
Thomas’ work on the person and mission of Christ from the concluding chapters of the earlier Summa 
Contra Gentiles (ca. 1264-1265); cf. Palémon Glorieux, “La Christologie du Compendium theologiae,” 
Sciences Ecclésiastiques 13 (1961), pp. 7-34. 
218
 For example, Compendium theologiae c. 209: Considerantes enim quidam, quod omne quod 
advenit alicui post esse completum, accidentaliter ei adiungitur, ut homini vestis, posuerunt quod humanitas 
accidentali unione fuerit in persona filii divinitati coniuncta, ita scilicet quod natura assumpta se haberet ad 
personam filii Dei sicut vestis ad hominem. Ad cuius confirmationem inducebant quod apostolus dicit ad 
Philip. de Christo, quod habitu inventus est ut homo. Rursus considerabant quod ex unione animae et 
corporis efficitur individuum quoddam rationalis naturae, quod nominatur persona. Si igitur anima in 
Christo fuisset corpori unita, videre non poterant quin sequeretur quod ex tali unione constitueretur 
persona. Sequeretur ergo in Christo duas esse personas, scilicet personam assumentem, et personam 
assumptam: in homine enim induto non sunt duae personae, quia indumentum rationem personae non 
habet. Si autem vestis esset persona, sequeretur in homine vestito duas esse personas. Ad hoc igitur 
excludendum, posuerunt quidam animam Christi unitam nunquam fuisse corpori, sed quod persona filii Dei 
animam et corpus separatim assumpsit. “In undertaking to explain this truth [of the Incarnation], some 
theologians have taken the wrong path. Persuaded that every perfection accruing to a being subsequent to 
its complete existence is joined to it accidentally, as a garment is joined to a man, certain theologians taught 
that humanity was joined to divinity in the person of the Son by an accidental union, in such a way that the 
assumed nature would be related to the person of God’s Son as clothing is related to a man. To bolster up 
this view, they brought forward what the Apostle says of Christ in Philippians 2:7, that He was ‘in habit 
found as a man.’ Likewise, they reflected that from the union of soul and body an individual possessed of 
rational nature is formed, and that such an individual is called a person. If, therefore, the soul was united to 
the body in Christ, they were unable to see how they could escape the conclusion that a person would be 
constituted by such a union. In this event there would be two persons in Christ, the person who assumes 
and the person who is assumed. On the other hand, there are not two persons in a man who is clothed, 
because clothing does not possess what is required for the notion of a person. If, however, the clothes were 
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Aquinas attempts to resolve this issue by addressing the more specific issue of 
how many persons and supposits are to be found in the incarnated Christ. Aquinas 
accepts the traditional definition of a supposit as a distinct subsistent individual in a 
particular nature, an entitative whole or complete entity which is the subject of accidental 
properties and which exists with its own proper and proportionate act of existence.   The 
term nature signifies the fundamental, substantial reason for the characteristic activities 
of such an existing being. A supposit in a rational nature has a special term all its own, 
namely that of person, while the equivalent Greek term for the Latin rational supposit is 
hypostasis.
219
  A person then, in strict metaphysical terminology, is a rational supposit—
or, in the famous definition formulated by Boethius—an individual substance of a 
rational nature.
220
  So personality, or that by which a person is a being, is the proper—or 
personal—act of existence (esse) proportioned to a hypostasis bearing a rational nature.221  
Chapter 12 of the Compendium follows from this by positing that since there are in Christ 
one person and two natures, we have to examine the relationship between them to 
determine what in Christ is to be understood as one, and what is to be spoken of as 
                                                                                                                                                                             
a person, there would be two persons in a clothed man. To avoid this conclusion, therefore, some proposed 
that Christ’s soul was never united to His body, but that the person of God’s Son assumed soul and body 
separately.” 
219
 Cf. Corey L. Barnes, “Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas on Person, Hypostasis, and 
Hypostatic Union,” The Thomist 72 (2008), pp. 107-146.  
220
 De persona et duabus naturis, c. ii: “Naturæ rationalis individua substantia.” 
221
  As early as Quaestiones quodlibetales, q. 2, a. 2, co., Thomas had begun to formulae a view 
according to which, the supposit is that which subsists in its nature and in its existence, or in other words, 
that which has the nature and has existence: it is the subsisting one as such constituted from these two 
principles. Moreover, that existence is limited to nature, essence, according to nature, since a nature or 
essence is a receptive potency: “Sed omne quod est participatum in aliquo, est in eo per modum 
participantis: quia nihil potest recipere ultra mensuram suam. Cum igitur modus cujuslibet rei creatae sit 
finitus, quaelibet res creata recipit esse finitum.”  Super libros Sententiarum, 1, d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, s.c. 2. Cf. In 
librum De Causis, lc. 4: “Intelligentia est composita in suo esse ex finito et infinito, in quantum natura 
Intelligentiae, infinita dicitur secundum potentiam essendi et ipsum esse quod recipit est finitum.”  
Moreover, what receives existence or esse is constituted in the very giving, and determining, of that act of 
existence/esse: “Deus simul dans esse, producit id quod esse recipit: et sic non oportet quod agat ex aliquo 
praeexistenti.” Quaestiones de potentia, q. 3, ar. 1, ad 17. As we shall see, this insight that esse is received 
and expressed acoording to the mode of the nature/esse of the receiver. 
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multiple.
222
  Whatever is multiplied in accord with the diversity of Christ’s natures, 
Thomas commences his analysis, must be acknowledged to be also plural in the enfleshed 
Son. In this regard, since natures are received by generation there must then be not only 
two natures in Christ, but there must also be two generations: one that is eternal, 
corresponding to the divine nature, and the other occurring in time, whereby the incarnate 
Son received assumed a human nature.
223
  Hence, whatever activities can be attributed to 
God and humans as pertaining to their rational nature must be predicated of Christ in the 
plural. Among these Aquinas predicates intellect and will and their perfections, such as 
knowledge or wisdom.  Likewise, Thomas also attributes these as integral aspects of 
rational human nature, since both will and intellect are faculties of the human soul. 
Therefore, Aquinas concludes, we must acknowledge two intellects in Christ, one human 
and one divine, and likewise two wills, as well as a double knowledge according to both 
the created and the uncreated intellect in the enfleshed Son.
224
 
 So far Thomas has provided a concise worded précis of the Dyophysite 
understanding of Chalcedon, and its Dyothelite Christological elaboration of two rational 
wills/intellects proceeding from the two natures of Christ that he had defended in the 
contemporaneous portions of the Contra Gentiles.  However, Thomas’ main concern here 
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 Compendium theologiae c. 212: Quia igitur in Christo est una persona et duae naturae, ex 
horum convenientia considerandum est, quid in Christo unum dici debeat, et quid multa.   
223
 Ibid. 
224
 Ibid. Quia igitur in Christo est una persona et duae naturae, ex horum convenientia 
considerandum est, quid in Christo unum dici debeat, et quid multa. Quaecumque enim secundum naturae 
diversitatem multiplicantur, necesse est quod in Christo plura esse confiteamur. Inter quae primo 
considerandum est, quod cum per generationem sive per nativitatem natura recipiatur, necesse est quod 
sicut in Christo sunt duae naturae, ita etiam duas esse generationes sive nativitates: una aeterna, secundum 
quam accepit naturam divinam a patre; alia temporalis, secundum quam accepit humanam naturam a matre. 
Similiter etiam quaecumque Deo et homini convenienter attribuuntur ad naturam pertinentia, necesse est 
plura dicere in Christo. Attribuitur autem Deo intellectus et voluntas et horum perfectiones, puta scientia 
seu sapientia, et caritas, sive iustitia, quae homini etiam attribuuntur ad humanam naturam pertinentia. Nam 
voluntas et intellectus sunt partes animae, horum autem perfectiones sunt sapientia et iustitia et huiusmodi. 
Necesse est ergo in Christo ponere duos intellectus, humanum scilicet et divinum, et similiter duas 
voluntates, duplicem etiam scientiam sive caritatem, creatam scilicet et increatam.    
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is to balance this account of the plurality of natures with the unicity of the person of the 
Word. “But whatever belongs to the suppositum or hypostasis, must be declared to be one 
in Christ. Hence if existence is taken in the sense that one suppositum has one existence, 
we are forced, it appears, to assert that there is but one existence (esse) in Christ.”225 This 
is consistent with Thomas’s oft-repeated claim that the person has but one act of 
existence which gives it substantial being. Nevertheless, he quickly qualifies this 
statement in order to maintain the reality of the plurality of natures in in the incarnated 
Word, as he points out that when a whole is divided, each separate part has its own 
proper existence; nonetheless, insofar as they are parts of a larger ontological whole, they 
do not have their own substantial act of existence (esse), for they have being in 
accordance with the existence of the whole. Therefore, if we look upon Christ as an 
integral suppositum having two natures, as a subsistent being his existence will be but 
one. 
 By affirming the one personal act of existence in Christ, Aquinas does not want to 
give credence to the mistaken Monoenergist notion that since actions belong to supposita, 
and there is but one suppositum in Christ, then there must be only one kind of action in 
Christ. This is mistaken idea is belied, however, by the fact that a plurality of actions are 
discerned in any individual, if there are many principles of activity in him. Thus, in 
humans the action of understanding differs from the activity of sense perception, because 
of the difference between sense and intellect. In all such instances, we must remember 
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 Ibid. Ea vero quae ad suppositum sive hypostasim pertinent, unum tantum in Christo confiteri 
oportet: unde si esse accipiatur secundum quod unum esse est unius suppositi, videtur dicendum quod in 
Christo sit tantum unum esse. Manifestum est enim quod partes divisae singulae proprium esse habent, 
secundum autem quod in toto considerantur, non habent suum esse, sed omnes sunt per esse totius. Si ergo 
consideremus ipsum Christum ut quoddam integrum suppositum duarum naturarum, eius erit unum tantum 
esse, sicut et unum suppositum. 
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that nature is related to actions as its principle of activity. Therefore it is not true that 
Christ has only one kind of activity because of the one suppositum; rather, there are two 
kinds of activity in Christ because of the two natures, just as, conversely, there is in the 
Trinity but one essential activity of the three persons because of the one divine nature of 
the Godhead. In concurrence with this distinction, Aquinas also wishes to affirm that the 
activity of Christ’s humanity has some part in the activity proper to the divine power. 
This he does by pointing out that of all of the natural capacities that are gathered together 
in the one suppositum, the most eminent—that is, the divinity—is served by the rest in an 
instrumental capacity, just as all the lesser faculties of man are instruments of his 
intellect. Hence, in Christ the human nature is held to be, as it were, the organ of the 
Word’s divine nature, and since it is axiomatic that an instrument acts in virtue of the 
principal agent, this is the reason why in the characteristic or proper activities of an 
instrument, we are able to discern not only the power of the instrument, but also that of 
the principal agent: A piece of wooden furniture is indeed made by the action of an axe, 
but only in so far as the axe is directed by the hand of a carpenter. So, in an analogous 
manner the activity of the human nature in Christ received a certain efficacy from the 
divine nature, over and above its human power. “When Christ touched a leper, the action 
belonged to Christ’s human nature, but the fact that the touch cured the man of his 
leprosy is due to the power of the divine nature.”226 In this way all the human actions and 
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 Participat tamen operatio humanitatis in Christo aliquid de operatione virtutis divinae. Omnium 
enim eorum quae conveniunt in unum suppositum, ei quod principalius est, cetera instrumentaliter 
deserviunt, sicut ceterae partes hominis sunt instrumenta intellectus. Sic igitur in Christo humanitas quasi 
quoddam organum divinitatis censetur. Patet autem quod instrumentum agit in virtute principalis agentis. 
Unde in actione instrumenti non solum invenitur virtus instrumenti, sed etiam principalis agentis, sicut per 
actionem securis fit arca, inquantum securis dirigitur ab artifice. Ita ergo et operatio humanae naturae in 
Christo quandam vim ex deitate habebat supra virtutem humanam. Quod enim tangeret leprosum, 
humanitatis actio fuit, sed quod tactus ille curaret a lepra, ex virtute divinitatis procedebat. Et per hunc 
modum omnes eius actiones et passiones humanae virtute divinitatis salutares fuerunt: et ideo Dionysius 
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sufferings of Christ were efficacious for our salvation in virtue of His divinity. For this 
reason Dionysius calls the human activity of Christ theandric, that is, divine-human, 
because actions of this sort proceeded from the Son’s assumed human nature in such a 
way that the power of the divinity was operative in them. 
  
 
5. Conclusion:  
 
In the course of this chapter we have traced Thomas Aquinas’ development of 
instrumental causality of the assumed human nature in the person of Jesus Christ.  The 
instrumentality of the human nature to the divine is predicated of the hypostasis or person 
which is the active source of union. What we learn from Summa Contra Gentiles IV, 41, 
is that this relation is so intimate as to be called conjoined (non separatum sed 
coniunctum).Neither of the natures, human or divine, eclipses or diminishes the other, 
and neither can be reduced to the other. Each operates according to its integral 
operational principles, but in theandric co-operation with the other, and in such a way that 
the distinctive operations bring about their effect in a conjoined God-human manner. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
vocat humanam Christi operationem theandricam, idest deivirilem, quia scilicet sic procedebat ex 
humanitate, quod tamen in ea vigebat divinitatis virtus.  
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IV. Chapter 3: Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics  
of the Incarnate Son’s Kenotic Existence 
 
 
1. Introduction: 
Following Thomas’ writings on theandry, instrumentality, and the human 
existence of the incarnate Word in roughly chronological order, we have discerned a clear 
progression in his thought wherein the natural operations proceeding from the divine and 
human natures of Christ work in theandric unity in order to bring about salvation, along 
with a renewed emphasis on the importance of the integral humanity of the Son.  As 
Chapter two indicated, a certain amount of this progress was at least partly spurred by 
Aquinas’ rediscovery of detailed records of the Christological debates as preserved in 
various early Conciliar texts, and his realization of the decisive role that certain biblical 
pericopes played in those debates.  Thomas’ sophisticated engagement with scriptural 
texts is no surprise, considering the fact that he was a Master of the Sacred Page in the 
Order of Preachers, and the heir to a rich Western legacy of biblical hermeneutics, but 
credit must be given to Thomas’ exceptional encounters, at least among Latin scholastics, 
with a notable portion of the Patristic biblical tradition as contained in the various 
homiletic and commentarial literature Thomas had access to during the composition of 
the Catena Aurea. As we have already pointed out, certain Scriptural passages were 
particularly relevant in Thomas’ Christological thought during this period of 
development, particularly Philippians 2:5-11 (alongside John 1:14, etc.), which 
emphasized the singular importance of Christ’s assumed humanity in the economy of 
salvation.  Thomas’ newfound appreciation for the centrality of the Word’s human 
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nature, and its profound soteriological role in the economy of salvation, can be seen in 
the emergence of Aquinas’ mature articulation of the function of instrumental causality in 
the Incarnation, an articulation which closely corresponds with Thomas’s most active 
period of scriptural commentary.  
Despite this newly honed appreciation of the criticality of the Son’s 
instrumentalized humanity, Aquinas nonetheless continues to scrupulously highlight the 
uniqueness of the divine and substantial personal act of being (esse) of the enfleshed 
Word in order to safeguard Christ from being divided into two separate hypostases.  
However, as we know, in a few short years Thomas will make the astonishing proposal 
that along with this uncreated divine esse of the Word, we must also take account of a 
non-accidental secondary human act of existence in the one person of Christ, the esse 
secundarium which will be posited in the Disputed Question on the unione Verbi 
Incarnati. Our contention is that this is not a baffling theological aberration that manifests 
itself at the tail-end of Aquinas’ career, but rather the culmination of a natural 
progression in Thomas’ Christological thought, and that the conceptual groundwork for 
that seemingly inexplicable proposition is developed precisely through Thomas’ ongoing 
critical encounters with the Bible.  Apropos of that contention, in this chapter we will 
examine Thomas’ most extensive detailed exposition of Philippians 2:5-11—arguably the 
single most important biblical text in Thomas’ Christological thought—in his 
Commentary on the Epistle to the Philippians, focusing especially on the theme of 
humility, perhaps one of Augustine’s key themes in his examination of the soteriological 
purpose and efficacy of Christ’s kenosis, as well as Aquinas’ adumbration of the function 
of moral and ontological exemplarity in the salvific role played by the kenotic Son.  In 
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the Commentary, Thomas concisely yet deftly connects the hypostatic union of divinity 
and humanity brought about by the Son’s obedient self-emptying, and the resulting 
theandric interweaving of operations and wills in the person of Christ, to our own 
sanctifying conformity to the enfleshed Word through our participation in that saving 
work, as effectuated by means of the instrumental causality of the humanity, which the 
Son united to himself in the kenotic Incarnation. 
Aquinas’ Lectura super Ioannem has long been recognized as the most extensive 
and theologically rich of his scriptural commentaries and it plays an equally important 
part in Thomas Aquinas’s Christology.  One of the Commentary’s most conspicuous 
characteristics is the way that Thomas elaborately explicates and vigorously defends the 
full humanity of Christ in the Fourth Gospel. As Paul Gondreau has pointed out, Thomas’ 
recurring dictum positing that the “humanity of Christ is the way that leads us to God” 
(cap. 7, lect. 4, no. 1074) clearly indicates that Aquinas understand that upholding the 
truth of the true humanity assumed by the Word to be one of his principal tasks in 
composing this work.
227
 Gondreau argues that in the Lectura Aquinas is specifically 
defending Christ from the dangers of Docetism—that is, the doctrine that the human form 
of Christ was nothing more than an illusion. Any such teaching that would deny the true 
and full humanity of the incarnate Word would vitiate the enfleshed Son’s saving work, 
since a completely spiritualized and utterly non-human Christ could not in fact save 
humanity. However, Thomas never specifically mentions Docetism in the Lectura, so 
while Gondreau’s position that Thomas’s argumentation is broadly anti-Docetic, and that 
he wishes to defend the integral humanity of the Words assumed nature, is generally true, 
I will argue that in this Commentary Aquinas is actually working out the implications of 
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 Gondreau, “Anti-Docetism in Aquinas’s Super Ioannem, p. 255. 
130 
 
 
the interrelated concepts of instrumentality and theandry, already formulated in the 
Contra Gentiles, but now within the context of an extended analysis and deeper reading 
of the Scriptural sources. More specifically, I posit that the Commentary should be read 
in light of Thomas’ retrieval of the post-Chalcedonian Monophysite denial of the full 
integrity of Christ’s humanity, and the anti-Monothelite and anti-Monoenergism debates 
regarding the two wills of Christ, rather than as a generic anti-Docetic polemic, and that 
Aquinas deploys his dynamic vindication of Christ’s integral humanity, his mode of 
being in the world (esse) as the man Jesus Christ, as a distinctively  Dyothelite-
Dyoenergist counter-arguments against those heretical teachings he had encountered in 
the material from Constantinople II, whose Acts he explicitly cites in the Commentary.  
Next, Thomas’ continuing engagement with these Christological passages from 
Scripture, and the parallel development of his thought on the function of Christ’s 
specifically human mode of being in the world, is traced to the commencement of his 
second Paris residency, and the start of his most renowned work, the Summa Theologiae. 
Unlike Aquinas’ treatment of passages such as Philippians 2:5-11 in earlier works, 
particularly the Scriptum commentary, Thomas now clearly employs an understanding of 
exemplarity which clearly functions now as a form of ontological exemplarity, since the 
‘example’ that Thomas discerns Paul as presenting is that of the humanity of Christ as 
head of the Church.  This expanded understanding of the soteriological significance of 
Christ’s kenotic exemplum is of particular importance in Aquinas’ elaboration of the 
salvific efficacy of the Incarnation, for Thomas will now connect, with notable urgency, 
the personal unity of the human and divine natures, and of their theandric acts in Christ, 
to that process whereby we are brought into sanctifying conformity to the Son.  In other 
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words, our imitation and participation in the instrumental causal efficiency of that human 
manner of living and acting which Christ has united to Himself is in turn the very means 
by which we are divinized.  Indeed, as Aquinas writes, with “regard to the full 
participation of the Divinity, which is the true bliss of man and end of human life; and 
this is bestowed upon us by Christ’s humanity.”228  Without kenosis, without the 
assumption of a human mode of existing and acting, there can be no theosis for fallen 
humanity, for it is through the divinized humanity of Christ that we become God-like. It 
is only in light of the working out of this doctrine that the seemingly contradictory 
explication found in of the De unione, composed contemporaneously with the 
Christological sections of the Summa, can be seen as a complement to Thomas’ 
consistent teaching on the divine esse of the Word. The basis of this resolution of 
apparent contrarieties can already be discerned in Thomas exploration of the question of 
Christ’s subsistence in both His divine and human natures in the opening articles of the 
De unione.  Already in a. 1, in one more in a series of fruitful encounter with the text of 
the Philippians Hymn, Aquinas’ reexamination of kenosis begins to yield new insights 
into how subsisting in a human modality entails a secondary, created human esse in the 
Word which for all of its distinctive integrity does not entail a divided Christ.  
 
2. Commentary on Philippians: “How beautiful to say that He emptied Himself, for 
the empty is opposed to the full!” 
 
It is impossible to date Aquinas’ commentaries on the Pauline corpus with 
absolute precision, but it is generally agreed that he lecture on the Epistles during his stay 
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 ST III, q.1, a.2: Quantum ad plenam participationem divinitatis, quae vere est hominis 
beatitudo, et finis humanae vitae. Et hoc collatum est nobis per Christi humanitatem, dicit enim Augustinus, 
in quodam sermone de Nativ. domini, factus est Deus homo, ut homo fieret Deus.  
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in Rome from 1265 to 1268, although it is speculated that he taught the course a second 
time after his second departure from Paris and his relocation to Naples in 1272.  
Nevertheless, this would place even the first round of the surviving lectures on Paul after 
both the composition of the Christological portion of the Contra Gentiles and the 
completion of the Catena Aurea.  The Commentary on the Philippians Epistle evinces 
clear affinities and therefore suggests a close compositional proximity to the Christology 
of SCG IV, especially chapter 34.  As he begins to analyze the beginning of the Kenotic 
hymn, Thomas queries how Christ’ came to possess a human nature, and what this 
assumption of humanity indicates about his divinity.  For Thomas, such all-important 
issues as the identity of the God-man, the structuring of his ontological composition, and 
the purpose and method of his saving mission all hinge on answering these key questions. 
The answer follows from the Apostle’s exhortation to the Philippians church to allow 
Christ’s humility to be their constant example, an exemplarity that begins with a 
consideration of the Son’s divinity as indicated by the phrase “qui cum in forma Dei.” 
The term form specifies a nature; hence the form is called the nature of a thing. 
Consequently, to be in the form of God is to be in the nature of God, so the Son was truly 
God.229  However, this raises the question why the Word is said to be in the “form” rather 
than in the “nature” of God?  According to Thomas, this due to the fact that the term 
“form” is connected to the three proper names of Christ: the Son, the Word and the 
Image. The Son is the one begotten, and the terminus of that begetting is the form. 
Therefore, to show the perfect Son of God he says, in the form, as though having the 
form of the Father perfectly. Similarly, a word is not perfect unless it leads to knowledge 
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 Cap. 2, lect.2: Dicit ergo qui, scilicet Christus, cum in forma, et cetera. Unumquodque enim 
dicitur in natura generis vel speciei per suam formam, unde forma dicitur natura rei. Et sic esse in forma 
Dei est esse in natura Dei, per quod intelligitur quod sit verus Deus.  
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of a thing’s nature; and so the Word of God is said to be in the form of God, because He 
has the entire nature of the Father. Finally, an image is not perfect, unless it has the form 
of that of which it is the image: “He reflects the glory of God and bears the very stamp of 
his nature” (Heb. 1:3).230 It is precisely for this reason that the Son did not count equality 
with God as something to be grasped, since the Word already possessed the fullness of 
the Father’s divinity in his very nature.231  
It is only with the ontological primacy of the Word’s divinity well established that 
Thomas can proceed to a consideration of the kenosis. The hymn reports that the Son 
emptied himself, but since He was filled with the divinity, did the Son jettison His divine 
nature? No, Aquinas replies, because thw Son remained what He was; it was only that 
which the Word was not that was assumed. For just as the Son descended from heaven 
without ceasing to exist in heaven, Aquinas explains, so the Son began to exist in a new 
way on earth, and thereby emptied Himself, not by putting off the divine nature, but by 
assuming a human nature. “How beautiful to say that He emptied himself,” Thomas 
concludes, “for the empty is opposed to the full! For the divine nature is sufficiently full, 
because every perfection of goodness is there. But human nature and the soul are not full, 
but capable of fullness, because it was made as a slate not written upon. Therefore, 
human nature is empty. Hence he says, He emptied himself, because He assumed a 
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 Sed quare potius dicit in forma, quam in natura? Quia hoc competit nominibus propriis filii 
tripliciter. Dicitur enim et filius, et verbum, et imago. Filius enim est qui generatur, et finis generationis est 
forma. Et ideo, ut ostendatur perfectus Dei filius, dicit in forma, quasi habens perfecte formam patris. 
Similiter verbum non est perfectum nisi quando ducit in cognitionem naturae rei; et sic verbum Dei in 
forma Dei dicitur, quia habet totam naturam patris. Similiter nec imago dicitur perfecta, nisi habeat formam 
cuius est imago. Hebr. I, 3: cum sit splendor gloriae, et figura substantiae eius, et cetera.   
231
 Ibid: Ergo dicendum est, quod arbitratus est non esse rapinam, scilicet se esse aequalem Deo, 
quia est in forma Dei, et cognoscit bene naturam suam. Et quia cognoscit hoc, ideo dicitur Io. V, 18: 
aequalem se Deo facit. 
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human nature.”232 This passage is charged with meaning: the kenosis, the supreme act of 
divine humility, is not as eschewal of the divine nature, but rather the assumption of 
humanity—which is nothing else than Son coming to be in a human mode of existence—
a human existence which in contrast to the perfect fullness of every divine actuality is 
comparatively empty.  Indeed, this taking on of humanity is akin to assuming the form of 
a servile slave. But it is by conforming ourselves to Christ’s exemplary humility and 
obedience in assuming such servility, the very manner in which he assumed our human 
emptiness, that we in turn will be made worthy to receive the fullness of the Son’s 
divinity within our own humanity.  Transformed in such a manner that we will come not 
only to see the divine glory, but become more Christ-like “so that being enlightened, we 
may be conformed to Him: ‘Your eyes will see the king in his beauty” (Is. 33:17); ’” 
made glorious, for as the Apostle writes “‘And we all, with unveiled face, beholding the 
glory of the Lord, are being changed into his likeness from one degree of glory to 
another’” (2 Cor. 3:18).233 
In order to begin to appreciate how Christ’s self-emptying is the condition for the 
possibility of our divinized fulfilment, Thomas feels the need to clarify why the 
assumption of a human nature is referred to as taking on the “form of a servant” rather 
than just becoming a “servant.”  As Aquinas explains, this is because “servant” is the 
name of a hypostasis, which was not assumed, but the nature was; for that which is 
assumed is distinct from the one assuming it. Therefore, the Son of God did not assume a 
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 Ibid: Pulchre autem dicit exinanivit. Inane enim opponitur pleno. Natura autem divina satis 
plena est, quia ibi est omnis bonitatis perfectio. Ex. XXXIII, 19: ostendam tibi omne bonum. Natura autem 
humana, et anima non est plena, sed in potentia ad plenitudinem; quia est facta quasi tabula rasa. Est ergo 
natura humana inanis. Dicit ergo exinanivit, quia naturam humanam assumpsit. 
233
 Ibid: Primo videre eius charitatem, ut ei conformemur illuminati. Is. XXXIII, 17: regem in 
decore suo videbunt, et cetera. II Cor. III, 18: nos autem omnes revelata facie gloriam Dei speculantes. 
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man, because that would mean that he was other than the Son of God; nevertheless, the 
Son of God became man; therefore, “He took the nature to His own person, so that the 
Son of God and the Son of man would be the same in person.”234 Moreover, the term “in 
the form of a servant” highlights the conformity of the incarnate Word’s nature to ours 
when the hymn further claims that the Son was “born in the likeness of men;” that is, 
human in every way, “Therefore he had to be made like his brethren in every respect” 
(Heb. 2:17). This avoids the error of thinking that the assumption of humanity results in a 
new nature comprised out of the both the Word’s  divinity and humanity, since this would 
mean that either the divine nature changed in some fundamental sense in response to this 
assumption, or that  the human nature was absorbed into some sort of hybrid divine-
human tertium quid.  Finally, the term “and being found in human form” (2:8, et habitu 
inventus ut homo—literally, in the habit of a man), for Aquinas denotes the material 
outward conditions of the Word’s humanity, According to Thomas, this phrase 
emphasizes the fact that the Son assumed all the defects and properties associated with 
the human species, except sin.  Thus, in his human mode of existence, the Word endured 
hunger and thirst, became tired, suffered pain, and so on.  Even more importantly, “form” 
refers to all of Christ’s outward human activities, those operations which find their 
principle of action in the human nature as lived out by the incarnate Son.235 
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  Ibid: Tangit ergo, primo, naturae humanae assumptionem, dicens formam servi accipiens. 
Homo enim ex sua creatione est servus Dei, et natura humana est forma servi. Ps. XCIX, 3: scitote quoniam 
dominus ipse est Deus, et cetera. Is. XLII, 1: ecce servus meus, et cetera. Ps. III, 4: tu autem, domine, 
susceptor meus es, et cetera. Cur dicitur convenientius formam servi, quam servum? Quia servus est nomen 
hypostasis vel suppositi, quod non est assumptum sed natura: quod enim suscipitur, distinguitur a 
suscipiente. Non ergo filius Dei assumpsit hominem; quia daretur intelligi quod homo esset aliud a filio 
Dei, cum tamen filius Dei factus sit homo. Accepit ergo naturam in persona sua, ut esset idem in persona 
filius Dei et filius hominis. 
235
 Ibid: Tertio naturae humanae conditiones ponit, dicens et habitu inventus ut homo, quia 
defectus omnes et proprietates continentes speciem, praeter peccatum, suscepit. Et ideo habitu inventus ut 
homo, scilicet in exteriori conversatione, quia esuriit ut homo, fatigatus fuit, et huiusmodi. Hebr. IV, 15: 
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This introduction of the term form/habit allows Thomas to recapitulate 
Augustine’s four-fold classification of the term habitus from his treatise De diversis 
quaestionibus.236 It is Augustine’s classification of habitus in which another is changed 
but it does not change the possessor, as a dress.  It is only in this manner that the human 
nature in Christ is called a habitus or “something had”; because it comes to the divine 
person without changing the Son, but the assumed nature itself is transformed for the 
better, because it is filled with grace and truth, as when the Evangelist writes, “We have 
beheld his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father” (Jn. 1:14). It is this 
assumption of a human nature which divinizes the humanity without in the process either 
changing the divinity or eliminating the humanity, this transformative vision of glory 
which at once also glorifies the beholder, which will eventually come to dominate 
Thomas’ later articulations of the Philippians hymn.  Because the assumed humanity 
retains its natural integrity, the manner in which the Son displays his supreme act of 
humility, with his obedience to the Father’s divine will, must be attributed to his human 
will conforming itself to the will of God. That this “obedience is great and commendable 
is evident from the fact that obedience is great when it follows the will of another against 
one’s own. Now the movement of the human will tends toward two things, namely, to life 
                                                                                                                                                                             
tentatum per omnia pro similitudine absque peccato. Bar. III, 38: post haec in terris visus est, et cum 
hominibus conversatus est. Et sic habitum possumus referre ad exteriores habitudines. 
236
 Ibid: Vel habitu, quia ipsam humanitatem accepit quasi habitum. Est autem habitus quadruplex. 
Unus mutat habentem, et ipse non mutatur, ut stultus per sapientiam. Alius mutatur et mutat, ut cibus. 
Alius, qui nec mutat, nec mutatur, ut annulus adveniens digito. Alius, qui mutatur, et non mutat, ut 
vestimentum. Et per hanc similitudinem natura humana in Christo dicitur habitus, qui sic advenit divinae 
personae, quod non mutavit ipsam; sed mutata est in melius, quia impleta est gratia et veritate. Io. I, 14: 
vidimus gloriam eius, gloriam quasi unigeniti a patre, plenum gratiae et veritatis. Dicit ergo in 
similitudinem hominum factus, ita tamen quod non mutatur, quia habitu inventus est ut homo. For 
Augustine’s explication of the term habitus within the larger context of his Christology, see Chapter 1, 
section 4, “Augustine: Gemina Substantia, Una Persona,” above.  
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and to honor. But Christ did not refuse death.” 237 While not explicitly mentioning 
instrumentality, Thomas argument here at least implicitly calls upon his earlier 
delineation of Christ’s humanity as the conjoined instrument of the divinity, a humanity 
which lacks nothing that is truly human, least of all a freely functioning will. Indeed, the 
incarnate Word’s salvific mission itself would not be efficacious if He had not suffered 
out of obedience; nor would Christ’s passion be so commendable, for obedience gives 
merit to our sufferings. Indeed, it is precisely through his human mode of being in the 
world, and his freely willed natural human activities that the enfleshed Words suffers and 
dies meritoriously for our salvation. 
It is due to the obedient sufferings of the God-man that the Father highly exalted 
the Son and bestowed upon him the name which is above every other name.  Now, for 
someone like Photinus, if this is truly a reward for Christ’s humility then that it does not 
mean the Jesus is true God, but merely that He received a certain pre-eminence over the 
creature and a likeness of the godhead. This however, cannot be correct, Aquinas 
contends, because the hymn unambiguously states that Christ was in the form of God. 
Hence, one must reinforce the fact that there are two natures and one hypostasis in Christ, 
that person of the Son is simultaneously both God and man. So the bestowal of the 
exalted name can be explicated in two ways: in one way, that the Father gave Him this 
name inasmuch as He is the Son of God; and this from all eternity by an eternal 
                                                          
237
 Ibid: Unde volens ostendere perfectionem humilitatis et passionis Christi, dicit quod factus est 
obediens, quia si fuisset passus non ex obedientia, non fuisset ita commendabilis: quia obedientia dat 
meritum passionibus nostris. Sed quomodo factus est obediens? Non voluntate divina, quia ipsa est regula; 
sed voluntate humana, quae regulata est in omnibus secundum voluntatem paternam. Matth. c. XXVI, 39: 
verumtamen non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu. Et convenienter introducit in passione obedientiam, quia 
prima praevaricatio est facta per inobedientiam. Rom. V, 19: sicut enim per inobedientiam unius hominis 
peccatores constituti sunt multi, ita et per obedientiam unius hominis, iusti constituuntur multi. Prov. XXI, 
28: vir obediens loquetur victorias. Sed quod magna et commendabilis sit haec obedientia, patet: quia tunc 
est obedientia magna, quando sequitur imperium alterius contra motum proprium; motus autem voluntatis 
humanae ad duo tendit: ad vitam et ad honorem; sed Christus non recusavit mortem.  
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engendering, so that this giving is no more than His eternal generation: “For as the Father 
has life in himself, so he has granted the Son also to have life in himself” (Jn. 5:26). In 
another way it can refer to Christ as man; and then the Father gave that man the name of 
being God not by nature, because God’s nature is distinct from the nature of man, but to 
be God by the grace, not of adoption, but of union, by which Christ is at once God and 
man: “Designated Son of God in power,” He, namely, “who was descended from David 
according to the flesh” (Rom. 1:4).  
 
3. Lectura on the Gospel According to John 
 
Thomas’ full-throated defense of Christ’s full humanity is also a touchstone of his 
Commentary on the Fourth Gospel, the Lectura super Ioannem, begun sometime in the 
early portion of Aquinas’ second Parisian regency, perhaps in the years 1270-1272. It 
will probably come as little surprise that the Kenotic hymn is a leitmotiv throughout the 
initial sections of the Lectura. In cap. 1, lect. 7,  nos. 174-176, commenting on John 
1:14a: “And the Word was made flesh, and made his dwelling among us,” Thomas 
defends the term “dwelling” from a Nestorian misreading; according to Aquinas, the Son 
was united to man in such a way that there was not as a result one divine person and also 
a fully subsistent man, since the Word was united to human nature only by an indwelling 
through grace, hence it follows that the Son is not a human person.238 Among the 
refutations Aquinas offers is the Kenotic hymn’s assertion that the union of God and man 
as an emptying, saying of the Word “being in the form of God ... emptied himself, taking 
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 No. 174: Ex quo verbo Nestorius occasionem sumens erroris, dixit, filium Dei sic esse unitum 
homini ut tamen Dei et hominis non esset una persona: voluit enim quod verbum per solam inhabitationem 
per gratiam fuerit humanae naturae unitum. Ex hoc autem sequitur quod filius Dei non sit homo.  
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the form of a servant” (Philippians 2:6). Clearly, God is not said to empty himself insofar 
as he dwells in the rational creature by grace, because then the Father and the Spirit 
would be emptying themselves, since they are also said to dwell in us through grace, as 
John 14:23(“Whoever loves me will keep my word. My Father will love them, and we 
will come to them and make our home with them”) indicates. 239 In lect. 8, no. 182, 
Aquinas tells us that Christ became man precisely so that we may be able to behold the 
divine glory of God, a paraphrase of Augustine’s Tract. 2. 16, but perhaps an allusion as 
well to De Trininitate I. 15 and its use of Philippians 3:21, where it is the kenotic Son 
“who shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like His glorious body.”  
Finally, in cap. 1, lect. 13, no. 246, kenosis is invoked once more, this time in reference 
to the phrase “standing in your midst” from John 1:26,  in order to point out the ordinary 
human existence that the incarnate Word undertook: “It refers to the ordinary way Christ 
lived among men,” Thomas writes, “because according to his human nature he appeared 
to be like other men: ‘He, being in the form of God ... emptied himself, taking the form of 
a servant’”(Philippians 2:6).  Christ’s assumption of a fully human mode of existence is 
revelatory, and is itself part of the saving mission of the enfleshed Word.  According to 
Aquinas, this is the reason why the Evangelist says, “there is one standing in your midst, 
i.e., in many ways he lived as one of you: ‘I am in your midst’ (Lk 22:27), whom you do 
not recognize, i.e., you cannot grasp the fact that God was made man.” Likewise, 
humanity does not “recognize how great he is according to the divine nature which is 
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 No. 176: Quod autem blasphemat Nestorius, auctoritate sacrae Scripturae evidenter refellitur. 
Apostolus enim Phil. II, 6 unionem Dei et hominis exinanitionem vocat, dicens de filio Dei: qui cum in 
forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est se esse aequalem Deo; sed semetipsum exinanivit, formam servi 
accipiens. Non autem dicitur Deus exinaniri Deus ex eo quod creaturam rationalem per gratiam inhabitet, 
quia sic pater et spiritus sanctus exinanirentur, cum et ipsi inhabitare hominem dicantur per gratiam; dicit 
enim Christus de se et de patre loquens, infra XIV, 23: ad eum veniemus et mansionem apud eum faciemus.  
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concealed in him: ‘God is great, and exceeds our knowledge’ (Job 36:26). And so, as 
Augustine says (Tract. 4.9), ‘The lantern was lighted,’ namely, John, ‘so that Christ 
might be found.’ ‘I have prepared a lamp for my anointed’ (Ps 131:17).”240 
One of the most extensive meditations on the specific efficacy of Christ’s 
humanity comes in Thomas’ detailed exposition of how Christ’ flesh itself gives life. 
Using Augustine as his interlocutor, Aquinas explains that in Christ there is both a divine 
nature and a human nature, and in each he has life-giving power from the Father, 
although not in the same way. According to his divinity he has the power to give life to 
souls; but according to his assumed nature, he gives life to bodies. Hence, as Augustine 
writes in his Tractate on John19.6, “The Word gives life to souls; but the Word made 
flesh gives life to bodies.” 241 For the resurrection of Christ and the mysteries which 
Christ fulfilled in his flesh is the efficient cause of the future resurrection of bodies. So, 
while the first manifestation of life-giving power he has from eternity; the other life-
giving power he has in time, a power made manifest precisely as human by the fact that 
the incarnate Word will raise the dead: first Lazarus, then others, and finally he will raise 
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 Quod quidem exponitur multipliciter. Uno siquidem modo, secundum Gregorium, 
Chrysostomum et Augustinum, ut referatur ad communem Christi conversationem inter homines, quia, 
secundum naturam humanam, aliis hominibus similis apparuit; Phil. II, 6: qui cum in forma Dei esset, non 
rapinam arbitratus est esse se aequalem Deo; sed semetipsum exinanivit formam servi accipiens, in 
similitudinem hominum factus, et habitu inventus ut homo. Et secundum hoc dicit medius vestrum stetit, 
idest multoties conversatus est quasi unus ex vobis; Lc. XXII, v. 27: ego in medio vestrum sum. Quem vos 
nescitis, idest, hoc quod Deus factus est homo, capere non potestis. Item, nescitis quam magnus sit 
secundum naturam divinam, quae in eo latebat; Iob XXXVI, 26: ecce dominus magnus vincens scientiam 
vestram. Et ideo, ut Augustinus dicit, accensa est lucerna, scilicet Ioannes, ut inveniatur Christus. Ps. 
CXXXI, 17: paravi lucernam Christo meo.  
241
 Cap. 5, lect.4, no, 759: In Christo enim est et natura divina et natura humana; et secundum 
utramque habet a patre potestatem vivificativam; sed aliter et aliter, quia secundum divinitatem habet 
potestatem vivificandi animas, sed secundum naturam assumptam vivificat corpora unde Augustinus: 
verbum vivificat animas, sed verbum caro factum vivificat corpora. Nam resurrectio Christi, et mysteria 
quae Christus implevit in carne, sunt causa futurae resurrectionis corporum 
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everyone on the Day of Judgment.”242 This life-giving power, which the Son exercises 
precisely as human, is closely allied to the Son’s power to judge, which he also 
effectuates in his humanity. Once again utilizing Augustine’s Johanine Tractate (21.11) 
as his thematic springboard, Thomas explains by quoting Christ’s words from John 5:21 
where he says that just as the Father raises the dead, so also does the Son. However, in 
order that no one should think that this refers only to those miracles the Son performs in 
raising the dead to this life, and not to the Son’s raising to eternal life, the Word “leads 
them to the deeper consideration of the resurrection to occur at the future judgment,” 
referring explicitly to the judgment, saying, “the Father himself judges no one.”243 Unlike 
the resurrection of souls, which is accomplished through the person of the Father and of 
the Son, the resurrection of bodies is accomplished through the humanity of the Son, 
according to which he is not coeternal with the Father; hence the Fourth Gospel attributes 
judgment solely to the incarnate Son. 
As Thomas subsequently explains, it is due to the enfleshed Son’s meritorious 
life, death, and resurrection, the very humanity of Christ, which is the cause of both the 
resurrection of the soul and the body: because through the mysteries accomplished in the 
flesh of Christ we are restored not only to an incorruptible life in our bodies, but also to a 
spiritual life in our souls.  In fact, as Thomas suggests, it is by means of the hypostatic 
union of the divine and human natures in the person of the Word, and a kind of 
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 Ibid: Sed primum habet ab aeterno, et hoc ostendit cum supra dixit: et omnia demonstrat ei 
quae ipse facit; quae quidem omnia demonstrat carni;  sed alia ex tempore, et quantum ad hoc dicit: et 
maiora his demonstrabit ei, idest demonstratur potestas eius in hoc quod maiora faciet, suscitando mortuos: 
quosdam quidem hic, sicut Lazarum, puellam et unicum matris; omnes tandem in die iudicii.  
243
 Ibid, n. 762: Secundum Augustinum quidem exponitur sic. Dixerat dominus supra, quod sicut 
pater suscitat mortuos ita et filius. Sed ne intelligeres illam mortuorum resuscitationem tantum qua aliquos 
ad hanc vitam resuscitavit ad miraculi ostensionem et non illam qua resuscitat ad vitam aeternam, ideo 
ducit eos ad altiorem considerationem alterius, scilicet resurrectionis quae erit in futuro iudicio. Unde et 
specialiter de iudicio mentionem facit, dicens neque enim pater iudicat quemquam. 
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ontological exemplarity through which the kenotic Son conforms fallen humanity, that 
we are raised both spiritually and bodily. exemplary cause and of that cause by which 
anything that is brought to life is made conformable to that which brings it to life, for 
everything that lives through another is conformed to that through which it lives. 
However, the resurrection of souls does not consist in souls being conformed to the 
humanity of Christ, but to the divine Word, because the life of the soul is vivified through 
the divinity alone, hence the resurrection of souls takes place through the Word.  But the 
resurrection of the body will consist in our bodies being conformed to the body of Christ 
through the life of glory, that is, through the glory of our bodies.  Accordingly, the 
resurrection of the body will take place through the Word made flesh. Even more than 
that, here Aquinas is reiterating a principle that he had already begun to develop his 
Philippians Commentary:  the Son’s kenotic assumption of humanity (Philippians 2:6-11) 
establishes the means whereby our own bodies will eventually be glorified through 
theosis (Philippians 3:21: “He will change our lowly body so it is like his glorious 
body”).244    
Upon this conceptual undergirding, Thomas now begins to explicate the 
importance of obedience to his understanding of the Son’s kenotic existence. This is the 
order of exposition which Thomas employed in his analysis of the Son’s obedience to the 
Father’s will in his Philippians Commentary, but now employed in an even more rigorous 
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 Ibid, no. 791: Augustinus loquitur de causa exemplari et de causa qua illud quod vivificatur, 
conformatur vivificatori: nam omne illud quod per aliud vivit, conformatur ei per quod vivit. Resurrectio 
autem animarum non est per hoc quod animae conformantur humanitati Christi, sed verbo, quia vita animae 
est per solum verbum; et ideo dicit animarum resurrectionem fieri per verbum. Resurrectio vero corporum 
erit per hoc quod corpora nostra conformabuntur corpori Christi per vitam gloriae, videlicet per claritatem 
corporum; secundum illud Phil. III, v. 21: reformabit corpus humilitatis nostrae, configuratum corpori 
claritatis suae. Et secundum hoc dicit resurrectionem corporum fieri per verbum carnem factum. 
143 
 
 
reading of John 5:26-30.245 For Aquinas, “sicut audio” is the key to unlocking this entire 
passage, for in this context to hear is the same as to obey—the hallmark of the Son’s 
kenotic obedience in Philippians 2, and the key passage as well for John Damascene’s 
discussion of Dyotheletism in De Fide III, 14. “Now to obey belongs to one who receives 
a command, while to command pertains to one who is superior. Accordingly, because 
Christ, as man, is inferior to the Father, he says, as I hear it, i.e., as infused into my soul 
by God.”246 Moreover, it is because the Son aligns his human will with the Father’s 
divine will that his judgment can be seen to be truly just, since in the Son reason is not 
seeking his own will, but rather the will of the one who sent him. “For there are two wills 
in our Lord Jesus Christ: one is a divine will, which is the same as the will of the Father; 
the other is a human will, which is proper to himself, just as it is proper to him to be a 
man. A human will is borne to its own good; but in Christ it was ruled and regulated by 
right reason, so that it would always be conformed in all things to the divine will.”247 
Aquinas does not have access to the texts of Constantinople III at this point, which is why 
he does not quote the relevant Conciliar documents in contrast to his parallel discussion 
of the incarnate Word’s two wills in ST III (e.g. q.18, a.5 and q.20, aa.1-20, nevertheless, 
it is apparent that the question of Dyotheletism plays an important part in Thomas’s 
discussion of the Son’s kenotic mode of being.  
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 Sicut enim Pater habet vitam in semet ipso sic dedit et Filio vitam habere in semet ipso. Et 
potestatem dedit ei et iudicium facere quia Filius hominis est. Nolite mirari hoc quia venit hora in qua 
omnes qui in monumentis sunt audient vocem eius. Et procedent qui bona fecerunt in resurrectionem vitae 
qui vero mala egerunt in resurrectionem iudicii. Non possum ego a me ipso facere quicquam sicut audio 
iudico et iudicium meum iustum est quia non quaero voluntatem meam sed voluntatem eius qui misit me. 
246
 Ibid 795: Obedire autem pertinet ad illum cui fit imperium. Imperare autem pertinet ad 
superiorem. Et ideo, quia Christus inquantum homo minor est patre, dicit sicut audio; idest, secundum quod 
inspiratur a Deo in anima mea. Non possum ego a me ipso facere quicquam sicut audio iudico et iudicium 
meum iustum est quia non quaero voluntatem meam sed voluntatem eius qui misit me 
247
  Ibid 796: n domino enim Iesu Christo sunt duae voluntates. Una divina quam habet eamdem 
cum patre; alia humana, quae est sibi propria, sicut est proprium eius esse hominem. Voluntas humana 
fertur in bonum proprium; sed in Christo per rectitudinem rationis regebatur et regulabatur, ut semper in 
omnibus voluntati divinae conformaretur.  
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So which theological issue is most relevant for understanding Thomas’ thematic 
concerns in the Lectio and the arc of his developing Christology—Dyotheletism or 
Docetism?  According to Paul Gondreau in his essay “Anti-Docetism in Aquinas’s Super 
Ioannem: St. Thomas as Defender of the Full Humanity of Christ,” in the Gospel of John 
Commentary Aquinas is specifically defending Christ from Docetic attacks that would 
deny the real humanity of the incarnate Christ.  As Gondreau explains, this sort of attack 
has a two-fold danger: soteriological—since a non-human Christ cannot in fact save 
humanity, and a metaphysical danger, since the denial of Christ’s material body 
denigrates the material in order to exalt the spiritual.  Gondreau points to Thomas’ dictum 
that “the humanity of Christ is the way that leads us to God” (Super Io., cap. 7, lect. 4, no. 
1074) to defend his thesis that Aquinas’ main task in the Lectio is to uphold the “truth of 
the human nature” (veritas humanae naturae; Super Io., cap. 4, lect. 1, no. 563) assumed 
by Christ, that is, a man who possesses a body [matter] and a soul [form] which were 
substantially (hylemorphically) united. Gondreau focuses on the Passion as the most 
important aspect of Thomas’ defense of Christ’s truly human body (Corpus Verum 
Christi), for “any meaningful proclamation of Christian redemption hinges strictly on the 
realism of the torturous crucifixion and death of Christ’s body.” 248 But this is a 
misunderstanding of Aquinas’ soteriology as regards Christ’s humanity and its relation to 
Thomas’ mature understanding of the Satisfaction theory of atonement; it certainly does 
not take account of Word’s enfleshment and the body’s role in human divinization.  
Gondreau also points out that “in addition to his mortality, the other physical 
weaknesses Jesus exhibits (hunger, thirst, fatigue) betray the humanness as well.  This 
Aquinas affirms in his gloss on John 4: 6, where Jesus sits down at Jacob’s well because 
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 Gondreau, “Anti-Docetism,” p. 261. 
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‘he was tired from his journey.’”249: Jesus, tired from his journey, rested there at the well, 
and through this act he reveals his weakness, not because of a lack of power, but to show 
us the reality of the human nature he assumed. As Thomas elaborates, Jesus is strong, for 
“In the beginning was the Word” (1:1); but he is weak, for “the Word was made flesh” 
(1:14). And so Christ, wishing to show the truth of his human nature, allowed it to do and 
to endure things proper to men; and to show the truth of his divine nature, he worked and 
performed things proper to God. “Hence when he checked the inflow of divine power to 
his body, he became hungry and tired; but when he let his divine power influence his 
body, he did not become hungry in spite of a lack of food, and he did not become tired in 
his labors.”250 As Gondreau rightly notes, this passage “gives witness to the vibrant 
patristic voice that often reverberates in Aquinas’ writings.”  Its very locution recalls the 
noted Christological formula penned by Leo the Great († 461): “Each form accomplishes 
in concert what is appropriate to it, the Word performing what belongs to the Word, and 
the flesh carrying out what belongs to the flesh.”251 This axiom, which was devised in 
order to counter the Monophysite denial of the full integrity of Christ’s humanity was 
appropriated by Damascene and used extensively in his De Fide, especially in III, 15, 19-
20; and while Thomas will cite Leo’s axiom itself on occasion,252 he prefers Damascene’s 
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use of it.253  So, while Gondreau acknowledges the importance of Leo for Chalcedon, and 
of Chalcedon’s anti-Monophysite teaching, he posits that Thomas uses it in an largely 
anti-Docetic manner, when it would make more sense to see Aquinas’ use as pointedly 
anti-Monophysite, especially since he is attacking Monophysite teachings, and doing so 
after he has recovered and absorbed the teachings of Chalcedon and Constantinople II, 
both of which are explicitly cited earlier in the Commentary, for example in Cap. 1, lect. 
7, nos. 166, 171.   
Moreover, as Gondreau himself goes on to explain, in defending the full humanity 
of Christ, Thomas will not only uphold the reality of Christ’s assumed human body, but 
of a body conjoined to a truly human soul, an Anima Vera Christi. If the enfleshed Word 
had assumed a body without a sensitive and rational soul it would not be a true 
incarnation, and it would have no soteriological efficacy. In addition, it would deny those 
portions of Scripture wherein Christ is shown to feel and suffer in a human way.  This 
extends to Christ’s human will, attested to by Scripture, and without which there is no 
salvation.   “It is, after all, by his human will that Jesus freely accepts his cross—‘not as I 
will, but as you will’ (Matthew 26:39)—and, hence, freely chooses to redeem the human 
race.”254 As we have seen Aquinas returns to this them at various points during his 
career.255 However, it is only in the latter treatments of the subject, from ST III onward, 
that Aquinas has direct access to the material from the recovered Acts of the Dyothelite 
Council of Constantinople III. Gondreau, of course is aware of these developments, he 
even affirms that for Thomas, body and soul unite as matter and form into an integrated 
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whole, so that a true human being is a unified composite of body and soul. And the very 
same principle holds for Christ; indeed, Aquinas often refers to a “dynamic hylemorphic 
exchange between Jesus’ body and his soul, such that the experience of one (like the 
bodily pain he endured in his tortuous crucifixion) always affected (or ‘redounded into’) 
the other.”256 Finally, Gondreau goes on to write that Aquinas’ anti-Docetism surfaces in 
another recurring theme in the Commentary: the need “for credibility in the Incarnation, 
that is, the need for Christ to appear as a true and genuine being. This need follows from 
the fact that faith in a God incarnate is little served if the human family cannot fully 
believe that Christ’s humanity accurately reflects the truth of human nature.”257 In fact, 
Christ’s possession of a fully believable human nature is directly tied with the need for a 
true human model or exemplar to imitate. As Gondreau points out, inspired by biblical 
texts (e.g., 1 Peter 2:21: “Christ suffered for you, leaving you an example, that you 
should follow in his steps.”) and rooted in a rich Patristic tradition, this notion of Christ’s 
exemplarity appears throughout Aquinas’ work.   
These claims are true enough: As we saw in chapter 1, Augustine already 
understood and pointed out the soteriological importance of the credibility of the kenotic 
forma servi. Moreover, while Aquinas is indeed working within a long tradition 
emphasizing the reality of Christ’s incarnational humanity for the sake of exemplarity, 
Gondreau fails to make a distinction between moral and ontological exemplarity. So, 
while he correctly points out that this theme of credibility leading to exemplarity is most 
often brought up when Thomas is dealing with Christ’s affectivity, since the virtuous 
movement of the passions in Christ is a model for us to follow, Gondreau fails to 
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underscore the fact that there was a profound sea change between Thomas’s utilization of 
exemplarity in the Scriptum Commentary and his later works. Much of this change, as we 
have already examined, is due to Thomas deepened understanding of the efficient 
instrumental causality of Christ’s assumed humanity. In his analysis of the Eucharistic 
aspects of Thomas’s defense of the incarnated Word’s full humanity in the Lectio, 
Gondreau certainly grasps the uniqueness of Thomas fully worked-out understanding of 
instrumentality.  In his explication of the phrase “and the bread which I will give is my 
flesh” (John 6:52), Thomas explains 
He then speaks of his body when he says, And the bread which I will give 
is my flesh. For he had said that he was the living bread; and so that we do 
not think that he is such so far as he is the Word or in his soul alone, he 
shows that even his flesh is life-giving, for it is an instrument of his 
divinity. Thus, since an instrument acts by virtue of the agent, then just as 
the divinity of Christ is life-giving, so too his flesh gives life (as 
Damascene says) because of the Word to which it is united. Thus Christ 
healed the sick by his touch. So what he said above, I am the living bread, 
pertained to the power of the Word; but what he is saying here pertains to 
the sharing in his body, that is, to the sacrament of the Eucharist.258 
 
 Christ’s body—his very humanity—is life-giving because it instrumentally mediates 
God’s grace, not only in his earthly embodiment, but sacramentally in the 
transubstantiated Eucharistic species, and this instrumental causal efficacy flows forth 
directly from the kenotic existence and actions of the theandrically conjoined natures of 
the God-man who divinizes through his human flesh.  
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149 
 
 
4. ST III, qq.1-16: Self-Emptying, Hypostatic Union, and Divinization;  
Or, No Theosis Without Kenosis 
  
Thomas Aquinas’ final months in Rome and his arrival in Paris for a second 
residency is marked above all by commencement of the Angelic Doctor’s most celebrated 
work, the Summa Theologiae.  It is quite probable that the entirety of the Prima Pars was 
finished in Rome, while the Tertia Pars, devoted in large part to the person and mission 
of Jesus Christ, was likely begun in Paris the winter of 1271-1272, and remained 
incomplete at the time of Thomas’ death in early 1274.259  The early sections of the Tertia 
Pars, from at least one point of view, can be seen as a vast recapitulation of questions 
already dealt with at length in both the Sentences Commentary and the Summa Contra 
Gentiles. Initially, Thomas is concerned with establishing the fittingness of the 
Incarnation, and his reasoning is largely given over to the theme of God’s supreme 
goodness.  Following Dionysius the Areopagite’s Neo-Platonic axiom that the good is 
self-communicative, and the Supreme Good must therefore be supremely so (Div. Nom. 
iv), hence God wishes to communicate his goodness to fallen humanity most effectively, 
and this takes form as the Incarnation.  We should note that this analysis mirrors the 
Prima Pars, where creation is explained as the natural yet voluntary, outward expression 
of God’s supremely good, loving, and self-communicative essence; similarly, he 
indicates that the incarnation is the result of God’s divine desire for self-communication 
and union with humanity.260  To speak of Christ’s significance in this way in the first 
                                                          
259
 Cf. Torrell, Saint Thomas, pp. 146-147. See also Palemon Glorieux, “Pour la chronologie de la 
Somme,” Mélanges de Science Religieuse 2 (1945), pp. 59-98. 
260
  ST III, q.1, a.1: Respondeo dicendum quod unicuique rei conveniens est illud quod competit 
sibi secundum rationem propriae naturae, sicut homini conveniens est ratiocinari quia hoc convenit sibi 
inquantum est rationalis secundum suam naturam. Ipsa autem natura Dei est bonitas, ut patet per 
Dionysium, I cap. de Div. Nom. Unde quidquid pertinet ad rationem boni, conveniens est Deo. Pertinet 
autem ad rationem boni ut se aliis communicet, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Unde ad 
150 
 
 
instance, rather than in terms of satisfaction, redemption, reconciliation, atonement, or 
sacrifice, is highly significant, it indicates that for Thomas the Word’s incarnation is, 
above all, God’s sharing of his own life with humanity. 
The efficacy of this fittingness is evident in various ways, most notably in the fact 
that the Word-made-man is exemplum of right conduct; hence Augustine says in a 
sermon (xxii de Temp.): “Man who might be seen was not to be followed; but God was to 
be followed, Who could not be seen. And therefore God was made man, that He Who 
might be seen by man, and Whom man might follow, might be shown to man.” The 
culminating reason, though, is given as full participation of the Divinity, which is the true 
bliss of man and end of human life; and this is precisely bestowed upon us by Christ's 
humanity; for Augustine says in a sermon (xiii de Temp.): “God was made man, that man 
might be made God.” Let us note as well the emphasis on theosis/divinization as 
exemplified in the quote from Augustine paraphrasing Athanasius.  There is an extensive 
use of Augustine throughout the early sections of the Tertia Pars, most importantly 
perhaps Aquinas’ appropriation of Augustine’s Christology, particularly his use 
Philippians: Christ the humble mediator between God the Father; Christ as revelation: 
The incarnate Son, through his human forma servi, reveals the glorious invisible forma 
Dei of the Father to sinful humanity. Faith in the Son’s divinity thus leads to 
knowledge/beatific vision of God. The path to salvation/vision proceeds through 
participation in Christ in the forma servi; that is, through self-emptying humility, 
obedience, and sacrificial love. The Son’s kenosis, death on the cross, and ultimate 
exaltation is the paradigm of the Christian life. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
rationem summi boni pertinet quod summo modo se creaturae communicet. Quod quidem maxime fit per 
hoc quod naturam creatam sic sibi coniungit ut una persona fiat ex tribus, verbo, anima et carne, sicut dicit 
Augustinus, XIII de Trin. Unde manifestum est quod conveniens fuit Deum incarnari. 
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While denying that the end of the Incarnation could have been achieved in no 
other way than by the Incarnation itself, Aquinas claims it was the best way of achieving 
that end.  The first reason he gives is that humanity’s furtherance in good could have 
been achieved by no better means.  By furtherance in good, he explains, he means 
primarily growth in faith, hope, and charity, the latter of which is “greatly enkindled 
[excitatur]” by the Incarnation (III, q. 1, a. 2, resp.).  Moreover, furtherance in the good is 
to be interpreted “with regard to the full participation of the Divinity, which is the true 
bliss of man and end of human life;” and this is bestowed upon us by Christ’s humanity.  
Aquinas subsequently combines both these themes at the question’s end, when he 
contends that by the Incarnation human nature is raised to its highest perfection because 
the Word incarnate is the efficient cause of the perfection of human nature (III, q. 1, a. 6, 
resp.). The Incarnation thus brings about human satisfaction-unto-glory in two quite 
distinct ways: by renovating human nature itself, a renovation effected by the hypostatic 
union, and by some more specific form of influence, presumably over the individual 
human subject.  Thomas has already indicated how such influence might work in the 
secunda pars: “Reply to Objection 2: Matters concerning the Godhead are, in themselves, 
the strongest incentive to love and consequently to devotion, because God is supremely 
lovable. Yet such is the weakness of the human mind that it needs a guiding hand, not 
only to the knowledge, but also to the love of Divine things by means of certain sensible 
objects known to us. Chief among these is the humanity of Christ, according to the words 
of Thomas’ Preface, “that through knowing God visibly, we may be caught up to the love 
of things invisible.” Wherefore matters relating to Christ's humanity are the chief 
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incentive to devotion, leading us thither as a guiding hand, although devotion itself has 
for its object matters concerning the Godhead” (ST, II-II, q. 82, a. 3, ad 2).261 
The mode of hypostatic union moreover parallels that of the union between God 
and humanity.  As grace is the medium between God and humanity in mystical union, so 
it is in the hypostatic union.  The union of the Incarnation is said to have taken place by 
grace, on two grounds: “if grace be understood as the will of God gratuitously doing 
something or reputing anything as well-pleasing or acceptable to Him, the union of 
Incarnation took place by grace, even as the union of the saints with God by knowledge 
and love. But if grace be taken as the free gift of God, then the fact that the human nature 
is united to the Divine Person may be called a grace, inasmuch as it took place without 
being preceded by any merits.” Here Thomas explicitly compares the union of the divine 
and human in Chris by grace with the human person’s union with God by grace.  Aquinas 
is not simply drawing our attention to two situations that happen to be similar; later on he 
makes clear that the one pattern is understood to be the form of the other: “When it is said 
that the Father ‘doth not give the Spirit by measure,’ it may be expounded of the gift 
which God the Father from all eternity gave the Son, viz. the Divine Nature, which is an 
infinite gift. Hence the comment of a certain gloss: ‘So that the Son may be as great as 
the Father is.’ Or again, it may be referred to the gift which is given the human nature, to 
be united to the Divine Person, and this also is an infinite gift” (ST III, q. 7, a. 11, ad 1).  
So not just the human nature of Christ benefits from the hypostatic union, then, but all of 
human nature. 
Christ’s kenotic existence then—his instrumental humanity—is the source of 
grace.  In other words, as an individual man Christ had such a fullness of grace that it 
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flowed out to others. Christ’s gratia capita, grace as the head of the Church, stresses not 
‘the imitation of Christ so much as Christ’s role in our deification’ or theosis. This 
emphasis on deification was already prominently displayed in Commentary on John 
(15:9): 
But the Son did not love the disciples in either of these ways. For he did 
not love them to the point of their being gods by nature, nor to the point 
that they would be united to God so as to form one person with him. But 
he did love them up to a similar point: he loved them to the extent that 
they would be gods by their participation in grace—“I say, ‘You are 
gods’” (Ps 82:6); “He has granted to us precious and very great promises, 
that through these you may become partakers of the divine nature” (2 Pet 
1:4)—yet he loved them to the extent that they would be united to God in 
affection: “He who is united to the Lord becomes one spirit with him” (1 
Cor 6:17); “For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be 
conformed to the image of his Son” (Rom 8:29). Thus the Father 
communicated to the Son a greater good, with respect to each nature of the 
Son, than the Son did to his disciples; yet there is a similarity, as was 
said.262  
 
As Aquinas goes on to explain, the soul of the one who has grace ‘participates, by way of 
a kind of likeness, in the divine nature’ through the mediation of  Christ’s humanity 
acting as a ‘living instrument with a spiritual soul’ (ST III, q. 7, a. 1, ad. 3).  Thomas 
takes the opening verses of Philippians 2, specially the Kenotic hymn, as a clear 
exhortation: ‘Let your manner towards one another arise out of your life in Christ Jesus. 
For the divine nature was his from the first; yet he did not think to snatch at equality with 
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God, but made himself nothing, assuming the nature of a slave. Bearing the human 
likeness, revealed in human shape, he humbled himself, and in obedience accepted even 
death—death on a cross.’ In this exhortation, Paul‘s urging to the Philippians to the virtue 
of humility by the example of Christ marks a very clear connection with Augustine and 
his emphasis on humility at this point. But—and this must be emphasized—this is not a 
mere ‘moralizing,’ or exemplarist, reading of Philippians—unlike Thomas’ earliest 
reading in the Scriptum, for there is now a clear ontological exemplarity  at work, since 
the ‘example’ that Thomas discerns Paul as presenting is that of the humanity of Christ as 
head of the Church. 
In Q. 8, a. 1, ad. 1, Thomas emphasizes once more that Christ’s “humanity was 
the instrument of his divinity,” and it will be in relation to this notion of instrumentality 
that  Aquinas will work out his theory of gratia capita—Christ’s personal grace as the 
grace of the head of the body of Christ/the Church. Christ’s headship in relation to the 
‘body’ can be seen in terms of order, perfection, and efficacy or ‘power-source.’ “Order, 
indeed; for the head is the first part of man, beginning from the higher part.” Under the 
relationship of perfection, Thomas says that ‘it is in the head that one finds all the internal 
and external senses which are in the other members, whereas in the other members there 
is only touch…Under the relationship of power “because the power and movement of the 
other members, together with the direction of them in their acts, is from the head, by 
reason of the sensitive and motive power there ruling… Now these three things belong 
spiritually to Christ. First, on account of His nearness to God His grace is the highest and 
first, though not in time, since all have received grace on account of His grace, according 
to Romans 8:29: ‘For whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable 
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to the image of His Son; that He might be the first-born amongst many brethren.’ 
Secondly, He had perfection as regards the fullness of all graces, according to John 1:14, 
‘We saw Him [Vulgate: 'His glory'] . . . full of grace and truth,’ as was shown, 7, 9]. 
Thirdly, He has the power of bestowing grace on all the members of the Church, 
according to John 1:16: "Of His fullness we have all received.’ And thus it is plain that 
Christ is fittingly called the Head of the Church” [ST III, q. 8, a. 1].  
So, not only the factual ‘being’ [existence, esse] of the humanity of Christ, but 
‘his [human] actions through the power of his divinity [and actualized, as human, by his 
human act of existence and through his human nature or principle of activity], give us 
salvation by causing grace in us, simultaneously by merit and by a certain efficacy’ [ST 
III, q.8, a.1, ad 1: “To give grace or the Holy Ghost belongs to Christ as He is God, 
authoritatively; but instrumentally it belongs also to Him as man, inasmuch as His 
manhood is the instrument of His Godhead. And hence by the power of the Godhead His 
actions were beneficial, i.e. by causing grace in us, both meritoriously and efficiently. But 
Augustine denies that Christ as man gives the Holy Ghost authoritatively. Even other 
saints are said to give the Holy Ghost instrumentally, or ministerially, according to 
Galatians 3:5: ‘He . . . who gives to you the Spirit.’ We have already seen this in nascent 
form in Thomas’ Commentary reading of Philippians 2:5, where Christ’s humility shapes 
our own [saving] experience.  For Aquinas, this ability to ‘experience’ Christ’s humility 
requires us to receive a gift—that is, the supernatural inclination to, or connaturality with, 
Christ’s goodness infused by grace. This is an affective or experiential coming-to-know 
of God in the senses and in the will.263  ‘Perhaps the most striking example of the unity of 
sanctification and glory in Thomas’ Christology is his analysis of the person of Christ 
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himself. Before the passion, Christ possesses the status of both wayfarer and 
comprehensor—of a wayfarer chiefly with respect to the body [which also entails nature, 
will, operation, and, by implication, the human esse], and of a comprehensor chiefly on 
the part of the soul (I answer that, In the state before His Passion Christ was at the same 
time a wayfarer and a comprehensor, as will be more clearly shown [q. 15, a. 10). 
Especially had He the conditions of a wayfarer on the part of the body, which was 
passible; but the conditions of a comprehensor He had chiefly on the part of the soul. 
Now this is the condition of the soul of a comprehensor, viz. that it is nowise subject to 
its body, or dependent upon it, but wholly dominates it. Hence after the resurrection glory 
will flow from the soul to the body. But the soul of man on earth needs to turn to 
phantasms, because it is fettered by the body and in a measure subject to and dependent 
upon it. And hence the blessed both before and after the resurrection can understand 
without turning to phantasms. And this must be said of the soul of Christ, which had fully 
the capabilities of a comprehensor. 
Q. 15, a. 10: ‘I answer that, A man is called a wayfarer from tending to beatitude, 
and a comprehensor from having already obtained beatitude, according to 1 Corinthians 
9:24: “So run that you may comprehend [Douay: obtain];” and Philippians 3:12: “I 
follow after, if by any means I may comprehend [Douay: obtain],”  Now man's perfect 
beatitude consists in both soul and body, as stated in I-II, 4, 6. In the soul, as regards what 
is proper to it, inasmuch as the mind sees and enjoys God; in the body, inasmuch as the 
body “will rise spiritual in power and glory and incorruption,” as is written 1 Corinthians 
15:42. Now before His passion Christ's mind saw God fully, and thus He had beatitude as 
far as it regards what is proper to the soul; but beatitude was wanting with regard to all 
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else, since His soul was passible, and His body both passible and mortal, as is clear from 
the above (4; 14, 1,2). Hence He was at once comprehensor, inasmuch as He had the 
beatitude proper to the soul, and at the same time wayfarer, inasmuch as He was tending 
to beatitude, as regards what was wanting to His beatitude.’ In Christ’s person, then, we 
find the entire story of human sanctification: the one being perfected as he travels along 
the road to God, and the other glorified as he sees the face of God. As we have traced at 
some length, in these early questions of the Tertia Pars dealing with the fittingness, 
method, structure, and purpose of the Incarnation, Thomas links the personal unity of the 
human-divine nature (or perhaps we should say the theandric interrelation of the natures 
in the divine person) in Christ to our sanctifying conformity to that divine-human nature. 
In other words, our imitation and participation in God through the instrumental causality 
of that humanity which Christ has united to himself. 
 
5. De unione, aa. 1-3: The Son’s Kenosis as Prelude to an Esse Secundarium 
 
While some have sought to diminish the importance—or even question the 
authenticity—of the De Unione, it is important to note that both the Christological 
portion of the Summa and the De Unione, despite differences of scope, size, and levels of 
elaboration, are actually structured  along very similar conceptual lines.  Most significant 
in this regard is the fact that in both texts Aquinas feels it is of vital importance to clarify 
the crucial matter of Christ’s human and divine natures as it relates to the issue of 
Christ’s act of existence before he goes on to explore the question of Christ’s specifically 
theandric operations.  Perhaps the simplest way to overcome the present difficulty 
regarding the importance and meaning of the De Unione, and its controversial position 
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regarding the esse of Christ, would be to simply dismiss the problematic text as spurious. 
This is precisely what some earlier Thomist scholars, such as Louis Billot, did, whereas 
others, Cajetan for instance, being more conservative in their assessment of the text’s 
authenticity, argued that De Unione was a very early work eventually rejected by a more 
mature Aquinas.
264
   Cajetan’s position gradually became codified as the majority-
opinion among Thomists, who developed an ‘ecstasy of existence’ theory, according to 
which Christ’s human nature has no separate created existence, for in this case God not 
only creates that nature, but also communicates his divine existence to it.  As a result, 
Christ’s human nature possesses no esse propium (proper personal act of being), but 
instead it can be said to have—analogously with the ecstasy of knowledge and love that 
Christ’s human nature enjoys through the beatific vision—an ecstasy of being or 
existence, since an ‘ecstasy’ is literally a being out of oneself.265  This has been in favor 
with Thomists generally since the seventeenth century, particularly in those self-
professed followers of the Cajetan School—such as Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange—and, 
much more recently, Shawn Colberg.
266
   
While, as we shall explore at much greater length in our next chapter,  a small 
number of unorthodox Thomists, such as Maurice de la Taille and his theory of created 
actuation, left room for a created existential reality which they were willing to call a 
secondary human esse in their account of Aquinas’ Christology, for the most part 
Thomists insisted on the axiom unum ens ergo unum esse (one being, therefore one [act 
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of] existence), and defended the basic concept of the ‘ecstasy of existence’ as the 
authentic view of Thomas.
267
  This opinion was weakened in its historical foundations by 
the pioneering scholarship of Franz Pelster and others, who established that the Quaestio 
de Unione Verbi Incarnati was not only authentic but probably a late work of Aquinas, 
and thus Aquinas did seemingly espouse a twofold existence in Christ.
268
  More 
significantly, some prominent students of Thomas in the 1950s, among them Bernard 
Lonergan, argued for the important role that this concept played in Aquinas’ mature 
Christology, and incorporated it into their own work.
269
  Perhaps the most significant 
figure in this regard was Herman Diepen, who wrote an extensive series of provocative 
articles defending just such a thesis in the pages of the Revue Thomiste.
270
  Indeed, no 
less a luminary of twentieth-century Thomism than Jacques Maritain, late in his career 
admitted that Diepen’s critique of the prevailing ecstasy of existence theory had caused 
him to abandon his own previous position, and acknowledge the presence in Christ of a 
secondary, created esse.
271
  With the passage of time, however, this predominantly intra-
mural debate—carried out for the most part within the somewhat limited precinct of pre-
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Vatican II Thomism—had been largely forgotten. The fact that these debates were 
undertaken primarily within the ambit of one French-language journal has restricted the 
extent of its influence within contemporary Anglophone debates about Christology even 
further.  
More recently, Jean-Pierre Torrell has reported in his survey of Thomas’ work 
that the authoritative Leonine commission, charged with the task of establishing a 
definitive critical edition of Aquinas’ oeuvre, through an extended and careful 
examination of the manuscript tradition has demonstrated the work’s authenticity beyond 
any shadow of a doubt; and, in addition, the commission now judges De Unione to be a 
mature Thomistic text.
272
  Torrell, along with a few selected older scholars, such as James 
Weisheipl and Palémon Glorieux, locates the text’s composition in Paris in the spring of 
1272, a date concurrent with the writing of the Summa Theologiae’s tertia pars.273 Most 
recently, the magisterial work of Klaus Obenauer, which we will explore in more depth in 
our next chapter, has used the work so far completed by the Leonine Commission, to 
publish a critical edition of the De unione which come s closer than ever to proving that 
this Disputed Question clearly belongs to Thomas second Parisian period.274 
The historical evidence, it seems then, will no longer support any easy dismissal 
whatsoever of the De Unione as either an apocryphal text or a youthful indiscretion on 
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the part of Aquinas.  For beter or worse, this work is now and forevermore firmly 
ensconced in the Corpus Thomisticum.   
Some recent scholarship has appealed to this chronology of Thomas’ works to 
develop a possible resolution to the difficulties surrounding the text.  For example, 
Donald Goergen agrees with the assertion that De Unione was written only a few months 
prior to Aquinas’ authoritative solution found in the tertia pars.275  According to 
Goergen, Thomas’ opinion in ST III shows a development in his own thinking on the 
Incarnation, while in q.4 of De Unione we see that Thomas is still groping toward an 
adequate solution, as evidenced by the fact that he allows Christ to have a human esse.  In 
other words, De Unione must ultimately be dismissed, not as spurious, or as immature, 
but as a provisional work-in-progress. Yet this position seems highly problematic, for 
Goergen’s argument depends largely upon the extraordinarily difficult task of precisely 
and conclusively fixing the date of De Unione to within a matter of months prior to the 
composition of the relevant portion in the tertia pars.  Furthermore, Goergen’s claim that 
ST III represents a development in Aquinas’ thought seems untenable in light of the fact 
that in Thomas’ other more youthful works he advanced arguments similar to the one 
found in the tertia pars. Thus, far from representing an evolution in Aquinas’ thought, the 
tertia pars, according to Goergen’s own reasoning, would suggest instead a regression 
away from De Unione and back to an earlier position.  It seems to me, then, that Goergen 
does not take seriously the difficulty that De Unione poses since he fails to offer an 
account of why Aquinas apparently vacillates back and forth on such a vital issue.   
J.L.A. West also bases his negative reading of the De Unione on chronological 
criteria, arguing that it seems unlikely that Thomas would change his elsewhere firm 
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stance that Christ has one esse in writing a preparatory work for the Summa, only to 
revert to his original position in the course of the work itself.
276
  Therefore, in West’s 
estimation, only reading the De Unione as an early work mitigates these concerns, 
notably the one concerning Christ’s esse, as it is more believable that it was written at a 
stage where Thomas’ views were not yet fixed than to claim that he wavered on this 
crucial point during, or immediately prior to, the writing of the tertia pars.  However, as 
we have already seen, discounting the De Unione as the ill-considered musings of a 
young and inexperienced scholar is no longer a viable option. By contrast, Marian 
Michèle Mulchahey uses such chronological issues to argue for a later dating of De 
Unione, citing medieval sources roughly contemporaneous with the life of Thomas, 
which seem to indicate that Aquinas continued to formulate disputed questions, very 
much like De Unione, even after the conclusion of his Paris sojourn.  However, 
Mulchahey fails to engage deeply enough with the Christological issues at hand, and so 
she is unable to establish a thoroughly plausible and fully argued theological rationale for 
such a momentous change in Aquinas’ opinion so late in his career.277 
Any attempt to reconcile the apparently irreconcilable positions on the act of 
existence in Christ as presented by De unione on the one hand, and the Summa 
Theologiae and much of the rest of Thomas’ oeuvre must begin by illustrating how 
conventional—in other words, how much of it perfectly aligns with all of Thomas’ other 
mature Christological texts—the vast majority of the f the Disputed Question actually is. 
This is quite clear right from the opening article, which unsurprisingly once again affirms 
that the union of the divine and human natures in Christ was made in the Person of the 
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Word and not in the natures. To establish the intelligibility of the truth of the union in 
person, Aquinas considers seventeen objections to the contrary, each concluding that the 
union must have been made in the nature, and not in the person. The objections can be 
grouped into three broad categories, with each category identifying a speculative problem 
that must be overcome if the incarnation is to be rendered intelligible. These groupings, 
in their own right correspond to actual arguments made by advocates of the various 
heresies that deny the possibility of two natures being united in one person.  According to 
the first area of difficulty, it seems that the union of any two things results in the 
establishment of one nature. Secondly, there is the seemingly insurmountable fact that the 
Word, as God, shares wholly in the divine nature with the Father and Holy Spirit. How 
could the person of the Word be united to a human nature without the human nature 
being united to the divine nature itself? Finally, a third grouping of objections maintains 
that every existent nature must necessarily be a suppositum (or person) of that nature, 
consequently there could not be a distinction between the suppositum of any nature and 
the nature itself.   
In the response, Thomas sets forth a tripartite order of inquiry that must be 
followed if clarity on the question of the union is to be obtained: “it is necessary to 
consider first what nature is; second, what person is; third, how the union of the Word 
Incarnate was made in the person and not in the nature.” To the third point of 
consideration: how does this understanding of nature and person vindicate the Christian 
truth of the incarnation as a union of two natures in one person? Given that nature is the 
specific difference that makes a thing the certain kind of being that it is, and given that 
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person is a concretely subsisting suppositum (individual substance) of a rational nature, 
Aquinas is able to draw the following conclusion: 
nothing prohibits some things from being united in a person, which are not 
united in a nature, for an individual substance of a rational nature can have 
something that does not belong to the nature of the species: this something 
is united to it personally, not naturally. 
 
This is a very important consideration to take note of. Because, particularly with material 
substances, there is a real distinction between person and nature, the person can be united 
to things that are not included in that person’s nature. This fact makes it possible for the 
Person of the Word to unite to himself the human nature which he assumed. The two 
natures, divine and human, would each retain their own specificity or uniqueness in being 
joined together in the one person. “It should be taken in this way,” Aquinas argues, “that 
the human nature was united to the Word of God in the person and not in the nature 
because if the human nature does not belong to the divine nature, it does however belong 
to his person, in so far as the person of the Word joined to himself a human nature by 
assuming it.” The difficulty in articulating the revealed reality of the union of God and 
man in Christ is pinpointing exactly what type of union is brought about. “For we see that 
in creatures,” Aquinas observes, “that one thing comes to another in two ways: namely, 
accidentally or essentially.” 
 One objection that Thomas considers argues that nothing that is included in 
another stretches out to something outside, just as what is found in a place is not also 
outside the place. But the suppositum of any nature is found in that nature, hence it is 
called a thing of nature. In this way, the individual is included under a species, just as the 
species is included under a genus. So since the Word is the suppositum of the divine 
nature, it is not able to stretch out to another nature so as to be its suppositum, unless one 
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nature is brought about.278 In his subsequent reply to the objection, Aquinas utilizes the 
by-now all too familiar Kenotic hymn to argue that the person of the Word is included 
under the nature of the Word, nor can it extend itself to something beyond. But the nature 
of the Word, by reason of its own infinity, includes every finite nature. Thus, when the 
person of the Word assumes human nature, it does not extend itself beyond the divine 
nature, but the greater receives what is beneath it. Hence, it is said in Philippians (2:6-7) 
that while the Son of God was in the form of God, he emptied his very self. Not only 
laying aside the greatness of the form of God, but also assuming the smallness of human 
nature.279  
Since, in conclusion, person and nature differ in composite things, it is possible, 
Aquinas conjectures, by the divine power, that the person of Word could subsist 
personally in a created (rational) nature. In responding to the objections, Aquinas refers 
to the Word “subsisting” in a human nature several times. “Although in divine things 
nature and suppositum (or person) are not really different, nevertheless they are different 
according to reason as was said,” Aquinas explains in the reply to the second objection. 
Nevertheless, “Because the same is subsisting in human and divine nature, the same 
essence, however, is not composed from both natures. Thus it is that the union was made 
in the person, to whose notion it pertains to subsist.” Furthermore, Aquinas argues that 
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“the union is said to be made in the person in so far as the un-composed divine person 
subsists in two natures, namely divine and human.” The distinction between person and 
nature enables Aquinas to speak of the Incarnate Word as one according to person, but 
composite according to nature: “the being of the person of the Word incarnate is one 
from the perspective of the person subsisting, but not from the perspective of the nature.” 
The second article of the De unione addresses an extremely demanding question: 
namely, what is the metaphysical status of the nature assumed by the Word? Aquinas 
approaches the problem by posing the question “Whether in Christ there is only one 
hypostasis?” This question forces a speculative articulation, primarily of the nature 
assumed, because the perfection of the hypostasis of the Word is not in question. 
Furthermore, given the single person and hypostasis, it appears difficult, if not 
impossible, to reconcile in what sense Christ is two on account of the two natures versus 
his hypostatic unity on account of the one person.  “A particular substance is a 
hypostasis. As a result, the human nature in Christ was a hypostasis. But the human 
nature in Christ is something in addition to the hypostasis of the Word of God. Hence, in 
Christ there is a hypostasis in addition to the hypostasis of the Word of God which means 
that in Christ there are several hypostases.” On the one hand, then, given the unity of the 
Person of the Word, it would seem that Christ could not be two, while on the other hand, 
given the substantiality of the human nature, it would seem that he is two supposita and 
hypostases. 
Aquinas also considered, in several of the objections in article 2, the problem of 
relating a person of the infinite divine nature to a created human nature. “There is no 
proportion,” says the objection “of the divine nature which is infinite to the human which 
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is finite. Therefore, one hypostasis or one suppositum cannot be made out of two 
natures.”  “If, therefore, in Christ there were one suppositum of the man and another of 
God, it could not be said that ‘man is God’ or ‘God is man.’ That position is erroneous. 
Therefore, in Christ there is not one suppositum of God and another of the man.” If there 
were two persons and supposita, the actions and operations predicated of each of the 
natures would belong to the person or suppositum of that particular nature. There would, 
on this account, be no personal or hypostatic union between the natures. Aquinas, 
however, judges the homo assumptus theory here, as well as in the Summa Theologiae, to 
regress into the heresy of Nestorianism which it sought to avoid. What Aquinas 
specifically rejects is the claim that there could be a suppositum of a rational nature that 
is not a person. “If in Christ there is a true hypostasis of the human nature or a true 
suppositum in addition to the hypostasis or suppositum of the Word of God,” Aquinas 
explains, “it would follow that there is a true person of the human nature in Christ in 
addition to the hypostasis of the Word. And thus this position is not different from the 
position of Nestorius.” Such a position, Aquinas points out, is explicitly condemned by 
Constantinople II which declares: “If anyone tries to introduce into the mystery of Christ 
two subsistences or two persons, and having brought in two persons then talks of one 
person only in respect of dignity, honor or adoration, as both Theodore and Nestorius 
have written in their madness let him be anathema.”  
What then is the status of Christ’s human nature if it is not a subsisting 
suppositum and hence person? “The human nature in Christ can indeed be called 
something individual or particular or singular,” Thomas explains, “but nevertheless as it 
is not a person Christ’s human nature cannot be called either a hypostasis or a 
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suppositum.” Given that it is “something individual or particular” Christ’s human nature 
is not an accident. Is it, therefore, a substance? Aquinas is careful about this. It appears 
that he is quite comfortable speaking of Christ’s human nature as a substance in the sense 
of completeness or wholeness. There is, in Christ, a complete human nature, including a 
rational soul with an intellect and will. However, since that integral nature was assumed 
by the Word, that nature lacks the substantial property of perseity, which is why the 
body-soul composite of Christ did not bring about a human person. And, thus, responding 
to an objection asserting that as a particular substance of a rational nature Christ’s human 
nature must indeed be a person, Aquinas replies: “In relation to the notion of hypostasis 
or suppositum, it is not sufficient that something be a particular in the category of 
substance, but it is further required that it be complete and subsisting in itself, as was 
said.” Aquinas clearly recognizes the singular uniqueness of the Incarnate Word. The 
human nature is in the category of substance, as a non-accidental whole, but it is not a 
person or suppositum because the human nature subsists in the Word, who already 
possessed the being of personhood prior to assuming the human nature.  
In the third article of De unione Thomas asks: Is the incarnate Christ one or two 
“things?” The objections focus on duality in Christ arguing that any being having two 
natures could not be considered one thing. For example: “Just as there is one nature in 
three divine persons, so too in the one person of Christ there are two natures. Yet, the 
three divine persons are called one on account of the unity of the nature. Therefore, 
Christ should be called two on account of the two natures.” Likewise, divine and human 
realities can be predicated of Christ. Aquinas says something arresting in the Sed contra: 
“Christ is not two persons nor two hypostases nor two supposita, as is evident from the 
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things already noted. Christ is also not two natures since human nature is not predicated 
of Christ. Therefore, Christ is not two.” Christ is not two natures? What Thomas clarifies 
here is that though Christ has two natures, divine and human, the one Person of the Word 
is both, and thus Christ is, indeed, not two natures in the sense of being two things. Christ 
is one reality: a composite person of a divine and human nature. The union (hypostatic) 
of the two natures in the one subsisting person constitutes the one reality of Christ. 
How then is Christ to be understood and spoken of in relationship to the duality of 
natures without violating his hypostatic and subsistent unity? Aquinas distinguishes the 
way in which any being is spoken of as one and many: “as there is accidental being and 
substantial being, so too some thing is said to be either one or many according to an 
accidental form or according to a substantial form.” To make this point Aquinas draws 
heavily on the distinction between a thing’s absolute (simpliciter) unity and unity only in 
a certain respect (secundum quid). One thing can be called many secundum quid because 
of its accidents: so, for example, a single man can be simultaneously heavy, white, and 
drunk. As such that one man is many things secundum quid. A thing’s absolute unity, or 
unity simpliciter, is established in the order of substance, and Aquinas closely follows 
Aristotle when he uses this principle to articulate Christ’s unity. “According to the 
Philosopher in Metaphysics V,” Aquinas observes, “substance is spoken of in two ways: 
namely, as a suppositum, which is not predicated of something else, and as the form or 
nature of a species, which is predicated of a suppositum.” This is the Aristotelian 
distinction between first and second substance which Aquinas then applies in an 
analogous way to the unique case of Christ: “It is therefore evident that Christ can in 
some way be called one thing because he is one by the suppositum, and he can in some 
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way be called many things, or two, because he has two natures,” much more so than 
Socrates, “about whom one thing is predicated in so far as he is one subject, and many 
things in so far he is white and musical.” Aquinas then concludes that “if one certain 
suppositum has many substantial natures, it will be one thing simpliciter, and many in a 
certain respect . . . Consequently, since Christ is one suppositum possessing two natures it 
follows that he is one simpliciter and two in a certain respect.” The error of the position 
that holds that Christ must be two things on account of the duality of natures is that it 
fails to reason through Christ’s unity from the pre-established truth of the hypostatic 
union. As was noted above, Aquinas views the reality Christ’s unity as a consequence of 
the union of the two natures in one person and subsistence. It is from the truth of the 
hypostatic unity of the two natures in the one person that the further understanding of 
Christ as one thing is derived. This is not a type of crypto-monophysitism; Aquinas 
carefully affirms the reality of each nature, but the duality of natures, is a secundum quid 
duality, which is made one in the absolute unity of the Word.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Through a close analysis of Thomas Commentary on Paul’s Epistle to the 
Philippians and his  Lectura super Ioannem, we saw the importance of the theme of the 
humility of the enfleshed Word in Philippians 2 for Thomas, a key theme as well, as we 
have already noted, in Augustine’s own examination of kenosis, indeed one of the 
principal reasons for the Word’s incarnation, as well as the primary means for fallen 
humanity to be redeemed through becoming more Christ-like in their humility  In his 
extended explications of the kenotic hymn, Thomas extends this connection beyond the 
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traditional confines of moral exemplarity,  connects the personal or hypostatic unity of 
divinity and humanity, that is, the theandric interrelation of the natures in the divine 
person of the incarnated Christ, to our sanctifying conformity to that union of natures, or 
our imitation and participation in the theandry of the Word through the instrumental 
causality of that humanity which Christ has united to himself. I also note the emphasis 
that Aquinas gives to the volitional dimensions of the God-man’s theandric existence, for 
it is Christ’s will in obedience to the Father that is the means of our salvation.   Thomas’ 
comprehensive utilization of the newly discovered documents of Constantinople II to 
begin to construct an argument for the importance of the two wills for the incarnate 
Word’s salvific mission. It is the Son’s freely given assent to undergo the passion willed 
for him by the Father, which finally allow Thomas to fully explicate the significance of 
the kenotic form of obedience that he firmly locates in Philippians 2:8. Thomas connects 
the personal unity of the human-divine nature (or perhaps we should say the theandric 
interrelation of the natures in the divine person) in Christ to our sanctifying conformity to 
that divine-human nature. In other words: our imitation and participation in God through 
the instrumental causality of that humanity which Christ has united to himself. The 
challenge presented at the end of this chapter is found in Thomas’s late Disputed 
Question on the Incarnate Word, which posits a second act of existence with the 
enfleshed Son. An exploration of the first three question of this work begins to indicate 
how the personal unity of the Word is compatible with Christ’s kenotic existence.  
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V. Chapter 4: The Being of Christ: The Ontology of Esse in the Quaestio 
Disputata de Unione Verbi Incarnati and its Modern Reception History 
 
 
 
1. Introduction: 
 
Thomas Aquinas’s thoughts on the question of Christ’s act of existence (esse) 
have seemed for many to be a settled issue. Part of this is due to Thomas’ seeming 
unanimity on the issue throughout a significant span of his career.  In both early texts, 
like the Commentary on the Sentences and Quaestiones Quodlibetales, as well as in much 
later works, such as the Compendium Theologiae, and perhaps most prominently in the 
Summa Theologiae, Aquinas consistently argues that there can only be one substantial 
being in Christ since he is one hypostasis or person.
280
  Even the one apparent anomaly in 
Thomas’ oeuvre, the Disputed Question on the Incarnate Word, does not contradict this 
basic insight. In the controversial fourth article of De unione, Aquinas’ argument for 
there being only one esse in Christ is rooted in the divinity of being enjoyed by the Word. 
In a rigorous consideration of the being of the Word’s human nature, Thomas will argue 
that “in Christ the subsisting suppositum is the person of the Son of God, who is 
sustained simpliciter by the divine nature.”  To be precise, the enfleshed Word is not 
given a personal act of existence by his assumed humanity: “the person of the Son of God 
is not sustained by the human nature.” “This is so,” Aquinas concludes, “because the 
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person of the Son of God existed before he assumed the humanity, and his person was not 
in any way augmented or perfected by having assumed a human nature.” 281  
This line of reasoning does not differ significantly from Aquinas’ thinking on this 
topic in his earliest writings, where he already affirmed that the hypostasis of the Word is 
a suppositum; that is, one substantial unified being sustained by one act of existence, a 
fact which safeguards both the unity and the oneness of the Son.  As far back as his 
Scriptum commentary, we already see Thomas arguing that “It is impossible that 
something should have two substantial beings [esse], since unity is founded upon being 
[ens]: whence if there were a plurality of esse, according to which something is said to be 
being [ens] simpliciter, it would be impossible for it to be called one.”282  In other words, 
to the degree that something is, it is a singular being with one act of existence. The 
suppositum of Christ is a complete whole, which is to say a single substance subsisting 
through itself, since that in virtue of which a hypostasis is a substance is its esse, 
specifically that unique act of existence which brings about its substantial unity. De 
unione, a. 4 unsurprisingly proclaims that Christ “has one being simply on account of the 
one being of the eternal suppositum” (habet unum esse simpliciter propter unum esse 
aeternum aeterni suppositi). However, what is surprising is the subsequent assertion that 
the eternal suppositum is sustained by the human nature in so far as it is this man, and 
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 De unione, a. 4, c. The entire argument reads: Dicendum quod huius quaestionis est 
quodammodo eadem ratio et praemissae; quia ex eodem dicitur aliquid esse unum, et ens. Esse enim 
proprie et vere dicitur de supposito subsistente. Accidentia enim et formae non subsistentes dicuntur esse, 
in quantum eis aliquid subsistit; sicut albedo dicitur ens, in quantum ea est aliquid album. Considerandum 
est autem, quod aliquae formae sunt quibus est aliquid ens non simpliciter, sed secundum quid; sicut sunt 
omnes formae accidentales. Aliquae autem formae sunt quibus res subsistens simpliciter habet esse; quia 
videlicet constituunt esse substantiale rei subsistentis. In Christo autem suppositum subsistens est persona 
Filii Dei, quae simpliciter substantificatur per naturam divinam, non autem simpliciter substantificatur per 
naturam humanam. Quia persona Filii Dei fuit ante humanitatem assumptam, nec in aliquo persona est 
augmentata, seu perfectior, per naturam humanam assumptam. 
282
  III Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2: Impossibile est enim quod unum aliquid habeat duo esse substantiala; 
quia unum fundatur super ens. Unde si sint plura esse, secundum quae aliquid dicitur ens simpliciter, 
impossibile est quod dicatur unum. 
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that this human, temporal, created mode of subsisting in the world is characterized by 
Thomas as a secondary esse or created act of existence in the person of the Word.  The 
elucidation of this line of argument in De unione, its apparently bold contradiction of 
Aquinas’ traditional understanding on the one esse of Christ, its contentious reception 
and interpretation in modern Thomistic theology, and its potential complementarity with 
a one-esse Christology, are all the subjects of this chapter.  
 
 
2. De Unione, a. 4: Christ’s Human Esse in Relation to ST III, Q. 17 
 
It would be instructive to begin an analysis of De unione’s apparent novelty 
regarding Christ’s human act of existence with a look at Summa Theologiae III, q. 17, 
since it has been historically understood to be the locus classicus of Thomas’ one esse 
position, and thus in direct contradiction to Aquinas’s innovative secondary esse proposal 
in De unione. a.4  The first article of Question 17 queries “whether Christ is one or two,” 
and goes on to affirm that in fact there is both something singular and something plural in 
Christ. However, even though Thomas is proposing to examine Christ’s being in regard 
to the duality of his two natures, nevertheless he affirms that “Whatever is, inasmuch as it 
is, is one; we confess that Christ is; therefore Christ is one.”283 In other words, substantial 
unity entails one substantial act of existence in the person of Christ. Thomas further 
strengthens this assertion by arguing that Christ’s concrete human nature cannot be 
predicated of him in the abstract because the person of Christ is the divine person of the 
Word, and in the abstract, the Word does not naturally possess a human nature. Rather, 
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 Sed contra est quod Boetius dicit, in libro de duabus naturis, omne quod est, inquantum est, 
unum est. Sed Christum esse confitemur. Ergo Christus est unum.  
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the Word assumes a concrete human nature to himself in the incarnation, but not as 
something inherent to his utterly simple divine essence and existence as God.  Hence, 
given that human nature cannot be predicated of the incarnate Christ, whose 
suppositum284 is the pre-existent Word, in the abstract, there is no duality that can be 
predicated of his being. Rather, Christ’s two natures are predicated of him “in the 
suppositum,” which is the person of Christ, and his suppositum is singular—although 
Thomas quickly adds that we must also affirm that in the concrete the supposit possesses 
two natures—both before and after the incarnation. The singular ontological uniqueness 
of the suppositum of the Word establishes beyond a doubt that Christ is a single subject. 
As we already saw in part five of the previous chapter, this line of argumentation is 
almost identical to the way Aquinas addresses the very same topic in De unione, a.3.  
Question 17, article 2 further advances this argument for the unity of Christ from 
the first article, but here Thomas specifically addresses the metaphysics which underlie 
his affirmation of one subsistent esse in the suppositum of Christ. As the sed contra 
succinctly proclaims “Everything is said to be a being inasmuch as it is one, for one and 
being are convertible.”285 Thus, it would seem to follow from the position established in 
article 1 that “Christ is one” that the Word must consequently possess only one being or 
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 Just to clarify, according to Roy Deferrari’s A Latin-English Dictionary of St Thomas Aquinas: 
Based on The Summa Theologica and Selected Passages of His Other Writings, (Boston: St. Paul Editions, 
1960), a suppositum can be defined a number of ways, among them: “That which underlies all the accidents 
of a thing, i.e. the individual substance of a certain kind which is the subject of existence and all accidental 
modifications which constitute the individual, synonym of hypostasis, subjectum, and substantia . . . - 
Kinds of suppositum in this sense are (a) suppositum aeternum seu increatum and suppositum temporale 
seu creatum, the eternal or increated and the temporal or created individual substance. - (b) suppositum 
completum ultima completione, the individual substance of highest completion . . .” In short, a suppositum 
denotes the incommunicable existence of any nature, while person/hypostasis specifically designates the 
incommunicable existence of an individual substance a rational nature This is the range of meaning that I 
will employ when using the term suppositum in the remainder of this chapter.   
285
 ST III, q.17, a.2: Sed contra, unumquodque, secundum quod dicitur ens, dicitur unum, quia 
unum et ens convertuntur. Si ergo in Christo duo essent esse, et non tantum unum, Christus esset duo, et 
non unum. 
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esse. However, in the corpus of the article Aquinas problematizes this straightforward 
assertion, which uncomplicatedly associated esse with the act of existence which belongs 
properly to Christ’s suppositum, by conceding that esse is related not only to Christ’s 
suppositum but in some regard to his two natures as well. Thomas goes on to explain that 
“being pertains both to the nature and to the hypostasis; to the hypostasis as to that which 
[quod] has being—and to the nature as to that whereby [quo] it has being.”286 The 
suppositum or hypostasis is that “which is”—quod est—or which has esse in and of itself, 
and therefore signifies the existing subject. For example, the suppositum underlies 
everything that constitutes the person of Socrates, and only the whole person, Socrates as 
an individual substance, exists. On the other hand, nature is that “whereby”—quo est—a 
thing exists, and so it signifies the quiddity (the what-ness or essence) of a thing. Socrates 
exists as a human being: his nature as rational animal defines the what-ness of his 
suppositum or hypostasis and in that sense nature is related to esse as that “whereby” the 
suppositum exists, in this case a s human. 
Thomas additionally complicates the relations of suppositum and nature to the act 
of existence by distinguishing two types of esse—“personal” and “accidental.” A 
suppositum possesses one personal esse; and as that which constitutes a thing’s individual 
existence, it cannot be multiplied under any circumstances. Accidental esse is the being 
which a suppositum has in virtue of a certain accident; so, to use Aquinas own 
illustrations, Socrates can be both “white” and a “musician” and thus have two accidental 
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 Ibid: Respondeo: dicendum quod, quia in Christo sunt duae naturae et una hypostasis, necesse 
est quod ea quae ad naturam pertinent in Christo sint duo, quae autem pertinent ad hypostasim in Christo 
sint unum tantum. Esse autem pertinet ad hypostasim et ad naturam, ad hypostasim quidem sicut ad id quod 
habet esse; ad naturam autem sicut ad id quo aliquid habet esse; natura enim significatur per modum 
formae, quae dicitur ens ex eo quod ea aliquid est, sicut albedine est aliquid album, et humanitate est aliquis 
homo. 
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esse, both whiteness and musicianship, which inhere in or are attached to his 
suppositum.287  They are “attached” to the man Socrates inasmuch as they do not 
constitute the personal esse of Socrates but actually gain their act of existence from their 
inherence to the personal esse of the suppositum.  However, Thomas is firm in his 
conviction that Christ’s human nature possesses neither a personal esse nor an accidental 
esse, which raises the question as to how Christ’s human nature can be said to exist at all. 
Aquinas’ response to this perplexing quandary is that Christ’s suppositum takes 
human nature to itself as “a constitutive part of the whole.” In other words, Thomas 
compares the human nature assumed by the suppositum of Christ to the way constitutive 
bodily parts, such as Socrates’ head or Socrates’’ hand, exist in relation to the one 
substantial being of Socrates. So, just as the addition and conjunction of a “constitutive 
part of the whole”—such as a head—does not add any new being to the suppositum of 
Socrates; so, in Aquinas’ estimation the accrual of a human nature  by the Word does not 
add any further substantial being to the suppositum of Christ. As Thomas writes, if is so 
happened that “after the person of Socrates was constituted there accrued to him hands or 
feet or eyes, as happened to him who was born blind, no new being would be thereby 
added to Socrates, but only a relation to these,” that is inasmuch as “he would be said to 
be, not only with reference to what he had previously, but also with reference to what 
accrued to him afterwards.” Likewise, the accrued human nature constitutes a “new 
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 Ibid: For nature is taken after the manner of a form, which is said to be a being because 
something is by it; as by whiteness a thing is white, and by manhood a thing is man. Now it must be borne 
in mind that if there is a form or nature which does not pertain to the personal being of the subsisting 
hypostasis, this being is not said to belong to the person simply, but relatively; as to be white is the being of 
Socrates, not as he is Socrates, but inasmuch as he is white. And there is no reason why this being should 
not be multiplied in one hypostasis or person; for the being whereby Socrates is white is distinct from the 
being whereby he is a musician. But the being which belongs to the very hypostasis or person in itself 
cannot possibly be multiplied in one hypostasis or person, since it is impossible that there should not be one 
being for one thing.  
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relation” to the pre-existing suppositum of Christ, which signifies something radically 
different, but nonetheless does not signify new act of existence. The Word’s accrued 
human nature brings no new esse to the divine suppositum because it is as if that assumed 
humanity always essentially belonged to Christ.288  
As a consequence of this, “the eternal being of the Son of God, which is the 
Divine Nature, becomes the being of man, inasmuch as the human nature is assumed by 
the Son of God to the unity of Person.”289 The Incarnate Son’s human nature—unlike 
other human natures which are instantiated and subsist in a human suppositum, and 
participate in divine being for their actualization—is conjoined to the Son of God as its 
suppositum, and it has existence directly from the divine esse and not through any sort of 
participation. To put is as succinctly as possible: the enfleshed Christ can be said to enjoy 
the personal divine esse of the Son of God. Accordingly, this divine act of existence 
makes Christ’s human nature wholly elevated and perfected; it makes Christ a perfectly 
graced human being whose human nature is fully actualized in view of its divine esse. 
And, as we sall see in the concluding chapter, thereby acts as both a moral and 
ontological exemplar for all humankind.  
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 Ibid: Si igitur humana natura adveniret filio Dei, non hypostatice vel personaliter, sed 
accidentaliter, sicut quidam posuerunt, oporteret ponere in Christo duo esse, unum quidem secundum quod 
est Deus; aliud autem secundum quod est homo. Sicut in Socrate ponitur aliud esse secundum quod est 
albus, aliud secundum quod est homo, quia esse album non pertinet ad ipsum esse personale Socratis. Esse 
autem capitatum, et esse corporeum, et esse animatum, totum pertinet ad unam personam Socratis, et ideo 
ex omnibus his non fit nisi unum esse in Socrate. Et si contingeret quod, post constitutionem personae 
Socratis, advenirent Socrati manus vel pedes vel oculi, sicut accidit in caeco nato, ex his non accresceret 
Socrati aliud esse, sed solum relatio quaedam ad huiusmodi, quia scilicet diceretur esse non solum 
secundum ea quae prius habebat, sed etiam secundum ea quae postmodum sibi adveniunt. Sic igitur, cum 
humana natura coniungatur filio Dei hypostatice vel personaliter, ut supra dictum est, et non accidentaliter, 
consequens est quod secundum humanam naturam non adveniat sibi novum esse personale, sed solum nova 
habitudo esse personalis praeexistentis ad naturam humanam, ut scilicet persona illa iam dicatur subsistere, 
non solum secundum naturam divinam, sed etiam humanam.  
289
 Ibid, ad. 2: Ad secundum dicendum quod illud esse aeternum filii Dei quod est divina natura, 
fit esse hominis, inquantum humana natura assumitur a filio Dei in unitate personae.  
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We come now to the fourth article of De unione, which raises the question of 
whether in Christ there is only one being, and follows quickly upon the thematic heels of 
the previous article of this Disputed Question, one that has already proven to establish a 
firm foundation for Christ’s ontological and existential oneness in much the same manner 
as does ST III, q.17, a.1.  Indeed, as Thomas himself readily acknowledges at the 
commencement of De unione, a.4: “It should be said that this argument is, in a certain 
sense, the same argument as the previous question, because something is said to be one 
and a being from the same thing.”290 The three opening objections point out the duality of 
Christ’s two distinct natures, asserting that there must be an esse or being corresponding 
to each of the natures. Objection two is of particular interest, since it once again utilizes 
the Kenotic hymn, this time to argue that every form corresponds to its own being or act 
of existence, and uses as its example the fact that it is one thing to exist as white, and 
quite another to exist as man. Moreover, it is in an undisputed fact that in Christ there are 
two forms; since, as Philippians 2:7 says, “While Christ was in the form of God, he took 
the form of a slave,” yet he did not set aside the form of God, rather he assumed a human 
form. Therefore, in Christ there is a two-fold being.
291
  In the third objection, Thomas 
invokes the authority of Aristotle when he writes that “according to the Philosopher, in 
book II of the de Anima [com. 37], in living things, living is being. But there is a two-fold 
life in Christ; namely a human life, which he was deprived of through death; and a divine 
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 De unione, a.4: Respondeo. Dicendum quod huius quaestionis est quodammodo eadem ratio et 
praemissae; quia ex eodem dicitur aliquid esse unum, et ens.  
291
 Ibid, obj. 2: cuilibet formae respondet suum esse: aliud enim est esse album, et aliud esse 
hominem. Sed in Christo sunt duae formae; quia, cum in forma Dei esset, formam servi accepit, ut dicitur 
Philipp. ii, non tamen formam dei deposuit. Ergo in Christo est duplex esse.  
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life, which he could not be deprived of through death. Therefore, there is not only one 
being in Christ, but two.”292 
In the body of the article Thomas responds in an altogether familiar manner to 
these objections by pointing out once again that esse is truly and properly said only of the 
subsisting suppositum, since accidental properties and other non-subsisting forms are said 
to be only insofar as something subsists by means of them; so, whiteness is called a 
being, but only insofar as something is white, for example by means of the person of 
Socrates. As Thomas has argued before, this is the only coherent way of thinking about 
the peculiar existence of accidental properties: they are forms by which something has 
existence, not simpliciter, but rather in a certain qualified manner.
293
 Aquinas contrasts 
this with forms by which a subsisting thing has esse simply; in other words, forms that 
constitute the substantial act of existence of an individually subsisting thing.
294
  With 
these initial considerations reminiscent of the arguments put forth in ST III, q.17 out of 
way, Thomas further argues that in Christ the subsisting suppositum is the person of the 
Son of God, which is sustained in existence simply through the divine nature, but is 
decidedly not sustained as a substance simply through the human nature; since the person 
of the Son of God existed before he assumed humanity. Nor was the pre-existent Word 
changed, or increased, or perfected in any way when he underwent this kenosis.295 
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 Ibid, obj. 3: Praeterea, secundum Philosophum, in ii de Anima, vivere viventibus est esse. Sed 
in Christo est duplex vita; scilicet humana, quae fuit privata per mortem; et divina, quae per mortem privari 
non potuit. Ergo in Christo non est tantum unum esse, sed duo.. 
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 Ibid, Resp: Esse enim proprie et vere dicitur de supposito subsistente. Accidentia enim et 
formae non subsistentes dicuntur esse, in quantum eis aliquid subsistit; sicut albedo dicitur ens, in quantum 
ea est aliquid album. Considerandum est autem, quod aliquae formae sunt quibus est aliquid ens non 
simpliciter, sed secundum quid; sicut sunt omnes formae accidentales.   
294
 Ibid: Aliquae autem formae sunt quibus res subsistens simpliciter habet esse; quia videlicet 
constituunt esse substantiale rei subsistentis.  
295
 Ibid: In Christo autem suppositum subsistens est persona Filii Dei, quae simpliciter 
sustentificatur per naturam divinam, non autem simpliciter sustentificatur per naturam humanam. Quia 
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Nevertheless, and this is a crucial distinction, the eternal suppositum now subsists 
through the human nature insofar as it is this man (Sustentificatur autem suppositum 
aeternum per naturam humanam, in quantum est hic homo). And so, Thomas concludes, 
just as Christ is one simply on account of the singular ontological unity of the 
suppositum, and two in a certain respect on account of the two natures by which he now 
subsists as both divine and human, he nonetheless “has one divine act of existence simply 
on account of the one divine esse of the eternal suppositum.”296  
Yet, notwithstanding these by now recognizably characteristic arguments, 
Aquinas goes on to insist that there in fact must be another esse or act of existence in the 
suppositum of Christ, “not insofar as it is eternal, but insofar as it became a man in time.” 
And that this secondary esse, even if it is not an accidental act of existence, because 
humanity is not an accidentally predicated characteristic of the eternal suppositum of the 
Word (as Thomas had argued in De unione, a. 1 and, indeed, in every other 
Christological text since the time of the Sentences Commentary), is nonetheless present 
and active in the enfleshed Word, not the principle esse of its suppositum, but rather only 
as a secondary esse. As Aquinas clarifies, only if there were two separate persons or 
supposits in Christ, would each suppositum then have its own singular esse or distinct 
principle act of existence. Consequently, there would be a two-fold esse in the Word 
simply, but as a result this would utterly destroy the ontological unity of the incarnate 
Son.297 Thomas concludes this analysis with a single, somewhat gnomic response to all 
                                                                                                                                                                             
persona Filii Dei fuit ante humanitatem assumptam, nec in aliquo persona est augmentata, seu perfectior, 
per naturam humanam assumptam.  
296
 Ibid: Et ideo sicut Christus est unum simpliciter propter unitatem suppositi, et duo secundum 
quid propter duas naturas, ita habet unum esse simpliciter propter unum esse aeternum aeterni suppositi.  
297
 Ibid: Est autem et aliud esse huius suppositi, non in quantum est aeternum, sed in quantum est 
temporaliter homo factum. Quod esse, etsi non sit esse accidentale - quia homo non praedicatur 
accidentaliter de Filio Dei, ut supra habitum est - non tamen est esse principale sui suppositi, sed 
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the previous objections: The esse of the human nature is distinctively not the esse of the 
divine nature. Yet we cannot simply state that Christ is two in regard to esse, because 
neither nature “relate in an equal way to the eternal suppositum.”298  
The controversy engendered by this article proceeds primarily from Aquinas’ 
introduction of this novel notion of an esse secundarium in such a seemingly enigmatic 
manner.  On the face of it, a secondary act of existence seems to directly contradict 
Aquinas’ treatment of Christ’s esse elsewhere in his work—certainly De unione, a.4 is 
the only text in his vast oeuvre in which Aquinas speaks of any other non-accidental esse 
in Christ other than the divine esse of the Word. Nevertheless, it seems indubitably clear 
that the position articulated in the De unione on Christ’s personal act of existence is 
without a doubt the traditional single-esse position seen in earlier works. In the body of 
the article Thomas makes it abundantly clear that there can only be one esse simpliciter in 
the incarnate Word. So, we are left to ponder, what can Aquinas intend for us to 
understand by the introduction of an esse secundarium? At the very least, it would seem 
to be a serious error to interpret the term secundarium as an affirmation of a second 
additional substance pertaining to Christ’s assumed humanity. In that regard, we may 
take it that the adjective secundarium does not refer to separate substantial being, or 
numerically second esse in Christ pertaining to the assumed humanity. In this article 
Aquinas never indicates that he is juxtaposing two ontologically and numerically distinct 
entities, but rather comparing that which is preeminent with that which is subordinate. A 
summary review of Thomas’ use of the word secundarium elsewhere clearly indicates the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
secundarium. Si autem in Christo essent duo supposita, tunc utrumque suppositum haberet proprium esse 
sibi principale. Et sic in Christo esset simpliciter duplex esse.  
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 Ibid, Obj. 1: Ad primum ergo dicendum quod esse humanae naturae non est esse divinae. Nec 
tamen simpliciter dicendum est quod Christus sit duo secundum esse; quia non ex aequo respicit utrumque 
esse suppositum aeternum. 
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term refers to an order of dependency, one in which that which is identified as 
secundarium is contingent upon that which is principale.
299
 To take but one example, in 
addressing a question relating to the teleology of the causal order, Aquinas points out that 
“just as there is an order in agent causes, so too there is an order in final causes: as, 
namely, a secondary end [secundarius finis] depends on a principal one [a principali 
dependeat], just as a secondary agent depends on a principal one.”300 In other words, the 
primary and secondary ends are two-fold, but the finis secundarium does not contribute 
“finis” to the primary end, and the secondary end exists as an end in a relation of 
dependency on the primary end.
301
 Applying this to the question of Christ’s human act of 
existence, we can say then that there is a genuine secundarium in the enfleshed Word in 
regard to the assume human nature. Because the assumed humanity depends on the 
Word’s primary esse it does not contribute a principal act of existence to the one reality 
of Christ. Nevertheless, this distinction does not fully explicate what precise role this 
dependent secondary act of existence plays in the Hypostatic Union. As we will now see, 
the various answers proposed to this lingering question by a host of Thomist scholars 
during the course of the last century have been as varied as they have been contentious.  
 
3. Maurice de La Taille and Bernard Lonergan 
 
Maurice de la Taille 
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  See Roger Nutt’s introduction to his translation of this Disputed Question: Thomas Aquinas: 
De unione Verbi incarnati, Dallas Medieval Texts and Translations 41, trans. R.W. Nutt (Leuven: Peeters, 
2015), pp. 1-78, especially pp. 57-66. 
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 Summa contra gentiles, III, 109, 5: Sicut est ordo in causis agentibus, ita etiam in causis 
finalibus: ut scilicet secundarius finis a principali dependeat, sicut secundarium agens a principali dependet. 
Accidit autem peccatum in causis agentibus quando secundarium agens exit ab ordine principalis agentis 
301
 Nutt, p. 59.  
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During his life Maurice de la Taille (1872-1933) was primarily known for to his 
writings on the Mass, which he closely identified with Christ at Calvary, describing the 
Mass above all as the Sacrifice of the Church and the Eucharist as the paradigmatic 
Sacrament of that sacrifice.302 This unity between Christ’s sacrifice begun at the Last 
Supper, consummated on the Cross, ratified in the Resurrection, and commemorated in 
the Holy Mass, indicated for de la Taille that there was only one immolation, undertaken 
once and for all by Christ on the Cross, and which the Eucharistic sacrifice of the Mass 
recalled and recapitulated.  De la Taille’s singular interest in the sacrifice of the God-man 
in the crucifixion led him in time to examine and develop a highly original explication of 
the Hypostatic Union, a theandric enfleshment of the Word that for de la Taille entails a 
true secondary created act of existence in Christ. De la Taille’s great insight was to regard 
the Hypostatic Union from an ontological point of view wherein the incarnational act is 
the  actualization of a potentiality, and the secondary human act of existence in Christ is 
understood to be a created actuation brought about by the divine esse, or uncreated Act, 
of the pre-existent Word.303  According to this model, Christ’s human esse is in only a 
potential existence until it is brought into being by the Son’s eternal actualization, the 
Word’s very act of divine existence. This actualization can be looked at simultaneously 
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 Cf. Maurice de la Taille, Mysterium fidei de augustissimo corporis et sanguinis christi 
sacrificio atque sacramento: Elucidationes L in tres libros distinctae (Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1921), 
Esquisse du mystère de la foi, suivie de quelques éclaircissements (Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1924), The 
Mystery of Faith: Regarding the Most August Sacrament and Sacrifice of the Body and Blood of Christ: 
Book I, The Sacrifice of Our Lord (London: Sheed & Ward, 1940), and The Mystery of Faith: Regarding 
the Most August Sacrament and Sacrifice of the Body and Blood of Christ: Book II, The Sacrifice of the 
Church (London: Sheed & Ward, 1940). See also Francis J. Wengier, The Eucharist Sacrifice (Milwaukee, 
WI: Bruce Publishing Co., 1955); Michon M. Matthiesen, Sacrifice as Gift: Eucharist, Grace, and 
Contemplative Prayer in Maurice de la Taille (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America 
Press, 2012). 
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 De la Taille, “Created Actuation by Uncreated Act: Light of Glory, Sanctifying Grace, 
Hypostatic Union,” in The Hypostatic Union and Created Actuation by Uncreated Act, Readings in 
Philosophy and Theology, trans. C. Vollert (West Baden Springs, IN: West Baden College, 1952), pp. 26–
41. Originally published as “Actuation créé par Acte incréé” in Recherches de Science Religieuse 18 
(1928), pp. 253-268.  
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as both the communication of an act of existence to the potency and also the reception of 
that act of existence within that potency.  From either point of view, in de la Taille’s 
accounting, the potency is carried over into an act through a process of actuation, which 
is to say that the imperfect is reduced to or brought to an actual perfection, (that is, 
actualized) by a perfecting act (or by that which is already actualized).304   
De la Taille goes on to make an important distinction by pointing out that 
actualization has two characteristic features. In the first instance, act is that within an 
entity that makes it a being with a particular essential natural perfection, but act is also 
that which causes a perfection to be added to a thing’s essential nature. So, whereas the 
first actuation is always a perfection within the essence, the second actuation is 
something outside the essence which is added to and thereby brings a potency to 
perfection (or actuation). The correlative term to act is potency, which de la Taille refers 
to as an imperfection, not because something potential is defective, but rather because it 
is an unrealized potential that needs to be brought to perfection precisely by being 
actualized. This two-fold way of understanding the characterizing feature of actualization 
in relation to potency leads de la Taille to posit a further distinction, one that is based 
entirely on whether or not the act depends on the potency to carry out its actualizing 
function. In the first instance of actuation, the act depends on the potency in such a way 
that the act informs the potency. The communication of form, of course, is a fundamental 
aspect of the notion of hylemorphism that Aquinas adopts from Aristotle, who taught that 
every entity is composed of a physical substrate arranged in a certain way. The concrete 
dimension of the entity is its matter (hyle), while the manner according to which the 
entity is arranged is the form (morphe).  To take one example from Thomas, a human 
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being is a composed of both a body and soul, the latter being the form and the former the 
matter.305 Nevertheless, as with any hylemorphic compound, a human being cannot be 
reduced to either a soul (its form) or a body (its matter); rather, it must be considered as a 
composite unity, the soul being the actualizing principle that depends of the material 
body as that potentiality which the soul informs or brings into act. 
The second instance of actuation involves an act which does not depend on a 
potency in order to carry out its actualizing function, and thus in such a case actuation 
and the communication of form do not coincide. The paradigmatic example of this sort of 
actualization is to be found in God, who as perfectly actualized—as uncreated Act—has 
no unrealized or potential perfections within himself. Indeed, as pure Act, God is even 
less dependent upon any potentialities in those things that he chooses to actualize.  This 
last point is important because it safeguards God’s utter transcendence. If God as 
uncreated Act were dependent on a created potency, then the actualization of that 
potential, its information by an Uncreated act, would inevitably result in a sort of 
pantheism where God becomes the essential form of every created entity that he 
actualizes. All instantiations of actuation and information concurring together perforce 
happen within the natural or created order, the place where form and matter come 
together in hylemorphically composite entities. On the other hand, when actuation and 
information do not concur, it can only be an instance of actuation within the supernatural 
order, that is, where uncreated Act is not upon potency for its ability to endow any 
potential with actuality.  
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When de la Taille subsequently turns to the question of the Incarnation, he 
emphasizes that both of these instances of actualization must be kept distinct yet 
nevertheless dynamically integrated within the Hypostatic Union. That is, within the 
enfleshed Word the divine transcendence of the uncreated Act, free from any dependency 
upon potentiality, is united to the immanence of God as that uncreated Act which brings 
created potency into actuality. This integration within the divine person of Christ cannot 
be attributed to the communication of a form, since as uncreated Act cannot be dependent 
on the created potentiality of the assumed humanity. Thus, in order to integrate Jesus’ 
human potency to Christ’s perfect actualization, something must be created in that 
potentiality, or added to its created essence, so that it will be united to the uncreated Act. 
In other words, there must be a created change within the potency itself that allows the 
assumed humanity to be joined to the term of the union, which is the uncreated Act. 
Succinctly put, this integration can be nothing other than created actuation by uncreated 
Act. 
Moreover, as de la Taille argues, this integration, this Hypostatic Union, must be 
a created actuation within the substantial rather than the accidental order of things 
because it brings about a communion of the Word and the assumed humanity into a 
substantial composite, the incarnate God-man. When the uncreated Act actualizes the 
potentiality of the assumed humanity, it is a full communication of the divine existence to 
the humanity of Christ bringing the substance from potency to act. This created actuation 
in the Hypostatic Union is called the grace of union. It is a grace, a substantial adaptation 
that brings about a relationship of union between the uncreated Word and the humanity of 
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Christ.306 As de la Taille would later explain, this grace that unites the divinity and the 
humanity in the person of the Son is not a separate tertium quid, or distinct medium, 
between the Word and the assumed humanity which connects them. On the contrary, the 
grace of union is nothing other than the created actuation communicated by the uncreated 
Act, which in its very act of communication brings about a new relation in the substantial 
order. Finally, de la Taille counsels us, we should not be misled into thinking of the 
Hypostatic Union as a kind of actuation by the communication of a form, because as 
uncreated Act the Word is not dependent on the potency of the assumed humanity. In this 
unique integration of the divine and the human, actualization and information do not 
coincide; nevertheless, there is a real relationship of union because the terminus of the 
union is solely in the uncreated Word. 
De la Taille goes on to apply this understanding of created actuation by uncreated 
Act to the problem of Christ’s secondary human esse. He first points out that two possible 
meanings of esse must be distinguished when reflecting upon the actuation of a created 
nature by the uncreated Act of existence, since the actuation of the created existence by 
Act will take place in the created temporal realm, while the uncreated Act itself subsists 
beyond time. As a consequence, when we enquire as to how many esse or acts of 
existence there are in Christ, we “shall have to reply, one or two, according to the sense 
of the inquiry.”307 We can see that Christ’s act of existence is singular if the manner of the 
nature’s existence is considered, i.e., the actuation of both the divine and the human 
natures by the one uncreated Act of the divine Word. Conversely, we can also recognize 
that there are two distinctive acts of existence in Christ if the question is how many 
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actuations exist. For there is clearly one uncreated Act of existence in the divine nature 
and one created act of existence in the human nature, since the former is a temporal 
actuation and the latter is eternal. De la Taille reconciles the apparent contradictions 
between the two accounts of Christ’s esse in the Summa and the Disputed Question by 
suggesting that the first treatment is written solely from the point of view of the uncreated 
Act, while the second enumerates both the temporal and atemporal acts of existence in 
the incarnate Son.  
 
Bernard Lonergan 
This approach to formulating the nature of the Hypostatic Union and the esse of 
Christ was challenged by Bernard Lonergan, particularly the analogy that de la Taille 
draws from created things and their composition (essence and esse, matter and form). 
Lonergan argued that this schema was unsuited for the purpose, and in its stead turned to 
an analogy in what we naturally know of God in whom being and knowledge and willing 
are one. As Lonergan points out, de la Taille’s account lacks a true analogy based on the 
composition of finite created being, since there is no created potency proportionate to 
uncreated Act, nor is the Act received in the potency, nor is the Act limited by the 
potency. As a result of this significant disanalogousness in de la Taille’s theory, 
Lonergan felt compelled to devise an alternative answer to the question of Christ’s 
secondary human esse within the larger ambit of his own discussion of the incarnate 
Son’s psychological and ontological constitution.308 Lonergan’s early treatise on the 
Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ examines in some depth issues 
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relating to both the unity and the duality of Christ’s consciousness, an outgrowth of the 
earlier Chalcedonian diophysite understanding of the ontology of the incarnation. In the 
first section of the book Lonergan addresses the questions of the Son’s human mode of 
existence, using the conciliar understanding of Christ as one divine person subsisting in 
two natures, along with the Thomistic determination of the Son as “one supposit, one 
being, one reality,” as the point of departure for his subsequent analysis.309  His basic idea 
is that, in the case of the Incarnation, the divine, eternal, and infinite esse of the Son is the 
intrinsic constitutive cause of the Hypostatic Union, from which there follows of 
necessity a secondary esse, a substantial act, by means of a terminus or terminating result.  
As Lonergan explains, God knows and wills by the selfsame act of knowing and 
willing both what is necessary and what is contingent; moreover, because as the doctrine 
of divine Simplicity teaches, God’s acts of knowing and of willing are not distinct from 
God’s divine esse or act of existence.310  Correlatively, God also, by the same act of 
divine existence, is what God is of necessity, that is essentially, and what he becomes 
contingently through his kenosis when God assumes a human nature. Lonergan further 
elucidates that just as God’s act of knowing and of willing what is necessary and what is 
contingent are really just one single act, so also, applying this to what the faith tells us 
about the Incarnation, “in the Word, ‘to be God’ and ‘to be man’ are really one because it 
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is through the same act of being that the Word is both God and man.”311  Hence, we must 
conclude that the divine esse of the Word itself establishes the real union of the divine 
and the human natures, since by this unitary esse one and the same person is God 
necessarily and also becomes human contingently.  Another way of putting this is to say 
that, since in God to know, will, and exist necessarily, and to know, will, and exist 
contingently are actually one and the same act of knowing, willing, and existing, then it 
must be by the selfsame act of being that the Word is both God of necessity and human 
contingently.  In addition, Lonergan characterizes this unitary act to be at once both the 
intrinsic and the constitutive cause of the Hypostatic Union, the coming together of the 
divine and human natures in the one person of Christ.  It is by becoming human in a 
contingent manner, by virtue of the same act of divine esse by which the Word is God, 
that the assumed humanity begins to exist in a human modality. Thus, the constitutive 
cause of the Hypostatic Union of the Word and the assumed humanity—or the reason 
why the same Word is both God and man—is nothing other than the divine esse of the 
Son, by whose infinite act of existence the Word is both what he is essentially or 
necessarily, and what he becomes in time contingently: the theandric God-man. 
This means that in addition to the eternal and uncreated cause of the Hypostatic 
Union in the divine esse of the Word, there must also be a temporal and created term, 
since what is true of a divine Person ad intra, must have a correlative temporal and 
created term ad extra. For Lonergan, this terminus must be the foundation for the union 
of the assumed humanity with the Word, as a created yet substantial act of existence. 
Moreover, it must be distinct from the uncreated esse of the Son.  In other words, it must 
be received in the human nature in such a way so as to exclude from that assumed 
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humanity its own separate personal existence apart from the Person of the Word. To this 
extent, Lonergan’s understanding of the function of created term is close to de la Taille’s 
concept of created actuation, yet Lonergan goes on to deny that the substantial act of 
Christ’s humanity is necessary for the real existence of that humanity; it is only necessary 
for that humanity to be in a real relation with the person of the Word.312  So, rather than 
actuating any natural potency in the human nature to be assumed by God, Lonergan by 
contrast posits the actuation of a purely obediential potency.  That is, a potency which is 
best characterized as the openness of a created nature to the Creator’s power to effect in it 
something beyond the powers of ordinary natural causes—or, put another way, the very 
being of an existing creature as obedient, subject, or positively ordered to God’s power to 
act in it.  According to Lonergan, it this divine power working upon the obediential 
potency of the assumed human nature which actuates that temporal, created, contingent 
nature in Christ. However, and most importantly, this same obediential actuation prevents 
Christ’s humanity from being a substantial being or a unity in the strict sense, and thus, 
from being a separate person.313  As a result, the Person of the Word is that which is at 
once both God and human, the incarnate God-man. Ontologically speaking, the eternal, 
uncreated act of existence (esse) of the Word is that by which the eternal Word is, as well 
as that by which person of the Word begins to exist in a temporal, contingent, and created 
human manner. For this reason, Lonergan insists that the existence of the humanity must 
be understood as “secondary,” consciously adopting the terminology employed by 
Thomas in the De Unione, a.4, and which Lonergan takes to mean simply as posterior to, 
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consequent upon, or a mere resultant of the union.314 Simply put, there is a logical and 
metaphysical necessity between the constitutive cause of the Hypostatic Union and its 
resulting extrinsic terminus: They are correlatives to each other and indeed inconceivable 
one without the other, but the term is ontologically in no way previous or concomitant to 
the union; rather, it must be seen as exclusively consequent and posterior to the union, to 
the exclusion of any concomitant or previous disposition on the part of the assumed 
humanity. 
This is a definitive rejection of de la Taille’s concept of created actuation, which 
in an important sense does ascribe a concomitant and previous disposition within the 
created nature for the reception of the uncreated Act of being, since, according to de la 
Taille, that act of divine existence does not account for the union, except by being 
communicated to the assumed humanity in a created actuation. In other words, for de la 
Taille, in actualizing a created nature and thereby becoming man, the Word transforms 
that assumed humanity in one all-important respect: its natural act of existence is 
replaced by the created communication of the act of the divine existence—a secondary 
esse, which is not a separate and personal act of existence, but rather an actuation. This is 
quite different from Lonergan’s account, wherein this secondary esse, a substantial act, is 
no less necessary, but only as a term ad extra consequent on the Word becoming united 
to the humanity in a contingent manner. 
 
4. H.-M. Diepen and Jacques Maritain 
 
Herman-Michel Diepen 
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Maurice de la Taille’s and Bernard Lonergan’s analyses of the Hypostatic Union 
can be seen as attempts to develop an explication of Thomas’ incarnational theology that 
moves beyond the received Thomistic tradition that ignored, or at least downplayed 
Aquinas’ speculations about a secondary human act of existence in the enfleshed Word, 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the most widely accepted interpretation of  the 
Angelic Doctor’s position prior to the modern reception of De Unione, a. 4, was 
adumbrated by Thomas Cardinal Cajetan in the sixteenth century, who defended Aquinas 
account in ST III, q. 17, a. 2 as the final word on the subject. In his commentary on this 
article, Cajetan upholds the finality of that position upholding the uniqueness of the 
divine act of existence in Christ by reiterating the distinction that Thomas made in a.2 of 
Question 17 between quod est, or that which has being, and the quo est, or that whereby 
something has being or how something exists.315  Cajetan interprets this distinction to 
mean that the human esse of Christ can only refer to the way that Word comes to live in a 
human manner after it has assumed a human nature—in other words, only to the quo est 
of Christ, for if it referred to a secondary existence quod est, then there would be a 
second separate hypostasis as a result. When he comes to the fourth article of De unione, 
Cajetan will only allow that when Thomas discusses two acts of existence, he is doing so 
solely in regard to the two natures whereby Christ exists quo est. If Aquinas’s discussion 
of a secondary created human esse in the De unione cannot be thus reconciled with 
Thomas’ explication of the one esse in the Summa—as well as in earlier accounts, such as 
the one found in the Quodlibetal Questions—then Cajetan urges that the Disputed 
Question on the Incarnate Word should be dismissed out of hand as a relatively 
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inconsequential or confused early work by Thomas.316 In time, Cajetan’s own explication 
of a one-esse model of the Word’s incarnation became normative in most Thomistic 
circles, at least, as we have seen, until the first half of the twentieth century.   
The historical theologian Dom Herman-Michel Diepen’s initial foray into the 
subject of Christ’s act of existence came in a series of articles that critiqued certain key 
aspects of Cajetan’s consensus position. As we have previously noted, this traditional 
interpretation came to be called the “ecstasy of being” theory  because it posited that 
Christ’s humanity was caught up—assumed by the divine person; raptured in a sense—
and given an act of existence that prevented it from having any independent esse of its 
own. Diepen found this theory highly problematic for a number of reasons. The first and 
perhaps most serious concern is that of pantheism, for even though orthodox Christianity 
affirms that God is intimately present in all things that he creates, the Creator cannot be 
that which he creates. Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy teaches that the act of existence, 
the esse, by which something exists is a constitutive part of that actually existing entity, 
so if the created existence of Christ’s humanity exists only by the divine esse, then the 
divine uncreated Creator problematically becomes a part of that derivatively extant 
creature. Moreover, since an act of existence is determined by the nature in which it 
exists, then not only would the result be a composition of the created and uncreated, but 
in addition that which is created by God would seem to be ontologically determining in 
some manner its divine Creator. The Thomist followers of Cardinal Cajetan’s theory 
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were of course aware of this incipient danger in his theory, a danger that perhaps could be 
at least theoretically avoided if the divine existence were actually not a formal cause of 
the created existence, but rather simply reduced to the latter.317  In fact, avoiding this 
danger was one of the main motivational imperatives of de la Taille’s theory of created 
actuation by uncreated Act, wherein actuation and information do not coincide, so that as 
a result God cannot be said to be dependent on the potency of his creation. But even the 
most ardent proponents of the ecstasy of being theory concede that on the Cajetanian 
account of Christ’s unique esse, the formal cause must indeed be a constitutive element 
of a created being, even though they also insist that the divine act of existence cannot be a 
strictly formal cause, since a formal cause performs two distinct functions, it actuates a 
potency and it unites with it to form a compound substance. However, they will point out, 
an act of existence only fulfils the first function, it draws the essence out of the realm of 
possibilities, and gives it reality—it actuates that thing—but does not thereby inform it. 
In other words, it merely brings it out of non-existent potentiality, but without entering 
into composition with it. 
However, this defense of the “ecstasy of being” theory has at least one fatal flaw, 
for the notion that the divine esse can actuate Christ’s human existence without entering 
into the composition of that created nature contradicts one of the basic tenets of 
Thomistic thought—the real distinction between essence and existence. As Thomas 
consistently explains from even his earliest works, everything has two principles that 
correlatively explicate its being, essence and existence.318  The real distinction between 
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essence and existence is, at its heart, an all-important distinction between what a thing is 
(quid est) and whether a thing is (an est). Since the term essence refers to the definition of 
a thing (essentia), essence therefore refers to the nature of a thing: both eessence and 
nature express the same reality as envisaged from the points of view of being or acting.  
As the essence is that whereby any given thing is that which it is, the ground of its 
characteristics and the principle of its being, so its nature is that whereby it acts as it does; 
or more simply stated, the essence considered as the foundation and principle of an 
entity’s operations. Moreover, in all beings except for God, these principles are both 
equally necessary in order for the actually existing individual thing to be. Each is distinct 
from the other, and this is a real, not merely a logical, distinction, so the fact that 
something has esse, that it actually exists, is a separate question from its essence/nature, 
or what it is. Therefore, there must be something about really existing things that 
accounts for their esse, and it cannot be their essence; in fact, it cannot be anything other 
than their very act of existence. Esse then is that which makes essences to be, to exercise 
the act of existing. In addition, by describing existence as the esse exercised by beings, 
Aquinas understands esse to be comparable to form, in that the act of existence actualizes 
a potency much in the way a form actualizes matter. Hence, just as the substantial form of 
a material being determines and makes actual some part of matter, so esse actualizes the 
potency of a thing’s essence. This similarity is an analogous one because the act of 
existence and the essence of a thing are not separable in actual entities, as the form is 
separable from matter in abstraction; the two are only distinguishable because of their 
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own very real distinction.  In conclusion, for Thomas esse  is indeed a formal cause, 
which not only actuates an essence but also really unites itself to it, composes with it; it is 
a formal cause whose formal effect cannot be distinguished from it; hence it not only 
actuates essence, it is the very actuation of essence itself. 
As a consequence, if the humanity of Christ is not a composite of a created human 
essence/nature and a created human act of existence, but is only an actuated 
essence/nature, then the real distinction between essence and existence has been 
disastrously collapsed. As Dom Diepen clarifies, if Christ’s human nature does not have 
its own act of existence, then it is an essentially imperfect thing, an unactualized potency, 
since essence is related to existence as potency to act.  As a matter of fact, the whole 
purpose of a potency resides in its eventual actualization, and something which is created 
without its actualization being at all possible is to all intents and purposes created in vain. 
However, as Diepen forcefully concludes, God does not create anything in vain.319  To be 
precise, existence itself has no specification apart from its reception and determination in 
the potency with which it unites, thus there is a perfect relation holding between each 
specific esse and essence, so that—as Thomas states—“everything has a specific being 
distinct from all others.”320 But this is exactly what Christ’s created human essence 
/nature lacks, since it is completely devoid of its own proper created act of existence with 
which to unite.  Perhaps most egregiously, this casts into grave doubt whether the Word’s 
assumed nature is a created human nature at all, for the telltale sign of creation is a proper 
act of existence. Again, as Aquinas himself argues, creation is the production of the 
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whole being, but precisely as an existent participating through its limited act of existence 
in the divine esse itself.321 According to this principle, if Christ’s human nature lacks a 
proper act of human existence then it is not created, and if it is not created, then it really 
is not human at all.  On this account, the ecstasy of being theory veers dangerously close 
to a kind of Monophysitism in which Christ’s humanity has no existential reality at all. 
Diepen culminates his critique of the ecstasy of being position with the damning 
judgment that this theory involves itself in extricable difficulties from every point of 
view; the only way out is to abandon altogether the theory of the divine actuation of 
Christ’s human nature by some kind of formal causality, and to return to what Diepen 
will go on to assert was Thomas’ own final thoughts on the matter, contained in De 
unione’s bold assertion that Christ’s humanity has its own proper created act of existence, 
but that this is so integrated, together with the nature which it actuates, that is, into the 
one complex subsistent reality which is the incarnate Son, that it in no way subtracts from 
the profound unicity of the Hypostatic Union. 
Diepen believes that such a position in the only one capable of respecting the 
absolute distinction between Creator and creature, while at the same time maintaining the 
fundamental ontological principles of the real distinction, and thereby safeguarding the 
true mystery of the God-man. Furthermore, Diepen contends that this position must 
follow Thomas’ original intent to integrate the one esse doctrine presented in the Summa 
and various other works, along with a reading of the created human act of existence of 
the De unione which affirms a secondary esse in Christ. As a result, article 4 of the De 
unione is central to Diepen’s Christological project in so far as he holds that this text 
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represents Thomas’ best and most mature formulation of the dual esse question. Along 
with traditional Thomists, Diepen upholds the real distinction between essence and 
existence, yet—against the objections of Cajetan and his followers—he defends Aquinas’ 
later elaboration of  a secondary created act of existence in the enfleshed Word. In fact, 
Diepen goes so far as to assert that this formulation of a secondary esse is simply a 
retrieval by Thomas of the authentic teaching of Cyril of Alexandria’s Christology. And 
in this Thomistic retrieval, Diepen claims, we uncover the somewhat neglected yet most 
profound meaning of the Cyrilline formula ‘from two natures,’ included in the original 
draft of the Council of Chalcedon, but which was excised due to fears that it sounded 
vaguely Monophysite. The redacted Cyrilline phrase only reaffirms that two natures are 
not two separate parts because the divine person is a unity, and so the human nature, 
without conferring anything to the person of the Word regardless of the self-emptying of 
the kenosis, was assumed integrally by the Word.
322
 On Diepen’s account, this is 
precisely the sense that ex duabis naturis had for Cyril, a sense recovered in the sixth 
century, especially in Rome, in the wake of the full reception of the Tome of Leo, in a 
new formula: in and from two natures. In Diepen’s opinion, this understanding of place 
and purpose of the two natures entered the dogmatic decrees of the Latin west, and 
eventually influenced the formulation of Lombard’s second opinion, the Subsistence 
theory of the incarnation. And, Diepen concludes, it was this at times misunderstood 
Cyrilline meaning that was re-discovered and adapted by Thomas in his 
conceptualization of a secondary human esse in his later Christology.323  
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 See Hans Van Loon, The Dyophysite Christology of Cyril of Alexandria, Supplements to 
Vigiliae Christianae 96 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2009), especially pp. 554-569.  
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 “On retrouve ici le sens le plus profound de la formule cyrillienne ex duabus naturis, écartée, 
on le sait, par le concile de Chalcédoine et remplacée par le terme leonine in duabis naturis [On aura noté 
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Diepen is quick to point out that this dual-esse conceptualization does not entail in 
any way the dissolution of Christ’s personal unity, since esse—he explains following 
Aquinas’ argument in De Unione, a. 1, ad 10—is consequent upon nature, or upon that 
whereby a thing is; but rather, it is consequent upon person or hypostasis, as upon that 
which has being. Hence the person of Christ has unity from the oneness of the hypostasis, 
rather than duality from the duality of the natures. Nonetheless, the esse which actualizes 
the human nature is not the act of existence of the divine nature, for the being of the 
person of the Word incarnate is one from the perspective of the person subsisting, but not 
from the perspective of the nature. Yet personal unity is maintained, for if the two 
existences were juxtaposed in the person, and each regarded ontologically equal, any 
substantial unity would no longer be conceivable; that is to say, there would then be two 
separate beings. If the two acts of existence do remain irreducibly distinct, then Diepen 
argues there must be an essential subordination in Christ of the human act of existence 
(the esse of a non-personalized nature) to the divine act of existence of the person of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
en lisant le long passage cité du Compendium, combine soigneusement saint Thomas a su éviter l’abus de 
la formule ex duabis naturis par Eutychès, cause de son éclipse de 451 à la fin du siècle.  Les deux natures 
ne sont pas deux parties. La personne divine est un tout et la nature humaine, sans rien lui conférer (sinon 
l’abaissement de la kénose), entre comme partie dans ce tout, assumée qu’elle est à son intégrité. Mais c’est 
là précisément le sens que l’ex duabis naturis avait chez saint Cyrille, comme on le verra en quelques 
instants], mais reprise universellement dès le VIe siècle, notamment à Rome, dans une nouvelle formule 
synthétique: in duabis et ex duabis naturis. Celle-ci est entrée dans les formulaires dogmatiques et jusque 
dans la formulation de la secunda opinio par Lombard. Son contenu est passé dans la christologie de saint 
Thomas;” Dom H. M. Diepen, O.S.B., La Théologie de l'Emmanuel: Les lignes maîtresses d’une 
christologie, Textes et Etudes théologiques (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1960), p. 152. Diepen will attempt 
to traces a direct line of development backwards to Leo’s Tome and it’s description of a human esse in 
Christ which comes to exist in time:  Mais n’est-ce pas la description même du mystère de l’Incarnation? 
Les formulaires de notre foi ne nous disent pas seulement que la Personne unique du Christ possède deux 
natures et qu’elle est née deux fois, ils ajoutent encore et par suite qu’elle existe deux fois: Ante tempora 
manens, esse coepit ex tempore [Tome of Leo, IV; “Invisible in his own he became visible in ours; 
incomprehensible he willed to be comprehended; remaining before times he began to be in time; the Lord 
of the universe took a servile form, the immensity of his majesty obscured; the impassible God did not 
disdain to be passible man and, immortal, to be subject to mortal laws” (p. 157). See also Diepen’s 
groundbreaking study Aux Origines de l’ Anthropologie de Saint Cyrille d’Alexandrie (Bruges: Desclée de 
Brouwer, 1957) 
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Word. This, Diepen reiterates, is what Aquinas intended when he emphasized the reality 
of the unity of the complete and personal being of Christ. It is a unity, Diepen contends, 
made by exemplarity and participation, by subordination and integration, but for all that 
it, it must still involve a certain duality.324  For Diepen, this is the same duality of natures 
spoken of at Chalcedon, a duality that is not a division or an opposition, but which rather 
signifies that both natures maintain their distinct properties even in the Hypostatic Union, 
so that in the final analysis, invoking Thomas’ own words from De unione, a. 4, ad 1, the 
esse of the human nature is not the divine esse.325    
 
Jacques Maritain 
Jacques Maritain, arguably the most famous lay Thomist philosopher of the 
twentieth-century, caused something of a commotion within the close-knit yet 
contentious world of 1950s French Thomism, as chronicled in the pages of the journal 
Revue Thomiste, when he publicly repudiated his long-standing support for the traditional 
one-esse Christology associated with the ecstasy of being theory—a theory he had been 
defending in print and in public debates for over twenty years—and embraced the notion 
of a secondary created human act of existence in the Incarnate Son.
326
  Maritain credited 
this somewhat notorious volte-face to Herman-Michel Diepen’s critiques of the notion of 
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 Cette unité se realize par participation et exemplarité, par subordination et intégration, mais elle 
comporte nécessairement une certain dualité. Relaté aux deux principes de l’être, cet exister est un être 
double. Ibid, p. 155. 
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 Il s’agit d’une unité réalisée par participation et exemplarité, par subordination et intégration, 
mais elle comporte nécessairement une certaine dualité… C’est la dualité meme des natures dont parle 
Chalcédoine, dualité qui ne fait pas nombres, mais qui signifie que l’une et l’autre gardent leurs 
irréductibles proprieties: “esse humane nature non est esse divine.” Ibid. 
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 This debate is presented with great lucidity in Torrell, Jean-Pierre. “Le thomisme dans le débat 
christologique contemporain,” in Saint Thomas au XXe siècle. Actes du colloque du Centenaire de la Revue 
Thomiste (1893-1992): Toulouse, 25-28 mars 1993, ed. S.-T. Bonino. (Paris: Éditions Saint-Paul, 1994), 
pp. 379-393. 
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the ecstasy of being outlined above; but perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the 
groundwork for this dramatic change had been carefully established in Maritain’s 
decades-long meditation upon the Scholastic concept of subsistence. The earliest stages 
of this meditation can be traced back to 1932, at the conclusion of Les Degrés du Savolr; 
ou Distinguer pour Unir, which laid the foundations for what would become Maritain’s 
own particular strain of existential Thomism, with its focus on the centrality on the act of 
existence.  In subsequent editions, Maritain added a long appendix entitled “On the 
Notion of Subsistence,” wherein he attempted to expand Aquinas’ understanding of 
potency and act by demonstrating their analogous functions in the relation between 
essence and esse.   
As Maritain explained it, an essence remains a pure potentiality in relation to esse; 
or better yet said, essence still needs to appropriate an act of existence for itself in order 
to be actualized, in order to be made actually real.  Essence requires a final ontological 
disposition in order to be terminated, or brought to completion in the order of existence, 
through a process whereby the pure act of being is joined to the essence, and thus 
completed within the order of existence as a particular being. This termination is 
achieved by what came to be known in Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy as subsistence, 
which is neither a constitutive part of the essence itself, nor the actualization of its being 
(for this function is reserved only to esse itself), but is rather that ultimate fulfilment of 
the potential inherent in an essence, and which allows the essence to transition from a 
mere potentiality to a real instantiation. “Subsistence appears as a sort of individuation,” 
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Martian writes, “by whose means the essence, individuated in its own life, appropriates to 
itself alone the existence it receives.”327 
This appendix continued to appear in subsequent editions in its original form until 
1954, when Maritain announced to the world his revised ideas on the notion subsistence, 
along with its groundbreaking implications for his Christology, in a newly added section 
entitled “Further Elucidations.” In this expanded portion of the appendix, Maritain once 
again returns to the fundamental insight that essence is in potentiality in relation to the 
actuality of the esse or act of existence. Indeed, Martian reasons, perhaps the best way to 
see what the concept of esse may mean, is to see it precisely as an “exercised act;” or 
better yet, “an activity in which the existent, itself, is engaged,” by way of the actualizing 
“energy that it exerts” upon essence.328  From this newly clarified conceptual vantage 
point, Maritain goes on to argue that essence, rather than merely needing subsistence in 
order to receive a delimiting form of existence, in point of fact requires subsistence in 
order to exercise the act of existence that it receives from esse: “essence, or nature can 
receive existence only by exercising it.”329 So, the specific function of subsistence is to 
allow essence to transition into the existential order since essence is best understood as a 
“kind of ultimate disposition for the exercise of esse.”330 This is the case because the act 
of existence is not received by the “essence as in a pre-existing subject which would thus 
already be an existential act. The essence which receives existence holds from it – in 
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 Jacques Maritain, Distinguish To Unite or The Degrees of Knowledge, trans. G. Phelan (New 
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1959), p. 433. 
328
 Ibid, p. 436. 
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 Ibid, p. 437. 
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what concerns the existential order – absolutely all its actuality, in short is nothing 
without it.”331 
Having elucidated the role of subsistence in relation to esse, Maritain is now 
ready to apply it to the vexing question of the esse of the enfleshed Word. In his first 
version of the appendix, while still convinced of the veracity of the older understanding 
of subsistence as merely the termination of essence in the act of existence, Maritain could 
easily dovetail this metaphysical notion with the traditional Cajetanian-inspired account 
of the primary divine subsistence of the Son as that which terminated the assumed human 
nature of Christ in the divine act of existence, without however giving that humanity the 
sort of independent subsistence that would render it a separate human hypostasis.  In 
other words, an assumed and hypostatically united human nature which only “subsists 
and exists by the divine subsistence and the divine existence.”332  At this juncture, when 
he raises the subject of Christ’s human existence, Maritain cites Diepen’s work as the 
immediate source of his change of mind, and invokes the example of the  Disputed 
Question on the Incarnate Word—a text which Maritain had previously considered of 
dubious value—with evident approval. In particular, Maritain now embraces the notion 
of a secondary created human esse in Christ, one that does not threaten to supplant in any 
way the Word’s primary divine personal esse, but could best be described as a “simple, 
temporal and created echo… of his uncreated personal existence.”333 What exactly does 
Maritain mean by this somewhat ambiguous phrase? As Maritain proceeds to elucidate, 
this means that the incarnate Christ must exist in a human manner, but in such a way that 
his humanity is precluded from having a purely human subsistence, for this esse is 
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received in the human nature, yet exercised by an un-created divine hypostasis (the 
Word) which pre-exists this created act of existence, and towards whose being as a divine 
person it in no way contributes. This observation, however, raises a further question in 
Maritain’s mind:  
Does St. Thomas’ teaching on this point indicate that the uncreated 
subsistence acts as subsistence for the human nature by divinely 
conferring on it the completion which created subsistence, of which this 
nature is deprived, would confer on it? Or does it indicate that the 
uncreated subsistence renders useless the human nature’s being perfected 
or completed by such a completion? For our part, we believe that it is the 
second interpretation that is better founded. In other words, a human 
nature, on which this mode or state in which subsistence consists is not at 
all conferred, is assumed, possessed and used by the eternally subsisting 
Person of the Word.334 
 
In other words, the Son’s divine existence does not render the assumed human nature 
subsistent, rather “it dispenses it from subsisting, or from being itself achieved and 
completed by that mode or state in which subsistence consists.”335 
Maritain concludes his thesis by affirming that “in Christ the Person, who is 
Divine, lives and acts at once in two totally distinct orders;” on the one hand, because “in 
virtue of the Divine Nature with which it is identical,” and on the other hand, “in virtue of 
the human nature which it has assumed”—hence it is “by His humanity, or always 
humanly, always by the exercise of His human operations” utilized instrumentally by the 
divinity, “that the Son of God has accomplished everything He did here below, has 
spoken, acted, suffered, accomplished His divine mission.”336 This solution elegantly 
avoids the great danger of imparting to the human nature of the Son the sort of separate 
subsistence that would result in a second, created hypostasis alongside the divine person. 
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Nevertheless, if the function of subsistence is to allow an essence to exercise existence, 
then how can we simultaneously affirm that Christ has a human act of existence, if we 
also posit that Christ’s human nature does not subsist in a human manner? Maritain’s 
revised appendix leaves this perplexing question unresolved. 
 
5. Richard Cross and Thomas Weinandy 
Richard Cross 
 
One of the most vocal critics of the Thomas’ view of the Hypostatic Union, and 
indeed of the entire Thomistic project insofar as it treats of the incarnation, in both its 
pro- and anti-ecstasy of being manifestations, is Richard Cross.337 For Cross, the crux of 
the problem is Thomas’s consistent appeal, except in the seemingly eccentric De unione, 
to an incarnational model based primarily upon the relation of a whole substance to its 
parts. To Cross’ consternations, in this whole-part model Aquinas “argues that the 
concrete parts of a substance do not in any sense contribute existence to a substance,” 
rather the parts share in the individual substance’s existence.338  As Cross explains, for 
Aquinas the “relation of the human nature to the divine person is like this. The human 
nature shares in the existence of the divine person; it does this by having the same sort of 
relation to the divine person as a concrete part has to its substance.”339 The fundamental 
problem with the whole-part relation as an analogy for the incarnation, as Cross sees it, is 
that in his estimation concrete parts have to be either essential or accidental. If they are 
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essential, then it makes sense to claim that they share in the substantial existence of a 
substance.”340  Cross finds this account especially objectionable: “in this case the analogy 
of concrete parts and substance cannot be a good one for the hypostatic union, because it 
would entail that the human nature is an essential property of the divine person, which 
would be a version of the monophysite heresy.”341 Looking at the De unione, however, 
Cross finds Thomas defending a completely different view of the incarnation, one that in 
his opinion “rejects” the whole-part analogy.342 By speaking of the esse secundarium in 
article 4, Cross maintains that De unione avoids the pitfalls of the one-esse model found 
in Thomas’ other works. The all-important difference between De unione and Aquinas’ 
other works “lies in his abandoning the claim that the human nature is a truth-maker 
precisely in virtue of its sharing in the esse of the suppositum,” by which Cross means 
that according to this account the esse secundarium, Christ’s human nature, does in fact 
communicate some sort of esse, a secondary, created act of existence, to its suppositum, 
the person of the Word.343 
Does Cross’ claim, that by esse secundarium Aquinas intends to affirm an esse-
communicating status to Christ’s human nature, square with what Thomas says regarding 
the Hypostatic Union in the rest of De unione? If Christ’s human nature exists such that it 
contributes an act of existence to its suppositum, as Cross claims, it is unclear how this 
could be reconciled with Aquinas’ clear teaching in article 3 that Christ is one thing 
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simpliciter. In article 3 Aquinas explains that “something is said to be such a thing 
simpliciter and in the proper sense when it is such a thing according to itself.”344  On 
Cross’s account, however, the Word is said to be man, not vis-à-vis that nature as quo est, 
but in regard to the esse that the human nature communicates to the Word. Moreover, in 
the same article of the De unione Thomas asserts that since Christ is one suppositum 
possessing two natures, then it must follows that he is one simpliciter and two in a certain 
respect.345 If Christ is one thing simpliciter but two in a certain respect according to the 
natures, and being one thing simpliciter is indicated when something is such a thing 
according to itself  (quod est secundum seipsum tale),  then Cross’s interpretation of the 
esse secundarium is problematic. Even more telling,  in article 4, in the passage prior to 
the introduction of esse secundarium, Aquinas states clearly that in Christ the subsisting 
suppositum is the person of the Word, who is sustained simpliciter by the divine nature; 
however, the suppositum of the person of the Word is not sustained by the human nature.  
In fact, the person of the Son “was not in any way augmented or perfected by the 
assumed human nature,” rather the “eternal suppositum is sustained by the human nature 
in so far as it is this man.”346 In addition, Thomas prefaces the passage that introduces the 
esse secundarium by drawing a direct parallel between Christ’s unity simpliciter and his 
esse simpliciter: “just as Christ is one simpliciter on account of the unity of the 
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 De unione, a.3, sc: Sed considerandum est, quid horum dicatur simpliciter, et quid secundum 
quid. Sciendum est ergo, quod simpliciter et proprie dicitur aliquid esse tale, quod est secundum seipsum 
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suppositum and two in a certain respect on account of the two natures, likewise he has 
one being simpliciter on account of the one eternal being of the eternal suppositum.”347 
According to Cross, Aquinas intends to affirm that the human nature contributes a 
secondary act of existence to the suppositum, but Aquinas asserts the exact opposite: that 
as a direct consequence of Christ’s numerical unity, there is necessarily only one esse 
simpliciter of the suppositum of the enfleshed Word.  In the end, Cross’s narrowly 
focused reading of the esse secundarium in article 4 cannot be defended in light of how 
this passage stands within the broader context of De unione as a whole. 
At least part of Cross’ confusion may reside in the fact that he propounds a 
conception of subsistence  that seems quite at odds with the way that Aquinas and various 
other medieval thinkers had come to understand this term. Subsistence, for medieval 
thinkers was generally a term used to indicate a sort of quasi-existence that is not the real 
act of existence of individual substances. This usage of the term can be traced back to an 
Aristotelian position that in the category of relation the relata are—strictly speaking—not 
the individual substances themselves, but rather certain non-substantial attributes of 
individual substances.348 Hence, subsistence came to signify the sort of existence such 
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relations had, and the same notion came to be applied also to universals or quiddities that 
had some sort of objective reality independent from the things in which they were 
instantiated, yet nonetheless did not exist substantially as independent entities. In other 
words, these quiddities in themselves ‘subsist’ but do not ‘exist’.349  This use of 
‘subsistence’ became yet more pronounced in dealing with the subject of the Trinity, 
where we have three divine Persons distinguished by relations like paternity, filiation, 
and spiration—the irreducible personal distinctions which distinguish the Persons—while 
nevertheless remaining only one Godin essence. So, to take just one example, for the 
Cappadocians a divine Person has subsistence but not existence (huparxis; esse) as a 
separately existing individual, a potion which avoid the ever-present Trinitarian danger of 
polytheism.350  However, in his analysis of what he takes to be Thomas’ paradigmatic 
whole-part model of the Hypostatic Union, Cross consistently refers to the type of 
existence in re peculiar to substances as ‘subsistence,’ completely ignoring the fact that 
for the most part the relational understanding of subsistence remains I play for Thomas 
and his contemporaries, and in in the process confusingly collapsing various conceptions 
of ‘existence’ that Aquinas and many other medievals were at pains to keep apart. Indeed, 
Cross tends to conflate subsistence with the act of existence (esse), and then think of this 
‘subsistence’ (that is, esse), as a thing or a metaphysical part that can be added to a 
nature.  But, as Maritain pointed out, and Cross fails to acknowledge, the act of existence, 
the esse, is a way in which natures are or exist, not a constitutive part of the nature, and 
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thus subsistence cannot be the act of existence simpliciter, but that which terminates a 
potential nature in a particular actuality, or—at most—that which allows an essence to 
exercise the act of existence that it receives from esse. 
In contrast to this ultimately misrepresentative account of Thomistic subsistence 
as simply identical to the act of existence, Cross expounds upon what he refers to as the 
“negation theory of subsistence,” which he claims to find in a fairly inchoate form in the 
work of several thirteenth-century thinkers, such as Peter John Olivi, Godfrey of 
Fontaines, and Hervaeus Natalis. In general terms, negation theories of subsistence argue 
against two different sorts of subsistence theories: “those that explain subsistence by 
appealing to some sort of relation added to a nature, and those that explain subsistence by 
appealing to some sort of non-relational entity added to nature,” which, according to 
Cross, would include Thomas’ whole-part account of esse.351 When these theories are 
used within a Christological context, there is no appeal to some sort of “positive” 
metaphysical concept, such as Aquinas’ act of existence, which accounts for a human 
being’s subsistence. Rather subsistence is merely accounted for by something negative, in 
this case a human nature not being assumed by the Word. Hence the purported 
importance of the negative theory for the incarnation: All human natures possess the 
passive potency of being assumed, but only Christ’s actually was, so it is only because all 
other human natures were not assumed that they exist as who they are. The upshot is that 
such a theory allows the human nature of Christ to be independent and concrete in that it 
can exist apart from the Word, and yet is now assumed by the Word and so is in fact the 
humanity through which the Son subsists humanly. 
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Cross locates the most advanced and potent articulation of the negation theory in 
Duns Scotus, who argued against the danger of adopting a Thomistic model wherein 
subsistence is explained by the presence of a positive feature over and above nature, for if 
this is granted, then on this account Christ’s human nature is given existence wholly 
through the divine esse, and therefore fails to be a subsistent entity. As Scotus warns us, 
this is theologically disastrous, using as example the work of John of Damascus, who 
echoed Gregory of Nazienzen’s venerable soteriological principle when he wrote that 
what cannot be assumed cannot be healed.
352
 Thus, if there were a feature of human 
existence that could not be assumed, then of necessity this particular characteristic of 
human existence would be excluded from redemption. Not only is this position 
theologically insalubrious, Scotus argues, but it is also philosophically undesirable. As 
Cross explains, “On the face of it, every created entity is equally susceptible of hypostatic 
dependence on the divine person,” however, no positive feature “explanatorily sufficient 
for subsistence could hypostatically depend on the divine person. (If it did so depend, it 
would be both, by definition, a subsistent (or a property of a subsistent) and, as 
dependent, a non-subsistent (or a property as a non-subsistent).”353 But, as this is in fact 
contradictory, Scotus will argue that there can be no positive ontological feature 
explanatorily sufficient for the reality of subsistence. Rather, Scotus accepts that a 
suppositum, or an independently existing substance of a rational nature, must satisfy two 
conditions. “For a nature to subsist—for it to be a suppositum—it must not only be 
factually independent, it must have a natural inclination for independence.”354  Or, as 
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Scotus will describe it, it must be independent unless it is otherwise prevented.355 Why 
should Scotus believe that every created nature has a passive potency for assumption? 
The reason is that an ontological impediment to assumption could only result from the 
presence of some sort of positive entity explaining subsistence. The lack of a passive 
potency must be the result of the way something is, not the way it is not. Thus, Scotus’ 
negation theory entails that independence cannot be a necessary feature of a created 
nature. On Scotus’ negation theory, independence is not some sort of positive feature of a 
nature. Neither does it result from any such feature. So nothing about independence 
entails that a nature lacks a potency for dependence.356   
So, even though subsistence is only a negative capability, for Scotus there must 
nevertheless be two ways in which the enfleshed Word lives in the world. Scotus is lead 
to the position that each nature in Christ must have a two-fold act of existence or duplex-
esse, something that is obvious from the fact that Christ lost one of his modes of existing 
upon his death at Golgotha, which indicates the Christ existed not only divinely through 
his divine nature, but also humanly by means of his human nature. However, Scotus 
rejects Aquinas’ whole-parts model, which means that “Christ exists formaliter by his 
assumed nature”—by this Scotus means that the Word’s humanity is related to him not as 
a part to a whole, and thus must relate instead either as an accident is related to a 
substance or as a nature relates to a suppositum.
357
 Along with Thomas, Scotus will argue 
that Christ’s assumed humanity does not exist as an accidental manner as contingent or 
transitory property, there indicating that Christ’s assumed human nature is truly related to 
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the suppositum of the Word. Indeed, Scotus will go so far as to claim that based on this 
relationship the Word exists simpliciter through the existence of the human nature, which 
is another way of saying that the Word’s humanity, the assumed nature, has its own 
existence. Consequently, Scotus also says that Christ, the person, exists simpliciter by 
virtue of the assumed human nature. By claiming that Christ has existence simpliciter in 
virtue of his human nature, Scotus obviously wants to emphasize the fact that the Word’s 
human existence is not a merely accidental one. Hence, Christ’s human existence is truly 
substantial, despite the fact that it does not have subsistence. This is precisely the aspect 
of Scotus’ incarnational model that appeals to Cross, since it seems to bypass what he 
takes to be the inherent problems of Thomas’ one-esse, whole-parts formulation of the 
Hypostatic Union. Yet, if the incarnate Word’s human nature has its own existence, an 
existence that is an existence in Christ, then the nature might seem to be a person—but 
this would mean that there are two persons in Christ, in which case Scotus would be 
guilty of Nestorianism. 
Scotus attempts to avoid this problem by affirming that there is one subsisting 
existence in the incarnate Word just as there is only one suppositum or person, so that 
“this nature . . . necessarily has its own proper actual existence ... but it does not have a 
proper existence of subsistence.”358 Again, while avowing that the assumed human nature 
of Christ exists, nevertheless denies once more that the humanity of Christ subsists. On 
this account, at least in Scotus’ own mind, the duplex-esse model of the Hypostatic Union 
appears to avoid the charge of Nestorianism. However, there still remains the question of 
the esse of the person, which Scotus argues is the esse not only in Christ but of Christ, 
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since he claims that Christ exists simpliciter by virtue of his human nature. The worry, in 
sum, would appear to be as follows: “Let us grant that Christ exists in two ways, as God 
and as man, and let us then accept that as long as we speak carefully”, it is right to say 
that Christ has a two-fold existence. Still, according to this criticism, “Scotus way of 
affirming the twofold existence is dangerous or worse,” for he says that “Christ not only 
has his divine existence simpliciter but also his human existence simpliciter,” and this is 
not compatible with Christ’s being just one person or suppositum.359 Despite Scotus’ best 
efforts, it appears that his model can only result in a position very much akin to that of 
Nestorius.360 
Irregardless of these worries, Cross still believes that a Christology based at least 
partially on Scotus’ insights may be a way to get beyond the unworkable incarnational 
model as traditionally understood in the Thomist tradition. According to Cross, a 
modified Scotus-style conceptualization of the Hypostatic Union would begin from the 
premise that the assumed humanity of Christ as, at least in some sense, a substance—a 
bearer of properties and accidents albeit not an ultimate subject of properties and 
accidents, some of whose properties are also properties of the Word. For Cross, the great 
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advantage of this model is that it “relies on the view that the Word and his individual 
human nature are two overlapping individuals,” a view that “entails the non-identity of 
Christ and the Word.”361 On this account, one can locate a subject for properties had by 
Christ that are incompatible with properties necessarily had by the Word, such as Christ’s 
human physical limitations over against the limitless divine omnipotence residing in the 
Word.  In effect, Cross sees this as a more plausible way of accounting for the 
communication of incommensurable idioms in the enfleshed God-man. Cross goes so far 
as to argue that it may be best to posit two distinct centers of consciousness in the 
Hypostatic Union, one human the other divine, in order to account for the Word’s two 
modes of knowing and willing. Of course, Cross concedes that all this “might seem 
absurdly Nestorian, to compromise irreparably the unity of person in the incarnate 
Christ’” after all, this account is broadly Scotistic in its sympathies, “small wonder, a 
reader may be thinking, that Scotus has always been suspected of Nestorianism.” 
Nevertheless, Cross dismisses this concern, since both he and Scotus insist that in such a 
model there is only one person the Word, and that the human nature is something like a 
property of this person. Thus, claiming that “this property might be an individual 
substance—even one which has some properties of its own over and above relational 
ones such as being assumed—does not entail Nestorianism, provided that the nature is a 
property of the Word’s.”362 
 
Thomas Weinandy 
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If Richard Cross is one of the most severe detractors of what he takes to be the 
fatal shortcomings of the traditional Thomistic understanding of the Hypostatic Union, 
then Thomas Weinandy may be one of the most ardent contemporary defenders and 
expositors of Aquinas’s incarnational theology, and—perhaps unsurprisingly—also one 
of Cross’ most trenchant critics. In Weinandy’s estimation Cross’ analysis fails to grasp a 
number of important elements of Aquinas’ understanding of the incarnation. First, 
Weinandy argues, Aquinas clearly did not hold a whole-part model for the Hypostatic 
Union as Cross delineates it, as if the humanity were an individual, discrete ontological 
‘part’ that came to exist as part of and within the larger whole of the divine person. If this 
were an accurate account of Thomas’ incarnational theology, then Weinandy agrees that 
Cross’ critiques would be valid, since this would make Aquinas an adherent of 
Monophysitism. However, this is a serious misinterpretation, since what Thomas actually 
wanted to uphold, Weinandy will forcefully argue, were three interrelated incarnational 
truths: that it is truly the Son of God who is man; that it is truly man that the Son of God 
is; and that the Son of God truly is man.363 According to Weinandy, these three basic 
Christological claims can only be upheld if we understand that for Aquinas the assumed 
humanity of Christ simultaneously both comes to exist, and is hypostatically (and so 
ontologically) united to the person of the Word in such a way that the Word actually 
comes to exist as man—the result (what Lonergan referred to as the terminus) of this 
incarnational coming to be must be that the Son is man. However, the Son does not come 
to be a new person; that is, no new personal esse comes to the Son. What is new is that an 
“authentic humanity does actually come to exist, but it does so only as it is united to the 
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person of the Son, thus allowing the person of the Son to exist newly as man” . . . the 
incarnational act “by which the humanity is united hypostatically to the Son is the very 
same act that guarantees that the Son is actually man.”364 In addition, in opposition to 
Cross, Weinandy argue that Aquinas does allow for a sort of twofold esse in Christ. 
Taking his lead from the De unione, Weinandy contends that in Thomas the incarnate 
Christ is one being due to the uncreated and eternal esse of the Word, but he is one only 
because the created esse, the real relational effect in the humanity, comes to be and is 
united to the Son in such a way that the Word actually subsists as man. However, in 
contrast to Cross, Weinandy asserts that this union with the divine Person does not 
jeopardize the reality of Christ’s humanity. As a matter of fact, it ensures that the reality 
of  the assumed humanity is so united to the Word that the Word does actually come to 
exist in a genuinely human way. 
Weinandy is notable among contemporary followers of Thomas for his robust 
defense of the orthodoxy of the esse secundarium. In his discussion of Aquinas’ theology 
and metaphysics of the incarnation, Weinandy readily acknowledges that in all of his 
writings on Christ’s esse, save for the De unione, Aquinas defended an explicit single-
esse understanding of Christ. So the two-esse position of article 4 of the Disputed 
Question “may appear to be a contradiction,” yet Weinandy asserts that Aquinas 
nonetheless “implicitly held two esse from the start . . . but only explicitly stated this 
position on the one occasion in the De unione Verbi Incarnati.”365 If this were not the 
case, if Thomas had indeed advocated a one-esse position as it has come to be traditional 
understood within Thomism “that Christ possessed only one esse and that uncreated,” 
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then Thomas “was a Monophysite.”366 Weinandy believes that the doctrines of 
Chalcedonian Christology when properly understood dictate the reality of a secondary 
human act of existence in the Hypostatic Union. “Jesus is one being/reality and the one 
being/reality he is the Son of God incarnate,” moreover what “establishes the one 
being/reality of Jesus is the esse personale of the Son,” for it is precisely by Christ’s 
humanity being assumed and united to the Son’s esse personale “that the Son actually 
comes to exist as man and so is man”. .  .and this position, in Weinandy’s mind “demands 
that Christ also possess a created esse.”367   
If there were but one divine act of existence in Christ, Weinandy argues that this 
would cause Christ’s humanity to be “divinized” in a manner that would absorb the 
assumed human nature and abrogate its authentic humanness. Weinandy reminds us that 
Aquinas categorically stated that the “being of the human nature is not the being of the 
divine nature.”368  So, if the esse of the humanity's existence were simply the divine 
uncreated esse of the Son, then that humanity would not be truly divinized in the sense of 
it becoming perfectly human within its relationship with the Word, and thereby acquiring 
divine qualities and virtues in a human manner. Rather such divinization would demand 
that the humanity actually be subsumed and so exist within the very divine esse, similar 
to an accident, such as whiteness, existing within a substance, for example Socrates.  As a 
result, we would “once more be within the realm of the monophysite tertium quid.”369 
In stark contrast to this sort of ‘ecstasy of being’ single-esse theory, Weinandy 
argues that “if the Son of God actually did assume the substantial nature of the manhood 
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and so come to exist as an authentic man, then the authenticity of that substantial 
manhood demands a human created esse.”370  On this account, then, the secondary created 
act of existence in De unione is nothing more than Thomas’ “attempt at saying both what 
it is not—neither an accidental esse nor a principal esse, and also positively what it is—a 
substantial esse that is such only in that it is in ontological union with the Son.”371 As 
Weinandy is at pains to point out, if the Word actually did assume the substantial nature 
of manhood and so come to exist as an actual man, then the authenticity of that manhood 
demands nothing less than a human created esse. As Thomas maintained even from his 
earliest works, Weinandy adds, the divine nature and the human nature are each a being 
in act.372 So, while the assumed humanity only exists within its ontological union with the 
Word, thus making Jesus one reality, yet that humanity’s existence is a created act of 
existence in that it has come to be. The humanity is in act (exists) as a man and thus its 
act is human. As Weinandy concludes, if Christ’s humanity lacked a finite human created 
esse, it would simply not exist, since it only is (that is, exists) because it has been created.  
According to Weinandy, this is the key to understanding why in De unione 
Thomas insists that this created human esse is neither an accidental nor a primary act of 
being, but rather a secondary esse. “The created esse,” Weinandy explains, “is more than 
accidental because the humanity is an authentic substance in its own right (manhood), 
and thus possesses its own integral created human esse.”373 Yet the created human act of 
existence is not the principal esse of the incarnate Son, since the assumed humanity does 
not exist independently of the Word as a separate suppositum, i.e., as a substantial person 
                                                          
370
 Ibid.  
371
 Ibid. p. 82.  
372
 III Sent. 5.1.2. Divina autem natura et humana est ens actu. 
373
 Weinandy, “Aquinas: God IS Man,” p. 82.  
222 
 
 
or hypostasis in its own right. The human act of existence is a substantial esse only 
insofar as it is ontologically united with the divine person of the Son. The created esse is 
wholly dependent upon the uncreated esse of the Word for its very being. For all that, 
there is a certain ambiguity to Weinandy’s claim that Christ’s secondary esse is a 
substantial existence. Even taking into account that this is a unique manifestation of esse, 
one limited solely to the assumed humanity within the Hypostatic Union, nevertheless 
Aquinas is quite firm in his position that “existence is twofold: one is essential existence 
or the substantial existence of a thing, for example man exists, and this is existence 
simpliciter. The other is accidental existence, for example man is white, and this is 
existence secundum quid.”374  So, while on this account Christ’s human esse is positively 
not of the accidental or secundum quid variety, it would seem that in his defense 
Weinandy may be stretching the concept of substance beyond the breaking point when he 
claims that the assumed humanity’s created esse as postulated in De unione, a. 4 is a 
“substantial manhood” or “substantial esse.” In point of fact, nowhere in this Disputed 
Question does Aquinas refer to the secondary act of existence in these terms, let alone as 
the existence of the incarnate Word simpliciter.   
 
6. Klaus Obenauer and John Tomarchio 
Klaus Obenauer 
For the contemporary Thomist scholar Klaus Obenauer, the application of the 
divine esse to Christ’s human nature has to be made without positing a distinction 
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between the Word’s subsistence and esse or act of substantial existence. So, when it 
comes to the issue of whether there may be a second substantial esse, as Weinandy would 
have it, in addition to the divine personal act of existence, Obenauer is very clear that 
insofar as this secondary mode of being only refers to the Word’s authentically human 
life, then it is acceptable. Nonetheless, Obenauer adds the proviso that this second esse 
must not differ numerically from the one personal divine act of existence. In this way, 
Obenauer will concede a certain similarity between his position and the incarnational 
theory propounded by Maurice De la Taille and earlier critics of the ‘ecstasy of being’ 
model of the Hypostatic Union.  
Obenauer commences his extensive analysis of De unione, a.4 with the 
observation that the human nature of Christ, even as a singular occurrence of the human 
mode or type of being in the world, is exclusively the substantial ‘whereby something is,’ 
in contradistinction to the divine hypostasis of the Word and its corresponding quod est, 
or ‘that which is.’ In other words, the human nature assumed by Christ is, as such, a 
singular occurrence, inasmuch as the hypostasis of the Word subsists according to it and 
in it; or, in other words, the incarnated Son is precisely determined—is subsistent—by 
means of this unique event. To put it simply, the Word is human in exactly this singular 
manner.
375
 So, we can, Obenauer concedes, say in a certain sense that in Christ there are 
two irreducibly distinct things, namely the uniquely self-subsistent divine nature, 
alongside the human nature by which the Words begins to exist humanly. Yet these are 
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not two ontological individuals (supposita) that have independent existences apart from 
each other, for it is the person or hypostasis of Christ himself who is the substantial 
individual possessing ontological independence, not each of his distinct natures. As 
Obenauer reminds us, in Christ there are diverse individual things or particulars, but we 
cannot say that Christ is several individuals or several individual things or particulars. 
The ultimate ontic independence of the hypostasis or person of the Word remains 
absolute.
376
    
This question regarding the ontological status of the human nature in relation to 
the person of Christ, whether it merely indicates a manner in which the hypostasis of the 
Word, with its act of existence also subsists humanly, or whether the secondary esse 
associated with the assumed human nature is a distinct and separate substantiation of the 
person of the Word, this time as human, is of great importance for Obenauer because of 
what recent work on the critical text of De unione has revealed. The manuscript sources 
used in all printed versions of this Disputed Question have almost invariably presented a 
crucial portion of the main response of De union, a. 4 as “In Christo autem suppositum 
subsistens est persona Filii Dei, quae simpliciter substantificatur per naturam divinam, 
non autem simpliciter substantificatur per naturam humanam. Quia persona Filii Dei fuit 
ante humanitatem assumptam, nec in aliquo persona est augmentata, seu perfectior, per 
naturam humanam assumptam,” and conclude with the words “substantificatur autem 
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suppositum aeternum per naturam humanam, in quantum est hic homo.”377 However, in 
consultation with Walter Senner, O.P. and other members the Leonine Commission who 
are responsible for establishing a critical edition of De unione, Obenauer has now been 
able to establish that an older manuscript tradition attests to the widespread use of 
“sustentificare” rather than the later variant of “substantificare” in this important 
passage.
378
 What are we to make of this difference?   
As Obenauer tells us, there is only one other significant use of the term 
sustentificare in Aquinas, in Quodlibetal Question III, q. 2, a. 2, arg. 1 and ad. 1, a 
significantly earlier work than the Disputed Question. The topic being debated in this 
portion of Quodlibetal III raises the question of the substantial existence and unity of the 
incarnate Word after the crucifixion, particularly as it relates to the body of Christ after 
death. According to Aquinas, it seems that we must affirm that the body of Christ and any 
of its parts are “sustentificatum mansit per hypostasim Dei Verbi,” thus we must 
conclude that even after death of the body and its parts, the substance of Christ remains 
numerically one in accordance with the oneness of the hypostasis or the supposit, which 
is the Person of the Word. This line of argument strongly suggests that in this passage the 
term “sustentificare” means to constitute something to an ontologically substantial 
manner. In other words, here “sustentificare” is merely another way of indicating 
“substantificare,” and this variant use is indeed found in several other extant manuscripts 
of Quodlibetal III, q. 2, a. 2, arg. 1.
379
 Thomas’ subsequent reply to the objection seems 
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to corroborate this dual-variant use of the term when he explains that substance can be 
predicated in two ways. Sometimes it is taken for the hypostasis, and so it is true that 
Christ’s body remained sustentificare from the hypostasis of the Word of God, so it is 
undoubtedly true that death did not dissolve the union of the Word nor the soul nor the 
body, and so there remains the same numerical identity according to the hypostasis of the 
body.  It can also be taken for the essence or nature of the substance, or that by which a 
substance is this particular substance and no other; and so the body of Christ is made real 
through the soul as it was by its form, but not by the Word, because the Word is not 
united to the body as its form. Neither does it follow that it was a union of God and man 
in the nature, thus Christ’s human body continues to subsist as the body of the Word, in 
accordance with the substance of the hypostasis of the Word, even after death.
380
 The 
point to be taken from this line of reasoning is that for Thomas , at least in this period of 
his work, the indicated meaning of the two terms is perhaps best understood as “to 
constitute as a substantial whole,” and that this substantiation is primarily seen as the 
constitutive function of the being of the hypostasis. 
However, Obenauer speculates that the use of this same term, sustentificare, may 
be notably different in the De unione. He begins by asking what could be the sense of this 
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rather cumbersome word “sustentificare” for Thomas. Obenauer posits that use of this 
term could be explained by the fact that Aquinas wants to name the function of the 
assumed nature in terms of substantially having being, without, however, referring back 
to the terminology of “being,” because that language is to be reserved for the act of 
existence. Seen from this vantage point, our “sustentificare” may be a way of beginning 
to distinguishing what constitutes being at the substantial level, as distinct from what 
constitutes being only at the accidental level.  When it comes to the Hypostatic Union, 
that suppositum is referred to as that which is subsisting, yet the mode of subsisting for 
the Son of Man and the Son of God is different. Therefore in the enfleshed Word they are 
one suppositum and yet the difference remains, and so in a real sense Christ is not one but 
two. Nevertheless, just as it is not necessary that as a consequence of this difference that 
Christ be “two sons,” simply on account of the fact that in one way he was born from the 
Father and in another way from his human mother; so also, it is not necessary that he be 
two according to the suppositum, on account of a different manner of subsisting by which 
he subsists insofar as he is God and insofar as he is man. As God and as human, in 
accordance with each distinct nature, Christ subsists by virtue of the respective modalities 
of subsistence. Having being is thus the substantifying function of the two natures of the 
divine person of the Son; simply put, he is substantified simpliciter by the divine nature, 
but only as regards his mode of living as this man in the world is he substantified by 
means of  the human nature.
381
 
                                                          
381
 “Entsprechend der präliminarisch erläuterten konstitutiven Funktion der Form in bezug auf die, 
gerade auch substantiale, Seinshabe wird also die “sustentifikative” Funktion der beiden Naturen für die 
göttliche Person des Sohnes ins Spiel gebracht: einfachhin wird er durch die göttliche Natur 
‘sustentifiziert,’ nicht einfachhin, sondern nur als dieser Mensch durch die menschliche Natur 
“sustentifiziert;” Obenauer, Über die Union, p. 373.   
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However, as Obenauer is careful to point out, it is not possible for the human 
nature of Christ to be granted the constitutive function of substantiality in the same way 
that this constitutive function is granted to being simpliciter. The human nature 
constitutes a divine Person, not simply, but only insofar as the hypostasis is denominated 
from such a nature. For human nature does not make the Son of Man to be simpliciter, 
since He is from all eternity, but only came to be man in time.  Obenauer does not deny 
that the assumed human nature has a significance for the hypostasis precisely as 
hypostasis, namely as the enfleshed Word subsists in the human nature. Substance in the 
fullest sense cannot be predicated of created human nature, but only to the supposit, in 
this case Christ, the nature-bearing divine person.
382
  Christ has only one act of being 
simpliciter because of the eternal esse of the pre-existent suppositum; which is not to 
deny that there is indeed another form of being that is accrued to this suppositum, i.e. not 
to that extent that the Word exists eternally, but only insofar as it became human in time. 
So, for Thomas, the Word has a single-esse according to that singular act of existence 
which is due to the unity of the supposit; and the Word also has a certain duality of esse, 
an act of existence in accord with each of the distinct natures.383  
As Obenauer points out, in De unione a. 4, Thomas makes the principle of unity 
or plurality of being strongly correlated to the unity or plurality of natural forms, whether 
                                                          
382
 “Die menschliche Natur hat (wiees auch immer mit dem “simpliciter” bestellt sein mag) 
bedeutung für die Hypostase als Hypostase, nämlich als in der menschlichen Natur subsistierende. 
Überdies ist besagte Wendung im Unterschied zu den umgekehrten Wendungen subsistenztheoretisch 
markant formuliert: Substanz im vollsten Sinne (erste Substanz) ist nicht die (menschliche) Natur, sondern 
das Suppositum, also im Falle Christi die die Natur tragende göttliche Person; also wird letztere auch durch 
diese Natur sustentifiziert = als substantiale Größe konstituiert.” Ibid. 374-375. 
383
 “Und deshalb hält er zum einen fest, Christus habe nur ein Einfachhin-Sein wegen des einen 
ewigen Seins des ewigen Suppositums; und dies, um zum anderen sofort nachzuschieben, es gebe noch ein 
anderes Sein, und zwar dieses Suppositums, nämlich nicht insofern es ewig, sondern insofern es in der Zeit 
Mensch geworden ist. Also: ein Einfachhin-Sein entsprechend dem Einfachhineines-Sein aufgrund der 
Einheit des Suppositums; entsprechend dem Gewissermaßen-zwei-Sein aufgrund der beiden Naturen ein je 
anderes Sein aufgrund der je anderen Natur.” Ibid. p. 376. 
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that be simply the divine form that Son shares with the Father essentially, or the 
additional servant form that Son kenotically assumes. Thus Thomas adduces the 
simpliciter substantification solely due to the divine nature—i.e., the ownership of a 
single-esse by Christ on account of the one eternal being of eternal supposit; as the basis 
of the subsequent substantification by means of the human nature (in a non-simpliciter 
sense) to person of the Son of God in regard to his being this man. In other words, only 
insofar as the Word has been enfleshed; and from this Aquinas infers that the latter is 
expressly not the principal esse of Christ, but only the secondary act of existence that 
leaves a principal esse in the incarnate Word, without, by any means, relegating the 
human mode of existence to an accidental property.384 Now, if, according to this model, 
which postulates that Christ has a single-esse on account of the eternal being of the divine 
supposit, and a singular substantification of the person of the Word by the divine nature, 
this raises the urgent question for Obenauer of how this single-esse on account of the 
eternal being of the Word is precisely to be understood: If one takes this interpretation as 
the basis for our understanding of the Hypostatic Union, then in Obenauer’s opinion the 
secondary, substantial human act of existence in Christ must be flatly denied, or the 
existence of the single-esse of the enfleshed Word must disavowed.  
As Obenauer correctly points out, it is almost insurmountably difficult to 
reconcile these two distinct modalities of being, the esse of the one suppositum of Christ, 
                                                          
384
 “Thomas macht sich also in De unione, a. 4 das Prinzip der Einheit oder Pluralität des Seins in 
strikter Korrelation zur Einheit oder Pluralität der Form zu eigen. Entsprechend scheint Thomas aus der 
Simpliciter-Sustentifikation nur durch die göttliche Natur [das Innehaben eines einzigen Einfachhin-Seins 
seitens Christus] wegen des einen ewigen Seins des ewigen Suppositums zu folgern; entsprechend aus der 
Sustentifikation durch die menschliche Natur, und zwar als nich einfachhin solcher, sondern die Person des 
Gottessohnes nur als dieser Mensch betreffender, das Innehaben eines anderen Seins seitens des Logos, 
nämlich als des Mensch gewordenen, ein akthaft eigenes Mensch-Sein eben; und zwar letzteres zu folgern 
ausdrücklich als solches, das nicht das prinzipale, sondern nur das sekundäre Sein des Logossuppositums 
darstellt und es daher bei dem einen Einfachhin-Sein Christi beläßt, um jedoch zugleich den nicht-
akzidentellen Charakter des Mensch-Seins in Erinnerung zu rufen.” Ibid, p. 377.  
230 
 
 
insofar as it is this man, which has the explicit status of a non-accident, and the singular, 
eternal, essentially divine esse of the Son. Or, as Obenauer designates it, the unavoidably 
irreconcilable alternatives between esse simpliciter or “simple existence” versus the 
notion of “being-to-some-extent or in-a-certain-mode” (i.e. only insofar as the Word is 
this man) of the esse secundarium. Or better yet, the paradoxical alternative between 
necessary and eternal “being at the foundational level” and contingent and temporal 
“being at the level of further determination.”385  Obenauer puts it starkly—in the natural 
order the only alternatives imaginable are either substantial being and accidental being, 
so that this concept which Thomas so briefly gives us of a secondary esse which is 
neither of these alternatives, yet has some features of both, so that it as a kind of being 
that exists only to-some-extent or only in-a-certain-mode, is on the face of it nigh 
incomprehensible. In no other work does Thomas acknowledge such a modal attenuation 
for the intrinsically correlated term of substance, since to do so would be to deny the 
essential characteristic of substantial esse as simpliciter, for to do so would be to lose 
sight of the transcendental convertibility of “one” and “being.” So, Obenauer has to 
conclude, Christ must be “one” simply, and he must have one “being,” or a single-esse, in 
exactly the same sense. 
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 “Allerdings: Legt man diese Interpretation zugrunde, dann ergeben sich massive 
Folgeprobleme, die sie als wenigstens sachlogisch nicht haltbar erweisen. Denn entweder wird dem 
“anderen Sein dieses Suppositums,” dem Mensch-Sein, rundweg abgesprochen, Einfachhin-Sein zu sein . . 
. das andere Sein des einen Suppositums Christi, insofern es dieser Mensch ist, hat den Status des Nicht-
Akzidentellen . . . Und umgekehrt ist die Alternative “Einfachhin-Sein” versus “Gewissermaßen-Sein” 
nicht hintergehbar, wie sie auch mit der Alternative von ‘Sein auf der Ebene der Grundlegung’ und ‘Sein 
auf der Ebene der Weiterbestimmung,’ und letztere wiederum mit der Alternative von ‘substantiales Sein’ 
und ‘akzidentales Sein’ untrennbar korreliert: ein substantiales Gewissermaßen–Sein ist ein Unbegriff. Und 
im Sinne dieser unhintergehbaren Alternative und besagter untrennbarer Korrelation ist die zweite 
Ausgangsprämisse formuliert. Auch machen Bedeutungsdifferenzierungen im Sinne modaler 
Abschwächungen (“modal akzidentell = gewissermaßen”) keinen Sinn: die Unvermittelbarkiet der 
Alternative  von “einfacchin” versus “gewissermaßen” steht dem ebenso entgegen, wie umgekehrt Thomas, 
wie gesehen, für das untrennbar korrelierende “substantialiter” eine solche modale Abschwächung auch 
nicht kennt.” Ibid, pp. 378-379. 
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From this line of argument Obenauer can draw only on conclusion: The human-
existence of Christ is the single-esse of the Word, and although distinguished from the 
eternal being of the Word as another act, not present as a second being simpliciter 
alongside to the eternal being of the Word, and so the single-esse that actualizes the 
humanity of Christ remains numerically indistinguishable from the eternal esse of the 
Word. Accordingly, what we have in Christ is multiple being as effectuated in the order 
of the single-esse, namely the being of God, or divine esse, along with the created human 
existence esse, but without a multiplication of the esse simpliciter. Since Thomas 
consistently presents the singular esse of Christ as two distinct acts of existence, one of 
which is divinely and the other humanly determined, then the divine esse is not the 
human act of existence simpliciter. However, since the single-esse is determined in each 
act of according to the divinity or humanity, but in such a manner that the substantial 
difference of divine and human acts of existence are not numerically different from the 
esse simpliciter, then the personal esse of the Word is distinguished from the esse 
secundarium only to the extent that it is a distinct actualization of the Word’s single act 
of existence, but not a separate esse simpliciter.
386
 
 
John Tomarchio 
John Tomarchio begins his considerations on esse and subsistence by pondering 
the meaning of a line from Aquinas: “when I speak of the existence of man or of horse or 
of any other thing, existence itself is considered formally and as received, and not that to 
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 “Da aber das Einfachhin-Sein im je anderen Seinsakt derart göttlich oder menschlich bestimmt ist, daß 
diese substantiale Differenz von ‘göttlich’ und ‘menschliche’ den menschlichen Seinsakt nicht (und zwar: 
numerisch) als Einfachhin-Sein vom göttlichen unterscheidet, dann kommt der Sachverhalt, wonach das 
göttliche Einfachhin-Sein nicht das menschliche Einfachhin-Sein ist, eben nur auf jenen hinaus, daß es ein, 
akthaft, je anderes Sein ist; nicht aber darauf, daß es ein je anderes Einfachhin-Sein ist.” Ibid. p. 383. 
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which existence belongs.”387 As Tomarchio points out, the “when I speak” of this last 
sentence signals that Aquinas is consciously employing singular terminology. In other 
words, in contrast with either the being or the essence to which an entity’s existence 
pertains, Aquinas will refer to a thing’s qualitatively distinct existence, to its existence as 
modified and thus capable of being considered as received and differentiated.
388
 The 
upshot all this is that even though the entity’s mode of existing accords with its form or 
nature/essence, it is nevertheless not reducible to it. The existence of a man or of a 
horse—the act of existence proper to a human or an equine nature/essence—must above 
all be considered precisely as modified existence. This indicates for Tomarchio that in 
Thomas’ estimation the idea of existential modality, the way something exists,  in the end 
cannot be reduced to any of the various principles of existence, whether we are speaking 
of the that things essence, form, or matter, nor—in turn—can those elements be reduced 
to a things act of existence. Rather, a finite mode of existing should be understood as the 
qualification of existence that is necessary for it be united with these principles. To be in 
composition with essence, Tomarchio explains, existence must be modified or 
determined to a particular kind of actualization. So, for Aquinas there is no parceling out 
of unspecified portions of common esse to this or that thing. Rather, the existence of a 
horse is precisely an equine existence, proportionate to equine essence in all its finite 
equine specificity. Tomarchio will point out that Aquinas argues, in the Summa as well 
other texts, the necessity for this type of proportion in any such composite union, 
otherwise it would not even be capable of being cognized: “The object must have a 
                                                          
387
 ST I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3. 
388
 John Tomarchio, “Aquinas'’s Division of Being According to Modes of Existing,” The Review 
of Metaphysics 54:3 (2001), pp. 585-613; at 600-601. 
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certain proportion to the cognitive power—more specifically, a proportion of what is 
active to what is passive, and a proportion of what is perfect to what is perfectible.”389 
With respect in particular to the relation between a finite being’s essence and its 
act of existence, Tomarchio cites Maritain’s approving comments regarding Diepen’s 
formulation that “the act of existing is of itself perfectly adapted and accommodated to 
the essence which is its formal principle; so perfectly that it can be joined to no other 
essence in the actuation of the latter.”390 Despite this approbation, Tomarchio nonetheless 
disagree with Maritain’s adoption of that traditional notion which considered modality as 
nothing more than a mere terminus, that closing off of the essence which allows it to 
appropriate its own act of existence. On the contrary, Tomarchio proposes that the 
necessary termination required by an essence is its completion by an esse that is proper to 
it, i.e., the act of existence by which it is actually constituted the individual essence of a 
distinct and ontologically completed being.  Tomarchio highlights the fact that in his 
discussion of persons, Aquinas explains that “Existence pertains to the very constitution 
of the person, and in this respect has the formality of a limit. Thus the unity of the person 
requires the unity of a complete and personal existence as such.”391  The implication is 
that a modality of being cannot be reducible to either essence or esse itself, but 
nevertheless it is not a tertium quid either—“It is a pure terminus in the order of 
existence, expressive of the intrinsic relation between an individual essence and its 
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 ST I, q.88, a.1, ad.3: requiritur aliqua proportio obiecti ad potentiam cognoscitivam, ut activi ad 
passivum, et perfectionis ad perfectibile.   
390
 Jacques Maritain, "On the Notion of Subsistence," Appendix 4 in Distinguish to Unite or The 
Degrees of Knowledge, trans. G. B. Phelan (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1959), 434 n. 1. For 
Diepen’s formulation, see “La critique du Baslieme selon saint Thomas d’Aquin,” Revue thomiste 50 
(1950), pp.115 and 304. 
391
 ST III, q.19, a.1, ad 4: Nam esse pertinet ad ipsam constitutionem personae: et sic quantum ad 
hoc se habet in ratione termini. Et ideo unitas personae requirit unitatem ipsius esse completi et personalis. 
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correlatively and constitutively proper act of existing.”392 A being’s nature/essence, it’s 
very substantial form is thus in potency, while a thing’s mode of existing, its actualizing 
esse, is obviously in act. In accordance with the Aristotelian understanding of the 
ontological priority of act over potency,
393
 modality first pertains to an entity’s act 
existence and only secondarily to its nature/essence.  
This is not to say that the reception and limitation of existence is identical with 
the essence, or that an entity’s nature/essence can be reduced to a mere limitation of the 
act of existence. Rather, what Tomarchio takes Aquinas to be saying is that the mode of a 
thing’s esse is proportioned to the mode of its essence in such a way that the ontological 
modality of the thing in itself is precisely the proportion or relation between its essence 
and its act of existing. This is the basis for Tomarchio’s assertion that the mode of 
existing is the “specific determination of an act of existing necessary to its composition 
with a particular essence,” which is why he will ultimately maintain that Thomas “uses 
the term modus to name the specification itself that an act of existing has as constituted in 
relation to an individual essence and as proper to the finite being of which they are the 
principles.”394 The proportionality of being and essence in the created order is established 
by the Creator, since a participated act of existence and its proportionate essence are 
cannot be limited before being conjoined. As Aquinas explains, “In giving existence God 
at the same time produces that which receives existence.”395 In other words, their 
reciprocal proportionality precedes their composition “in the intention of the creative 
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 Tomarchio, “Aquinas’s Division of Being,” p. 602.  
393
 See Giovani Reale, The Concept of First Philosophy and the Unity of the Metaphysics of 
Aristotle, trans. J.R. Catan (Albany, NY: State Univeristy of New York Press, 1980); Christos Y. 
Panayides, “Aristotle on the Priority of Actuality in Substance,” Ancient Philosophy 19:2 (1999), pp. 327-
344. 
  
394
 Tomarchio, “Aquinas’s Division of Being,” p. 603.  
395
 Quaestiones de potentia, q. 3, a. 1, ad 17: Deus simul dans esse, producit id quod esse recipit: 
et sic non oportet quod agat ex aliquo praeexistenti.  
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agent which orders them to one another and proportionately limits them to one another in 
creating the being of which they are the principles. This culmination is the prerequisite of 
their being the composite principles of a complete being.”396 The nature/essence of any 
given entity, along with its concomitant delimiting esse, are simultaneously co-created 
and determined to one another in the very same act of creation. In fact, all the 
distinguishing characteristics of a thing, whether they be essential or accidental, are 
actual only in virtue of the determinate mode of esse of a particular entity, for it only due 
to the distinct act of existence by which a nature exists simpliciter that any other 
perfections can accrue to it. God as Creator assigns to each creature its own proper mode 
of existing, is present in every creature according to its proper mode, and knows each of 
these creations according to the proper mode of each.
397
  
Even though Tomarchio references Maritain’s approbation of Diepen in the 
course of his analysis of Christ’s modalities of subsistence, Tomarchio never extends his 
own examination of the Thomas’ employment of the concept of existential modality to 
the question of the Hypostatic Union.  He is content to merely gesture in that 
Christological direction when he, in the course of explication how the perfection of a 
thing cannot be found solely in the nature, but rather in the ontological union of a nature 
and an act of existence, Tomarchio quotes from the ST III, q.7, a.1, where Aquinas is 
arguing that there is no numerical plurality in the enfleshed Word. This absence of 
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 Tomarchio, “Aquinas’s Division of Being,” p. 604.  
397 Quaestiones de veritate, q. 10, a. 11, ad 8: Ad octavum dicendum, quod mens nostra cum 
intelligibilitate, quam habet ut proprium quoddam, et cum aliis communiter habet esse: unde, quamvis 
in ea sit Deus, non oportet quod semper sit in ea ut forma intelligibilis; sed ut dans esse, sicut est in 
aliis creaturis. Quamvis autem creaturis omnibus communiter det esse, tamen cuilibet creaturae dat 
proprium modum essendi; et sic etiam quantum ad hoc quod in omnibus est per essentiam, 
praesentiam, potentiam, invenitur esse diversimode in diversis, et in unoquoque secundum proprium 
eius modum. 
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numerical plurality is directly attributable to the fact that there is only one suppositum of 
the incarnate Christ, however there is still something “other” (aliud) in the Son in a 
relative manner.
398
 That is to say, an irreducible distinction present in Christ according to 
the subsisting modality of the assumed human nature, which in turns finds its subsistence 
only in relation to the divine mode of existence of the Word.   
 
7. Conclusion 
 An examination of the contested fourth article of de unione, a. 4, with a 
subsequent analysis of various modern receptions of the text yielded some potential 
insights into what the controversial secondary act of existence may be for Thomas, 
especially the notion that it should perhaps be seen as a particular way in which he 
incarnate Son subsists in the temporal world.  However, it is unclear precisely in what 
way this modality of the assumed human nature interacts with and finds its own created 
existence within the Hypostatic Union.  These unanswered questions are addressed in the 
next chapter. 
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 Dicendum quod alterum importat diversitatem accidentis, et ideo diversitas accidentis sufficit 
ad hoc quod aliquid simpliciter dicatur alterum. Sed aliud importat diversitatem substantiae. Substantia 
autem dicitur non solum natura, sed etiam suppositum, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Et ideo diversitas naturae 
non sufficit ad hoc quod aliquid simpliciter dicatur aliud, nisi adsit diversitas secundum suppositum. Sed 
diversitas naturae facit aliud secundum quid, scilicet secundum naturam, si non adsit diversitas suppositi. 
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VI. Chapter 5: The Saving Mystery of the Kenotic God-Man 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The previous chapter reached an inconclusive end with a potentially rich 
observation, that the esse secundarium of De unione may be most fruitfully 
conceptualized as the specifically human modality by which the incarnate Word subsists 
kenotically in a human way.  In addition, it was postulated that the signal character of this 
creaturely mode of subsistence is to be seen in the assumed nature’s inability to achieve 
ontological independence. However, the precise manner in which the Word’s humanity 
subsists in the Hypostatic Union was left unresolved.  In this chapter I explore these 
unanswered quandaries, and I connect it specifically to the Kenoticism of the Son. 
Finally, I devote the remainder of the chapter to an in-depth analysis of the soteriological 
ramifications of the Word’s kenotic existence in a soteriological register, with special 
emphasis on the theandric instrumentality and ontological exemplarity evinced by the 
Word made flesh. 
 
2. Kenosis as a Mode of Subsistence 
 
As we have seen in many previous instances, for Aquinas a human nature is an 
individual but not a person, which is to say that by which something is human does not 
constitute a person or an individual in and of itself (per/in se). As Stephen A. Hipp will 
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put it, humanity does not lack personality, but rather proper personality—personality of 
and in itself.  We can thus say that the human nature of Christ is not merely individual 
but an individual, and it is a person insofar as it is united to the person of the Word, and 
that it subsists in a human mode of subsistence, although it is certainly not an individual, 
or a person, nor subsistent in and of itself.  This quality of being in and of itself, or per-
/in-seity, is thus the principal distinguishing characteristic of the person or supposit over 
and against natures. It provides the individualization without which the nature can never 
be an individual. Thus esse, the act of existence—existence per se and in se—which is 
proper to the supposit or person, is not proper to natures as such.   
However, the fact that an individual substantial nature does not subsist per/in se does 
not mean that it does not subsist, since in addition to subsisting in/per se there is also a 
further manner or mode of subsisting: subsistence in alio (in another). In such later cases, 
a thing subsists derivatively as part of another being that does subsist per se and in se. 
The humanity of Christ subsists in alio, yet nevertheless it is a complete individual 
substance, precisely because it has been assumed into the subsisting individual supposit 
of the Word in the Hypostatic Union. Thus, the humanity of Christ lacks nothing except a 
separate per/in se subsistence. Its hypostatic perfection is a result of that union, and forms 
the ontological basis for an authentic communication of idioms. As Stephen Hipp 
explains, “There must exist something by which the human nature actually possesses the 
subsistence of God (or subsists in God). There is a certain passive capacity by reason of 
which, formally speaking, it is attained by the hypostatic act of the Word,” since the 
reality of the Incarnation—the actual change or effect—is rooted in the created humanity, 
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which is nothing other than the counterpart to the unitive act whereby the human nature is 
assumed. 
399
  
This simultaneity and reciprocality of the assumptive act and the actualization of the 
assumed humanity has a number implications.  Among the most important is the fact of 
the enfleshed Word’s compositeness, that is, the notion that we have already looked at 
some length that the assumed human nature can best be understood as a constituent part, 
and as such derives its existence from the primary personal being of the Son. Even more 
so, it indicates that the hypostatic union is much more than a mere conjunction of the 
divine person and a human nature, it also invokes “both the intrinsicalness of the union as 
well as the dynamical (mutually influencing/conditioning) relationship” obtaining 
between the person and the assumed humanity.
400
 This integrally united dynamism is 
evinced in the Word’s dual subsistence, for the Son at once hypostasizes the human 
nature—i.e., the human nature is actualized by the divine person—and correlatively the 
Word comes to be through the human nature in time—i.e., there is a new substantive 
modality in which and out of which the Son exists that is rooted in the assumed 
humanity. Although the Word is not constituted as a supposit by the human nature, 
nevertheless the Word is made, substantially, to be a man.  
In this regard, hypostatization and hominization are the correlative terms of the 
one subsistent act. To be more precise, the supposit has two distinct properties, it exists in 
se and per se, but it also has the capacity of substanding a nature (or even a plurality of 
natures). The first property allows us to say that s supposit subsists in the sense that it has 
an in/per se mode of existence or esse.  The second property also allows to declare that 
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 Stephen A. Hipp, The Doctrine of Personal Subsistence: Historical and Systematic Synthesis, 
Studia Friburgensia, 114 (Fribourg: Academic Press, 2012), p. 84.  
400
 Ibid, p. 87.  
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the supposit subsists in a correlative manner because it substands or stands beneath or 
bears a substantial nature, thereby not only conferring a portion of the supposit’s 
individuality to the nature that is borne, but also integrating it into the being of the 
supposit (in other words, “substantifying” the nature).  As a result of this ontological 
integration, the supposit also now has the property of subsisting in the particular mode of 
being (that is, it is “substantified” by the nature) appropriate to that nature. In other 
words, the subsisting nature confers its manner of existence to the supposit which bears 
it.   
As we have already explored at some length, this is not to suggest that that the 
assumed nature gives something to the Word that it did not have before, or that it perfects 
some potential that the Son lacked before the incarnation, let alone that the assumption of 
a human nature causes a change in the pre-existent divine person. Aquinas is nothing if 
not scrupulous in his insistence that the incarnation is rooted in the absolutely perfect and 
immutable divinity of God, hence the assumed humanity cannot add any perfection to the 
assuming Word, but only contributes an obediential potentiality, an ontological 
availability, to be the vessel through which the divine condescends to subsist in a spatio-
temporal manner. This delimited modality of being, nonetheless, indicates that the 
assumed humanity does have some intrinsic quality which it possesses in itself that is of 
importance to the Word’s being in the world, even if it is at most only a relative kind of 
being.  So, though Christ’s humanity is a not subsisting entity unto itself (it only subsists 
in alio), yet it nevertheless remains that by means of which the subsisting hypostasis of 
the Word has a certain mode of being. Above all, it allows the subsistent act of the Word 
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to be the “principle of subjective singularity for a human nature, and for that nature to 
operate in such a manner that is actions belong to God.”401  
Thomas’ appreciation of the assumed humanity’s intrinsically distinctive worth in 
its dynamically integral relation to the divine hypostasis is strikingly evident in his 
probing answer to that perennial medieval conundrum of whether Christ’s humanity is 
something (aliquid).  As we saw in the first chapter, twelfth- and thirteenth-century 
theological debates regarding the metaphysical status of Christ’s human nature often 
revolved around the question of whether the Word, qua human, was “something” 
(aliquid). Since, the theologically orthodox consensus eventually decided, Christ’s 
humanity could not be ascribed a wholly autonomous subsistence (the trap of 
Nestorianism), then it could only be accurately designated as “nothing”—an ontological 
non-entity. Even though this type of radical Christological nihilianism was eventually 
proscribed, nonetheless a troubling paradox remained. If natures do not have independent 
existence, then it seems we are committed to the disturbing view that Christ’s assume 
human nature, in and of itself, is non aliquid (not something). In his earliest engagement 
with this topic, in the Commentary on the Lombard, Thomas argues that strictly speaking 
one cannot say that the humanity of Christ is something (aliquid) individual.  As Aquinas 
explains, man (homo) taken in general is not something particular, only this man (iste 
homo) can be said to be something individual (“Christ is not something particular as man, 
but only as this man”); in other words, the Son’s individuality as this man is a function of 
his assumption of a human nature whereby he subsist as the particular human individual 
Christ Jesus—without the divine person’s assumptive act, Christ’s humanity remains a 
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generalized abstraction (homo) without any individuating singularity.
402
 The ultimate 
implication of this line of argument is that apart from the hypostasis, the assumed 
humanity of Christ seems to be for all intent and purposes non-aliquid. 
By the time Aquinas reengages with this topic in the Summa his argument for 
Christ’s individuation has changed in subtle yet important ways.  On the one hand, 
Thomas is characteristically concerned with denying that the assumed human nature is a 
distinct person, and he does this by clarifying the two ways in which the phrase “Christ as 
Man is a person” can be understood, using the venerable doctrine from the Kenotic Hymn 
as a the problematic proof text in the initial objection. “It would seem that Christ as Man 
is a hypostasis or person. For what belongs to every man belongs to Christ as Man, since 
He is like other men according to Phil. 2:7: ‘Being made in the likeness of men.’ But 
every man is a person. Therefore Christ as Man is a person.”403 As Thomas explains, if 
such passages are taken as referring to the suppositum or subsisting subject of the 
incarnate Word, then it is clear that Christ as man is indeed a person, since the subject 
subsisting in the human nature is none other than person of the Word.
404
 However if the 
term ‘man’ is understood as referring to the nature, it may be parsed in two different 
ways. First, we may understand it as if it belonged to human nature to be in a person, and 
in this way it is true, for whatever subsists in a human nature is indeed a person. 
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Secondly, it may be taken to mean that Christ’s humanity ought to have personhood as 
brought about by the principles of the human nature. However, in this sense Christ as 
man is cannot be a person, since the human nature does not exist of itself apart from the 
divine nature, as the very concept of personhood.
405
  
This clarification lays the groundwork for Thomas’ discussion of the assertion 
that “Christ is something (aliquid) that the Father is, and something (aliquid) that the 
Father is not” (Christus est aliquid quod est pater, et est aliquid quod non est pater). The 
gravamen of this problematic statement lies in the fact that if the Christ has both a divine 
and a human nature, then Christ is one thing and another (something divine and 
something human), and therefore Christ is two.
406
 Aquinas responds by pointing out that 
when it is said, “Christ is something (aliquid) that the Father is,” this instance of aliquid 
corresponds to the divine nature, which is held in common, and thus predicated even in 
the abstract of both the Father and Son. However, when on says that  
“Christ is something (aliquid) that is not the Father,” then here aliquid signifies, not to 
the human nature as it is in the abstract, but as it is in the concrete. In other words, it 
signifies the humanity of Christ as it is in the supposit or person of the Word, concretely, 
truly (i.e., not merely conceptually), yet nonetheless not distinctly, but rather indistinctly 
(indistinctum).
407
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What does this last qualification regarding the indistinctiveness of the humanity mean? 
For Thomas, the force of this qualitative stipulation resides in the fact that here the term 
aliquid designates the human nature as it is in the supposit, not as it points to this man 
Christ Jesus, but rather as it signifies man in its essence, since a nature is that by which 
something is and is thus referenced abstractly. That is, Christ is man insofar as he 
possesses a human nature, which this aliquid denotes. Alternatively, if it were a 
distinctive signification, that would locate Christ’s ontological distinctiveness, his 
aliquid, in a per se/in se human subsistence, thereby rendering Jesus Christ a distinct 
human hypostasis. Hence, the aliquid in the phrase Christus est aliquid quod non est 
pater (Christ is something that the Father is not) designates a supposit, a distinct 
subsisting substance other than the divine supposit of the Father, but only as that supposit 
underlies the human nature and not the individuating properties that would constitute an 
ontologically separate human supposit. Hence, Aquinas can conclude, “it does not follow 
that Christ is one thing and another, or that He is two, since the suppositum of the human 
nature in Christ, which is the Person of the Son of God, does not reckon numerically with 
the divine nature, which is predicated of the Father and Son.”408  
Note well that with this superbly balanced qualification Aquinas has precisely 
located the aliquid of Christ without sacrificing the personal unity of the incarnate Word.  
From the vantage point of the individuating properties that ontologically distinguish this 
supposit from all others, there is simply one individual supposit in Christ. As Thomas 
forcefully reiterates, “Two signifies what has duality, not in another, but in the same 
                                                                                                                                                                             
sed secundum quod significatur in concreto; non quidem secundum suppositum distinctum, sed secundum 
suppositum indistinctum. 
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 Ibid: Prout scilicet substat naturae, non autem proprietatibus individuantibus. Et ideo non 
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thing of which ‘two’ is predicated. Now what is predicated is said of the suppositum, 
which is implied by the word ‘Christ.’ Hence, although Christ has duality of nature, yet, 
because He has not a duality of suppositum, it cannot be said that Christ is two.”409 
However, from the perspective of the substanding that actualize the assumed nature, there 
is a supposit that is unmistakably identified with the human nature—a conceptually 
distinct secondary supposital act that substantifies the Word in a fully human manner—in 
addition to that ontological substanding associated with the supposital act of the Word’s 
divine nature. To be more exact, the selfsame supposital act results in an irreducibly two-
fold articulation of subsistent modalities in the one person.     
While Thomas’ exploration of the two-fold esse in De unione a.4 is not couched 
in terms of aliquid, nonetheless—as we have already elaborated—the parallels with the 
preceding argument are too obvious to ignore. In the Disputed Question the Angelic 
Doctor is concerned with securing the unicity of the incarnate Word within the thematic 
ambit of possible misreadings of the kenotic hymn, much as in ST III, q. 16, a. 12 he is 
apprehensive about correctly answering the query of whether Christ as man is a person in 
the face of the text from Philippians 2:7. As we saw in our analysis of De unione in 
Chapter 3, in De unione a. 3 Aquinas establishes that in Christ, “the son of man is said to 
be one thing and the son of God another, because each name predicates a different nature; 
not because there is a different suppositum [for each nature], from which it would follow 
that Christ is two simply.”410 Quite reminiscent to the argumentative thrust that bridges 
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across from the conclusion of ST III, q.16, a.12, Thomas commences his exposition in De 
unione a. 4, by pointing that his answer is in an important sense a mere continuation of 
his explanation in De unione a. 3: “in a certain measure solution of this question and the 
previous one is the same” (Dicendum quod huius quaestionis est quodammodo eadem 
ratio et praemissae).   
Again, at the risk of belaboring a previously argued point, the parallels run even 
deeper between De unione, a. 3 and ST III, q.17, a.1.  In the third article of the Disputed 
Question, Thomas initially framed his argument on the simplicity or duality of Christ 
with the query “"Whether Christ is one or two in the neuter?  For seems that he is two in 
the neuter (Tertio quaeritur utrum christus sit unum neutraliter vel duo. Et videtur quod 
sit duo neutraliter). Following typical linguistic usage of the time, Aquinas uses the term 
“neuter” to indicate Christ in the abstract, and employs the term “masculine” to designate 
Christ in the concrete. Hence, he will go on to argue that a “word formulated in the 
masculine gender is customarily referred to the person; and thus it is clear that Christ is 
not two in the masculine, but one; since there are not two persons in Christ, but one.”411  
But, certain authors, positing one person in Christ, posited two supposita or hypostases, 
one of the Son of God and another of the son of man (Cf. S.T. III, q. 2, a. 3). Hence, 
although they did not say that Christ is two in the masculine because of the unity of 
person, still they said that he was two in the neuter because of the duality of supposita. 
But, because this opinion too is contrary to the truth of the faith, as was said above; thus, 
leaving aside this opinion, we must consider whether, supposing that in Christ there is 
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one hypostasis and one suppositum, Christ ought to be called two in the neuter or one. for 
just as in his defense of the principal being of the Word in ST III, q.17 is accompanied by 
a subtle yet important caveat about the distinctive supposital act of the assumed 
humanity, so in De unione, a.4 Thomas’ compelling argument that in Christ “the 
subsisting suppositum is the person of the Son of God, which is made a substance simply 
through the divine nature” (In Christo autem suppositum subsistens est persona Filii Dei, 
quae simpliciter substantificatur per naturam divinam), is followed almost immediately 
by the equally subtle yet important caveat that even thou there is a unity of suppositum in 
the word, nonetheless there are subsisting modalities of being in the Word, one ascribed 
to the divine person, the other associated with the assumed humanity. While the language 
is slightly different, the two arguments come to the same conclusion—in the incarnate 
Word the selfsame supposital act results in an irreducibly two-fold effectuation of 
subsistent modalities in the one person.   
This account of the simultaneity of distinctive supposital actions within the 
hypostatic union has yet to address the reciprocal dimensions of the Word’s assumption 
of a human nature.  So far we have focused on the mode of subsistence through which the 
Son is human, and the assumed nature that allows the Son to subsist in such a manner, so 
that while the person of the Word becomes a man in time, nonetheless the assumed 
natures never becomes a human person. But what is the actual mechanism within that 
hypostatic union that prevents a fully independent human supposit from arising out of 
such a union? As we saw in the previous chapter, for Jacques Maritain the function of 
subsistence is to allow an essence to exercise an ontologically independent existence, 
which leads him to the conclusion that in the hypostatic union Christ subsists in a human 
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manner in such a way that his human nature never attains personal existence apart from 
the assuming Word. Maritain’s insight is not completely unique within Thomism. In fact 
Cajetan, the originator of the ecstasy of being theory of the incarnation, had initially 
developed this concept, speculating that subsistence precedes and prepares the way for 
essence to be ushered into existence, a perfection which esse cannot bring about of itself 
but is only completed in the very actualization of being.
412
 Moreover, subsistence makes 
the esse to be received in a certain modality, in this case a human modality, for—as 
Thomas himself had often remarked—whatever is received into something is received 
according to the mode of the receiver.
413
  
This human mode of subsistence is of course predicated on Christ’s human 
nature, a nature that is a perfect example of its type, except for the fact that it does not 
subsist in a full-fledged human person the way that all other actualized human natures do. 
Maritain later appropriated and expanded upon this notion of Cajetan’s, arguing that 
essence receives its final ontological completion or terminus only when it is completed in 
the order of existence within a particular being. But for Cajetan, as well as Maritain, and 
Lonergan, and others, the question remains as to what precisely this terminus can rightly 
be, since it is neither a constitutive part of the essence, nor the actualization of being 
itself, but only a non-essential tendency in an essence, “by whose means the essence, 
individuated in its own life, appropriates to itself alone the existence it receives.”414 Even 
more puzzling is the difficulty of explaining how this terminus of subsistence in Christ’s 
assumed humanity does not terminate in a fully-fledged human person. Cajetan merely 
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says that, barring any impediment in the natural course of events, a human nature is 
invariably terminated as a self-subsistent supposit—i.e., a person.415 At best, one can only 
surmise that the absence of a fully subsistent human personality in Christ is due solely to 
the impediment of being assumed by the Word, which somehow prevents the humanity 
from achieving its natural ontological finality. Indeed, this view seems to be strongly 
endorsed by Cajetan: “remove the impediment, and there is no reason to search for 
another cause …for the very nature in itself has of itself what is sufficient for its terminus 
to follow.”416 For Cajetan’s followers down through the centuries, this impediment could 
only be explicated by means of the ecstasy of being theory, but its attendant weakness as 
a theory, particular in this regard, have already been enumerated.  The most readily 
apparent of these danger is that of pantheism, since the esse by which any entity exists is 
part of that actually existent thing, so if the created existence of Christ’s humanity exists 
only by recourse to the divine esse, then the Word’s act of existence becomes a 
constituent part of the humanity by actuating its potential to be, and in the process uniting 
with the assumed humanity in such a way as to form a compound substance.  
The contemporary theologian Jean-Hervé Nicholas has offered an elegant solution 
to this metaphysical impasse, while retaining his loyalty to a broadly Cajetanian 
understanding of the incarnation.  According to Nicholas, subsistence distinguishes 
between primary substances—which as subjects have ontological independence, and thus 
subsist per/in se—and secondary substances, such as accidents, which have no individual 
subsistence, but merely subsist in alio in other, truly independent metaphysical entities. 
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In the manner of Cajetan and Maritain before him, Nicholas posits that subsistence is a 
termination in the line of being; i.e., that which makes an essence pass from the province 
of the purely conceptual into the realm of actual existents.
417
  But what is it about 
subsistence that allows a primary substance to achieve this individuating mode of being 
through and of itself? Nicholas’ distinctive answer is that the key must reside in the 
relational modality of that subsistence. In other words, its mode of subsistence is to be 
related to esse as something for and in itself, as opposed to those things (such as 
accidents) that receive their act of existence for and in another. With this basic relational 
insight in place, Nicholas goes on to speculate that the failure of Christ’s assumed 
humanity to terminate as an independently existing substance can be explained in terms 
of its assumptive relation to the assuming Word.  
To be more precise, in Nicholas’ estimation, it is exclusively the fact that in the 
assumptive act the humanity of Christ is drawn into and wholly ordered to the Word 
which alone can account for its lack substantive termination as a distinct human person. 
Moreover, the basis of this assumptive ordering of the human nature to the assuming 
Word can be located within the assumed humanity of the Word itself. The non-
substantive termination of the assumed nature is thus formally constituted by the 
humanity’s relation of belonging, while the very foundation for that relation in the 
assumed humanity accounts for the actuality of belonging.
418
 Even though Nicholas’ 
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explication is strikingly simple yet evocative, it is not altogether unique. The importance 
of the assumptive act for the fate of the assumed humanity’s individual being was always 
seen as dependent upon its assumption by the word—it is in some sense what Dom 
Diepen emphasized when he pointed out that the Word’s assumed humanity is both 
integrated and subordinated to the assuming Divine Person.
419
 Nonetheless, it does have 
the positive feature of explicating the assumed nature’s depersonalization strictly in terms 
of the act of assumption. However, as critics such as Stephen Hipp point out, in merely 
stating that that the basis of the human nature’s belonging to the Word is that humanity 
insofar as it belongs to Word, Nicolas has not yet provided a “satisfying explanation of a 
positive principle by which the Word or the assumptive act provides for the subsistence 
(in alio) of the human nature.”420 The difficulty of providing such an explanation, as Hipp 
shrewdly points, resides in the fact that the assuming Word cannot provide anything to 
the assumed humanity in the order of efficient causality, otherwise it would be seen as 
part of a composite with the human nature. Hence, the Son can only act as the extrinsic 
formal term of a relation which finds its foundation in the assumed humanity as radically 
appropriated and ordered to the assuming Word. That is to say, the assumptive act itself 
conditions the mode in which the assumed natures comes to be; or, reciprocally, the very 
modality of the assumed humanity’s esse is determined by the union resulting from the 
assumptive act.
421
 Hence, Hipp concludes, what ultimately has to be explicated at once is 
                                                          
419
 Diepen, La Théologie de l'Emmanuel: “Il s’agit d’une unité réalisée par participation et 
exemplarité, par subordination et intégration,” p. 155.  
420
 Hipp, Doctrine of Personal Subsistence, p. 178.  
421
 Nicholas, Synthèse dogmatique, p. 316.   
252 
 
 
both the relationship between the humanity’s assumptive ordering to the Word, and the 
assumed human nature’s relation to its act of existence.422   
Hipp brings us one step closer to such an explication when he attempts to develop 
the notion of how the modality of the secondary esse of Christ’s assumed humanity may 
be determined in some fundamental way by its assumptive ordering to the assuming 
Word. As we have seen, every Thomist concurs that the divine act of existence of the 
Word is the personal, primary esse of the Son, and since there is no real distinction 
between essence and existence in God, the Word’s divine essence is identical to his 
esse—a divine essence/existence that he shares equally with all the persons of the Trinity. 
All the activities of the Triune Godhead are equally ascribed to this shared divine essence 
in se, and extends as well to all of God’s divine activities pro nobis, including the 
incarnation/assumption of a human nature by the Word, which is a shared work of the 
Godhead. Yet, as Hipp readily points out, the assumed humanity does not terminate in the 
Godhead as a whole, but only in the second Person of the Trinity, the Son. So, even 
though the personal property of the Word solely as the second person of the Trinity 
cannot account for the assumptive act through which the assumed humanity comes to be, 
since this is the common work of all three Divine Persons, nonetheless in Hipp’s 
estimation it must “account for the modality of the being thus conferred, since the human 
nature is actuated only in and as belonging to the Word.”423 So, while the act of 
assumption itself is attributed to the Godhead in general, the termination of that act in the 
Word, and in no other Divine Person, indicates that it occurs with a relational ordering 
principle that is specific to the distinctive, irreducibly personal properties of the Word. In 
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other words, the distinguishing personality of the Son not only specifies the conditions in 
which the humanity is brought into being, but also specifies the modality under which 
that assumed nature will exercise its created act of existence by conditioning the 
humanity’s existential relation to the assuming Divine Person. Concisely stated, the very 
mode of subsistence that individuates and brings into being the humanity of Christ would 
“be owing to the distinctive personality of the Word and inconceivable apart from it.”424 
This more profound reformulation of Nicholas’ Cajetanian interpretation of 
Thomas’ incarnational doctrine holds a wealth of potential new insights into our 
understanding of the function of the hypostatic union, especially relating to the question 
of the Christ’s secondary act of existence. However, what Hipp fails to identify in this 
provocative proposal is what could be the specifying personal property or individuating 
characteristic of the assumptive Son, which would condition the very being of the 
assumed humanity in the manner we that we see in the incarnate Word.  The underlying 
thematic structure of this dissertation, which has traced an intrinsic link, from earliest 
Christianity, between the very being of the Son as he is himself (Christus in se) and 
Christ’s salvific mission for us (Christus pro nobis), along with the attendant convictions 
that the manner in which the enfleshed Word assumed a human nature reveals something 
profound about God as Godself, I believe has laid much of the conceptual groundwork to 
provide the crucial missing element in Hipp’s formulation. As we have seen, from the 
Western tradition, from Augustine to Lombard, Aquinas is working within the larger 
soteriological framework which understand the kenotic narrative in Philippians 2:6-7—
which proclaims how Christ, being found in the form of God, emptied himself (ipsum 
exinanivit), assumed a servant-form, and was made in the likeness of men—establishes a 
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hermeneutical lens through which one can understand how the Word is one subject who 
may be spoken of as he is eternally and as he is having assumed human flesh, but also 
serves as a summary of the entire incarnational mission within the economy of salvation.  
In other words, everything that the Word did in his humanity he did for us (pro nobis) 
and everything that the incarnate Word is he is for us. The person of Christ is not just 
God acting for our salvation, it is God acting as a man for us.   
Adding this Christological hermeneutic to Hipp’s insight, we now have a way to 
account for the being of the Word in se alongside the Word’s saving mission pro nobis, 
an account that not only establishes the precise ontic mode in which the Word’s humanity 
subsists, but also locates that modality within the assumptive relationality of the Word’s 
divine personal characteristics to the assumed humanity. Building upon the previously 
explicated work of John Tomarchio, we had already intimated that the terminus of 
subsistence could perhaps best seen as the reception and delimitation of an essence within 
a determinative way of being in the world, a specific esse—in other words, the 
completion of a nature/essence by an act of existence proper to it. In the Hypostatic 
Union, this terminus finds its completion of the assumed human nature in its existence in 
alio, a secondary act of created existence that, as Diepen had already articulated, is 
ordered towards and subservient to the primary divine esse of the Word, which exists in 
and for itself (in/per se). But with Stephen Hipp we have also pointed out the 
insufficiency of the argument which fails to see that the subsistent terminus is expressive, 
not only of the intrinsic relation between an individual essence and its correlatively and 
constitutively proper act of existing, but that in the unique case of the incarnation the 
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assumed humanity’s subsistence in alio is itself conditioned by the assumptive act which 
brings it into hypostatic union with the Word.  
This means that the very modality of the Word’s being in the world in a human 
manner mirrors a basic personal property of the assuming divine Person, which, as has 
been amply argued at length over the course of this entire study, is nothing other than the 
Son’s uniquely kenotic character. As Aquinas forcefully articulates, when arguing for the 
equality of divinity in the shared essence of the Father and Son by recourse to Philippians 
2:6 (“He thought it not robbery to be equal with God”), yet maintaining the relative 
distinction of the Son from the Father precisely in the Son’s personal humility, the filial 
piety whereby he subjects himself obediently to the Father’s paternal authority.425 The 
direct result of this inner-Trinitarian relation of Fatherhood to Sonship in God ad intra is 
the Word’s incarnational mission ad extra, wherein in his assumed humanity he can truly 
state “the Father is greater than I” (John 14;28). But, as Thomas further clarifies, while 
these words are to be understood of Christ’s human nature, wherein Jesus is less than the 
Father, and subject to Him; but in His divine nature He is equal to the Father.
426
 
Nonetheless, the Son’s visible mission in the World is a direct reflection of the Son’s 
obediential relation to the Father from whom he receives everything that he possesses. 
The relation of the Son’s personal kenoticism, and his kenotic assumption of a human 
nature, are thus intrinsically united—as united as the two natures in the hypostatic 
union—and hence cannot be fully appreciated apart from each other. As we have already 
glimpsed in previous chapters, the best means of understanding this kenotical reciprocity 
is to be found in the incarnate Word’s theandric existence, at once both truly human and 
                                                          
425
 ST I, q.42, a.4, ad 1: Subiectio filii naturae pietas est, idest recognitio auctoritatis paternae 
426
 Ibid, Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verba illa intelliguntur dicta de Christo secundum 
humanam naturam, in qua minor est patre, et ei subiectus.   
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fully divine, and in the divine-human instrumentality of the God-man’s operations. The 
remainder of this chapter will explore these related issues in some depth.  
 
 
3. Dyoenergism and Dyotheletism: Reading De Unione A.5 Along With ST III, 
QQ.18-19 
 
 
Consequent upon the Hypostatic Union of natures in the divine person of the 
Word, Thomas elucidates a distinction in unity of both operations and wills in the 
enfleshed Son. After the formulation of Chalcedonian Christology, certain theologians 
argued that there must be a singular activity and a unique manner of volition in Christ, 
the heresies of Monenergism and Montheletism. In both the Tertia Pars of the Summa 
and in the final article of De unione, Thomas concludes his theoretical exposition of the 
person of Christ with a defense of two operations and wills of Christ, Dyoenergism and 
Dyotheletism. Significantly, near the beginning of a.5, as well as in ST III, q.19, a.1 of 
the Summa, Aquinas quotes from the Sixth Ecumenical Council (Constantinople III), 
focusing on the grave misinterpretation of the precise character of the Hypostatic Union 
by heretics such as Severus, who recognized that Christ both performed human and 
divine activities, yet nonetheless concluded that despite this diversity of actions they must 
be the selfsame operation of the one incarnate Son.
427
 If Aquinas’ defense of the one-esse 
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 Unde in sexta synodo inducuntur verba Severi haeretici sic dicentis, ea quae agebantur et 
operabantur ab uno Christo, multum differunt. Quaedam enim sunt Deo decibilia, quaedam humana. Veluti, 
corporaliter vadere super terram profecto humanum est, cruribus vero vexatis, et ambulare super terram 
penitus non valentibus, sanum gressum donare Deo decibile est. Sed unum, scilicet incarnatum verbum, 
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in Christ in the Word were as single-minded as some have argued, then perhaps Thomas 
would be have attracted by arguments for an analogous singularity of activity and 
volition in Christ. In fact, this is the very sort of argument that Thomas presents in 
objection six, when he posits that since the enfleshed Word does not a have a separate 
hypostasis, then it would make sense that Christ would have a distinct human operation 
to an even lesser extent.
428
 
Aquinas’ initiates his responses by referring to the authoritative texts of 
Constantinople III and their recapitulation in John of Damascus. As Constantinople III 
declares: “Two natural operations, without division, change, separation, confusion, we 
honor in the same our Lord and true God Jesus Christ, that is, a divine operation and a 
human operation.”429 Along with the corresponding questions from ST III, this is the first 
utilization of the texts from the Sixth Ecumenical Council in Aquinas. Indeed, as already 
mentioned, Thomas was the first Latin theologian to employ the findings of 
Constantinople III in more than half a millennium.  Using these texts, along with 
Damascene’s elaborations of the Council’s findings in De fide, Thomas will finally bring 
the whole of Patristic Conciliar Christology to bear upon the crucial questions of kenosis, 
theandry, and instrumentality in a. 5 of the De unione. 
As even Aquinas is the first to concede, Christ’s human activity, insofar as it is 
moved instrumentality by the divinity would not seem to be proceeding for the assumed 
human nature as a principle of operation. However, as we have already explored in earlier 
                                                                                                                                                                             
hoc et illud operatum est et nequaquam hoc quidem huius, hoc vero huius est naturae. Neque, eo quod 
diversa sunt operamenta, ideo duas operatrices naturas atque formas iuste definiemus. 
428
 De unione Verbi, a. 5 ad 6: Ad sextum dicendum quod suppositum est quod est ab aliis 
distinctum; et ideo si natura humana haberet per se suppositum, repugnaret unioni personali. Operatio 
autem non importat rationem alicuius distinctionis; et ideo ratio non sequitur. 
429
 Ibid. sc: Est quod in sententia sextae synodi dicitur: duas naturales operationes indivise, 
inconvertibiliter, inconfuse et inseparabiliter in eodem domino Iesu Christo vero Deo nostro glorificamus, 
hoc est divinam et humanam operationem.  
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chapters, instrumental causality respects the natural integrity of the utilized nature as a 
secondary causal agent. Indeed, Aquinas will elucidate how to distinguish the respective 
contributions of each causal agent within instrumental operations. Offering an analogy 
from the human operations of seeing and hearing, Aquinas argues theses sensations with 
be separate when operated by two different humans, but that these two distinct operations 
can be distinguished even in one person, wince seeing in hearing and hearing is not 
seeing. Even in that one person, a multitude of distinct capacities may be utilized to bring 
about one unified action. This is particularly true when we talk about the human will, 
which is the controlling or superior motivation power for all operations involving the 
human senses. Hence, although in one human agent there may appear to be a multitude of 
distinct activities due to the diverse sensorial capacities involved, in point of act they all 
proceed from the one principal volitional action that controls and directs them towards 
singularly united operation.
430
 
So human operations derive their unity from the will as an intrinsic principle of 
activity proceeding from the human nature, and thus the movement of the senses is 
something that is more acted upon than an action, since it is subject to the movement of 
the primary volitional power. Building upon this premise, Aquinas will now argue that in 
Christ, the human volitional power which has control over its acts, namely the will, is 
moved by a superior divine power in such a way that it is not only acted upon, but also 
                                                          
430
 Ibid. Considerandum tamen quod, si virtus quae est actionis principium, ab alia superiori 
virtute moveatur, operatio ab ipsa procedens non solum est actio, sed etiam passio; in quantum scilicet 
procedit a virtute quae a superiori movetur. In homine autem omnes virtutes sensitivae partis moventur 
quodammodo a voluntate sicut a quodam primo principio. Et ideo et audire et videre et imaginari et 
concupiscere et irasci non tantum sunt actiones, sed etiam quaedam passiones procedentes a motione 
voluntatis; in quantum scilicet homo ex propria voluntate ad praedicta progreditur. Et ideo, licet in uno 
homine secundum diversas potentias et habitus videantur esse plures actiones specie differentes; tamen, 
quia omnes procedunt ab una prima actione voluntatis, dicitur esse una actio unius hominis. Sicut si unus 
artifex per multa instrumenta operaretur, una eius operatio diceretur.  
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acts.  And since Christ has a human will as part of his assumed human nature, then this 
human will necessarily had control over its human as well.
431
 In this manner, Thomas 
safeguards the causal integrity of the secondary agent in an instrumental operation.  As 
Aquinas finally argues, if operations derive an absolute unity from the activity of another 
agent, even one superior in power, then it would follow that all things would be one 
action, since there is one first principle that ultimately moves all things, namely God. As 
a consequence, Thomas concludes that Christ must have two distinct operations on 
account of his two distinct natures, and the fact that Christ’s instrumental human 
operation is moved by God as the principal agent does not compromise its integrity as a 
human operation.
432
 For Aquinas, this all-important conclusion grounds the very 
possibility of Christ meriting our salvation through his theandric operations, since if 
Christ had been merely moved by God and had not also been freely knowing and loving 
through his human intellect and will, then he would not have been able to merit according 
to his human nature. The volitional operation proper to the assumed human nature makes 
Christ’s humanity a unique soteriological instrument of the divinity.  
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 Ibid. Secundum ergo hunc modum aliqui posuerunt quod in Christo est una tantum operatio, eo 
quod humana natura in eo divinae operationi subiicitur, et ab eo movetur. Et sic actio humanae naturae in 
comparatione ad divinam magis habet rationem passionis. Unde propter virtutem divinae actionis dicebant 
in Christo esse unam tantum actionem. Sed hoc irrationabiliter dicebatur, duplici ratione. Primo quidem, 
quia quaecumque virtus non habet dominium sui actus, sic a superiori movetur, quod ipsa non agit, sed 
potius agitur. Unde et philosophus dicit, IV Ethic., quod sensus non est alicuius actionis principium. Sed 
virtus quae habet dominium sui actus, scilicet voluntas, sic movetur a superiori, scilicet a Deo, quod non 
solum agitur, sed etiam agit. Et quia in Christo secundum humanam naturam est creata potentia voluntatis 
sicut et intellectus creatus, cum nihil ei desit eorum quae pertinent ad perfectionem naturae humanae, 
consequens est quod motus voluntatis humanae in Christo, actio sit et non solum passio. 
432
 Ibid. Secundo, quia operatio alicuius speciem et unitatem habet a primo principio pertinente ad 
eamdem naturam. Sicut voluntas, a qua habent unitatem omnes actiones humanae, est quoddam principium 
intrinsecum humanae naturae. Non autem aliquae actiones habent unitatem ex hoc quod reducuntur in 
aliquod primum principium alterius naturae; alioquin sequeretur quod omnium rerum esset actio una, quia 
est unum primum principium movens omnia, scilicet Deus. Sic igitur, etsi humana natura in Christo 
moveatur a divina, quia tamen sunt duae naturae distinctae, necesse est etiam quod sint duae actiones. Quia 
igitur ex hoc quod aliquis ponit unam actionem in Christo, sequitur quod sit ibi una sola natura et una sola 
voluntas. Ideo haec positio est tamquam haeretica in sexta synodo condemnata. 
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In his analysis of De unione, a.5, Klaus Obenauer conjectures that here Thomas’ 
understanding of instrumental causality is influenced to such an extent by the line of 
argumentation explored in a. 4, that Thomas’ understanding of instrumental causality can 
retrospectively be seen as applied beyond natures and operations to the topic of esse. So, 
even though Aquinas’ examination of instrumentality entails that there cannot be only 
one operation in Christ identified solely with the divine activity, nonetheless, the 
instrumentality nature of theandric or divine-human operations in Christ as proceeding 
form the primary agency of the divine finds an analogy in the relationship of the 
secondary kenotic subsistence of the assumed humanity to the principal divine act of 
existence. In both instances, we can say that in an entity in accord with a higher principle, 
the greater power transfers its actualization of movement to the lower principle that 
moved or actualized by it, so that the movement of the lower principles cannot be 
adduced to be the primary source of self-actuation. On this reading, the relationship of the 
single divine esse to the esse secundarium is analogous to the intricate interrelation of the 
divine will/operation to the conjoined instrument that is the assumed humanity. Obenauer 
concludes that one can find at least some circumstantial support for this hypothesis that in 
some texts, instead of the regular causal binary connections of “primary” with 
“secondary” or of “principal” with “instrumental”— he sometimes will pair “principal” 
with “secondary,” thereby at least putting “instrumental” in the conceptual vicinity of 
“secondary,” and even (on occasion) identifying “secondary” with “instrumental, as, for 
example, in ST II-II, q. 17, a. 4,
433
 where Aquinas seems to posit that a principal efficient 
cause can be considered as a first agent, while the secondary efficient cause is equated 
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 In genere autem utriusque causae invenitur principale et secundarium. Principalis enim finis est 
finis ultimus; secundarius autem finis est bonum quod est ad finem. Similiter principalis causa agens est 
primum agens; secundaria vero causa efficiens est agens secundarium instrumentale. 
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with a secondary and instrumental agent.434 While these are only tantalizing hints, it does 
perhaps appear to indicate that there is a theoretical connection in Thomas’s mind 
between the kenotic modality of Christ’s human subsistence as an instrumental cause and 
the soteriological efficacy of his volitional theandric operations. 
 
4. Kenosis and Exemplarism: The Soteriological Consequences of Christ’s 
Self-Emptying 
 
Questions 26 of the Summa, particularly the final article on Christ as mediator pro 
nobis, or secundum quod homo, brings together many of Thomas’ previously articulated 
thoughts of the  relation between the kenotic mode of the enfleshed Word and the saving 
mission of the incarnate Christ, and prepares the reader for an informed perusal of qq.27-
59, which focus on what Christ did and underwent in the flesh (acta et passa Christ in 
carne).  On the whole, question 26 may perhaps best be considered as an extended 
commentary on I Timothy 2:5: “There is one mediator between God and man, the man 
Jesus Christ,” and Aquinas will encapsulate his answer in the singular observation that “it 
pertains to the office of mediator to conjoin and to unite those between whom the 
mediator stands, for extremes are united in the middle.”435  Thus, this soteriological 
mission is perfectly fitting to Christ, precisely because humanity is united to God 
                                                          
434
 “Eine Untermauerung kann die Hypothese, es liege hier eine (uneigentliche) Proportionalität 
zum Verhältnis eines prinzipal gegenüber einem instrumental Verursachen bzw. Agierenden vor, durch 
Loci erhaltent, in denen Thomas—statt der regulären Verknüpfung von “primär” mit “sekundär” (“causa 
prima et secunda”) bzw. von “prinzipal” mit “instrumental”—“prinzipal” mit “sekundär” verbinder, um 
dadurch “sekundär” wenigstens in die Nähe von “instumental” zu rücken bzw. “sekundär” mit 
“instrumental” zu identifizieren, so z.B. in ST II-II, q. 17, a. 4.” Obenauer, Über die Union, p. 386. As 
further evidence Obenauer cites ST I, q. 45, a. 5, in which the specified term-pairs are more or less equated. 
See also SCG II, 89, n.1749 and SCG III, 148, n.3212. 
435
 ST III, q.26, a.1, c.: Respondeo dicendum quod mediatoris officium proprie est coniungere eos 
inter quos est mediator, nam extrema uniuntur in medio.   
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perfectly through the reconciling mode of existence and subsequent operation of the God-
man Jesus Christ. The culmination of this entire section asks the crucial question whether 
Christ was the mediator of God and humanity secundum quod homo, and we cannot 
understand the answer the Thomas provides unless we appreciate the nuanced meanings 
of the phrase secundum quod homo. As Aquinas argues here and in earlier texts the term 
can designate either materially for the supposit or formally for the nature.
436
 Taken in a 
material sense, secundum quod homo indicates the supposit as one having human nature 
distinctly, and it is this sense that will be of crucial importance for an accurate 
understanding of the role of Christ’s assumed humanity in the economy of salvation. 
 The three opening objections of a.2 argue that Christ was not mediator only 
secundum quod homo, but rather as both God and man; the second objection posits that 
inasmuch as Christ is a man, then he is not a middle point between God and human 
beings but himself a human being, hence Christ as man is not a medium between God 
and humanity; while the third and final objection contends that Christ was mediator 
inasmuch as he is God, since only God can reconcile us to himself by remitting our 
sins.
437
 In the sed contra Aquinas quotes from Augustine’s De Civitate Dei, IX.15 to the 
effect that Christ is our mediator secundum quod homo. As Thomas goes on to explain in 
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 See in III, D.10, q.1, aa.1 and 2 and D.19, a.5, qua.2.  
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 ST III, q.26, a.1, ob, 1-3: Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non sit mediator 
Dei et hominum secundum quod homo. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro contra Felicianum, una est Christi 
persona, ne sit non unus Christus, non una substantia; ne, mediatoris dispensatione submota, aut Dei tantum 
aut hominis dicatur filius. Sed non est Dei et hominis filius secundum quod homo, sed simul secundum 
quod Deus et homo. Ergo neque dicendum est quod sit mediator Dei et hominum solum secundum quod 
homo. Praeterea, sicut Christus, inquantum est Deus, convenit cum patre et spiritu sancto, ita, inquantum 
est homo, convenit cum hominibus. Sed propter hoc quod, inquantum est Deus, convenit cum patre et 
spiritu sancto, non potest dici mediator inquantum est Deus, quia super illud I Tim. II, mediator Dei et 
hominum, dicit Glossa, inquantum est verbum, non medius est, quia aequalis est Deo, et Deus apud Deum, 
et simul unus Deus. Ergo nec etiam inquantum homo, potest dici mediator, propter convenientiam quam 
cum hominibus habet. Praeterea, Christus dicitur mediator inquantum reconciliavit nos Deo, quod quidem 
fecit auferendo peccatum, quod nos separabat a Deo. Sed auferre peccatum convenit Christo non 
inquantum est homo, sed inquantum est Deus. Ergo Christus, inquantum est homo, non est mediator, sed 
inquantum est Deus.  
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the corpus, a true mediator must be a medium between extremes and fulfill the action of 
conjoining, and this is true for Christ only secundum quod homo, since in his kenotic 
modality as man, a natural distance separates Christ as human from God, just as his 
divine dignity, grace, and glory distance him from other human beings. Thomas replies 
that if the divine nature is taken away from Christ, then he loses all the fullness of grace 
that makes him a medium between God and human beings. Removal of the divine nature 
alters Christ secundum quod homo, for even the removal of the divine nature does not 
alter Christ’s human nature considered in the abstract. This removal drastically alters 
Christ secundum quod homo, for this refers to Christ’s human nature in the concrete, as 
an individual subsists in it. The individual in question is the person of the Word, so 
removal of the divine nature removes the very constitution of this concrete human 
individual. 
In order to fully comprehend Thomas’ response to the third objection we must 
briefly recall once again his teaching concerning efficient instrumental causality, how he 
found in it John of Damascus’s description of Christ’s human nature as an instrument of 
his divinity (instrumentum Divinitatis, οργανον της θεοτητος), and how Aquinas already 
deployed it in the very early Scriptum commentary, although at that point he described 
the instrumental causality of the assumed human nature as only meritorious and 
dispositive (e.g. in III, D.18, a.6, qua.1). After a series of developments, perhaps most 
notably witnessed in the De Veritate, by the time we arrive at the Tertia Pars of the 
Summa, as we have explored at some length, Thomas depicts Christ’s humanity as an 
instrument working in conjunction with the power of the principal divine cause. So, when 
Aquinas refers to Christ secundum quod homo as the one who establishes satisfaction for 
264 
 
 
human sin and acts as cause of salvation, we must understand that the phrase designates 
at one both the principal cause of salvation in the person of the Word and the efficient 
instrumental cause in Christ’s human nature. The person of the Word is the actor in all of 
Christ’s actions. Each of Christ’s human actions was the human action of the divine 
person of the Word and so expressed a theandric activity. Christ’s human actions 
participated in the divine power and so acted with a divine efficacy, and his passion 
causes our salvation not simply as a medium or conduit for the divine power but as its 
instrument. 
As we have already explicated at some length in previous sections, the Word did 
not assume a generic human nature, but rather this humanity, a unique, individual 
principle of activity which was expressed through the truly human life of this man, Jesus 
Christ. And as we have also seen, that which at once both actualized the purely potential 
humanity of Christ, and individuated it was subsistence, conceived as that which not only 
terminates an essence/nature in this particular modality of esse, but which allows it to 
exercise that act of existence. An act the reciprocally mirrors the proper Kenoticism of 
the Son of the Father through its deferral of full personal existence through and in itself. 
Hence, the created instrument which the Son utilizes is simultaneously the assumed 
humanity through which the Son subsist as this man, Christ Jesus, and through which the 
Word mediates God’s salvific activity pro nobis. Thus, in defending the full integrity of 
the human will and human operation of this human nature, Aquinas is also affirming the 
full integrity and reality of that conjoined human instrument’s act of existence or kenotic 
mode of being in the world. With the issue thus framed, we can return to q.26, a.2, ad 3. 
Aquinas argues there that “although to bear away sin as author of the action befits Christ 
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secundum quod est Deus, nevertheless to make satisfaction for the sin of the human race 
befits him secundum quod est homo.”438 Here, the phrase secundum quod homo indicates 
both Christ’s human nature and the person of the Word, indeed it refers to them not 
merely as distinct principles of operation, but in their theandric interrelationship. The task 
of making satisfaction falls to Christ’s humanity, which out of obedience freely wills the 
passion as a sacrifice satisfying the debt of sin. This free human act can satisfy the debt of 
sin because it participates in the divine power. Christ’s freely willed human act takes its 
efficacy from the divine operation, and since Christ’s human will operates in communion 
with his divine operation (ST III, q.19, a.1), that human will wields the divine power 
precisely as human, and this soteriological result could not be brought about without the 
Words’ kenotic modality as evinced in its human activity. 
The theandric intertwining of divinity and assumed kenotic humanity also plays a 
pivotal role in the way that Christ undertakes his saving role as an exemplar.  Already, in 
a sermon for the First Sunday after Epiphany, probably preached in January of 1271 
during his second stay in Paris, Thomas claims that “everything that the Lord did or 
suffered in the flesh is an instruction and an example for our salvation.”  This brief 
assertion brings together two central aspects of Aquinas’ mature Christology: that “every 
action of Christ is for our instruction,” such that there is no aspect of Jesus’s life that is 
not exemplary, whether in a moral, spiritual, or doctrinal manner.  And secondly, that “all 
Christ's actions and sufferings operate instrumentally in virtue of His Godhead for the 
salvation of men” in order to show the salvific efficacy of every moment of Christ’s 
human life, since his humanity is united to and operates as the instrument of his divinity.  
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  Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet auctoritative peccatum auferre conveniat Christo secundum 
quod est Deus, tamen satisfacere pro peccato humani generis convenit ei secundum quod homo. Et 
secundum hoc dicitur Dei et hominum mediator.  
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This combination of the concepts of exemplarity and instrumentality brings to surface a 
theme which is consistently present—but only periodically made explicit—in Thomas’ 
Christology, that Christ’s exemplarity is not merely an external influence upon human 
beings but rather that it possesses a genuinely causal dimension.  
Scholars such as Jean-Pierre Torrell have noted this connection and adumbrated 
how exemplarity and the salvific efficacy of Christ’s human activity are intricately 
related in Thomas’ work. In articulating the way in which Christ’s exemplarity is 
efficacious, Torrell posits a distinction between moral exemplarity and ontological 
exemplarity. The former, he asserts, “places the focus both on Christ as the living 
Incarnation of the evangelical virtues and on the human effort to collaborate with God 
through the grace received from him.”439  The latter, in contrast, “explains how the 
imitation of Christ is made possible only by the grace that he gives us, a grace that has 
already conformed us to him” and in this way “the accent lies not so much on human 
effort as on the work of God in the human being.”440  Torrell’s exposition of Christ’s 
exemplarity is quite valuable, for it highlights the ontological depth that attends Christ’s 
moral example on account of the hypostatic union and places a particular emphasis on the 
necessity of not only imitation of Christ but also conformity to Christ. Nevertheless, 
Torrell’s schema contains two flaws which do not so much render it invalid as much as 
call for its clarification and expansion. First, and perhaps less importantly, Torrell’s 
account of moral exemplarity seems tacitly to reduce the incarnate Christ’s activity to 
actions for human beings to imitate and thereby divorces Christ’s moral example from 
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 Jean-Pierre Torrell, “Christ in the ‘Spirituality’ of St. Thomas” in Christ and Spirituality in St. 
Thomas Aquinas, trans. B. Blankenhorn (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 
pp. 74-109, at p. 87. 
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 Ibid, p. 91.  
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the causality that his actions possess by virtue of his humanity being the instrument of his 
divinity. I would submit instead that Christ’s moral exemplarity ought to be considered as 
a species of his ontological exemplarity. Second, Torrell confines ontological exemplarity 
to the domain of efficient causality. He focuses primarily on the way that Christ is the 
exemplar in the production of creatures and in their regeneration by bringing these about 
as efficient cause. This reduction of exemplarity to efficient causality, however, fails to 
convey the richness and diversity that characterizes Aquinas’ broader account of 
exemplar causality.  
As an amendment to Torrell’s account of Christ’s exemplarity, I propose a way of 
reading Aquinas’s treatment of the mysteries of Christ’s life that highlights the way in 
which Christ, through the instrumentality of his kenotic humanity, serves as the exemplar 
of humanity in a way that entails efficient, formal, and final causality. One of the key 
texts for understanding Aquinas’s account of the exemplarity of Christ is found in his 
commentary on 1 Corinthians 11:1-3, where he writes: 
[T]he primordial principle of the production of things is the Son of God, as it says 
in John (1:3): “All things were made through him.” He is, therefore, the 
primordial exemplar, which all creatures imitate as the true and perfect image of 
God. Hence it says in Col (1:15); “He is the image of the invisible God, the 
firstborn of every creature, for in him all things were created.” But in a special 
way He is the exemplar of spiritual graces, with which spiritual creatures are 
endowed, as is said to the Son in Ps 110 (v. 3): “In the splendors of the saints 
before the morning star I begot you,” namely, because He was begotten before 
every creature through resplendent grace, having in Himself as exemplar the 
splendors of all the saints. But this exemplar of God has been very remote from us 
at first, as it says in Ec (2:12); “What is man that he could follow the king, his 
Maker?” And therefore He willed to become man, that He might offer humans a 
human exemplar.
441
 
 
This text encapsulates Aquinas’s understanding of the exemplarity of the pre-
existent Word and gestures toward the further manifestation of this exemplarity in the 
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 Thomas Aquinas, Super I Corinthios, ch.. 11, lect. 1, no. 583; trans. F. Larcher, O.P. 
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incarnation. Because “in the Word is implied the operative idea of what God makes,” 
Aquinas perceives an affinity between the Second Person of the Trinity and creation 
since the Word is the idea through which God knows and makes all that is.
442
 
Furthermore, Aquinas notes that the Word bears a unique likeness to human beings 
“since the Word is a concept of the eternal Wisdom, from whom all man's wisdom is 
derived.”443 Nevertheless, while the pre-existent Word is the pattern according to which 
rational creatures are made, human beings nonetheless have scant knowledge of their 
exemplar. Citing Augustine, Aquinas proposes that the incarnation is a remedy to this 
dilemma, because “Man who might be seen was not to be followed; but God was to be 
followed, who could not be seen. And therefore God was made man, that He Who might 
be seen by man, and whom man might follow, might be shown to man.”444 For this 
reason, one of Aquinas’s arguments for the fittingness of the incarnation concerns “right 
action, in which He set us an example.”445 As this argument shows, Aquinas’s 
understanding of Christ’s exemplarity is intimately related to his understanding of the 
incarnation and of Christ’s humanity because it is through these that Christ’s exemplarity 
is made manifest most clearly to human beings. Therefore, it is necessary to examine 
Aquinas’s discussion of the union of divinity and humanity in Christ in order to discern 
how the incarnate Christ reveals his exemplarity in his assumed humanity.  
Aquinas’ account of the Hypostatic Union, his articulation of the doctrine of the 
instrumentality of the incarnate Christ’s humanity, and his insights into the kenotic mode 
that exemplifies the Word’s way of being in the world, all provide helpful resources for 
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understanding how the incarnation both intensifies and widens the scope of his 
exemplarity. The Hypostatic Union renders the example of the incarnate Christ sure and 
certain, for although “doubts may be raised about the teaching and the life of any other 
man because of a defect in his human knowledge and his mastery of truth.”446  
Furthermore, because the humanity of Christ is hypostatically united to his divinity and 
operates instrumentally in virtue of that divinity, Aquinas affirms that “since the flesh is 
the instrument of His divinity, and since an instrument operates in virtue of the principal 
cause… everything done in Christ’s flesh was salutary for us by reason of the divinity 
united to that flesh.”447  For Thomas, it is precisely by virtue of the incarnation and the 
assumption of a human nature, i.e., his kenotic modality of being, that Christ may be said 
to be an efficacious exemplar for human beings.  
Aquinas’ persistent claim that every action of the kenotic Christ is an instruction 
and example for human beings and that every action of the Son possesses some causal 
dimension ordered toward their salvation demands that any account of Christ’s 
exemplarity possess explanatory power for how it manifests itself concretely. To take but 
one example, Aquinas’s treatment of Jesus’s healing of the blind man in the Super 
Iohannem highlights the efficient dimension of the exemplarity of Christ in a unique way, 
illustrating it most clearly through the instrumentality of Christ’s humanity. Aquinas 
identifies five steps to Christ’s action.448 First, he spits on the ground to moisten the 
earth; second, he makes clay with the spittle; third, he smears the clay onto the blind 
man’s eyes; fourth, he commands the man to go and wash in the pool of Siloam; and 
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finally, the man’s sight is restored. Thomas observes that while Christ “could have 
performed all his miracles by his mere word,” he instead “used his body to show in them 
that as an instrument of his divinity it held a definite healing power.”449 Yet, Aquinas 
does not believe that it is merely a generic type of divine power that Christ’s humanity 
manifests in this miracle but precisely the efficiency that belongs to him as the exemplar 
cause of rational creatures.  
Aquinas explicitly links Christ’s activity in this miracle to his role in creation, 
observing that “He made clay from his spittle to show that he who had formed the entire 
first man can reshape the deficient members of a man. Thus, just as he formed the first 
man from clay, so he made clay to re-form the eyes of the one born blind.”450 Thomas 
understands this miracle to represent—both mystically and literally—the refashioning of 
the blind man and his more perfect conformity to the exemplar of humanity. Aquinas 
maintains that in this miracle, “by repairing the eye, which is more excellent than the 
other bodily members, [Christ] showed that he was the creator of the entire man.”451 The 
incarnate Christ’s exemplarity as the one through whom all things were made is here 
rendered efficacious by remaking the body of the blind man, and this is so to such an 
extent that Thomas, citing Augustine, notes that “the man’s appearance changed when he 
regained his sight.”452 
As in all of Jesus’s miracles, Aquinas holds that the restoration of the blind man’s 
sight was not merely a physical healing but also that “what was accomplished in him 
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physically represents what is accomplished spiritually.”453 After his healing, when the 
Pharisees interrogate the man concerning who had restored his vision, he answers that 
“the man called Jesus made clay and anointed my eyes.”454 For Aquinas, this “answer 
was remarkable” because it points out that the blind man knew that Christ “was a man, 
and that he was true man.”455 While Thomas finds this answer impressive because the 
blind man could perceive that Jesus was human despite being unable to see him and 
despite his performance of such a miracle, it is noteworthy for our purposes to see 
Aquinas here describe Christ not only as a man but as verus homo, true man, the 
exemplar of humanity due to his kenotic assumption of a human nature, and his 
authentically human mode of subsisting.
 
 It is this exemplarity which enables Christ to 
conform the blind man more perfectly to himself, healing him both physically and 
spiritually. Aquinas further highlights the faith of the blind man engendered through this 
miracle when Thomas observes that the blind man comes to believe in the divinity of 
Christ both through the confession of his lips, “‘Lord, I believe,’” and through his 
external actions, “and he worshipped him.”456 This belief comes about, Thomas suggests, 
precisely because “those whose consciences have been cleansed know Christ not only as 
the son of man...but as the Son of God who had taken flesh.”457 Christ’s restoration of the 
blind man’s vision not only healed him and so conformed him more closely to the 
exemplar of humanity physically, but it also cleansed his conscience, conforming him 
more closely to Christ such that the blind man could now come to believe in and follow 
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Jesus. In this pericope, the efficient dimension of Christ’s exemplarity is acutely present 
and at work. 
 
5. The Eschatological Fulfilment of the Kenotic Principle 
 
We have just seen how some previous accounts of Thomas’ notion of exemplarity 
fail to take account of how Christ’s kenosis, enfleshment, theandry, and instrumentality 
all help expand our understanding of his role as exemplar beyond the narrowly moralistic.  
This shortcoming is perhaps most evident in the interpretations of Aquinas’ account of 
the resurrection.  For Torrell, the rising of Christ is merely another instance of the Word’s 
efficient causality at work in the economy of salvation. However, he fails to take account 
of the way Thomas highlights the  crucial distinction between efficiency and exemplarity 
any further in Aquinas’ assertion that “although the efficiency of Christ’s Resurrection 
extends to the resurrection of the good and wicked alike, still its exemplarity extends 
properly only to the just, who are made conformable with His Sonship.”458 As we will 
see, these distinct causal prinnicples differ in their modality. The efficiency of Christ’s 
resurrection brings about a change in all human beings regardless of the pattern to which 
they are conformed; all human beings will be raised whether to righteousness or to 
condemnation. The exemplarity of the Son’s resurrection, however, extends only to those 
who are raised unto their final glory, for their resurrection has been patterned after his. 
Hence, although Christ’s resurrection brings about the resurrection of the wicked 
according to efficient causality, their resurrection is not modeled after his example. 
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To appreciate the importance of this causal differentiation we must look more 
closely at ST III, qq. 53-56 of the Summa, where Aquinas explores a number of topics 
related to Christ’s rising from the dead, not only such basic questions regarding the facts 
of the resurrection in itself, such as its necessity, timing, and order, but also—and perhaps 
most crucially—the cause of the resurrection.  In the process, Thomas will also explore 
the nature of the Christ’s resurrected kenotic body, before returning to the all-important 
question of resurrection and its causal power, that is, how Christ’s rising will effectuate 
our own rising, and if that rising will be merely corporeal, or also spiritual. These 
questions are also of the utmost importance for the topics that we have been discussing in 
this dissertation because they are the soteriological outgrowth of Aquinas’ Christological 
project of explicating the function of the Word’s kenotically assumed humanity in the 
economy of salvation. 
In q. 53, Aquinas devotes four articles designed to establish some basic facts 
about the resurrection itself.  In a. 1, Aquinas affirms the necessity of Christ’s rising in 
five ways.  First because it is necessary to exalt those who humble themselves for God’s 
sake; an explination that parallels the theme of obedience that as we have seen runs like a 
leitmotiv throughout Christian discussions of Christ’s kenotic enfleshment. Secondly, 
because it is necessary to reveal not only the Son’s assumed humanity, but also the power 
of Christ’s divity, and thereby show that the God which Jesus spoke of is true and worthy 
of our faith. Third, because of the necessity to give humanity hope in their desire for 
bodily and spiritual resurrection by demontratinng that the human person might also 
attain these resurrections. Fourthly, in order to give us new life. Fifth, and finally, 
because it is necessary for Christ to rise again, since it completes God’s plan of salvation 
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for humanity. In a. 2, Aquinas affirms that Christ should have risen again on the third 
day, since to defer His bodily resurrection until the end of the world would not have 
benefited the faith of his followrs,  and to enact His bodily resurrection on the day of his 
death may have aroused doubt or suspicion as to whether He truly died.  In the 
subsequent article, Thomas affirms that even though Lazarus and others rose from the 
dead prior to Christ, they did so in a manner that was imperfect, which is why they had to 
die again. Thus, Thomas affirms that Christ was the first to rise from the dead perfectly 
so as to never die again. Finally, in a. 5, Aquinas explains that Christ is the cause of His 
resurrection insofar as He has a divine nature. With respect to his created kenotic nature, 
and its attendant secondary act of existence, there was no power in that assumed 
humanity in and of itself that could have caused Christ’s own resurrection.   
 In Question 54, Aquinas explores four further topics, this time regarding the 
quality or characteristics of the person rising.  First, Aquinas affirms that Christ had a 
true body after His Resurrection, for if Christ had an imaginary body “then His 
Resurrection would not have been true, but apparent.”459  Christ says to His disciples, “A 
spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see me to have” (Luke 24:39), and for the 
resurrection to be true, the same body which died must be the same body which 
resurrects. In A. 2, Aquinas affirms that Christ’s body rose glorified by the lowliness of 
His passion—an allusion to Philippians 2:8 and the Word’s kenotic obedience even unto 
death.  Christ’s entire body rose glorified, Thomas explains in A. 3, otherwise “it would 
not have been a complete resurrection, if whatever was lost by death had not been 
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restored.”460 Lastly, in a. 4, with regards to the quality of the person rising, Aquinas 
affirms that Christ’s kenotic human body ought to have risen with its scars. One reason is 
so that Christ may enhance the faith of his disciples: “Then he said to Thomas, ‘Put your 
finger here and see my hands, and bring your hand and put it into my side, and do not be 
unbelieving, but believe’” (Jn. 20:27). Another reason is so that his scarification would 
serve as an everlasting sign of His victory before those he saves, before those who 
persecute Him, and before the Father through Whom He salvifically intercedes on our 
behalf. 
In the aforementioned question 56, Aquinas devotes two decisive articles to the 
causality of the resurrection, wherein he affirms that Christ’s rising from the dead causes 
the twin-effects of the resurrection of our bodies and the resurrection of our souls. The 
resurrection of Christ can achieve both of these by being at once an instrumental, 
efficient, and exemplar cause. That is, Christ is both the instrumental, efficient and 
exemplar cause of our bodily resurrection, as well as the instrumental, efficient and 
exemplar cause of our spiritual resurrection. With regards to our bodily resurrection, 
Christ is the instrumental cause insofar as the divine power of God works through the 
assumed humanity of Christ to bring about our own physical rising. Christ is the efficient 
cause insofar as the resurrection took place and achieved its proper effect of raising the 
dead to life.
461
 Finally, Christ is the exemplar cause insofar as our “wretched” bodies are 
likewise to be raised into glorious copies of His body.
462
 With regard to our spiritual 
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resurrection, Christ is the instrumental cause insofar as the divine power of God works 
through the humanity of Christ to bring about our spiritual resurrection. Christ is the 
efficient cause insofar as the resurrection took place and achieved its proper (twin) effect 
of the justification of souls.
463
  Lastly, Christ is the exemplar cause insofar as our souls 
are ordered to be ultimately conformed to Christ’s soul which is just, good and eternal.464 
Thomas invokes a number of significant objections that are worth mentioning 
regarding the causality of the resurrection. For example, in the second objection raised in 
q. 56 a. 1, which proposes that divine justice could have been achieved without the 
Resurrection of Christ, but rather by some other instrument, so that Christ’s resurrection 
would not have to be the cause of our bodily resurrection. Aquinas agrees that his is true 
insofar as the power of the principle agent is not restricted to “act in a predetermined way 
with respect to the instrument.”465 However, Christ’s resurrection is the instrument of 
choice; therefore it is the necessary cause of our bodily resurrection. The instrumental 
character of the resurrection is further explained in this manner: It is a tool or means 
through which the power of a principle cause works, but it is not disregarded in the final 
result of the effect since the effect bears its stamp.
466
 Thus, it is not “merely the divine 
power which acts, but also the resurrection itself… hence. true power and true activity 
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must be attributed to it [the instrument].”467 Also, the instrumentality of Christ is 
proximate. In other words, by being first in the order of our resurrection and the closest to 
the Godhead, Christ extends the effects of His resurrection to enact ours. So, just as 
“death came through one man,” in the same way the resurrection of the dead will come 
through the one man Jesus Christ.
468
  
 Notably, the third objection raised in q. 56 a. 1 proposes that Christ’s bodily 
resurrection could not in fact be attributed as the exemplar or efficient cause of our bodily 
resurrection. As Thomas writes, God needs no other model for the resurrection besides 
Himself. And this objection is undoubtedly true, since it is we, as less perfect beings, who 
need an exemplar conformity to Christ, the highest and first being in dignity and 
perfection: “Less perfect beings imitate in their own fashion whatever is at the summit of 
perfection and is the model.”469 Efficient causality, on the other hand, requires spiritual or 
bodily contact in order for something to be affected, and thus cannot be efficacious, since 
without contact of any kind there simply cannot be efficient causality. Indeed, how can 
the resurrection which happened almost two-thousand years ago effect the present time? 
To answer this question, we must carefully distinguish between the resurrection as a 
historic event (in facto esse) and the resurrection as an ongoing reality (in fieri). Aquinas 
will contend that the Christ who rose centuries ago is still the risen Christ in His glorified 
kenotic humanity today.  The divine power of the Godhead, as united to the Word, is 
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extended “by being present in all times and places, and this contact of power is sufficient 
to fulfil the definition of efficient causality.”470 Thus, the resurrection is ongoing.  
 Before addressing a third objection regarding the causality of the Resurrection, let 
us compare and contrast exemplar and efficient causality, in order to remind ourselves of 
similarities and differences, which are important, though subtle. As we have already 
established, efficient causality may be defined as the first principle of movement in the 
order of execution. It brings something new into being, or causes something already in 
existence to undergo a substantial change.
471
 Exemplar causality, in contrast, may be 
thought of as the form or idea according to which something is made or changed. It is the 
form of the effect to be imitated or participated in, and this effect to be achieved may be 
described as the goal, or the telos, such that the imitation or participation in that form 
may be best understood as the specific activity by which one achieves that goal. As we 
elaborated at the commencement of this section, regarding the question of the raising of 
the dead, Christ’s resurrection is the efficient cause for the resurrection of all—the good 
and the evil, the faithful and the unbelieving alike. The power of divine justice extends 
that far, so as to effect in everyone the resurrection in their body and soul.
472
  Exemplar 
causality, on the other hand, “extends only to good men who become conformed to the 
image” of Christ’s own sonship.”473 Hence, exemplar causality with respect to the 
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resurrection is achieved in us to the extent that we have Christ’s glorified body as our 
final end or beatitude.  
 As we have already seen, in his exposition of Thomas’ Christology, Torrell at first 
discusses the exemplarity of Christ in largely moral terms. Everything Christ performed 
in his humanity was and continues to be for our instruction, “for when it comes to the 
Christian life, the imitation of Christ certainly marks the way of salvation.”474 Torrell 
thinks this is the most immediate and obvious point to be taken from Aquinas’ notion of 
exemplarity. Torrell continues his discussion of exemplarity by assessing Christ’s 
function as an ontological exemplar, explaining, “God the Father, acting in us by the 
grace that he grants us through the mediation of Christ, conforms us through this very act 
to the image of his first-born Son.”475 Made possible by the grace He gives, God makes 
New Adams and New Eves out of a humanity born unto original sin, and Torrell explains 
how this ontological transformation is accomplished through efficient causality: 
The argument centers on the established law according to which the 
efficient agent can only produce what is similar to it; in this way, there 
exists in all actions a certain likeness of the effect to its cause. Applied to 
the issue at hand, this law means that the mysteries of Christ’s life produce 
in us a likeness first to Jesus and then, through him, to God himself…. 
Such an understanding strikes at the very heart of ontological exemplarity 
and the mystery of Christo-forming grace.
476
 
 
“Christo-formation” is the change that is brought about—the “something new” that 
comes into being in us due to Christ’s exemplarity. Torrell implies a central role for 
instrumental causality here as well, although he discusses it more explicitly when quoting 
Aquinas’ articulation of that subject in the Summa (III, q. 19, a. 1, ad 2; p. 93).  Insofar as 
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the mysteries of Christ’s life serve as the instrument of God who affects Christ-likeness, 
then the mysteries of Christ’s life are instrumental.  
 As explained in the preceding section, from the restricted viewpoint of 
instrumental causality viewed primarilly in terms of efficiency, Torrell’s account of 
ontological change is well-presented. However, his account is sorely lacking when 
Aquinas makes a crucial distinction in the resurrection-event between efficient and 
ontological exemplar causality. According to Aquinas, we not only partake in a general 
resurrection where, by default, we are all raised from the dead in body and soul (since the 
Divine power extends to all by being present in all times and places). But, in addition, we 
partake in a resurrection where we are conformed to Christ as our exemplar to the extent 
that we have Christ’s glorified humanity as our final end or beatitude. Some of us are 
conformed to Christ perfectly and others imperfectly. In his study Torrell appears to 
ignore the resurrection understood in this sense. In fact, he cites the very place where 
Aquinas makes this distinction to begin with, but excludes some significant details: 
Aquinas does not posit that we are all raised from the dead to a glorified state, since this 
is reserved only for those who have been conformed to Christ through his exemplarity. 
Hence, Torrell’s single-minded focus on causal efficiency fails to account for the 
importance of exemplar causality, and even more seriously, the centrality of Christ’s 
kenotic modality of human subsistence, in Thomas’ explication of the resurrection,  
This serious imbalance can be redressed, to a certain extent, by recalling fuller 
accounts in the earlier work of scholars of the resurrection, such as Nicholas Crotty. In 
“The Redemptive Role of Christ’s Resurrection,” Crotty traced the development of 
Aquinas’ understanding of the resurrection, from its earliest manifestations in the 
281 
 
 
Commentary on the Sentences, to its final fruition in the Summa. In the process Crotty 
critiques earlier, incomplete explications of Thomas doctrine on the resurrection. In the 
process of closely tracing the development of Aquinas’ theological progress on this topic, 
Crotty rightfully focuses a significant portion of his attention on Aquinas’ notion of 
instrumentally in its relation to efficient and exemplar causality, pointing out an 
important distinction between the resurrection considered as a historical event (in facto 
esse) versus the resurrection considered as an ongoing reality (in fieri). Crotty first points 
out that in his Sentences commentary Aquinas does not fully articulate the idea that 
Christ’s resurrection is the instrumentally-efficient cause of the resurrection of souls or 
the resurrection of bodies. “At this period,” he explains, “the young Thomas regarded the 
production of grace as an act of creation and accordingly denied that there are any 
instruments co-operating in this work, so that in our justification nothing created can be 
posited as an instrumental cause.”  Aquinas’ immature understanding of causality further 
leads him to attribute virtue and activity to the divine power alone. Yet, “it must be said 
that [the risen Humanity] is the cause of ours inasmuch as it works by the divine power.”   
There is a real disposition for the resurrection of those united to the risen Christ, and the 
two (divine power along with the assumed humanity) are not entirely separable. By the 
time he gets to the Summa, the instrumentally-efficient cause of Christ’s resurrection is 
expressed with much greater clarity.  In fact, this shift is already evident in the earlier 
Contra Gentiles, where Thomas teaches that Christ is the efficient cause of the 
resurrection of all, but his efficiency extends perfectly only to those united to His 
mysteries and imperfectly in the case of others. Here, the resurrection of the just and the 
dammed are explained, it seems to Crotty, in terms of efficiency. Compared with the 
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updated notion of exemplarity alongside efficiency as found in the later Thomistic 
texts—that Christ’s resurrection is the efficient cause of the resurrection of all, the 
exemplary cause only of the glorious resurrection of the just —it might be said that 
Torrell’s partial understanding of the resurrection parallels the thoughts of the young 
Thomas. Either way, Crotty makes use of the noteworthy distinction and insightfully 
accounts for the moral agent’s hope for, tendency towards and movement in the practice 
and progress of virtue, to adumbrate how for Thomas the resurrection may be achieved in 
the moral agent seeking beatitude.  
Crotty further contends that for the later Aquinas the exemplarity of Christ 
extends not merely to the moment of justification itself, but also to the whole pattern of 
subsequent, Christian life. By the time he comes to write on this subject in the Summa, 
Aquinas will attribute to the resurrection the exemplary cause of positive justification and 
newness of life by grace, whereas to Christ’s passion, he attributes the exemplary cause 
of the remission of sin and the destruction of death.  Both the passion and the resurrection 
are attributed a single, efficient cause, as Crotty explains: “It is equally obvious that the 
Passion of Christ must be the efficient cause of eternal life, if it is the efficient cause of 
the destruction of death, and His Resurrection must destroy death if it is the efficient 
cause of the newness of life.”477  
At this point, Crotty raises the question of the resurrection’s historical character 
(in facto esse) as well as the ongoing efficacy (in fieri) of that long-ago event. The 
resurrection in facto esse defines the resurrection-event as the act in which Christ’s 
kenotic body rose from the dead. The resurrection in fieri defines that event in terms of 
the ongoing reality of Christ rising. While Crotty points out the importance of exemplar 
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causality along with instrumentally-efficient causality in the risen Christ (in facto esse), 
he fails to explicate the relationship of exemplarity to the resurrection considered in fieri. 
It is clear that the resurrected Christ must be efficacious by means of the assumed 
humanity as used instrumentally by divine power, and also that the resurrecting Christ is 
efficacious due to the fact that the divine power enacts resurrections in all times and 
places. Also, it is clear that the resurrected Christ is exemplary in some fashion, both 
Torrell and Crotty agree that the life of Christ is not only morally exemplary but also 
displays some aspect of ontological exemplarism. However, the question of how exactly 
the resurrection in fieri—the resurrecting Christ, is also exemplary in an ontological 
manner, which, as we have seen, Aquinas explicitly associates with the conformity of 
those to Christ as their final end or telos, remains unanswered by Crotty and is never even 
raised by Torrell. Ultimately, although he does not intend to, Crotty excludes exemplar 
causality as a central part of the ongoing, dynamic event of the resurrection in fieri.  
Perhaps this ongoing confusion about the precise role of exemplarism, and indeed 
ontological causation itself, may be one of reasons why Aquinas’ complete understanding 
of the resurrection has yet to be fully embraced.  At least, that seems to be the contention 
of the next scholar we will look at, Gerald O’Collins, who presents a provocative theory 
of why modern Thomism has failed in its ambitious attempt integrate Aquinas’ 
understanding of the resurrection into the very center of Catholic theology. According to 
O’Collins, Western Christianity has persistently concentrated on Calvary and neglected 
the lesson of Easter Sunday. Indeed, the Resurrection has been displaced from its proper 
place at the heart of Catholic thought and. despite all attempts by various modern 
Thomists to correct this one-sidedness, the imbalance remains.  For O’Collins, the source 
284 
 
 
of the problem seems to reside in two theological misapprehensions, Manicheanism and 
Pelagianism, both of which are evident throughout Christian history, and are still present 
in modern Catholic thought.
478
 As Crotty explains, a “Manichean irreverence towards 
man's physical being” inevitably leads to a “weakened interest in our resurrection implied 
less concern for Christ's resurrection.” For the Pelagianism, on the other hand, “a 
crucifixion-oriented trend offered more possibilities for man's spontaneous activity, 
whereas the Resurrection confronts us as God's sovereignly free action. No created agent, 
not even Jesus' humanity, could share in that divine intervention.
479
  So, Pelagians turn to 
the Passion to find a moral example of virtuous action, since the unearned, freely-given 
gift of the Resurrection is not something that can be humanly imitated. In addition, 
modern ideas of radical individualism oppose the notion of the Resurrection on similar 
grounds—because it seems to undercut modern notions of human autonomy by placing 
emphasis on God as the sole author and source of saving grace necessary for the 
Resurrection of all. In O’Collins’ opinion, Aquinas is the happy exception, indeed a 
counterweight, to this individualizing trend; in fact, O’Collins thinks Thomas’ exposition 
of the Resurrection can serve as a powerful corrective to the contemporary Christian 
misunderstandings on this topic, since “in the face of a preoccupation with the 
crucifixion,” Thomas “asserts the essential place of the Resurrection within an adequate 
Christology.” O’Collins goes on to list some of Aquinas’s other accomplishments in this 
regard:  Thomas distinguishes between a perfect and imperfect resurrection, he discusses 
the difference between our resurrection and Christ’s resurrection, he maintains the 
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distinction between the testimony of the apostles and later believers and finally, he values 
the difference between visible signs and argumentative proof.
480
  
Taking Aquinas’ exposition of the Resurrection as their point of departure, in the 
years immediately preceding and shortly following the Second Vatican Council (1963-
65), a number of Catholic scholars, such as Francis X. Durrwell, wrote various articles 
and books in attempt to highlight the importance of a true understanding of the 
theological significance of Christ’s rising. Unfortunately, in their attempt to do so, 
O’Collins believes they have instead affected a collapse of interest in the soteriological 
appraisal of Christ’s Resurrection.481 Why? O’Collins speculates that there is a certain, 
innate weakness in the very idea of causality employed, not only by Durrwell and Crotty, 
but by Aquinas himself, which is antithetical to contemporary notions.. As O’Collins 
explains, “properly speaking, an exemplar functions as a model, the first product, 
according to which a maker fashions further specimens of the same type. Instrumental 
efficient causes like hammers, brushes, and typewriters require the intervention of a 
principal cause before they can affect anything.”482 Among other things, O’Collins notes 
the almost inevitable modern construal instrumental efficiency as a kind of passivity, 
more apparent in “dead tools” than in living ones, so he concludes that a theology of the 
Christ’s resurrection should be sought elsewhere than in Aristotelian Categories of 
causality.
483
 While O’Collins’ critique of the displacement of the resurrection has merit, I 
think he misapprehends Aquinas’s conception of causality in ways which are akin to 
Torrell and Crotty.  For the remainder of this presentation, I hope to show the merits of 
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Francis Durrwell’s work on the resurrection, and begin to point out how a fuller 
understanding of causality, particularly exempla causation, can resurrect Durrwell’s 
seemingly deceased theological project. 
According to Durrwell, “Christianity derives its source precisely where it finds its 
ultimate achievement.  It is only through the exemplary act of glorification that the death 
of Christ becomes meaningful, in which we are then “invited to reconsider the notion that 
Christ paid a price to repair sin, and that the merits he thus acquired are applied to 
humans.”  Similarly, it is only by His death on the cross that He becomes exalted and 
glorified. Durrwell imagines the death and Resurrection of Christ as one exemplar action: 
“Being lifted up on a cross symbolizes being lifted up above earth into the bosom of God. 
Raised by the cross into glory, Jesus can draw all people to himself and give them life  . . 
. In one movement, it is the end that provides meaning. In some way, the end is first.” 
The Passion and Resurrection are interwoven and inseparable; the newness of the 
Resurrection is simultaneously a mystery of death, and the suffering of the Passion a 
mystery of life. This paradox of an end that is also a beginning is already found in the 
Gospel of John (11:25) where Jesus calls Himself the Resurrection: “I am the resurrection 
and the life; he who believes in Me will live even if he dies, and everyone who lives and 
believes in Me will never die. Do you believe this?” This Paschal mystery of the Passion 
and the Resurrection, the Resurrection functioning as the “culmination of the Passion in 
full,” is incarnated in the very hypostatic union of the truly divine and fully human God-
man. 
For Durrwell, this new appreciation of the Resurrection as an exemplary event 
may begin to correct theologies which “make the entire weight of redemption reside in 
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only the passion of Christ.”  Durrwell recalls the conditions in which the kenotically 
incarnated Christ descended upon earth as a slave obedient unto His death on the cross. 
His kenotic entry into creation in the form of a servant was also his ascent toward the 
glory of the Father, and for this reason God exalted him to the highest place and gave him 
the name that is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, in 
heaven and on earth and under the earth, and every tongue acknowledge that Jesus Christ 
is Lord, to the glory of God the Father (Philippians 2: 9-11). So, rather than speak of 
atonement in a way that is merely juridical or predominantly legalistic, as in the old 
understanding of the Satisfaction theory of the atonement, where “reparation of sin 
constituted the point of departure and ended with the Passion,” Durrwell proposes we 
should instead speak of communion with Christ as “the true point of departure [in] the 
mystery of the Resurrection.”  Durrwell mentions how Christ, becoming our salvation 
through his Passover, was the work of the loving Father. The Resurrection was an “act of 
love, an act of eternally begetting the Son according to the fullness of the Holy Spirit. 
That love is infinite and gratuitous. Absolutely gratuitous, it supersedes any notion of 
repairing sin or of satisfying justice.”  Indeed, the Resurrection (in fieri) continues to be 
realized in Christ and is eternally operative because of his filial relationship with the 
Father. Though the Son allows himself to be emptied and handed over unto death, He is 
assumed into glorious communion with the Father. Thus, the Father’s infinite act of 
reception and the Son’s infinite act of begetting are “two infinities… joined together in 
the death and resurrection.” Christ’s death and Resurrection are everlasting acts of 
obedience and love which form the unique paschal mystery. Eternal glorification holds 
Jesus in the death from which glory is inseparable .Though he rises and leaves the tomb, 
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Jesus never leaves the mystery of his death. When Christians encounter Christ today, it is 
not the crucified Christ who once rose from the dead, but rather “it is Christ in His death 
as he is being raised.”  For Durrwell, redemption could never be a business transaction to 
pay back for something which was lost. Rather, Christ by his incarnation, as the 
ontologically exemplaRY embodiment of deliverance, was the “very event of salvation.” 
Humanity is born to die, Durrwell claims, but it is not the death incurred by all 
flesh in the aftermath of the fall, a death which is a permanent estrangement from God.  
This separation could never be part of God’s eternal plan of salvation, so if humanity is 
indeed “created for death, then death must be something other than what it seem.” The 
Father begets his children in love, and whoever loves says to the other: “You must not 
die, I love you forever;” therefore, if “created humanity is mortal, then in God’s plan 
death can only be at the service of humanity’s birth as children of God.” For Durrwell, 
the Paschal mystery of Christ is the place where this filiation takes place, since the Son in 
his kenotically assumed humanity is the “point of convergence for mortal humanity.”  In 
other words, humanity is created toward Christ as its telos.  Already, Durrwell points out, 
many begin to “unite themselves to Christ from the beginning of their lives on earth 
through baptisms” and other sources of grace, preparing themselves even in this life, for 
“for the ultimate encounter with him in death.” All of humanity, to the extent that is 
created mortal, is created toward Christ as its ultimate orientation, for all are destined to 
die Christ’s obediently relational and kenotic death with him. This is because Christ is 
not only our destination but also the road we must travel in order to attain this destiny, he 
is both the passage and the means of passage.  Christ comes to us while we are trapped in 
our mortality. And he comes to us “by drawing us to himself—he always comes in that 
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way. He attracts us by revealing himself—he always attracts in that way.” Christ both 
“truth and its splendor, its beauty and its sweetness.  These are things that the human 
person loves. Jesus was transformed by the Spirit of love. Now we have the joy of being 
loved.  Can anyone resist such a great attraction?”484 
Here we see perhaps the greatest point of convergence between Durrwell’s 
explication of the true meaning of death unto eternal life and Aquinas’ true understanding 
of Christ’s resurrection, a convergence that is all the stronger for connection our own 
resurrections to Christ’s ontological exemplarity, a connection that Torrell, as we have 
pointed out repeatedly, either ignored or left unspoken.  And a connection potentiually 
severed by some theologians through a mis-characterization which focued on that 
exemplarity in terms of a long-ago occurrence, rather than to the resurrecting person of 
Christ himself.  For Durrwell, in stark contrast, the kenontic Son’s glorification is eternal 
today: Christ’s redemptive death “was not only a past act, it is eternal. Christ . . . is the 
redemption in person, the permanent crucible, recasting sinful humanity into ‘a new 
creation.’”  And thus, because redemption is not reduced to “a simple act the occurred 
long ago,” it continues to be “realized in Christ, and is forever in Christ, through his 
relationship with the Father.” This is an understanding of the Resurrection which fully 
embraces and articulates the notion that it is through an encounter with the kenotic 
Christ’s rising in fieri that we are ourselves come to eternal life. Moreover, for Durrwell, 
much like Aquinas, Christ is not a mere moral exemplar to be imitated, but also an 
ontologically exemplary icon of our own journey toward beatitude, a divinized image of 
humanity to which we are continuously conformed. The grace through which we become 
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Christ-like is an efficient cause, but the goal to which we are oriented is that final 
exemplary cause that is the ultimate good towards which we are drawn.  Lastly, like 
Thomas, for Durrwell it is the person of Christ, through the assumed humanity 
instrumentally conjoined to his divinity, who brings this about, since the enfleshed Word 
is the “point of convergence” between mortal humanity and God, and so he is thus both 
the “passage and the means of passage.” 
The final judgment and entry into the Beatific Vision, the teleological end-point 
for humanity wwithin the economy of salvation, is the culmination of the Resurrection. 
Aquinas and Durrwell both pay special attention to this topic- Aquinas by devoting all of 
question 59 in ST III to this point and Durrwell in ch.10 of his book by discussing “A 
Purifying Judgment,” “The Final Resurrection,” “The Last Judgment,”  and “The Life of 
the World to Come.”  Through of an examination of these works and in light of what has 
already been said about Torrell, Crotty and O’Collins, we can see how the judiciary 
power of the kenotically enfleshed Christ is at once instrumental, efficient, and 
exemplary. Beginning with a.1 of Question 59, Thomas indicates the way in which 
judiciary power is specially attributed to Christ. The son is “wisdom begotten, the Truth 
proceeding from the Father and His perfect image.”485 Though judiciary power is 
common to the whole trinity, it is by special appropriation to the Son that makes Him the 
art and rule of judgment.
486
 Christ possesses the necessary conditions for judiciary 
judgment—strength, power and perfect zeal—and He is recognized by Aquinas as the 
very embodiment of living justice: “judgment belongs to truth as its standard, while it 
belongs to the man imbued with truth, according as he is as it were one with truth, as a 
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kind of law and living ‘justice.’”487  In a. 2 Aquinas clearly posits that the judiciary power 
of Christ belongs to Him as man, not on account of his human nature alone but rather on 
account of His graced kenotic humanity. So, while “it belongs to God alone to bestow 
beatitude upon souls,” by participation with Himself, it is “Christ’s prerogative to bring 
them to such beatitude, inasmuch as He is their Head and the author of their salvation.”488 
The overflow of the Godhead into Christ’s soul allows Christ in His Humanity to know 
and judge the secret desires of men. While in a. 3, Aquinas further explicates how 
judiciary power belongs to the kenotic Christ on two accounts: due to his His divine 
persona and on account of His merits. The dignity of his headship and the fullness of 
habitual grace were obtained by his merits so that “in accordance with Divine Justice, He 
should be judge who fought for God’s justice, and conquered, and was unjustly 
condemned.”489  Subsequently, in a. 4, Aquinas elucidates how judiciary power belongs 
to Christ with respect to all human affairs: “The Father hath given all judgment to the 
Son” (John 5:22) and, if what is said in Corinthians 2:15 is true, that “the spiritual man 
judges all things,” then, “ inasmuch as his souls clings to the Word of God, [even more 
so] Christ’s soul, which is filled with the truth of the Word of God, passes judgment on 
all things.”490 Finally, in articles 5- 6, Aquinas discusses the general judgment which 
takes place at the end of time and he expresses the judiciary power of the kenotic Son as 
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extending over all creatures. With regards to the general judgment, Thomas explains the 
reason for both the first and final judgment: After death man enters into an unchangeable 
state as to all that concerns the soul: and therefore there is no need for postponing 
judgment as to the reward of the soul. But since there are some other things pertaining to 
a man which go on through the whole course of time, and which are not foreign to the 
Divine judgment, all these things must be brought to judgment at the end of time. For 
although in regard to such things a man neither merits nor demerits, still in a measure 
they accompany his reward or punishment. Consequently all these things must be 
weighed in the final judgment.
491
 
For Aquinas, the final judgment is a perfect and public judgment which concerns 
every human in every respect. By this judgment, God does not judge twice the same thing 
in the same respect; rather, he judges the same thing according to different respects.
492
 
Christ has judiciary power of the good and wicked angels, since Christ’s soul is above 
every creature and He is the head of angels in a similar manner. With regards to our 
present and final judgments, Christ as man will be the instrumental cause of our 
judgments insofar as the Divine power of God works through the humanity of the Son to 
bring about our present and final judgment. According to Aquinas, God does so as stated 
above in a. 2. Christ as the kenotically incarnated God-man is also the efficient cause of 
our present and final judgments insofar as our judgments take place and achieve its 
proper effect of blessing the good and damming the wicked. According to a.5, this 
efficiency is occurring in the present and will occur again on the last day. Finally, the 
Word is the exemplary cause of our present and final judgments insofar as we are to be 
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judged blameless and worthy unto eternal life as Christ Himself was blameless and 
worthy. All of humanity is judged in their present and final judgment by efficiency; the 
degree to which they are judged as having either conformed perfectly or imperfectly to 
the image of the Son, is an effect of exemplarity. We look to Durrwell for a fuller 
explication of how Christ is the exemplary cause of our entry into the Beatific Vision.     
Durrwell describes the singular power of Christ to raise the dead and to judge the 
dead in raising them. This power is God-given which Christ exercises through His 
resurrecting action. Souls may be judged in one of two exemplary ways: Some are judged 
simply in the fact of rising to life: “Anyone who hears my word… has eternal life, and 
does not come under judgment, but has passed from death to life” (John 5:24). For others, 
the resurrection turns into condemnation: “All who are in their graves will come out-
those who have done good, to the resurrection of life, and those who have done evil, to 
the resurrection of condemnation” (John 5:28-29).493 For Durrwell, to be saved is to be 
with Christ in our actions and to be like Christ in our hearts. If we wish to be Christ-like 
in our hearts, then we must similarly will our entry unto eternal life through good 
judgment since it is the will of God that we also become eternal like Him.  Ultimately, 
“God did not send the Son into the world to condemn the world but [so] the world might 
be saved through Him” (John 3:17). Here, Durrwell confirms the instrumental nature of 
Christ’s Judiciary power: the kenotic Son is the mediator of justice in which God 
appointed Him “as judge of the living and the dead” (Acts 10:42). By the power of His 
resurrection, the enfleshed Christ was established as judge for the sake of our 
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Resurrection: “God saves us in his risen Son by exercising his kind of justice. And he 
exercises it by leading people to their eternal life.”494  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I explored how the particular subsistent modality exercised by 
Word by virtue of its assumed humanity can be nothing other than the proper Kenoticism 
of the Word as mirrored in the esse secundarium of the enfleshed Son. This insight was 
subsequently explored through a detailed reading of De Unione a.5 in parallel with ST III 
qq.17-19, both of which treat Dyoenergism and Dyotheletism in the light of 
instrumentality of the natures as actualized in the two-fold being of the enfleshed Word.  
I further contended that it is the very Kenoticism proper to the Son of the father that 
establishes the kenotic mode of subsistence of the enfleshed Word in creation.  This 
theme is then explored in an examination of Thomas’ exposition on theandric activity, 
meritoriously redemptive death, and resurrection of the God-man as efficient, 
instrumental, and exemplary cause of salvation in us, and the final judgment of Christ as 
man. 
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VII. Conclusion 
 
Christ’s human operation evinces a principle of nature through which a person—
in this unique case the incarnate Word—lives and acts humanly, so that when Christ acts 
as a man, he does so by virtue of his created human existence (esse secundarium), but the 
one who actualizes the operation is the eternally begotten divine Word, and this divine 
employment of the God-man’s distinctively human modes of being, willing, and acting 
grants them with their unique soteriological efficacy, since they are enacted, and indeed 
exist, for our redemption on account of the divinity itself. Hence, the esse secundarium of 
De unione is not a aberration on the part of Thoma,but rather an articulation of his 
deepest insight on the kenotic mode of  the Word’s human subsitence in the created and 
temporal order, a modality that mirror’s the pre-existent and divine Word’s own proper 
kenoticism.   
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